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PREFACE 
The sub-title of this study suggests an opposition of 'scientific 
systems' to 'literary fictions'. Such an elaboration of the title, however, 
is intended to pose questions rather than to assume answers. The thesis 
looks at a 'relationship' between 'Literature' and •Natural Philosophy' and 
does not seek to locate any opposition. Rather, it is crucial to an under-
standing of this study to see it as an exploration of levels of integration 
involved in both the creation of a 'fiction' and in the response to it. 
Professor R.W.Hepburn remarks in his Poetry and Religious Belief: 
Religious poetry, therefore, is, so to speak, doubly i ntegrated. 
The Christian symbols effect t heir own patterning of a life which 
receives them, and the poet adds his own further shaping as he 
incorporates them into his closely unified poem. This re-
inforcement of one integrating agent by another brings a complexity 
to any study of the religious poet's work. 1 
This is a shrewd comment, but it is limited on two counts. Firstly, it 
implies that the process of 'double-integration' only occurs for a religious 
'poet' rather than, for instance, a religious 1 thinker 1 or 'believer', and, 
secondly , it i mplies that the process only takes place in the formation of 
a poem by a poet who is also 'religious'. Instead, however, t he process 
of 'double-integration' surely occurs in all intellectual activity, and 
not l east in the activity of the literary historian or critic. 
When 'English' established itself as an academic subject at the end of 
the Nineteenth Century , it stood in relation to 'Classics' r a t her in the 
same way as t he first English translations of the Bible stood i n relation 
to t he Vulgate. The Bible was t ransla ted int o English so tha t religious 
1. R.W.Hepburn. "Poetry and Religi ous Belief." p. 139. (B.Dii). 
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truth should not be obscured by a language barrier, and, equally, the 
study of 'Classics' was removed from its pinnacle so that humanitarian truth 
should not be similarly obscured. However, the rise of 'English' as the 
most significant 'humanities' pursuit crucially affected the relationship 
between 'humanities' and Christianity. The literature studied within 
'Classics' was predominantly pre-Christian, with the result that it was 
possible for the study of literature to exist happily alongside an 
acceptance of Christian dogma. There was no conflict between literary and 
religious authority. The change to the study of English literature 
necessarily terminated the segregation of literary from religious values, 
since English literature was wholly produced within a Christian context. 
To study English literature was often to study the product of the specific 
process of 'double-integration' which Hepburn describes. There were no 
longer two dogmatic authorities with delimited territories, but one. The 
authority of literature became more attractive because works of literature 
were humanised or existentialised versions of religious authority. 
Literature became dogma. 
My feeling is that we have now entered into a post-dogmatic period with 
regard to poetry. Perhaps 'sociology' now stands in relation to 'English', 
as 'English' once stood in relation to 'Classics'. There is certainly a 
need for us now to examine precisely the ideological nature of our response 
to the literature of the past, as well as a need for us to recognize 
equally precisely the ideological constraints and choices which influenced 
the creation of that literature. There is a need to 'de-mythologise' past 
literature and to rationalise the relation which we .accept or impose between 
the past and the present. It is not sufficient to be aware that our 
present response is the result of the 'double-integration' whereby images 
in literature fuse with our own ideas. We must now see that our response 
is the product, at the very least, of a process of 'treble-integration', 
and each step in the process needs to ·be consciously understood. The 
paradigms or the syntheses enshrined in the works of poets have become our 
dogmas, and we now have to work out our own individual paradigms in the 
context of a dogmatic tradition of literature which was tentatively created 
for us in the 1930 1 s by T.S.Eliot and F.R.Leavis. In the light of this 
contention, my purpose, therefore, is not to encourage the kind of personal 
relationship with past literature which, sub-religiously, Professor Knights 
recommends in 'Idea and Symbol: Some Hints from Coleridge•, 2 but instead 
to illustrate the way in which The Ancient Mariner is a 'double-integration'. 
I have this purpose for two reasons: firstly, in order to elaborate the 
constituent 'meanings' which were synthesized in the creation of the poem 
which has now attained a dogmatic status, and, secondly, in order to try to 
describe the process of double-integration in the forming of the poem which 
may now be a model for our reaction to it as dogma. In this manner, the 
study of English literature may be re-humanised, and may again become 
existential. 
In Part I, I explore the intellectual achievement of Jos:eph Priestley. 
Here was a natural philosopher whose supreme motivation was to integrate 
his inherited theological assumptions with his developing curiosity con-
cerning matters of natural science. The connotation of 'integration' 
normally suggests a self-regarding motivation. Hepburn's use of the phrase 
implies that an individual seeks to join established attitudes and sets of 
images with personally developed opinions for the sake of self-satisfaction. 
This was not Priestley's motivation. He sought to formulate an integrated 
'system' for the moral benefit of others. He believed that it was 
2. L.C.Knights. . (B.Dii) p. 166. 
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important to present an objective intellectual system of the universe which 
could then be rationally accepted by others. In spite of his hostility to 
'corruptions' of Christianity, Priestley actively contributed to a shift 
away from allegiance to theological dogma. In attempting to communicate 
systematically the dual communication of God to man in the Word and in 
Nature, Priestley was involved in a process of 'double-integration' whereby 
the meaningful symbols of orthodox Christianity were absorbed into a new 
creative explanation of the universe. We shall see that the desire to 
present a system of explanation which retained the exhortatory moral message 
of orthodox Christianity corrupted the integrity of the explanation. 
Priestley's systematic attempts might have been more successful if they had 
been wholly personal, but he sacrificed individual integrity for the sake 
of public effect. Priestley attempted to shift the emotion that was 
traditionally directed towards orthodox dogma to the dogmatism which was 
his own formulation. Not only did the new dogmatism fail to explain the 
universe, however, but it also failed to do any justice to the conviction 
of a personal relationship between man and the Divine being felt by 
orthodox Christians. 
Coleridge had powerful religious assumptions from childhood, and to 
forget this would be to misunderstand the development of his philosophy. 
What is i mportant for this study is to assess t he relation between these 
assumptions and the products of Coleridge's creativity. However, this is 
to simplify. I f this were the main intention of Part II, it might 
reasonably be objected that the thesis should be entitled "Literature and 
Theology, 1770-1800. 11 That title is not apt because the detailed s tudy of 
Coleridge begins wi th the year 1794 when Coleridge's allegiance to Chris t ian 
dogma was modified by his allegiance to the dogmas of Priestley's 
substitute system. I n 1794, Coleridge was a materialist, a necessarian, 
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and an Unitarian. Coleridge was in the process of receiving as dogma the 
product of Priestley's 'double-integration'. In Part II, I follow the 
steps by which Coleridge sought to reject Priestleyan systamatisation and 
all systems of t hought. The steps do not follow a straight path, and some 
guide-lines are required. 
I have indicated that the motivation for Priestley's systematic effort 
was moral. Priestley's assumption, therefore, was that 'thought' or 
'principles I modify I behaviour 1 • The objective form of Priestley's systems 
was dictated by this psychological conviction. Coleridge disbelieved in 
an innate 'moral sense' as much as Priestley, but he was inclined to 
recognise abstractly the significance of feelings more than was Priestley. 
Coleridge wanted to see a process of integration between a man's rational 
beliefs and his irrational behaviour, much more than he wanted to see the 
self-consistency of the beliefs themselves. This caused Coleridge to 
become sceptical of rational formulations which either did not bear fruit 
in actions or did so in 'wrong' actions. He was unhappy about Southey's 
'republicanism' and he became uneasy about Godwinian t heory as a basis for 
political behaviour. He came to feel that systematic '-isms' might be 
dangerous because they were human creations and might therefore encourage 
the enactment, in rationalised disguise, of false human desires, whilst the 
proper seat of authority for behaviour should be extra-human. However, 
since Coleridge was unprepared to accept the virtue of the pure self, and 
was equally unprepared to accept the doctrine of prevenient grace, a proper 
sense of obligation had to be acquired rather than gratefully received. 
The same scepmicism that was directed against Godwinism came to be directed 
against Priestley's systematic Unitarianism. For Coleridge, Priestley 
sought to impose rational characteristics upon a Deity about whom nothing 
should be said. At the same time as the primacy of the •self' and the 
imcomprehensible primacy of the 'Deity' began to coalesce, Coleridge also 
became trapped in a circular position with regard to the relation between 
•thought' and 'action'. Coleridge seemed to acquire a theory concerning 
the attainment of knowledge of God after he had been forced to assume that 
the spontaneous dictates of his own being and of the Divine Being were the 
same. Coleridge became conscious that his theory of the achievement of 
subordination to the Divine will by means of an inaugurating deed of an a-
moral nature was a rationalisation of a directly felt ontological relation-
ship. He became sceptical about the status of his explanation at the same 
time as he proceeded to elaborate it. In the Political and Theological 
Lectures of 1795, Coleridge both rationalises himself into a sense of 
identity with God, and also makes progress in developing a rational theory 
of the process leading to 'Godlikeness' arising from the relation of 
'thought' to 'action'. Coleridge's thinking contains an implicit sense 
of one-ness with God and also an explicit programme which might be followed 
by others for the benefit of society. I elaborate these points in the 
first four chapters of Part II. 
In effect, Coleridge's thinking in moral philosophy had caused him to 
see that religious belief was the result of a delicate relationship between 
meditation and action, faith and works, necessarily involving emotional 
experience rather than the purely intellectual commitment to an integrated 
system envisaged by Priestley. But although Coleridge rejected Priestley's 
attempt to integrate an orthodox theological system with positivist 
scientific attitudes, it does not at all follow t hat Coleridge ceased to 
examine the relation between orthodox dogma and the 'facts' of science. On 
the contrary, the multitude of current systems gathered in Coleridge's mind 
as a series of alternative descriptions of the rational theory that he had 
formulated. Aspects of various theories coalesced in the making of The 
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Ancient Mariner. Equally, persons and events were influential. The making 
of the poem conformed to the theory of delicate inter-play between thought 
and action that Coleridge proposed for the pursuit of theological knowledge. 
He had himself reached a theological conviction by an intellectual process, 
but the possibility of an experiential one-ness with God became the subject 
of his poem whilst the creation of the poem was itself, for Coleridge, the 
enactment of the process that he posited for theological aw~reness. For 
the remaining chapters of Part II, therefore, I seek to indicate both the 
development of Coleridge's thought and also the experiential basis of his 
thinking which continually moved across to inform the nature of the thought 
itself. Whilst Coleridge was thinking about the implications of the 
relation between thought and behaviour, in other words, his own balance of 
thought and action continually provided material to aid his reflection. 
Coleridge's correspondence and slight friendship with John Thelwall, for 
instance, stimulated Coleridge in two ways. Firstly, Coleridge took pains 
to understand Thelwall 1 s philosophy, and it seems likely that he was 
interested abstractly in Thelwall 1 s secular morality, his laissez-faire 
naturalism, his hostility to retrospective remorse, his uncertain confidence 
in the physical communication of sympathy, and his vision of the potential 
organic unity of man with nature. All these attitudes merged with 
Coleridge's speculative considerations and contributed to his description 
of t he pro~ess which led towards Godlikeness, but, secondly, Coleridge was 
interested in the relation between Thelwall's t hought and his behaviour, and 
he tended to see his friend symbolically as an energetic activist. 
Coleridge was thus in a position to use the person of Thelwall as a datum 
wi th which he could work in his speculation. The person of Thelwall fitted 
into the theory of Coleridge which was itself a partial adaptation of 
Thelwall's philosophy. 
Coleridge's relationships with Charles Lamb and Charles Lloyd were 
similarly complex. There was a continuous oscillation between theory and 
actuality. The problems and characters of Charles and Mary Lamb merged in 
Coleridge's speculation. Mar y had acted in killing her mother, and Charles 
suffered from her action. The action of Mary fused with the activism of 
Thelwall, whilst Charles provided examples of remorse and fortitude which 
were positive rather than self-indulgently retrospective. Coleridge offered 
consolation in terms of his developing theory that passivity and suffering 
were necessary preludes to Godlikeness, but Charles Lamb's hehaviour and 
experience offered vivid exemplification of the t heory. Lamb's loneliness 
and his sense of isolation from human relationships as a result of living 
in London provided data for a •type' that was totally opposed to the 
Thelwall 'type', but Col~ridge's belief in transformation of character was 
such that the two 'types' were fused. Coleridge began to believe that 
'Lamb' could not exist unless he had been ' Thelwall', and that for his 
spiritual well-being 'Thelwall' must become 'Lamb'. 
The influence of Charles Lloyd was also significant. It was perhaps 
through Lloyd's parents that Coleridge became interested in Quaker ideas and 
in spiritual autobiographies. Coleridge's theory of the necessary inter-
action between thought and behaviour as a prelude to a relationship wi th God 
was stated. in more orthodox Christian terms at the end of 1796 and during 
1797 than it had been previously. This was mainly due to his reading of 
Seventeenth century theology at this time. The language of sin, repentance, 
and redemption was now super-imposed upon t he language of crime, remorse, 
and Godlikeness which earlier characterised Coleridge's theory . But the 
Quaker influence was strong in Coleridge's emphasis of quiescence and 
openness to Divine influence. The receptiveness to Divine grace which 
Coleridge had earlier eschewed now fits neatly into his schema as a 
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description of man's condition after his primary assertion of will in action. 
The language of Christian orthodoxy now reinforces certain aspects of 
~Coleridge's own system. Coleridge is not converted to an acceptance of the 
sufficiency of Christian description. This development in Coleridge's 
thinking may coincide with his acquaintance with Charles Lloyd only by 
chance, but Coleridge's knowledge of the personal condition of Lloye was also 
grist for his speculative mill. Coleridge saw Lloyd as in the predicament 
of Mary Lamb and wished to transform him so that he reached the suffering 
contentment of Charles Lamb. Thelwall was a conscious activist, whilst 
Coleridge saw Mary Lamb as someone whose action had been willed by 
providence. The unconsciousness of Lloyd's actions, however, was not a 
manifestation of the hand of providence b~t a symptom of his physical 
illness. It is not clear what was the precise nature of Lloyd's illness, 
but it is possible that h~ suffered from epilepsy. Certainly, the case of 
Lloyd must have given a further dimension to Coleridge's sense of the nature 
of activity. Coleridge's friendship with Thomas Beddoes whom he consulted 
about Lloyd's condition and some of whose pamphlets he had reviewed in The 
Watchman, must have enlarged his medical knowledge and, importantly, also 
have offered the prospect of conflicting systematic medical theories. Un-
conscious physical activity might not be the hand of providence, but it 
might be a determined event in a materialist universe. Medical science 
might conf irm the necessity of Coleridge's system of which the end rather 
than the origin was God. 
I attempt, therefore, to present in Part II a picture of Coleridge as 
a person manipulating ideas and persons as ideas to give substance to a 
theory of the progression towards theological knowledge which was as much 
an ideal projection for the benefit of others as was Priestley's system. 
Fundamentally , I do not find it useful to see The Ancient Mariner as an 
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an autobiographical poem. The fate ' of the mariner as presented in the poem 
is the product of a subtle inter-play between theory and observation or 
vicarious exper ience. Of cours.e, Coleridge himself felt a sense of 
isolation and suffered ill-health and had many experiences which corresponded 
with t hose of his friends, but Coleridge seems to have analysed himself 
through others. The poem is not autobiographical, but it is self-expressive. 
In Part III, I describe the poem and suggest its relation to the process of 
Coleridge's development analysed in Part II. However, the correlation is 
not easily made, and I suggest that it is best to see the poem as Coleridge's 
public presentation of his developed t heory and also as an indication of the 
way in which his personal enactment of the theory (remembering that only in 
enactment was it constituted) found culminating expression for Coleridge in 
a poem describing the process rather than in the ideal end of the process -
Godlikeness. The system which was meant to point the way to God became, 
almost tangentially, an aesthetic end-in-itself. In looking at the 
process whereby Christian apologetic ceases to offer an objectively 
integrated system of the universe whose fictional quality is rigorously 
denied, and instead begins to offer a meticulously subjective integration 
which is intended to be of general validity as a guide to theological know-
ledge but in fact succeeds in being a fiction which is of interest because 
it is expr~ssive of true feeling . Priestley's system was not integrated 
with his own self, and, as an account of 'facts' it was unsatisfactory. 
Coleridge took Pries tley's system and systematised the integration of it 
with his own self and with other influences. The result was highly 
individual, but, perhaps, less 'fictional' in being a satisfactory account 
of the 'facts' of his own self. 
My account of the relation between the poem and Coleridge's development 
is necessarily tentative. There is a danger of systematising objectively 
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the dogma of the poem, just as Priestley systematised Christian dogma in 
relation to the ideas current in the 1770's and 1780 1 s. Our interpretation 
of the poem is modified substantially by our intentions, our conception of 
current moral or social needs, or our conception of the nature of art. 
Objective ordering can be stagnant, and is often dishonest. Ideally, an 
account is required of The Ancient Mariner which not only assesses the 
complexity of its creation, but which is also prepared to indulge in the sort 
of self-conscious responsiveness which was Coleridge's attitude towards 
Priestley's systematisation of orthodox Christian dogma. Coleridgean 
analysis of Coleridge should be personal and not systematic, and how can a 
scholar who is attracted to Coleridge offer anything other than a Coleridgean 
analysis? But Coleridge himself exemplifies the point that self-
consciousness can be achieved through a precise awareness of the •other' that 
is assimilated to the self. To a certain extent this thesis is self-
expressive, but I have chosen to indicate the nature of the self-expression 
not by an account of my integration in responding personally to the t hought 
and poetry of Coleridge, but by offering a brief description in Par~ IV of 
the ways in which the interpretations of four critics of Coleridge are 
related to, or integrated with their evident attitudes towards art. 
Inevitably t he integrations which I attribute to Coleridge are selected, 
and further examination would undoubtedly uncover many more. Several 
practical omissions must be mentioned in this Preface. I have not, for 
instance, pursued Coleridge's relationship with Wordsworth at all. Similarly, 
I have paid little attention to Coleridge's relationship with Sara Fricker, 
and, again, no attention to the poems which preceded The Ancient Mariner, 
which clear l y modified both Coleridge's thinking and his attitude to for mal 
arti s tic problems. Nevertheless, Coleridge's early r adical and ma ter i a l is t 
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thinking has received slight consideration in the past, and it is important 
for an assessment of the nature of his activity as a poet t hat it should be 
considered alongside the philosophy from which it derived so much . 
Perhaps the comparison may enable us to see both Priestley and Coleridge 
rather di f ferently . 
PART I 
Joseph Priestley 
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INTRODUCTION 
Joseph Priestley was brought up within a family circle where 
theological discussion and controversy were familiar. Born in Yorkshire in 
1733, he was cared for by his father's sister after the death of his mother 
in 1739, His aunt entertained many of the dissenting ministers of the 
locality. As a result, it was taken for granted that the choice between 
specific doctrinal positions was important. In his youth it was considered 
important, for instance, that Priestley should decide whether he was a 
Calvinist or an Arminian, and when he was sent to the Daventry Dissenting 
Academy in 1752 he then decided that he could not accept orthodox doctrines 
of the Trinity and became an Arian. Priestley attended the Daventry Academy 
until 1755. It was there that he composed the first copy of the Institutes 
of Natural and Revealed Religion, a work whi ch was later published in three 
volumes between 1772 and 1774, In 1755, _Priestley undertook the duty of 
dissenting minister at Needham Il1arket in Suffolk. There he made a study of 
atohement which was published in part in 1761 as The Doctrine of Remission 
and was published again in The Theological Repository which Priestley 
edited between 1769 and 1771, This f irst published work i mplied Arianism, 
and it was because of his theological views that Priestley was forced to 
leave SuffQlk, and, in 1758, he moved to Nantwi ch in Cheshire where he 
ministered to a dissenting congregation and also ran a school. Priestley 's 
interest in education was advanced when he was offered a post as tutor in the 
recently established Warrington Dissenting Academy. 1 He moved to Warrington 
in 1761 and remained there until 1767. During this period Priestley's 
1. For an account of the Warrington Academy and other Dissenting 
educational institutions, see H. McLachlan. English Education 
under the Test Acts. (B.Di). 
concerns, as tutor in 'languages and belles lettres', deviated from the base 
in theology which had previously been dominant. In 1762, he published! 
Course of Lectures on the Theory of Language, and Universal Grammar, and, in 
1765, An Essay on a course of liberal education for civil and active life. 2 
The former work was related to The xudiments of English Grammar, and the latter 
led to Priestley's fuller development of his educational and political views 
in An Essay on the First Principles of Government. Publication of other 
lectures was delayed by decades until Priestley fel~ that there was a 
specific reason or demand for publication. A Course of Lectures on Oratory 
and Criticism was published in 1777 in order to support the case which 
Priestley was seeking to make in favour of Hartleian associationism throughout 
the 1770's in particular, and the publication of Lectures on History and 
General Policy was delayed until 1788. Whilst at Warrington, also, Priestley 
decided to write an account of the development of experimentation in 
electricity. Through the assistance of Richard Price, Benjamin Franklin and 
others, Priestley was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society in 1766, and his 
promised The History and present state of electricity with original 
experiments was published in 1767. A year later, Priestley wrote A familiar 
introduction to the study of electricity. 
Priestley's return to theological issues. 
However, the year 1767 marked 
In September of that year he 
accepted the invitation of the dissenting congregation at Mill Hill, Leeds, 
to become their minister. At about this time, Priestley was convinced by 
his reading of Dr. Lardner's Letter on the Logos3 that he should become a 
2. Priestley was replying to J.Brown. See J. Brown. Thoughts on Civil 
Libert on Licentiousness and Faction. (B.C). 
John Brown 1715-1766) - •author of the Estimate of the 1v1anners and 
Principles of the Times. (1757)', see D.N.B. vol. 7. pp. 10-12, is 
not to be confused with the medical doctor of the same name. 
See N. Lardner. A Letter writ in the year 1730. (B.C). For a life 
of Lardner by Kippis, see N.Lardner. Works. (B.C). volume I. 
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Socinian. Not only did he change his theological position, but he also 
became involved in the practical problems of the Christian ministry. The 
titles of a series of pamphlets written in the years of his ministry at 
Leeds indicate the nature of t his involvement: A Free Address to Protestant 
Dissenters, on the subject of the Lord's Supper (1768); Remarks on some 
paragraphs in the fourth volume of Dr. Blackstone's Commentaries on the L~ws 
of England, relating to the Dissenters (1769);4 Considerations on Church-
Authority (1769 ) ; Considerations on Differences of Opinion among Christians 
(1769); and A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, on the subject of 
Church-Discipline (1770). In these years, Priestley edited the first volume 
of The Theological Repository (1769-1771), and the publication of the 
Institutes (1772-1774) was an attempt to provide the instruction in theological 
matters which Priestley felt was so sorely lacking in churches of all 
denominations. At the same time, Priestley was friendly to the cause of 
those Anglicans who were petitioning in the early 1770 1s against subscription 
to t he Thirty-Nine Articles, and had met Theophilus Lin~sey5 in 1769 who was 
to become the minister of the first Unitarian chapel in Essex Street, London, 
in Apri l, 1774 . But Priestley moved away from this area of polemical 
engagement, and, in the Summer of 1773 he moved to Calne to become Librarian 
to Lord Shelburne. 6 He remained there until 1780, and it was in these years 
that he advanced his own experimental scientific activity and became the 
vigorous advocate of the doctrines associated with the name of Hartley7 and 
4. See W. Blackstone. (B.C). 
see D.J.Boorstin. (B.Di). 
For an account of Blackstone's Commentaries, 
5. Theophilus Lindsey, (1723-1808), - 'unitarian•. 
PP • 317-8. 
See D.N.B. vol. 33, 
6. William Petty, first Marquis of Lansdowne, better known as Lord 
Shelburne, (1737-1805). See D.N.B. vol. 45. pp . 119-127, 
7. See Hartley's Observations on Man (B.C), and Original Letters (B.C). 
See also B.Rand (B.Dii), a nd R.I\18.rsh (B.Dii). 
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of his own systematic version of Hartleianism, involving a trinity of 
beliefs - in materialism, necessarianism, and Socinianism. In 1772, 
Priestley had published The History and present state of discoveries relating 
to vision, light, and colours , and, also, Directions for Impregnating Water 
with Fixed Air. The first was a continuation of the t~chnique that 
Priestley had already developed with reference to electricity , but the second 
was t he prelude to his experimentation with air which continued throughout 
his stay at Calne and beyond, and which was described in six volumes which 
were published between 1774 and 1786 . In 1774 and 1775, Priestley 
published An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, and 
Hartley 1 s Theory of the Human Mind ••• With essays relating to the subject 
of it, and this area of enquiry wa.s continued by the delayed publi cation of 
A Course of Lectures on Oratory (1777), Disquisitions relating to Matter 
and Spirit (1777), The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity illustrated 
(1777), and A Free Discussion of the doctrines of materialism, and 
phi losophical necessity, in a correspondence between Dr. Price, and Dr. 
Priestley (1778). 9In spite of the apparent move towards an interest in 
experimental science and in materialism and theory of Mind to the exclusion 
of Theology, Priestley's central theological concern was not dulled. The 
Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit was in emphasis as much an 
attack on Arianism as on 'immaterialism', and, by demand, Priestley 
published, in 1779, a sermon entitled The Doctrine of Divine Influence on 
the Human Mind in which he attempted to reconcile his theology with his 
materialism by reference to Scriptural authority. A year after this 
publication, Priestley was again the minister of a dissenting congregation, 
8. For the Scottish School, see S.A.Grave (B.Dii). 
9. For an account of Price's life, see C.B.Cone (B.Di), and of his 
moral philosophy, see L. Aqvist (B.Di). 
17 
this time that of the New Meeting in Birmingham. He retained this position 
until the Birmingham riots of 1791 forced him to leave the town, branded as 
a Jacobin. In April, 1794, Prie·stley left for America where he stayed 
until his death in 1804.10 
Priestley's move to Birmingham in 1780 is a convenient point at which 
to end close examination. By that time, he had written enough in enough 
fields of interest for a proper understanding of the complexity of his 
thought to emerge from the works I have mentioned and no more. Even of the 
works written before 1780, I give no attention to Priestley's writing on 
Air or on Language and Grammar. 
It is immediately obvious from this short summary of the most important 
years of Priestley's career that his written achievement was massive and 
diverse - so massive and so diverse that we are forced to ask ourselves 
where was the centre of his activity, or what was the prime motivating force 
of his extensive effort. This question is the way in to my enquiry, but 
it does not lead directly to the answer that I s hall present. It is 
possible to categorise Priestley's writings as I have done in my summary, 
but this does not bring us to the core of the problem which Priestley poses. 
It is not sufficient to say that Priestley wrote about Church-Authority, 
about Church-Discipline, about Government, about Natural and Revealed 
Religion, about Electricity, about Optics, about Oratory, about the Mind, 
or about Matter and Spirit. '11his emphasis implies too much conceptual 
detachment. I suggest, instead, that Priestley continually struggled to 
unify his different interests so that he could present a coherent intellectual 
10. For further details of Priestley's life, see his own Memoir (B.B), and 
the biographies of Priestley by F.W.Gibbs (B.Di) and A.Holt (B.Di). 
For elaboration of the social and political context of Priestley's 
writing, see A.Lincoln (B.Di). 
For a general survey of 18th century religion, see G.R.Cragg (B.Di). 
N.L.Torrey (B.Di) provides a useful survey of English Deism, and 
A.W.Evans (B.Di) gives insight into certain aspects of mid-century 
theological debate. 
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system. This was difficult enough, but Priestley's difficulties were 
increased because he inclined towards the presentation of a system which 
would be exhortatory rather than explanatory. He tried to integrate his 
theological and his scientific interests through the coincidence of Natural 
Religion with Natural Science so that the integrated system itself might 
become a substitute for Theology in its moral i mplications, at a time when 
even his own scientific method was becoming steadily more positivist. The 
strains involved in pursuing this endeavour are the subject of my enquiry. 
For this reason, a more rewarding categorisation suggests itself. There 
were occasions when Priestley clearly addressed himself to practical problems 
and sought to engage directly with events. The situation which he described 
on these occasions, I regard as the •context' of his writing. Pries tley 
felt that rational activity was the only safeguard of human liberty between 
the extremes of anarchy and tyranny which he took to be the warring factions 
of his 'context•. For Priestley, therefore, it was of the utmost 
importance that rational activity should be seen to occur and, hence, that 
his writings should seem to be rationally systematic in 1 form 1 • The formal 
emphasis inherent in his attitude towards communication and moral persuasion 
requires investigation and analysis. He was inclined to think that the 
form of his presentation signified more than the validity or otherwise of 
the arguments presented, but, nevertheless, his arguments must be examined. 
I shall assess the consistency of Priestley's arguments with respect to 
several central problems, and I shall suggest that Priestley's urges to 
exhort and explain became irreconcileable. In spite of his own thinking 
about the status of scientific hypotheses in relation to 'facts' which led 
him to distrust early scientific system-making before experimentation had 
11 been fully extended, Priestley would not let go of his more general 
11. See for instance, History of Electricity. P• 480. 
systematic activity. He would not accept that his systems were 'fictions', 
and, even if he had, he would still have regarded them as morally 
necessary. Priestley's position rested on largely implicit assumptions 
about moral action. Coleridge did not share these assumptions, and I 
shall show that it was for this reason that Coleridge was able to present a 
'system' which was openly a literary fiction - a poem, demanding what he 
was later to call a 'willing suspension of disbelief'. Equally, I shall 
show that the development of Coleridge's thinking which allowed him to 
conceive of his poem formally in these terms also directed the attitude 
which is encour~ged towards the tale of the mariner. The explanation and 
exhortation offered by the mariner within the poem bears as puzzling a 
relation to the real events of the voyage as implied by the omniscient poet/ 
narrator as does the poem itself to the real world that is known to an 
omniscient Deity. 
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CHAPrER I 
Priestley's 'context' 
The pamphlets which Priestley wrote in the years following his 
appointment to the ministry at Mill Hill, Leeds, constitute the focal point 
for a consideration of the nature of his engagement with his actual 'context'. 
In An Essay on the First Principles of Government, Priestley had made a 
distinction between civil and political liberty. He argued: 
1. 
In these circumstances, if I be asked what I mean by liberty, I 
should chuse for the sake of greater clearness, to divide it into 
two kinds, political, and civil; and the importance of having clear 
ideas on this subject will be my apology for the innovation. 
Political liberty, I would say, consists in the power, which the 
members of the state reserve to themselves, of arriving at the 
public offices, or at least of having votes in the nomination of 
those who fill them: and I would chuse to call civil liberty that 
power over their own actions, which the members of the state reserve 
to themselves, and which their officers must not infringe. 
Political liberty, therefore, is equivalent to the right of 
magistracy, being the claim that any member of the state hath to 
have his private opinion or judgment become that of the public, and 
thereby control the actions of others; whereas civil liberty, 
extends no farther than to a man's own conduct, and signifies the 
right he has to be exempt from the control of the society, or its 
agents; that is, the power he has of providing for his own 
advantage and happiness. It is a man's civil liberty, which is 
originally in its full force, and part of which he sacrifices when 
he enters into a state of society; and politica l liberty is that 
which he may or may not acquire in the compensation he receives for 
it. For he may either stipulate to have a voice in the publick 
determinations, or, as far as the public determination doth take 
place, he may submit to be governed wholly by others. 1 
Essay on First Principles. p. 130 
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This was an ideal projection for society, and in his engagement with the 
•actual' Priestley was always in danger of advocating a course of action for 
Dissenters which would be suitable if society were based on the tenets which 
he adumbrated, or of claiming that Dissenters could not possibly be 
politically subversive as if the society in which this claim would be 
defensible were already in existence. Nevertheless, Priestley's distinction 
gave him a polemical platform. The social facts in the late 1760 1 s were 
that in practice Dissenters were allowed freedom of belief and worship and 
were prevented from holding positions of political authority. The 'civil' 
liberty of Dissenters was dependent on t he benevolence of those in political 
authority. It was dependent on whim, not on free choice. However much the 
English constitution may have been defended in terms of Locke's principles 
of toleration, in practice there was no contract whereby the individual 
sacrificed some political freedom in order to secure civil liberty . Indeed, 
there were justifiable fears that the attitudes of those in ecclesiastical 
and political authority were hardening against toleratton in favour of a 
comprehensive alliance of Church and State. It was in this situation tha t 
Priestley feigned gratitude to his opponents for re-stating their arguments 
and hence for keeping the perniciousness of their position constantly in 
mind as a warning to Dissent. 
Authority, .Priestley observed: 
In the Preface to Considerations on Church-
Considerable advantage cannot but accrue to the cause of religious, 
as well as civil liberty, from keeping the important subject con-
tinually in view. We are under great obligation, t herefore, to 
all the advocates for church-authority, whenever they are pleased 
to write in its defence; whether it be in the old, hackneyed, but 
consistent strain, and pretend to derive their ecclesiastical power 
jure divine, from Christ and his apostles; or whether they go more 
aukwardly to work, and (as they have been obliged to do since the 
great catastrophe of their affairs in England) adopt a more 
moderate and humble style, being content to receive their divine 
authority at second hand from the civil powers; whose divine 
ordination it, therefore, well behoves them to maintain. 2 
It was against the advocates of State religion - notably William 
Warburton and his followers,3 that Priestley presented himself as the champion 
of the rights of men to hold whatever opinions they wished in so far as they 
were not prejudicial to the good of the whole society. He argued that 
matters of religious belief were outside the control of the magistracy and 
that it was an error to assert religious authority with political sanctions. 
Priestley was not so much concerned to gain political rights for Dissenters 
as to ensure that their civil rights were not threatened by their political 
impotence. 
Priestley's first stand in defence of the rights of Dissenters was made 
in his Remarks on Blackstone. There Priestley categorically states: 
2. 
But, with such men as Dr. Blackstone and Dr. Warburton, religion 
mus t be governed by the maxims of civil policy; and I am sorry to 
observe, even for the honour of the church of England, that, 
according to their new principles of church-authority, (which would 
have been disavowed by the founders of it) the mode of vindication, 
which her champions have lately chosen, seems to arise, not out of 
her proper foundation, christianity, but out of those abutments 
which the policy of men have erected for her s upport; by means 
whereof she hath contracted not only an alliance with, but a str iking 
resemblance of the kingdoms of this world. What effects this new 
measure may produce on the minds of unbelievers, or of her own 
serious and considerate sons, I pretend not to pronounce: only t~is 
I know, that it by no means serves to promote a veneration for her 
in the minds of thoughtful Dissenters; who, whatever others may do, 
consider themselves as subjected, in all matters of religion, to an 
~onaiderations on Church-Authority. p. v. 
3. Fo±,w. V{arpurton, see A.W.Eva ns (B . Di) . 
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authority much superior to human; obliged by laws which will 
support themselves without human aid or alliance, and remain in 
force when the laws of England, and all the commentaries on them, 
wi ll have no more than an historical existence; and therefore 
think themselves bound by the duty they owe to their master and 
lord, Christ Jesus, to observe carefully both parts of that 
injunction he delivered to them, and to protest earnestly against 
the attempts of political men to confound and thereby subvert it: 
Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the 
things that are God 1 s.4 
In opposing the authority of the state, Priestley here claims that Dissenters 
owe allegiance to a 'superior' authority. Dissenters are obedient to the 
commandments of God, not of men. 
Considerations on Church-Authority: 
As Priestley himself puts it in 
But let the truly christian-rninded reader also consider, the 
indignation with which our Lord himself treated the Scribes and 
Pharisees among the Jews, who made the law of God void by their 
traditions, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men; and 
think what any person ought to feel, who considers the founders 
and abetters of all ecclesiastical establishments as, in a great 
measure, liable to the same charge. For what are the creeds, and 
confessions of faith, to which they require subscriptions; and 
what are all their ecclesiastical canons, but the commandments of 
men?5 
On occasions it is easy for Priestley to insist confidently that Dissenters 
are citizens of an external state and subject to rules which will pertain 
long beyond the extinction of the English constitution, but this kind of 
argument did not satisfy Priestley for very long. Instead, he adopted two 
kinds of argument to contend for the political neutrality of religious 
beliefs. 
4. 
5. 
In the first place, Priestley asserted that, by definition, religious 
R' ma.~ks on .Blackstone. p. 18. 
Considerations on Church-Authority. p. vi. 
belief was a matter of personal concern, and of relevance only to men as 
individuals rather than as members of society. 
Church-Authority, Priestley argued: 
In Considerations on 
These, and many other reasons, lead me to consider the business 
of religion, and every thing fairly connected with it, as intirely 
a personal concern, and altogether foreign to the nature, object, 
and use of civil magistracy. As a man, and a member of civil 
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society, I am desirous to receive such assistance as numbers can 
give to individuals, but by no means that assistance which numbers, 
as such, cannot give to individuals; and, least of all, such as 
individuals are better qualified to impart to numbers. 6 
and, later in the same work , with special reference to excommunication: 
In short, all that the New Tes tament authorizes a christian church, 
or its officers, to do, is to exclude from their society those 
persons whom they deem unworthy of it. There is no hint of such 
excluded members lying under any civil disqualification. I f they 
were not to be considered as christians, and proper members of 
christian societies; they were still men, proper members of civil 
society, and not liable to civil penalties, unless they had, like-
wise, offended against the laws of the state.7 . 
The emphasis has shifted from the easy insistence upon obedience to the 
superior authority of God to an assertion of the necessity of freedom of 
conscience and private judgment in religious matters. The use of the word 
'conscience' becomes significant in this line of argument: 
For my own part, I can conceive no method whatever, in which the 
civil magistrate can be invested with ecclesiastical power, or 
ecclesiastics with civil power, so that a conscientious christian 
shall consider himself as under any obligation to yield them 
obedience in their new character. In civil matters he will obey 
the civil magistrate, and where religion is concerned, he will 
listen to nothing but the dictates of his own conscience, or the 
6. Ibid. p. ~.; . 
admonitions of his chosen spiritual guide; and to him no 
farther than he is satisfied he has a better authority than 
8 his own for what he says. 
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The authority of 'conscience' is again involved when Priestley refuses to 
accept that the civil disobedience of Christ was an exception which should 
not be taken as an example: 
It is said by some, who think themselves obliged to vindicate 
the conduct of Christ and his apostles, that, though no general 
plea to oppose an established religion can be admitted, in excuse 
of a pretended reformer, yet that a special plea, such as a 
belief of a divine commission, and the like, will excuse him. But 
I can see no material difference in these cases. The voice of 
conscience is, in all cases, as the voice of God to every man.9 
In these two cases Priestley begs the question concerning the nature of 
the authority of 'conscience' that he is setting up in opposition to the 
authority of the state. Priestley's 'conscience', however, is acquired, 
t . t 10 no 1nna e. It therefore follows that the conscience has no authority. 
Rather it is the communicator of commandments which it learns from an 
authority. Priestley's appeal to 'conscience' is rhetorically effective, 
but, otherwise, empty. 
Priestley's second line of argument in defence of the rights of 
Dissenters was more surprising than the first. It emerges most clearly 
in Considerations on Differences of Opinion among Christians. In this 
pamphlet, Priestley attacks the practice of excommunication not on the 
grounds that historically it had involved the withdrawal of political 
liberty as well as of the rights of communion and had therefore implied ·a 
false coincidence of the jurisdiction of Church and State, but, instead, 
on the grounds that any excommunication for unorthodoxy in matters of belief 
8. Ibid. P• 31. 
9. Ibid. P• 11. 
10. For Priestley's belief that 'conscience' was acquired, see Part II, 
Introduction. 
26 
or theological opinion was unjustified since no human could be capable 
of judging the inward feelings of any other human from his verbal state-
ments, but only from his actions. In other words, Priestley was prepared 
to defend the absolute freedom of the individual in matters of belief on 
the grounds that opinions were of no importance in comparison with action, 
and that faith did not matter in comparison with works. He writes: 
Let those who maintain that the mere holding of any opinions 
(without regard to the motives and state of mind through which 
men may have been led to form them) will necessarily exclude them 
from the favour of God, be particularly careful, with respect to 
the premises from which they draw so alarming a conclusion. Of 
all the tenets that can be the subject of debate, this has the 
most dreadful practical consequences. This belief lays such hold 
of the mind, and is apt to excite such a horror of the reprobated 
opinions, as, in the frail state of humanity, is with difficulty 
brought to be consistent with any esteem or love of the persons 
who hold them; and, from the affinity of our passions, is, in too 
many minds, capable of degenerating into absolute hatred, rancour, 
and the diabolical spirit of persecution. 11 
And, again, Priestley later remarks: 
In all our disputes about different tenets, and modes of the 
christian religion, let us be careful not to lose sight of the 
great end and design of christianity in general, viz. that Bhrist 
came to bless .mankind, in turning them away from their iniquities; 
to redeem (or deliver) us from all iniquity, and to purify unto 
himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works. The chief thing, 
therefore, that we should attend to, and the only rule for 
estimating the importance of any opinions, is their efficacy for 
this moral purpose. Let us, then, not suffer ourselves to be 
deceived by mere words, and pompous sounds. As to those who 
follow other rules of estimating the importance of opinions, and 
who think that mere belief can be of any avail to recommend them 
to the favour of God; they ought, as I observed before, to have 
11. C<brils.ide:ra, ttOc.s on Differences of Opinion. p. ll. 
j 
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very good reasons for their persuasion. For, if once the above 
mentioned plain and obvious rule be quitted, it will not be easy 
to find another that can be applied to any good purpose. After 
losing this clue, men will be involved in an endless labyrinth. 12 
Thus this second line of defence for Dissenters seems to involve a 
depreciation of belief, a depreciation, perhaps of that which is being 
defended. As a response to his 'context•, however, Priestley was not solely 
concerned to save Dissent from the false authority of the State in religious 
matters. He was forthrightly the defender only of rational Dissent since 
only rational Dissenters could be proper citizens of his .ideal society in 
which civil and political liberty were rationally divided. Priestley was 
concerned, therefore, to oppose all manifestations of irrational Dissent. 
At the end of his discussion of the proper form of church government in 
A Free Address to Protestant Dissenters, on .the subject of Church 
Discipline, in which he assesses the structure of both the Established 
Church and the Independent churches, Priestley concludes: 
Far better, however, were it for any society, that the power of 
church discipline be lodged in the hands of the minister, and he 
be the only object of reverence, than that there should be no 
such power in any hands at all. The former of these situations 
may be said to approach to tyranny, or despotism; but the latter 
tends to anarchy, and dissolution. 13 
F.arlier in the same work, Priestley had strongly criticised the Independents 
for their concentration upon the assessment of belief rather than of 
behaviour: 
As to the second object of their discipline, viz. the state of 
the heart with respect to God, and a person's actual fitness for 
heaven, their conduct is not only absurd, but dangerous to the 
12. Ibid. p~ JQ. 
13. 1. Free Address ... on Church Discipline. p. 108. 
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interests of real virtue. All that men can be proper judges 
of, is the outward propriety and regularity of behaviour. This 
was all that the primitive churches attended to; and whenever 
men pretend to decide concerning any thing but plain facts, of 
which every man can judge by the evidence of seeing and hearing, 
a field is open for the utmost extravagance of fancy, which may 
be productive of the grossest self-delusion and imposition. 14 
Priestley was afraid of the anarchic implications os such irrational 
commitment: 
What can be more precarious than to judge of a man's fitness 
for christian communion by certain internal feelings, which are 
incapable of being described, except by strong metaphors; by a 
kind of faith that is different from believing, and a new birth, 
that is something else than a change of affections and conduct, 
proceeding from rational motives; a new birth, in which a man 
is entirely passive, and to which nothing he does, or can do, 
does in the least contribute. What room is not here left for 
self-delusion with respect to the candidate, and imposition with 
respect to the judges. 15 
The Independents believed in the possibility of a direct relationship with 
Divine authority, and the commands which they might consider to have 
received from the superior power might challenge the authority of the state. 
In spite of the fact that Priestley was willing to use this orthodox claim 
against the Established Church, as we have seen, he believed that intuitive 
beliefs had to be controlled because they offered no guarantee of moral 
behaviour that would take account of the good of the whole. Moral 
authority must be exercised because inward feelings and the authority of 
individual conscience cannot be trusted. 
Hence, in order to secure the freedom of Dissent from State control, 
Priestley was fQrced to argue in favour of personal religion - religion of 
14. Ibid. p. }51. 
15. Ibid. p. 31. 
the individual conscience, and to derogate the influence of opinion over 
behaviour; whilst, in order to discourage irrational Dissent, he was forced 
to attack any emphasis on individual insight into divine will based on the 
authority of an innate conscience, and was also forced to argue that the 
inculcation of the right rational moral principles, which could be nothing 
other than 'opinions', would modify behaviour. In the one case, matters of 
belief were insignificant, and, in the other, they were to become the crucial 
determinants of action. The resolution of Priestley's contradiction is easy 
to find if we again accept that his confrontation with the actual situation 
was tenuous. He clearly thought that religious belief would be insignificant 
when it had become rationalised in such a way that commitment to the will of 
God was identical with commitment to the good of the whole within society. 
Priestley thought that the purpose of God in creation and the function of the 
State were the same - to realize the happiness of the whole, wi th the result 
that in an ideal world, divine and secular authority would sanction the same 
behaviour. 'Opinion' did not matter at all in determining behaviour, 
because the 'opinion' of an ideal Dissenter would be the same as the 'opinion ' 
of any ideal citizen in an ideal society. Priestley did not truly accept 
the framework of an antithesis of rival claims between God and State within 
which he was polemicall y obliged to debate. His task was dual because he 
was dealing With an actual duality. He needed to argue the case in political 
philosophy to ecclesiastical and political authorities that the purpose of 
government was to maximise the happiness of the whole people, and, at the 
same time, to argue the theological case to all Dissent that the will of God 
was the same. 
In practical terms, the resolution of Priestley's dilemma was also easy. 
He could oppose the institutional intervention of the State, arguing for the 
freedom of religion from physical restraint, at the same time as he could 
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oppose the emphasis on an intuitive knowledge of the will of God in favour 
of an insistence upon a rational relationship with the Divine. But this 
last positive possibility for Priestley is unclearly stated. Priestley 
was concerned to harness the power of divine authority for secular ends. 
Most certainly he was convinced that he was following a divine will in 
pursuing this policy, but it would be misleading to suggest that Priestley 
wanted to inculcate rational responses to a discrete Divine authority. 
Much more was it the case that Priestley wanted to stimulate a rational 
response to his own rationalisation of the relationship between divine and 
human affairs. Priestley offered for the instruction of others his own 
systematic integration of theological and secular speculation, presenting 
as theological apologetic arguments which were designed to negate the 
possibility of appeal to an autonomous theological sanction. The purpose 
of Priestley's presentation was, in any case, moral. How far, therefore, 
should his systematic instruction attempt to persuade to action directly, 
or how far should it offer an explanation of truth which might indirectly 
stimulate the correct moral response? The question is, partly, whether 
Priestley was prepared to offer rational explanations which would appeal to 
a rational private judgment, or to offer a systematic and dogmatic statement 
which would hope to elicit obedience. Priestley's choice of communicative 
method ironically mirrors the choice between Church Establishment and 
irrational Dissent. This is wrongly to imply, however, that Priestley was 
either conscious of a choice to be made or that he made it. Priestley's 
endeavour is a mixture of the use of persuasive devices which function 
without reference to content where the work is its own authority, and of the 
presentation of an argument which itself debates the basis of authority for 
moral behaviour. 
31 
CHAPTER II 
Systematic Form and Exhortation 
We have seen that Priestley felt that the tendency towards anarchy 
of irrational Dissent needed correction. The product of Priestley's 
feeling was the three volume Institutes of Natural and Revealed Religion, 
published between 1772 and 1774. It is clear that he considered that 
systematic communication was heuristically important: 
The great object of a minister's chief attention being thus fixed, 
viz. upon the younger, and more teachable part of his congregation, 
it remains to be considered in what manner their instruction may 
be best provided for. Now it appears to me, that the only effectual 
provision for this purpose is a course of regular and systematical 
instruction. Every branch of knowledge is built on certain facts 
and principles; and in order that these be fully and clearly under-
stood, they must be delivered in a proper order, so that one thing 
may most naturally introduce another. In other words, no branch 
of knowledge, religion not excepted, can be taught to advantage but 
in the way of system. Frightful as this word may sound, it 
signifies nothing but an orderly and regular se-t of principles, 
beginning with the easiest, and ending with the most difficult, 
which, in this manner, are the most easily demonstrated. No person 
would ever think of teaching Law or Medicine, or any other branch 
of science in the manner in which religion is now generally taught; 
and as no person ever acquired a competent knowledge of Law, 
Medicine, or any other science by hearing declamatory discourses upon 
the· _subject; so neither can we reasonably expect that a just and 
comprehensive knowledge of religion should ever be communicated in 
the same loose and incoherent manner. 1 
Priestley had already discussed the nature of persuasion in the lectures on 
Oratory which he had given at Warrington, and which were to be published in 
1. _I_n_s_t_i_t_u_t_e_s_. _ _..;.V..;.o_l_ •....;;.r. p. xxxi. 
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1777. It was traditional to regard oratory as an art, but Priestley 
could not be happy with the idea that attitudes of persons might be un-
naturally manipulated by the techniques of presentation which treatises 
on oratory conventionally described. 2 At the beginning of his lectures 
Priestley insisted that the art of communication was dependent on prior 
knowledge: 
It may not be amiss, at the entrance upon these Lectures upon 
Oratory and Criticism, to premise one caution; which is, that we 
must not expect too much from the art; since this can do little 
for us in comparison of what must be the fruit of our own previous 
application to science. The art of oratory can only consist of 
rules for the proper use of those materials which must be acquired 
from various study and observation, of which, therefore, unless a 
person be possessed, no art of oratory can make him an orator. 3 
It was essential to have a corpus of knowledge to communicate. Priestley's 
commitment to associationism made it inevitable that he should believe 
that the way in which an individual accumulated knowledge would also be the 
way in which another individual might progress towards the same knowledge. 
The process of communication was nothing other than the repetition of 
one's own thought-process for the benefit of others. Oratory might 
provide artificial rules of communication, but these were only rational-
isations of what would naturally occur without rules. Discussing 
'recollection' and 'invention' in the fourth lecture on oratory, Priestley 
observes: 
What is recollection but the introduction of one idea into the 
mind by means of another with which it was previously associated? 
Are not ideas associated by means of their connection with, and 
relation to one another? And is it not very possible that 
2. For a conventional treatise, to which Priestley refers, see J. Ward (B. C) • 
3. Lectures on Oratory. p. 2. 
particular ideas may be recollected by means of general ideas, 
which include them? 
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It is impossible to endeavour to recollect (or, as we generally 
say, invent) materials for a discourse, without running over in 
our minds such general heads of discourse as we have found by 
experience to assist us in that operation. It is even impossible 
to conceive in what other manner a voluntary effort to invent, or 
recollect, can be directed. A person may not have recourse to 
any particular list, or enumeration, of topics; or he may never 
have heard of the artificial distribution of them by rhetoricians; 
but if he compose at all, though he may be ignorant of the~, 
he must be possessed of the thing.4 
Priestley moved so far away from artificial manipulation that he was able 
to argue for spontaneity of delivery, since the less rational control that 
occurred, the more likely it would be that natural thought processes might 
be conveyed from person. to person: 
It may, likewise, be of service to add, that it is very possible 
a writer may cramp his faculties, and injure his productions, by 
too great a scrupulosity in the first composition. That close 
attention to a subject which composition requires, unavoidably 
warms the imagination: then ideas crowd upon us, the mind hastens, 
as it were, into the midst of things, and is impatient till those 
strong conceptions be expressed. In such a situation, to reject 
the first, perhaps loose and incorrect thoughts, is to reject a 
train of just and valuable thoughts, that would follow by their 
connexion with them, and to embarrass and impoverish the whole 
work. Whenever, therefore, we begin t o feel the ardour of 
composition, it is most adviseable to indulge it freely, and leave 
little proprieties to be adjusted at our leisure. 
Besides, if we would wish to communicate to our readers those 
strong sensations that we feel in the ardour. of composition, we 
must endeavour to express them whole of our sentiments and 
4. Ibid. p. 22. 
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sensations, in the very order and connexion in which they 
actually presented themselves to us at that time. For, such is 
the similarity of a ll human minds, that when the same appearances 
are presented to another person, his mind will, in general, be 
equally struck and affected with them, and the composition wi ll 
appear to him to be natural and animated. Whereas, if, in 
consequence of an ill-judged scrupulosity and delay, we once lose 
sight of any part of that train of ideas with which our own minds 
were so warmed and interested, it may be impossible to recover 
it: and perhaps no other train of ideas, thought, separately 
taken, they may appear to be better adapted to the subject, may 
have the same power to excite those sensations with whi ch we would 
wish to composition might be read. Whatever these sensations be, 
they will be the same with those with which the composition was 
written; it being almost impossible to counterfeit successfully 
in such a case as this. As, therefore, we wish to affect and 
interest the minds of our readers, we should endeavour, without 
losing time in examining every thing with a minute exactness, to 
express the whole state of our own minds while they are thus 
affected and interested. 
advantage afterwards.5 
Correction will be employed with more 
This was not only considered to be true of the communication of thoughts 
from person to person, but also of the communication of 'facts• - the nearer 
the form of communication mirrored the form of what was being communicated, 
the more satisfactory was the transmission of information likely to be. 
This was a psychological truth for Priestley. Hence it was wise for 
historians to mirror in their narratives the actual chronological sequence 
of facts: 
If the view of the historian be simply to communicate information, 
and he be desirous to. do it in such a manner as to give it the 
easiest admission into the mind, and leave the most lasting 
impression upon the memory, his general endeavour must be to give 
5. Ibid. P• 31. 
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as clear and just an idea as possible of the most striking 
relations that the ideas he exhibits bear to one another; since 
it is by means of their mutual relations that ideas introduce one 
another, and cohere, as it were, in the mind. 
In general, the order of nature, or of their real existence, will 
be found to be, at the same time, both the easiest, and, in every 
respect, the best manner of reciting them, viz. the order of time 
for events, and that of place, for the subjects of what is called 
natural history. 6 
In order to impart some theories, Priestley claimed that it might be most 
effective to recapture descriptively the process of discovery rather than 
to attempt to convey the accomplished theory. Priestley called this 
technique the analytical method, and its opposite - the direct presentation 
of a completed theory, the synthetic method. 
explained this terminology: 
In the seventh lecture he 
The greatest difficulty, in point of method, is found in properly 
arranging t he parts of an argument, so as _ to give them the most 
weight, and encrease the degree of evidence resulting from the 
whole, by the aptness of their order and connexion. 
Logicians speak of two kinds of method in argumentative 
discourses, the analytic and the synthetic; and the distribution 
is complete and acfurate. For, in all science, we either proceed 
from particular observations to more general conclusions, which is 
analysis; or, beginning with more general and comprehensive pro-
positions, we descend to the particular propositions which are 
contained in them, which is synthesis. 
In . the former method we are obliged to proceed in our investigation 
of truth; for it is only by comparing a number of particular 
observations which are self-evident, that we perceive any analogy 
in effects, which leads us to apprehend an uniformity in their 
cause, in the knowledge of which all science consists. In the 
latter method it is generally more convenient _ to explain a system 
Ibid. p. 33. 
of science to others. For, in general, those truths which were 
the result of our own inquiry, may be made as intelligible to 
others as those by which we arrived at the knowledge of them; and 
it is easier to show how one general principle comprehends the 
particulars comprized under it, than to trace all those particulars 
to one that comprehends them all. 
On the other hand, the analytic method is properly to communicate 
truth to others in the very manner in which it was discovered; and 
first discoveries are generally the result of such a laborious and 
minute examination, as is, in its own nature, a slow and tedious 
procedure. Is it not much readier to take the right key at first, 
and open a number of locks, than begin with examining the locks, and 
after trying several keys that will open one or two of them only, 
at last to produce that which will open them all? 
Notwithstanding this, in theories not perfectly ascertained, or 
with regard to sentiments not generally admitted, it may be 
adviseable to inform others in the method of analysis; because then, 
beginning with no principles or positions but what are common, and 
universally allowed, we may lead others insensibly, and without 
shocking their prejudices, to the right conclusion. It is as if 
the persons we are instructing did themselves mate all the 
observations, and, after trying every hypothesis, find that none 
would answer except that which we point out to them. 
is more tedious, but perhaps more sure.7 
This method 
Priestley was aware that most theological presentations tended to be 
synthetic: 
A great variety of modern treatises upon moral subject, in whi ch 
mankind are far from being agreed, have lately been written in the 
analytic method, as best suited to the infant state of the science. 
The science of theology hath been, perhaps, too precipitately 
handled in the method of synthesis, or systematically; and several 
ingenious persons, being aware of it, have gone back, and have begun 
again in the more cautious method of analytical inquiry.
8 
7. Ibid. P• 42. 
8. Ibid. P• 44. 
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Priestley was himself uncertain of the method of communication to use for 
theological information, because he was uncertain of the factual basis of 
the material that he wished to communicate. Was the theological world-
view that he believed was a necessary basis for moral behaviour, a fact, a 
theory, or a fiction? 
Priestley was well aware that created fictions - systems which could 
not be verified, might be morally potent forces. He was sufficiently 
conscious of the influence of fictions to advise that close attention should 
be paid to the reading of the young: 
These observations relating to the vivid representation of objects, 
show us the importance of a discreet use of fiction, and works of 
imagination, for the cultivation of the human heart. The heart is 
instructed chiefiy by its own feelings. It is of consequence, 
therefore, how they are directed, and it cannot be a matter of 
indifference what tales and novels are put into the hands of 
children and youth.9 
Priestley was inclined to claim that methods of persuasion were used 
distinctly to influence either the passions or the judgnient. At the end 
of the second Part of the Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, he writes: 
I would observe, at the conclusion of this part of the course, that 
the whole use of topics and of the disposition of them, hitherto 
explained, hath for its object and end the informing of the 
judgment, and influencing the practice, and that this is the only 
dire~t and proper, at least the ultimate end of oratory. The 
pleasure that a discourse may give to the imagination, or the 
emotion it may raise in the passions, are things that are brought 
about more indirectly, being effected by the manner in which things 
that tend ultimately to convince and persuade are expressed. The 
orator may, indeed, intend to please or affect his hearers; but, if 
he understands himself, he only means to influence their judgments, 
or resolutions, by the medium of the imagination or the passions.
10 
9. Ibid. P• 83. 
10. Ibid. p. 68. 
But Priestley could not avoid having to accept that an emotional response 
might preponderate over a rational one, with the result that it could not 
be denied that fiction was often significantly more affective than true 
history: 
The faithful historian, and the writer of romances, having the 
same accress to the springs of the human passions, it is no wonder 
that the latter generally moves them more forcibly, since he hath 
the choice of every circumstance that contributes to raise them; 
whereas the former hath nothing in his power but the disposition 
of them, and is restricted even in that. I fancy, however, that 
no person of reading and observation can doubt of the fact, that 
more tears have been shed, and more intense joy hath been expressed 
in the perusal of novels, romances, and feigned tragedies, than 
in reading all the true histories in the world. Who ever, upon 
any occurrence in real history, ever felt what he must feel in 
reading Clarissa, George Barnwell, Eloisa, and many other well-
contrived fictions. It is to no purpose to say to ourselves, 
"This is all a fiction, why am I thus affected?" if we read, and 
form an idea of the scenes there exhibited, we must feel in spi te 
of ourselves. The thought of its being a fiction enables us to 
make but a feeble and ineffectual effort to repress our feelings, 
when the ideas which excite them are very strong and vivid.
11 
At the same time, the doctrine of association caused Priestley to believe 
that any strong emotional response was probably evidence for the reality 
or the truth of the stimulus. 
appear to be indistinguishable: 
Judged affectively, fact and fiction might 
Vivid ideas and strong emotions, therefore, having been, through 
life, a ssociated with reality, it is easy to imagine that, upon 
the perception of the proper feelings, the associated idea of 
reality will likewise recur, and adhere to it as usual; unless 
the emotion be combined with such other ideas and circumstances 
as have had as strong an association with fiction. In this case 
11. I bid. p. 80. 
I 
I 
I 
/, 
1: 
I 
39 
the absurdity and impossibility of the scene precludes assent; 
and at the same time, by taking away the associated circumstance, 
it greatly weakens the original impression. But, while the 
impressions remain vivid, and no certain marks of fiction appear, 
the idea of reality will occur; that is, the mind will find 
itself strongly inclined to believe the scene to be real. 
12 
In the Lectures on History and General Policy, Priestley argued that the 
appeal of fiction to the passions was gradually corrected by judgm.ent based 
on wider human experience - that the emotional acceptance of fiction as 
truth was peculiar to the young and was counter-acted by the judgment of 
the adult. In this work he assesses the merits of fact and fiction rather 
more favourably for true history than in the Lectures on Oratory and 
Criticism: 
Let a person of taste, and just sentiment, read the history of the 
life of Cicero written by Middleton, the conquest of Mexico, or 
the voyage of Commodore Anson, or even such larger works as the 
history of Herodotus, Thucyaides, Livy, Philip de Commines, &tc. 
and then judge. If the amazing and interesting scenes of fiction 
be worked up with more art, be more happily disposed to excite and 
interest the passions, and be more agreeably diversified with proper 
episodes, the very thought that it is fiction (the influence of 
which grows with our years) makes that artful disposition, those 
embellishments, necessary; whereas the mere thought that we are 
list~ning to the voice of truth is able to keep the attention awake 
through many a dry and ill digested narrative of facts.
13 
The assumption here is not that passionate and judging responses are 
different in kind, but that the wider experience of 'reality' of the adult 
causes him to reject certain systems of thought as 'unreal' which might still 
correspond with the limited experience of the 'real' of a child. The 
reality of a system, in other words, is pragmcl,tically assessed and, 
12. Ibid. P• 89. 
13. Lectures on History. p. 6. 
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apparently, has no absolute foundation. The appearance of truth and 
reality can be given by inducing emotions which are connected with those 
ideas in other contexts. For the purpose of gaining assent, self-
consistency of presentation is very important. 
Lectures on Oratory and Criticism: 
Priestley writes in the 
If, however, the fiction be consistent with itself, and be natural 
upon any uniform principles, or suppositions, so that it shall 
require only one single effort of the imagination to conceive the 
existence of the imaginary beings and powers, and the ideas of 
inconsistency and contradiction do not frequently occur through 
the course of the narration, to destroy the illusion; a reader of 
a lively turn of mind, though of good discernment, may enter into 
the scene, and receive great pleasure from the performance. But 
still, in consequence of a thousand reiterated associations, all 
representations of things not founded on nature and truth will grow 
less and less interesting as men advance in life. Even those 
fictions which most nearly resemble truth, have but little power 
of amusing persons of great age and reflection. And that stories 
in which are introduced such imaginary beings as the heathen gods, 
fairies, genies, necromancers, and the like, retain their power of 
amusing persons of reading and taste so long as they do, may be 
ascribed to the impressions made by them upon such persons in their 
very early years; by means of which the scenes in which they are 
exhibited are rendered much more vivid, and consequently have 
stronger associations with reality than they would have had, if 
thos.e persons had not been made acquainted with them, till they 
had been capable of perceiving their absurdity. 14 
Not only does Priestley recognize the force of a systematically formal 
presentation, but he also goes as far as to suggest that the convictions 
alone of the speaker can be sufficient to achieve an assenting response 
in the listener. The doctrine of association is again responsible for 
this denigration of the content which is actually communicated from 
14. Lectures on Oratory . p . 90. 
person to person: 
Every act of persuasion founded upon nature, and really tending 
to engage belief, must consist of such forms of address as are 
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. natural to a person who is himself strongly convinced of the truth 
and importance of what he contends for; who is conscious that he 
is perfectly master of his subject, and acquainted with every thing 
that can be advanced for or against the question in debate; who 
is possessed even of a redundancy of proof for what he advances; 
and who is, moreover, perfectly candid and unprejudiced, willing 
to allow all the weight he can to the pleas of his adversaries. 
From the principle of sympathy, which is na tural to the human 
mind, we universally feel ourselves disposed to conform to the 
feelings, the sentiments, and every thing belonging to the situation 
of those we converse with, and particularly of all those persons 
who engage much of our attention. If, therefore, no prejudice 
intervene, we always feel ourselves more or less disposed to adopt 
the opinions of those persons with whom we have frequent inter-
course. Consequently, we are, in all cases, more disposed to give 
our assent to any proposition, if we perceive that the person who 
contends for it is really in earnest, and believes it himself. 
Indeed, prior to our hearing any arguments, we are naturally 
inclined to suppose, that a strong conviction and persuasion in 
other persons could not be produced without a sufficient cause; 
from being sensible that a like strong persuasion is founded upon 
sufficient reasons in ourselves. The ideas of strong persuasion 
and of truth being, on this account, intimately associated together, 
the one will introduce the other, so that whatever manner of address 
tend_s to demonstrate that the advocate for any opinion is really 
convinced of it himself, tends to propagate that conviction. 15 
It is clear from the above passages taken from Priestley's writing that he 
was concerned with communication as a process, and also that he was unable 
to make a pragmatic distinction between fact and fiction. Nevertheless, 
it was important for him that a •truth' other than one defined by human 
15. Ibid. P• 108. 
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association should be isolated. The attempt to discriminate between fact 
and fiction by reference to their affects may have failed, but it was 
still a discrimination that Priestley anxiously seemed to want to effect. 
He confidently distinguished, for instance, between the study of the 
inherent system of nature and the study of the human attempts to impose a 
system upon that existing analoguous order. Priestley tried to use a 
distinction between systematic 'facts• and systematic fictional descriptions 
of fact. This division is made most clear in the Preface to the History 
of Electricity, where Priestley discusses the different pleasures to be 
derived from the study of 'civil, natural, and philosophical history'. In 
na tural history we perceive the analogy already inherent in things: 
Natural history exhibits a boundless variety of scenes, and yet 
infinitely analoguous to one another. A naturalist has, 
consequently, all the pleasure which the contemplation of 
uniformity and variety can give the mind; and this is one of the 
most copious sources of our intellectual pleasures. But he 
had no direct view of human sentiments and human actions; which, 
by means of their endless associations, greatly heighten and 
improve all the pleasures of taste. 16 
In philosophy, however, we are, in addition, able to enjoy the study of 
the systems devised by men in an attempt to match or mirror the natural 
order: 
Philosophy exhibits the powers of nature, discovered and directed 
by human art: it has, therefore, in some measure, the boundless 
variety with the amazing uniformity of the one, and likewise 
every thing that is pleasing and interesting in the other. And 
the idea of continual rise and improvement is conspicuous in the 
whole study, whether we be attentive to the part which nature, or 
that which men are acting in the great scene. 17 
16. History of Electricity. p. iii. 
17. Ibid. p. iv. 
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Just as Priestley's account of the •art' of oratory suggested that it 
imposes rules on a natural process, so his account of the relation between 
•words' and 'things' in general implied t ha t the whole of human systematic 
endeavour might consist in seeking to offer superfluous explanations of 
what naturally occurs regardless of human linguistic description. 
Priestley reveals this apparent skepticism most clearly in his An 
Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry. 
work, he writes: 
In the introductory essay to that 
Words are of great use in t he business of t hinking, but are not 
necessary to it. In like manner though ,· the knowledge of logic 
is not without its use, it is by no means necessary for the 
purpose of reasoning . And as the doctrine of syllogisms was 
deduced from observations on reasoning, just as other theories 
are deduced from facts previously known; so the doctrine of 
propositions and judgment was deduced from observations on the 
coincidence of ideas, which took place antecedent to any know-
ledge of t ha t kind. 
There is hardly any thing to which we give the name of opinion, 
or belief, that does not require some degree of abstraction, and 
knowledge of what passes within the mind . And the common actions 
of life, which may be analized into opinions and reasoning , and 
which discover what we sagacity in a very high degree, may be 
performed without any such thing , that is without any explicit 
knowledge of such mental affections and operations. Let us, for 
an example of t his, take the belief of an external world. This 
is thought to be universal; and yet it appears to me to be very 
possible, not only that the lower animals , but even that children 
may not have reflected so much as that, properly s peaking, they 
can be said to have formed any such opinion. 18 
It is not j ust that our behaviour is unself-conscious, for the powers of 
18. An Examination of Dr. Reid's Inquiry. p. xlviii. 
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nature in the external world are seen to be equally independent of our 
knowledge of them. Having explained the process of human perception a 
little later in the same essay, Priestley continues: 
This kind of knowledge is gained by observation and experiment, 
as much as the theory of the eye and of light, though we ourselves 
are the subject of the observations and experiments. And our 
thinking and acting, in the conduct of life, is as much independent 
of this branch of knowledge, as the powers of air and light are 
independent of our knowledge of them. 19 
There would seem to be a disparity between physical processes and the 
systematic language we use to describe them. In Priestley's remarks on 
the writings of another philosopher of the Scottish Common-sense School -
])r, Beattie, which form part of the Examination, he is prepared to accept 
that the disparity does apply to his own doctrine of necessity. He 
argues: 
It is true that, strictly s peaking , the doctrine of necessity 
would oblige a man to depart from the common language in speaking 
of human actions; but this makes no change with respect to his 
conduct. The very same is the case with respect to the doctrine 
of the sun standing still. Philosophers use the language of the 
vulgar with respect to this subject, and even think with them too, 
except in their closets, and when they are explicitly attending to 
it. Copernicus and Newton themselves, I will venture to say , not 
only talked of the sun rising and setting, but, in their ordinary 
conceptions, had the very same ideas t hat a common farmer annexes 
to those words. So also it is impossible that, with respect to 
common life, a necessarian should have any other ideas to the words 
praise and blame (which however are equa lly foreign to both the 
schemes of liberty and necessity, philosophically and strictly 
considered) tha n other people have, and he will be influenced as 
much by t hem. And as to t he different views t hat he will be able 
19 , Ibid. p, lvii, 
-to take of these things in contemplation, they appear to me only 
to remove virtue from one foundation to place it upon another, 
much broader and firmer. Our conduct depends not upon what we 
't t' t b b t h t 't 11 · 20 think our consti u ion o e, u upon w a i rea y is. 
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It might appear from Priestley's description of t he gulf between fact and 
human description of fact, t hat he believed that the nature of things is 
be;yond hwnan perception, and that the knowledge of t he nature of things is 
of little importance for moral persuasion. It would be wrong , however, to 
think of Priestley as a skeptic. The true situation is very different. 
Priestley saw the natural order of t hings as the systematic 
presentation of God. Nature a nd human history , t herefore, were already 
conceptual systems designed by God for the purpose of exhorting men to 
righteousness and to happiness. God's language wa s as unreliable as 
explanation as man's. Human language in communication between persons 
mi ght seem remote from physical facts, but in the wider, divine perspective, 
physical facts themselves fulfilled the function of language between God 
and man. There was no need to be perplexed by the inability of men to 
understand -f ully the nature of things, since the 'nature of things' itself 
was only the systematic device used by God to conmunicate with man, and, 
hence, the information transmitted was of no importance in comparison with 
the sympathy between the communicator and the recipient. What were 'facts' 
lurking behind the fictions of human language we r e themselves fictions with 
no apparent 'factual' antecedent. The conviction and sincere intention 
of the communicator were sufficient evidences of t he truth of the 
communication. Just as the conviction of a person was taken to stimulate 
a comparable assent and conviction whatever the content of his proposi tion , 
so God's intention to realise human happiness, which, for Priestley , was 
20. Ibid . p. 178. 
by defini tion His intention, enforced imitation whatever might be the 
content of the manifestation of tha t intention. Just as Priestley found 
it impossible to distinguish between the factuality or otherwise of human 
statements except on pragmatic grounds, with the result tha t they could not 
be susceptible to rational examination, so he could not, in t hese same 
terms, find any justification for the posi tivist examination of the language 
of God - nature and human history. 
In discussing the moral government of the universe by God through 
general laws in the first volume of the Institutes, Priestley wrote: 
It may be said, that we might have been differently constituted, 
so as to have been happy i n a world not governed by general laws, 
and not liable to partial evi l s. But there i s no end of these 
suppositions, which, for any thing that we can tell, may be, in 
their own nature, impossible. All that we can do, in these 
difficult speculations, is to consider the connections and 
tendencies of things as they now are; and if we see reason to 
conclude that, ceteris manentibus, nothing could be changed for 
the better, we may also conclude that the system itself could not 
be changed for a better; since the same wisdom that has so 
perfectly adapted the various parts of the same scheme, so as to 
make it productive of the mos t happiness, may well be supposed to 
have made choice of the scheme itself, as calculated to contain 
the most happiness. Even divine power cannot produce 
impossibilities; and for any thing that we know, it may be as 
naturally impossible to execute any scheme free from the 
inconveniences, that we complain of in this, as that two and two 
should make more than four. 21 
Priestley describes a God who presented a patural system which was as 
consistent within itself as was possible, but he also describes a God who 
made the best possible choice in deciding to reveal. himself systematically. 
As a communicator, Priestley also chose a systematic presentation because 
21. I nstitutes. Vol. I . p. 30. 
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he recognised that it would be the most effective mode of persuasion, and 
he also chose to offer a rational system which was as self-consistent as 
possible. Priestley was prepared to accept that God might have been under 
some restraint in choosing his scheme, but his own restraints were 
different and especial ones. For Priestley saw himself as a communicator 
of God's prior communication, with the result that he was forced to regard 
himself as both the de-coder and the re-coder of the Divine message. 
Priestley's systematisation in the Institutes, therefore, faces two 
directions, and the very same arguments in the Lectures on Oratory which 
indicate the force of systematic presentation as exhortation must cause 
skepticism when the recipient of Divine exhortation offers his under-
standing of the message either as explanation or as secondary exhortation. 
The dominant feature of the Institutes is the sys tematic integration 
which it offers of Natural and Revealed Religion. The validity of either 
the natural science or the Biblical exegesis is secondary. Gradually , 
however, Priestley came to see that the analysis of natural history and 
civil history might be of interest without reference to any superior and 
already existing divinely providential system. The burden shifted from 
God to man as systematiser. Priestley gradually ceased to gesture 
towards a divinely ordered system of nature which was empirically un-
verifiable., but, instead, became involved in positivist analysis whi ch 
caused him to create cautiously his own systematisation by abstraction 
from I facts' • Pries tley's systematic effort became less mimetic and more 
creative. It is t his alteration in the relation between the systematic 
content of his wri ting and the 'system of nature' that I shall now 
examine. 
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CHAPTER III 
Systematic Content and Explanation 
The first volume of the Institutes of Natural and Revealed Re l igion, 
published in 1772, was subtitled: "The Elements of Natural Religion". The 
first part of the volume is headed: "Of t he Being and Attributes of God". 
The development of the argument under this heading is important but 
straightforward. Priestley begins by discussion "the existence of God, 
and those attributes which are deduced from his being considered as un-
caused himself, and the cause of every thing else." Here Priestley claims 
that it is inconceivable that the universe could have existed without a 
cause. In the course of his argument, for instance, he attacks the 
Epicurean cosmogony: 
It was said, by the Epicureans of old, that all things were formed 
by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, t hat , originally, there were 
particles of all kinds floating at random in infinite space; and 
that, since certain combinations of particles constitute all bodies, 
and since, in infinite time, these particles must have been 
combined in all possible ways, the present system at length arose, 
without any designing cause. But, still, it may be asked, how 
could these atoms move without a mover; and what could have 
arisen from their combinations, but mere heaps of matter, of 
different forms and sizes. They could, of themselves, have had 
no power of acting upon one another, as bodies now have, by such 
properties as magnetism, electricity, gravitation, Etc. unless 
these powers had been communicated to them by some superior 
b . 1 eing. 
He then proceeds to a discussion of "those attributes of the deity which 
are deduced from the consideration of his being the original cause of all 
things," and, . from here to a description of "those attributes of the divine 
1. Institutes. Vol. I. p. 10. 
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being which the consideration of his works leads us to ascribe to him." 
The transition in argument from a deduction from the divine 'being ' to a 
deduction from the •consideration of his works' is vitally important, and 
is briefly effected in the follqwing passage: 
That God is immaterial, eternal, and immutable, follows necessarily, 
as we have seen, from his being uncaused; but if we consider the 
effects of which he is the cause, or, in other words, the works of 
which he is the author, we shall be led to ascribe to him other 
attributes, particularly those of power, wisdom, and goodness; 
and consequently all the attributes which are necessarily connected 
wi t h , or flow from them. 2 
A progression has occurred from a predominantly a priori argument to a 
seemingly empirical one. The argument from t he necessity of a first cause 
that must, in order to avoid an infinite regress, itself be uncaused, has 
swiftly developed into an argument from the design of the universe. 
Priestley writes: 
We see the greatest wisdom in the variation of the seasons of the 
year in the same place, in the provision that is made for watering 
as well as warming the soil, so as to prepare it for the growth of 
the various kinds of vegetables that derive their nourishment from 
it. The wisdom of God appears in adapting the constitutions of 
vegetables and animals to the climates they were intended to 
inhabit, in giving all animals the proper means of providing their 
food, and the necessary powers either of attacking others, or 
securing themselves by flight, or some other method of evading the 
pursuit of their enemies.3 
Equally, Priestley argues from the providential design of human history in 
which he finds a progression towards happiness: 
The designs of such a being as this, who cannot be controlled in 
the execution of any of his purposes, woul d be very obvious to us 
2. Ibid. p. 18 . 
3. Ibid. p. 34. 
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if we could comprehend his works, or see the issue of them ; but 
this we cannot do with respect to the works of God, which are both 
incomprehensible by our finite understandings, and also are not 
yet compleated; for as far as they are subject to our inspection, 
they are evidently in a progress to something more perfect. Yet 
from the subordinate parts of this great machine of the universe, 
which we can in some measure understand, and which are compleated; 
and also from the manifest tendency of things, we may safely 
conclude, t hat the great design of the divine being, in all the 
works of his hands, was to produce happiness . 
That the world is in a state of improvement is very evident in 
the human s pecies, which is the most distinguished part of it. 
Knowledge, and a variety of improvements depending upon knowledge 
(all of whi ch are directly or indirectl y subservient to happiness) 
have been increasing from the time of our earliest acquaintance 
with history to the present; and in the last century this progress 
has been amazingly rapid. By means of increasing commerce, the 
valuable productions of the earth become more equally distributed, 
and by improvements in agriculture they are continually multiplied 
to the great advantage of the whole family of mankind.4 
The emphasis on the tendency towards beneficence in the universe is not 
empirical._ It is based on the assumption of the benevolence of the deity. 
Nature and history are assessed in a pseudo-empirical manner in order to 
support a moral contention. Priestley acknowledges that a shift in 
emphasis has occurred, and, in the following passage, he locates the 
difference between a 'natural' and a 'moral' argument: 
The power and wisdom of God, together with those attributes which 
are derived from them, and also t hose which are deduced from his 
being considered as an uncaused being, may be termed his natural 
perfections; whereas his benevolence, and t hose other attributes 
which are deduced from it, are more properly termed his moral 
4. I bid. P• 19. 
perfections; because they lead to such conduct as determines 
what we commonly call moral character in men.5 
51 
Priestley also admits that, finally, the 'moral character' of God cannot 
be deduced from Nature, but rather from the scriptural revelation of 
Himself: 
Upon the whole, it must be acknowledged, that it is but a very 
imperfect idea that we can form of the moral perfections of God 
from the light of nature. 
an idea of his character. 
It hardly amounts to what may be called 
We know nothing of God by the light of 
nature, but through the medium of his works; and these are such 
, 
as we cannot fully comprehend; both the efficient and the final 
causes being, in many cases, unknown to us: whereas the clearer 
i deas we have of the characters of men are acquired from a 
reflection upon such parts of their conduct as we can both fully 
comprehend, and are capable of ourselves; so that we can tell 
precisely how we should feel and be disposed, if we acted in the 
same manner. The knowledge, also, of the manner in which men 
express t hemselves, upon known occasions, is a great help to us in 
judging of what they feel, a nd consequently in investigating their 
proper character; and this is an advantage of -which we are 
intirely destitute, with respect to God, on the principles of the 
light of nature. It is from revelation chiefly, if not only, 
that we get a just idea of what we may call the proper character 
of t he divine being. There we may both hear his declarations, 
and see various specimens of his conduct, wi th respect to a variety 
of persons and occasions; by which means we have the best 
opportunity of entering, as it were, into his sentiments, per-
ceiving his disposition, learning what are the objects of his 
approbation or dislike, in short, of gaining a proper and distinct 
6 idea of his moral character. 
Hence, in the crucial exposition of Natural Religion in volume I of the 
Institutes, Priestley seems to prepare the way for his exposition of the 
5. Ibid. P• 56. 
Ibid. P• 63. 
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supplementary significance of Revelation in the second and third volumes . 
But the phrase "It is from revelation chiefly, if not only •.• " indicates 
a deep uncertainty, and the word 'revelation' itself causes difficulties 
by its occasionally imprecise use. For the root of Priestley's un-
certainty is the problem whether God reveals His 'moral character' in His 
works as well as in the Scriptures, and, if so, whether that 'revelation' 
is direct through miraculous intervention, or secondary by means of 
general laws. 
In volume I, Priestley had insisted that Natural Religion deduc tions 
can now be hypothetically made, although it is a fact that historically 
they were not made: 
In order t o give the most distinct view of the principles of 
religion, I shall first explain what it is that we learn from 
nature, and then what farther lights we receive from revelation. 
But it must be observed, that, in giving a delineation of natural 
religion, I shall deliver what I suppose !D!i.ght have been known 
concerning God, our duty, and our future expectations by the light 
of nature, and not what was actually known of them by any of the 
human race; for these are very different things. Many things are, 
in their own nature, attainable, whi ch, in fact, are never 
attained; so that though we find but little of the knowledge of 
God, and of his providence, in many nations, which never enjoyed 
the light of revelation, it does not follow that na ture did not 
contain and teach those lessons, and that men had not the means of 
learning them, provided they had made the most of the light they 
had, and of the powers that were given them.7 
The opening part of volume II is devoted t ,o a demonstration that monotheism 
was the original religion of man, but that this primitive purity of belief 
was corrupted by human speculation so that God was forced to intervene to 
reveal his true self. Priestley tries to prove that revelation was 
7. Ibid. P• 3. 
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historically necessary because human reason was and is inadequate without 
aid. At the beginning of this attempt, Priestley writes: 
Persons who begin to think upon these subjects when they are 
arrived to years of maturity, and who find in themselves a ful l 
persuasion concerning the great truths of natural religion, con-, 
cerning the being of God, the unity of his nature, and his moral 
character and government; as also concerning the rule of human 
duty, and the doctrine of a future state, do not sufficiently 
consider how they came by that knowledge; and thinking the whole 
system to be very rational and natural, they are apt to conclude 
that it must therefore have been very obvious, and that all the 
particulars of it could not but have been known to all mankind. 
But, in fact, there is no man living whose knowledge of these 
subjects was not derived from instruction, and the information of 
others; and t herefore there is no man living who, from his own 
sense of things and experience, can be deemed a competent judge of 
what the powers of his own nature are able to do in this case. 
For the solution of this important question, we must have recourse 
to history only, and see what mankind have in fact attained to in 
a variety of circumstances. 8 
Priestley asserts that unguided reason could not have attained a knowledge 
of God in the past, and that, equally in the present a priori knowledge is 
inadequate if it exists at all. Priestley strongly denies here that the 
capacity of reason was any more restricted in the case of ancient than of 
modern thinkers. After describing some of the corruptions of theology 
in ancient -times, Priestley comments: 
It will be said that such a religion, and such philosophy, wer e 
the produce of an early age; and t hat it may be presumed that, in 
time, men would have formed juster notions of the attributes and 
moral government of God, have attained to a steady and practical 
dependance upon him, and have expressed their devotional sentiments 
by proper acts of homage. But we shall be obliged to abandon this 
8 . I nstitutes. ~olume II . p . 4. 
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flattering idea, when we consider what has been advanced upon 
these subjects by philosophers of a more enlightened age, who have 
abandoned revelation, and have pretended, at least, to be guided, 
by nature only. 
Mr. Hobbes says, that whatever is incorporeal is nothing at all, 
and he makes religion a business of the state only. Mr. Hume 
subverts the very foundation of all our reasoning from effects to 
causes, so that from what we see round us, we cannot with certainty 
infer an intelligent author.9 
The misguided reasoning of modern thinkers is given as evidence that God 
must have interposed historically, but not, as we shall see, as evidence 
t ha t God must still intervene directly to rectify human errors. Priestley 
does not want to say tha t Divine interposition is still necessary because 
he does want to assume that natural religion deductions can validly be 
made in the present on the premise of the uniformity of general natural 
law. Hence, to preserve the possibility of actually making the deductions 
of the first volume rather than suggesting deductions which 'might have 
been' made, Priestley mus t deny that there can now be any miraculous divine 
intervention. At the same time, so as to preserve the status of 
Revelation, Priestley has to admit that there were miraculous interventions 
in the past because the pretended 'might have been' of rational deduction 
was never actual. Priestley ca n easily solve this problem by asserting 
t hat God is free to change his mind in deciding how he should act in his 
universe, but it is less easy to maintain a belief in the uniformity of 
human nature, the unchangeability of man's .rational powers. 
On several occasions Priestley indicates that it is not incompatible 
with a belief in the power of God to accept that direct divine inter-
position in nature has now ceased. I n defending miracles in Part II of 
9 . Ibid. p. 29. 
the second volume, Priestley defends t he right of God to behave as he 
wishes, even though this defence would here imply that in the future God 
may a gain choose to intervene: 
For any thing t hat we know, t herefore, the best of all schemes 
may be that in which the divine agency and interposition are 
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never wholly superseded; and though, as was shown before, it be 
wise, and even necessary to establish general laws, yet occasional 
deviations from them may contribute more to promote the same great 
d th f t .f ·t 10 en an a per ec uni ormi y . 
Priestley makes the same point, sacrificing the uniformity of nature, 
without reference to God when, s hortly afterwar ds, he answers Hume on 
miracles: 
Mr. Hume , indeed, has advanced, that we ought not to listen to 
any evidence in favour of miracles, or of there ever having been 
a departure from the l aws of nature, because every such evidence 
is contradicted by our own constant experience, of the absolute 
uniformity of the laws of nature. 
But, with respect to past facts, this is taking for granted the 
very thing to be proved, because it is asserted by the friends of 
revelation, that the course of nature has not always proceeded 
without interruption, but t hat, for great and good purposes, the 
divine author of it has not confined himself to it, but has 
occasionally departed from it. In reality, t herefore, all that 
Mr. Hume has advanced, with respect to t his case, is t hat t here 
have been no miraculous events because there have been none. At 
least, it is judging from the experience of one age, against the 
express testimony of former ages, and in a case in which there is 
no contradiction between them; since both may be equally true. 
For the course of nature may be perfectly uniform now, and yet 
, 11 
may not have been so, in all cases, formerly . 
Since Priestley does not want to say t ha t Divine interposition is now 
10. Ibid. P• 69. 
11. Ibid. p. 80 . 
necessary, he argues that the evidence of God which supplements human 
reason is adequately provided by historical revelation. 1rl1e essential 
premise of volume II of the Institutes, subtitled "The Evidences of the 
Jewish and Christian Revelations", is that to establish the historicity 
of religious claims is also to establish their timeless validity. As 
Priestley states categorically in the Preface: 
If the bible contains a true history, we can no longer entertain 
the least doubt, or be under any uncertainty, concerning the 
existence, or the moral government of God. We are sure that a 
being of infinite power and wisdom is the author of every thing 
that we behold, that he constantly inspects, and attends to the 
interest of all his creatures, nothing that he has made being at 
any time neglected or overlooked by him; and, more especially, 
that he is influenced by a most intense affection for all his 
rational offspring; that he is good and ready to forgive, and to 
receive into favour all who sincerely repent of the sins they have 
committed, and endeavour to conform to his will for the future. 
If christianity be true, we can entertain no doubt with respect 
to a future life, but are absolutely certain that, though we must 
all die, we shall all be made alive again, that Christ will come, 
by the appointment of God his father, to judge the quick and the 
d d d t . t ~ d" t h" ' 12 ea, an ogive o every man ac~or ing o is worKs. 
The implication of this attitude can be most clear ly seen in a reference 
which Priestley later makes to the claims of Christ himself: 
If there be any truth in history, all this, and much more than 
this, was unquestioably fact. Now, what is there in human nature, 
or in the history of mankihd, that can lead us to imagine that the 
man who could act this part should solemnly assert that he was 
commissioned by God to do it, without really having such a 
. . 13 comrrussion. 
12. Ibid. p. v. 
13. Ibid. P• 191. 
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Priestley is only concerned to establish the conviction of past witnesses, 
regardless of the content of their testimony. Therefore, it is 
essential for him to maintain the authenticity of the records of testimony, 
and, secondly, to argue that human evidence is always reliable - as much 
in the past as in the present. He insists that this is th~ case on 
several occasions, notably when he describes the evidence for the 
authenticity of Christ's mission that is supplied by the response of the 
disciples and the leaders of the Early Church: 
That a few persons might have had their heads turned, and have 
acted in an absurd and unaccountable manner, may be supposed; 
but unless human nature was constituted in a manner quite different 
from what we see and experience at present (which would be much 
more extraordinary than any thing that the scheme of revelation 
requires us to believe) it can never be supposed that so man.y 
persons as actually incurred reproach and persecution, even unto 
death, for the sake of the gospel, at the first promulgation of 
it, should, all of them, for so long a course of time, have been 
so infatuated, as to risk and abandon every thing, without a well 
grounded hope of a sufficient recompense; that is, without a 
rational conviction concerning the resurrection and power of 
Christ. 14 
Priestley attacked the way in which Hume dismissed miracles by placing 
the experience of the present age against the 'express testimony of former 
ages', and here he argues positively that the rational conviction of a 
past age properly forms the basis for the imitation of that conviction in 
the present. Not only does Priestley attack Hume 1 s rejection of the 
testimony of previous ages, but he accepts that testimony with eagerness. 
The reason for such eagerness is simple enough, for the acceptance of 
historically described revelation does not involve the acceptance of 
14. Ibid. P• 117. 
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present interposition in nature, but, instead, simply the rational 
acceptance of evidence for historicity . However, this must mean that 
the authority of Revelation as truly a revelation of the •moral character' 
of God is dependent on precisely the same human rationality that functions 
in natural religion. Priestley readily accepts that the same reasoning 
process is involved in verifying the evidence for historical revelation 
and the evidence for a hypothesis about a natural phenomenon. Priestley 
asks what kind of evidence is proper in order to carry conviction that 
miracles had occurred: 
. ·-~. -
Now the proper evidence that there has been any such interruption 
in the usual course of nature, or that any real miracles have been 
performed, must be the testimony of those who had an opportunity 
of examining the facts, in the same manner as, by our own 
observation, and that of others together, we acquire a knowledge 
of the laws of nature themselves. 
In some respects, however, the evidence of revelation borrows 
aid from other considerations, independent of human testimony, so 
a s to be perfectly similar to the evidence for natural religion. 
The proper evidence for natural religion arises from present 
appearances, the doctrines of it being nothing more than the con-
clusions we draw from them. Could we possibly account for every 
thing t hat we see in the world around us without the supposition 
of an uncaused being, there would have been no foundation for 
natural religion; but not being able to account for what we see 
without supposing the existence and agency of a supreme being, we 
are under a necessity of admitting that there is such a being, 
and consequently of assenting to every other article of natural 
religion. 
In like manner, a variety of present appearances may be 
considered as so many standing evidences of several leading 
articles in revealed religion; because, unless we admit that the 
divine being has interposed in the government of the world, in 
such a manner as the histories of the Jewish and christian 
revelations assert, it is impossible to give a satisfactory account 
of the known state of the world in past and present times; as, 
-
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for instance, that such a system as Judaism should have been 
established, and such a religion as christianity should have had 
that spread in the world, which all history shews that it had, 
in such circumstances as the same history informs us both the 
professors of that religion, and the world in general, then were . 
In fact, the evidence from testimony itself is ultimately the 
same with this, being reduceable to the method of judging from 
known and even present appearances. For the reason why we are 
influenced by it, and act upon it, in any particular case, is that, 
from our knowledge of human nature, we have found that, so 
circumstanced, it never has deceived us; so that human nature 
must be changed before such testimony could be fallacious. For 
the same reason, all historical evidence is ultima tely an appeal 
to present appearances. For if things in time past had not been 
as they represent, the information we now receive concerning them, 
could not have been conveyed to us. 15 
One of Priestley's arguments in support of the contention that 
revelation occurred historically had been that human reason was so in-
adequate alone that Judaism and Christianity could not have developed 
naturally towards their 'present appearances'. Priestley invites the 
deduction from the course of history that God must have intervened in the 
natural universe at historical moments. Priestley is asking for a 
rational deduction that depends on the assumption that historically man 
has been incapable of making accurate deductions. In practice, Priestley 
does not sustain consistency in arguing that human nature has been uniform 
through history. He tacitly works with the assumption that the r eason 
of the present is superior to the reason of the past. The rea son that 
is capable of vindicating revelation by making deductions from human 
history is as capable of dispensing with revelation altogether and of 
making the same deductions , if at all, directly f r om nature. Priestley 
15. Ibid. P• 74. 
relies on the human mind to accept in the present a theological 
explanation of events in human history, whilst he will not allow an 
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identical present explanation of natural phenomena. He is prepared to 
reta in metaphysical assumptions with relation to the phenomena of history, 
but not with relation to the phenomena of nature. Priestley argues that 
human nature is unchanged as a means of establishing the validity of past 
human testimony, but he does not then ask why the present unchanged human 
nature is now safely able to rely on a revelation t hat is mediated by 
reason rather than, as in the past, on revelation itself. The Scriptures 
are authenticated as historical documents by reason. Priestley emphasizes 
a historically mediated revelation so as to avoid the implications of 
present positivism in natural science. But a new systematic effort was 
needed when his attitude to history also became positivist. 
The systematic content of the Institutes involved an attempted 
integration of an understanding of God's personality derived from the 
exercise of natural reason and an understanding derived from the Scripiures 
which contained an account of God's revelation of himS"elf to man in history. 
We have seen t hat Priestley went through the motions of arguing that an 
a priori deduction of God's existence as an uncaused causer was in need 
of support from 'revelation•. We have seen , however, that in fact 
Priestley 's rational a priorism was only supported by an 'empirical' 
attitude towards nature and human history which was as fallible or i n-
fallible in its rationality as the original a priorism, and totally 
dependent on it. The 'argument' was circula r. 
In the Institutes, the relationship between 'cause' and 'effect' was 
important only i n so far as it was the foundation of the a priori deduction 
of natural religion. I t was a logical device which Priestley was willing 
to use to rationalise his conviction that the universe was controlled by 
. ~ . - -
--
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God. He was prepared to be as skeptical about it as such as about any 
other rationalisation. In the History of Electricity, Priestley's 
attitude towards causality is still mentalist as a result of his 
associationism. He writes at the beginning of Part III of that work: 
One of the most intimate of all associations in the human mind is 
that of cause and effect. They suggest one another with the 
utmost readiness upon all occasions; so that it is almost 
impossible to con template the one, without having some idea of, 
or forming some conjecture about the other. 16 
Equally, in the Institutes, Priestley expressed little interest in the 
debate about the materiality or immateriality of God. Priestley expresses 
unconcern here, not simply because, as was later to be entirely the case, 
he considered that it was impossible to say anything about the essence of 
God, but also, perhaps, because he was able to be indifferent since the 
divine materiality or immateriality was of no relevance to the logical 
status of God in his system: 
Since matter i s a substance incapable of moving itself; since it 
can only be acted upon, and we cannot connect with it the idea of 
action, or an original power of acting upon other things, we 
cannot but conclude that God is an immaterial being , or a s pirit. 
But, we must acknowledge ourselves to be altogether ignorant of 
the nature or essence of God, and, indeed, of matter too; since, 
to the properties of length, breadth, and thickness, we cannot be 
certain but that other properties, of very different natures, such 
as even perception and intelligence, may be superadded. But 
shou'id this be possible, we still cannot conceive that a thing 
which, of itself; is so sluggish and inert, should be the original 
cause and fountain of life, action, and motion to all other 
beings. Notwithstanding our i gnorance, therefore, concerning the 
nature of matter, and of the properties whi ch may, or may not be 
compatible with it, there seems to be sufficient reason to 
16. History of Electricity. p. 441. 
.~ ·--~: 
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conclude that the essence of God cannot be matter, but something 
very different from it, which we therefore call immaterial, or 
spiritua1. 17 
Only a few years later, Priestley could not have been quite so casual in 
treating this matter. Nevertheless, there are intimations also in the 
Insti~utes that Priestley wanted to see God not just as a logically 
necessary First Cause who was the instigator of a system which it was his 
task to de-code, but also as a potent force, an agent in nature. He 
writes: 
As the matter of which the world consists can only be moved and 
acted upon, and is altogether incapable of moving itself, or of 
acting; so all the powers of nature, or the tendencies of things 
to their different motions and operations, can only be the effect 
of the divine energy, perpetually acting upon them, and causing them 
to have certain tendencies and effects. A stone, for instance, can 
no more move, or tend downwqrds, that is towards the earth, of it-
self, than it can move or tend upwards, that is from the earth. 
That it does tend downwards, or towards the earth, must, therefore, 
be owing to the divine energy, an energy without which the power 
of gravitation would cease, and the whole frame ·of the earth be 
dissolved. 
It-follows from these principles, that no powers of nature can 
take place, and that no creature whatever can exist, without the 
divine agency; so that we can no more continue, than we could 
begin to exist without the divine will.iliS 
It was . this emphasis which wa s gradually to preponderate. Priestley 
became concerned with active material forces working necessarily in the 
universe. God is still accepted as the Fir~t Cause, but Priestley no 
longer wants to make deductions of personality which are then supplemented 
17. Institutes. Vol. I. p. 15. 
18. Ibid. p. 38. 
by 'revelation'. It is possibly false to see this development as a 
chronological one. It is probable that Priestley held an orthodox 
'apologetic' and a positivist attitude towards science and history at the 
same time. The theologian, the scientist, and the historian are not 
genuinely reconciled in the Institutes because a Natural Religion is not 
genuinely under construction. It may well be correct to see the new 
systematisation which emerged not as a substitute for the systematic effort 
of the Institutes but as a purer elaboration of the first volume of that 
work which might equally be integrated with Revealed Religion. With this 
caution in mind, I shall examine the development of Priestley's natural 
religion. 
I n the Preface to the History of Electricity, Priestley praises 
experimentation because it offers a direct confrontation with nature. 
Speculating about Sir Isaac Newton's likely reaction to the present state 
of electrical discovery, Priestley comments: 
Could that great man revisit the earth, and view the experiments 
of the present race of electricians, he would he no less amazed 
than Roger Bacon, or Sir Francis would have been at his. The 
electric shock itself, if it be considered attentively, will 
appear almost as surprising, as any discovery that he made; and 
the man who could have made that discovery, by any reasoning~ 
priori, would have been reckoned a very great genius: but 
electrical discoveries have been made so much by accident, that 
it is more the powers of nature, than of human genius, that excite 
our wonder with respect to them. But if the simple electric 
shock would have appeared so extraordinary to Sir Isaac Newton, 
what would he have said upon seeing the effects of a modern 
electrical battery, and an apparatus for drawing lightning from 
the clouds! 19 
19. History of Electricity. p. xiii. 
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Priestley is excited by the relation between the laboratory experiment 
and the actual world, by the powers of nature rather than the system-making 
mind of man. The same enthusiasm is shown elsewhere in the Preface: 
The instruction we are able to get from books is, comparatively, 
soon exhausted; but philosophical instruments are an endless fund 
of knowledge. By philosophical instruments, however, I do not 
here mean the globes, the orrery, and others, which are only the 
means that ingenious men have hit upon to explain their own con-
ceptions of things to others; and which, therefore, like books, 
have no uses more extensive than the views of human ingenuity; but 
such as the air pump, condensing engine, pyrometer, Etc. (with 
which electrical machines are to be ranked) and which exhibit the 
operations of nature, that is of the God of nature himself, which 
are infinitely various. By the help of these machines, we are able 
to put an endless variety of things into an endless variety of 
20 situations, while nature herself is the agent that shows the result. 
Throughout the work, also, Priestley seems excited that he is no longer 
discussing human conceptualisations but natural facts. He is excited by 
the power and cosmic significance of electricity. 
reports Beccaria 1 s 21 ideas in the following manner: 
For instance, he 
Since a sudden stroke of lightning gives polarity to magnets, he 
conje?tures that a regular and constant circulation of the whole 
mass of the fluid, from North to South, may be the original cause 
of magnetism in general. This is a truly great thought; and , if just, will introduce greater simplicity into our conceptions of the 
laws of nature •••• 
H~ thinks that the Aurora Borealis may be this electric matter 
performing its circulation, in such a state of the atmosphere as 
renders it visible, or approaching nearer to the earth than usual. 
Accordingly very vivid appearances of this kind have been observed 
22 to occasion a fluctuation in the magnetic needle. 
20. Ibid , p. xi. 
21. Jean-Baptiste Beccaria. (1716-1781) See Biographie Universelle. Vol. 3. PP• 444-5• 
22. History of Electricity. p o 351. 
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The excitement in the Lectures on History and General Policy is similar 
and has the same foundation. It is significant that in praising the 
experimental nature of historical study, Priestley echoes the language of 
the Preface to the History of Electricity: 
Works of fiction resemble those machines which we contrive to 
illustrate the principles of philosophy, such as globes, and 
orreries, the uses of which extend no farther than the views of 
human ingenuity; whereas real history resembles the experiments 
made by the air pump, the condensing engine, or electrical machine, 
which exhibit the operations of nature, and the God of nature 
himself, whose works are the noblest subject of contemplation to 
the human mind, and are the ground work and materials of the most 
extensive and useful theories. 23 
Priestley constantly asserts that the study of history is the study of 
. cause and effect as an active force in human affairs. 
for instance, Priestley writes: 
In Lecture XXXIII, 
••• if we read history like philosophers, we must principally 
attend to the connexion of cause and effect, in all the great 
changes of human affairs. We ought never to be satisfied with 
barely knowing an event, but endeavour to trace all the circumstances in the situation of things which contributed either to produce, or 
facilitate; to hasten, or to retard it, and clearly see the manner 
of their operation; by which we shall be better able to form a judgment of the state of political affairs in future time, and take 
our measures with greater wisdom, and a more reasonable prospect 
of success. 24 
As the final sentence above indicates, Priestley was also fascinated by the 
possibility of experimentation and prediction in affairs of government as 
much as in natural science. Here Priestley gives a very specific example 
of the potential advantage to be derived from an experimental attitude 
towards history: 
23. Lectures on History. p. 5. 
24. Ibid. P• 247. 
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As all other sciences have made very rapid advances in the present 
age, the science of government bids fair to keep pace with them. 
Many ingenious men have of late turned their thoughts to this subject, 
and valuable treatises upon it have been published both in this 
country and abroad. But what is of much more value, we have now 
a vast stock of important facts before us, for our contemplation. 
The old governments of Europe are arrived to a considerable degree 
of maturity. We may rather say they are growing into decay; so 
t hat their several advantages and defects are become sufficiently 
conspicuous, and the new governments in North America are so many 
new experiments, of which political philosophers cannot fail to 
make the greatest use. 25 
Certainly, in both the History of Electricity and in the Lectures on History 
and General Policy, causality is presented as a manifestation of divine 
providence, but the enthusiasm for the process itself cannot be denied. 
During the 1770's, Priestley's advocacy of a thoroughgoing materialism 
was resolute. He made his position perfectly clear in t he introductory 
essay to Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, entitled "A general view of the 
doctrine of Vibrations. 11 : 
I am rather inclined to think that, though the subject is beyond 
our comprehension at present, man does not consist of t wo principles, 
so essentially different from one another as matter and spirit, 
which are always described as having not one common property, by 
means of which they can affect or act upon each other; the one 
occupying space, _and the other not only not occupying the least 
imaginable portion of space, but incapable of bearing relation to 
it; insomuch that, properly speaking, my mind is no more in my 
body , than it is in the mood. I rather think that the whole man 
is of s ome uniform composition, and t hat t he property of perception, 
as well as the other powers that are termed mental, is the result 
(whether necessary or not) of such an organical structure as that 
of .the brain. 26 
25. Ibid. P• 14. 
26. Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind. p . xx. 
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The defence of materialist necessarianism as not incompatible with 
Christianity became Priestley's main concern. In the Disquisitions 
relating to matter and spirit, Priestley's position remains fundamentally 
the same as that expressed in the first volume of the Institutes, but there 
is also a change in emphasis. He still insists that nothing certain can 
be said of the essence of God, but the stress on the unknowableness of God 
is now greater, and the corollary that a grea t deal can be said of the 
effects of the unknown cause is stronger. It seems, perhaps, that 
scientific and theological enquiry can join hands now that scientific 
endeavour need not be stifled by unjustifiable theological presuppositions. 
Priestley's attitude towards nature has become a-moral. Again and again 
in the Disquisitions he insists that God can only be discerned by an 
examination of his effects - the forces inherent in nature. In Section IX, 
for instance, Priestley writes: 
We canot speak of att r~ction or repulsion, for example, but as 
powers belonging to, and residing in some thing, substance, or 
essence, but our ideas do not go beyond these powers; and when we 
attempt to form any thing of an idea of the substance of matter, 
exclu$ive of the impenetrability which it has not, all ideas vanish 
from the mind, and nothing, absolutely nothing, is left for an 
object of contemplation. If it be still called a substance, it 
is, however, as immaterial a one as any person can wish for. In 
reality, the term immateriality never did, or could suggest any 
idea -whatever. That the term substance and essence are of no use 
but as modes of expression, is evident from our speaking of the 
substance or essence of things, as if they themselves were only 
properties. 
If then our ideas concerning matter do not go beyond the powers 
of which it is possessed, much less can our ideas go beyond 
powers, properties, or attributes, with respect to the divine 
Being; and if we confine our definition of God to these, it is 
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not possible that we can make any mistake, or suffer by our 
. t' 27 misconcep ions. 
Equally, in A Free Discussion, Priestley's allegiance to the doctrine of 
necessity seems to derive from a confidence that he is offering an 
explanation of the actual. In the Institutes, the proof of necessity was 
involved with the accuracy of scriptural prophecy - was inseparably linked, 
in other words, with the idea of divine moral providence. But in this later 
work, Priestley holds tenaciously to necessarian explanations for the 
purpose of Christian apologetic so as to sustain the factual validity of 
the link between the First Cause and all other causes and effects. 
Priestley explains: 
If I were disposed to retort upon my adversaries, I would say that 
a man who believes that one effect may exist without a cause (which 
I maintain to be the case with every person who denies the doctrine 
of necessity) may believe that any other effect, and consequently 
that all effects may exist without a cause, and therefore that the 
whole universe may have none. And what might I not say of the 
Scotch defenders of the doctrine of instinctive principles of truth; 
who, disclaiming argument, rest this most sacred article of all 
religion upon a fallacious instinct; and especially of Dr. Oswald, 
who even professedly, and at large, endeavours to invalidate the 
only proper argument for the being of God, viz. from effects to 
causes, and to prove it to be altogether inconclusive. 28 
There is no doubt that Priestley's God, although still unknowable in 
essence, is rtow a God who is active in the physical world, and is 
recognisable through an examination of his force rather than through an 
examination of his design of a whole system. ' In A Free Discussion, 
Priestley claims: 
27. Disquisitions. p. 105. 
28. A Free Discussion. p. xxvi. 
Exclude the idea of deity on my hypothesis, and every thing except 
space, necessarily vanishes with it; so that the Divine Being, 
and his energy, are absolutely necessary to that of every other 
being. His power is the very life and soul of every".: thing that 
exists; and, strictly speaking , without him, we ARE, as we l l as, 
can DO nothing. But exclude the idea of Deity on the common 
hypothesis, and the idea of solid matter is no more excluded, than 
that of space. It remains a problem, therefore, whether matter be 
at all dependent upon God, whether it be in his power either to 
annihilate, or to create it; a difficulty that has staggered many, 
and on which the doctrine of the two original independent 
principles was built. 29 
It would seem that Priestley had come to terms with things as they are 
rather than with rational descriptions of things without now having to 
regard things as themselves the language of God. It would seem that 
Priestley should now be able to direct apologetic attention unashamedly to 
the creation in which the creator was so visibly potent. But it remained 
the case that Priestley could not countenance such an unmediated vision. 
He could not now be content with systematic explanation alone. In the 
Disquisitions, he remarked that an advantage of the materialist position 
was that it under-mined theories of pre-existence, and, therefore, 
discredited Arian doctrine concerning the person of Christ: 
Upon the whole, I cannot help thinking it to be a capital 
advantage of the doctrine of Materialism, that it leaves no shadow 
of s u~port for the doctrine of pre-existence, or the Arian 
hypothesis, which are totally repugnant to the genuine principles 
of the christian religion, so as hardly to be brought within the 
general outline of it; and that the greatest mischief that 
christianity has derived from the unnatural mixture of heathen 
phi losophy with the principles of it, has been the injudicious 
29. Ibid. P• 254. 
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exaltation of our Saviour; which, in fact, has been nothing else 
than setting up the vain conceits of men in opposition to the 
wisdom of God.30 
But it was not just that Priestley needed to integrate materialism, 
necessarianism, and Socinianism. He was unable to resist the desire to 
present this system as a vehicle for moral exhortation. Towards the end 
of the Disquisitions, he commends the value of his integrated system: 
In short, ,it is my firm persuasion, that the three doctrines of 
ma terialism, of that which is commonly called Socinianism, and of 
philosophical necessity, are equally parts of one system, being 
equally founded on just observations of nature, and fair 
deductions from the scriptures; and that whoever shall duly 
consider t heir connexion, and dependence on one another, will find 
no sufficient consistency in any general scheme of principles, that 
does not comprehend them all. At the same time each of these 
doctrines stands on its own independent foundation, and is capable 
of such separate demonstration, as subjects of a moral nature 
require, or admit. 
I have advanced what has occurred to me in support of all the 
three parts of this system, confident that, in due time, the truth 
will bear down before it every opposing prejudice, how inveterate 
soever, and gain a firm establishment in the minds of all men.31 
and, again, tqwards the end of A Free Discussion: 
It is acknowledged that a necessarian, who, as such, believes that, 
strictly s peaking , nothing goes wrong, but that every thing is 
under the best direction possible , himself, and his conduct, as 
part of an immense and perfect whole, included, cannot accuse him-
self of having done wrong, in the ultimate sense of the words. 
He has, therefore, in this strict sense, nothing to do with 
repentance, confession, or pardon, which are all adapted to a 
different, imperfect, and fallacious view of things . But then, 
30. Disquisitions. p. 335. 
31. Ibid. P• 356. 
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if he be really capable of steadily viewing the great system, and 
his own conduct as a part of it, in this true light, his supreme 
regard to God, as the great, wise, and benevolent author of all 
things, his intimate communion with him, and devotedness to him, 
will necessarily be such, that he can have no will but God's. 
In the sublime, but accurate language of the apostle John, he will 
dwell in love, he will dwell in God, and God in him; so that, not 
committing any sin, he will have nothing to repent of. He will 
be perfect, as his heavenly father is perfect. 
But as no man is capable of this degree of perfection in the 
present state, because the influences to which we are all exposed 
will prevent this constant referring of every thing to its primary 
cause, the speculative necessarian, will, in a general way, refer 
actions to himself and others; and consequently he will 
necessarily, let him use what efforts he will, feel the sentiments 
of shame, remorse, and repentance, which arise mechanically from 
his referring actions to himself. And, oppressed with a sense 
of guilt, he will have recourse to that mercy of which he will 
stand in need. These things must necessarily accompany one 
another, and there is no reason to be solicitous about their 
separation. 32 
The isolation of the systematic description from the thing described is 
evident once again. Necessarianism and materialism are parts of an 
exhortatory fiction which cannot ultimately be taken seriously as a 
description of fact since man would not then be able to detach himself from 
the products of his thinking and adopt a worshipful attitude towards them. 
Finally, Priestley could not tolerate an ontological monism. 
Significantly, the exhortation in these two works of the late 1770 1 s is an 
after-thought. The attempt at human explanation of the phenomena of 
na ture a nd history was becoming dominant, but Priestley could not trust the 
32. A Free Discussion. p. 301. 
possibility of a similarly positivist assessment of moral behaviour 
sufficiently to prevent himself from wishing to present his systematic 
explanation as itself a phenomenon to be admired and analysed as a 
whole. 
PART II 
Coleridge's Intellectual Development 
from June, 1794 until November, 1797 
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I NTRODUCTION 
Joseph Priestley's constant assmnption was that principles had to be 
inculcated in order to fix or change human behaviour. His systematic 
presentations were necessary because man possessed no intuitive sense of 
what he should do, nor any innate knowledge of the will of God. Priestley 
also believed that one could only be confident of t he moral stability of a 
person when his principles were wholly integrated with his behaviour. A 
person might act properly in spite of false principles because, un-
consciously, he was still mo tivated by the right principles he had imbibed 
in the past . Such a person, however, would be morally unstable. False 
principles would soon necessarily condition the person to act immorally. 
Priestley makes this point clear in the second volume of the Institutes: 
1. 
Persons who have had a christian education, may continue to act, in 
a great measure, upon christian principles, after they become 
nominal unbelievers; especially if a virtuous and decend conduct 
have become habitual to them, if temptations to act otherwise be 
not very strong, and if they act without much reflection. But I 
own that I do not see how I can have the same dependance upon a 
man's acting a truly virtuous and disinterested part, especially 
in a case where a considerable risk must be run, with respect to 
fortune or life, whether he believe a future state or not; 
especially if he have time to reflect on the hazard that he runs 
with respect to things of the most importance to him. If, however, 
an unbeliever should sacrifice his fortune, or his life, in a good 
cause, which I do not say is impossible, it would give me a very 
high idea of the force of good habits, and mechanical propensities 
in him, but a proportionably low opinion of his understanding. It 
would argue such a weakness of intellect, or such inattention to 
his known interest, as I should not presume to find in any man. In 
order to gain my intire confidence, I must see a man's reason, his 
interest, and his passions, all leading the same way. 1 
Institutes. Vol. II. p. 59. 
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The emphasis of rational :Dissent was firmly on the need for rational 
principles. These were conceived in a dualist spirit - reason should stand 
in opposition to feeling. Priestley was aware that 'conscience' took 
control of behaviour when a person had no time to reflect rationally, but 
he argued that the principles ordained by 'conscience' should continually 
be checked against the considered principles which were their source: 
In order to govern our conduct by a regard to our true interest, 
to the good of mankind, or the will of God, it is necessary that 
we use our reason, that we think and reflect before we act. 
Another principle, therefore, was necessary, to dictate to us on 
sudden emergencies, and to prompt us to right action without 
reasoning or thinking at all. This principle we call conscience, 
and being the natural substitute of all the three other rules of 
right conduct, it must have the same title to our regard, As this 
principle, however, is a thing of a variable nature, it must be 
corrected from time to time, by recurring to the principles out of 
which it was formed. Otherwise, as we see exemplified in fact, 
conscience may come to dictate things most injurious to our own 
good, or that of others, and even most dishonourable to God. What 
impurities, what ridiculous penances and mortifications, yea what 
villainies and cruelties do we not find to have been acted by 
mankind, under the notion of rendering themselves acceptable to the 
object of their supreme worship. 2 
Coleridge seems to have begun with an emphasis on integration which was 
similar to Priestley's, but his problems in moral philosophy were augmented 
by an acceptance of materialist necessarianism which was initially more 
rigorous than that of Priestley himself.3 l{owever much Priestley saw the 
universe as containing material agents which were the instruments of the 
Divine Will, he did not, as we have seen, take seriously the strict 
2. Institutes. Vol. I. p. 133. 
3. See Part III. (1) 
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implications of this position for human moral behaviour. Man himself 
should have been considered as a material agent among material agents , and 
Priestley should have regarded rational principles as superfluous 'opinions' 
which were able to exercise no control over spontaneous instinct. 
Instinctive human behaviour should have been seen as itself part of God's 
providential natura l plan. Rational descriptions of the obligations 
imposed by God should have been seen as secondary to the necessary ful-
filment of God's will in activity . Priestley was not prepared to take 
either materialism or necessarianism this far. For practical purposes men 
stood apart from the materialist and necessarian system of the universe and 
contemplated it. Throughout the controversy with Richard Price on moral 
behaviour in A Free Discussion, Priestley insists tha t the advantage of 
necessarianism in moral questions is that the individual can predict with 
absolute certainty the effects whi ch will follow specific actions and can 
therefore choose how to act confidently by pragmatic criteria. Price 
wrongl y assumed that he was answering a complete necessarianism and there-
fore argued that it removed the possibility of choice and hence made 
morality and immorality equally meaningless. 
Col eridge wanted to assert the prime sanctity of the 1 heart 1 - of 
human feelings, but, like Priestley , he was afraid of the licentious 
i mplica tions of a belief in the necessary correctness of any spontaneous 
action. As much as Priestley, Coleridge wanted to exercise control, but, 
unlike Pries tley, Coleridge distrusted reason and therefore sought a control 
which would not s tand in direct opposition to feelings. 
As an undergraduate, Coleridge must have encountered t hese problems as 
they were played out before him, as on a stage, in the confrontation between 
~ illiam Frend and the authorities of the Univers i 1..y of Cambridge. 4 
4. For sources for Frend , see (B.C) . 
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Frend was a tutor at Jesus College, and there can be no doubt that 
Coleridge would have read the pamphlets in which Frend describes his 
renunciation of orthodox Anglicanism for Unitarianism, and tradition runs 
that Coleridge was vociferously.present at the Senate House trial which 
condemned Frend's views as subversive. 5 Frend can be fairly described as 
a disciple of Priestley. Like Priestley, he believed firmly that the 
Established Church, authoritative dogma, political institutions based on 
the authority of traditions, and legal codes based on precedent, should 
all be examined in the light of present reason. At the same time, Frend 
was convinced that there remained a need for new and more rational dogmas, 
6 institutions, and laws. Frehd's iconoclasm was directed at practical 
matters of law, whilst Priestley's was directed more at intellectual matters 
of theological belief, but both men equally and similarly withdrew from 
anarchy. Both men attacked the blind obedience of authority, but both were 
anxious to ensure that a credible alternative authority should be found to 
restrain passionate behaviour. The views advanced by Isaac Milner, the 
Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University, in his summing up advice to the 
students at the end of the Frend trial, reveal the attitude which was 
anathema to Priestley, Frend , and the tradition of rational Dissent: 
The remaining part of my advice to you is short but important. 
Beware of entering into religious controversies, at this period 
of your lives. Whatever may be the profession you are intended 
forr improve your understandings by the diligent pursuit of 
academical studies: obey your tutors: frequent the service of 
5. For further details of this incident, and other aspects of Coleridge's undergraduate career, see P. Kaufman. "New Light on Coleridge as Undergraduate." (B.Dii) 
6. For Frend's hostility to precedent, see Considerations on the Oaths. (B.C). p. 5. For Frend's moderate, reformist position, see his 
speech in An Account of Proceedings in the University of Cambridge. (B.C). P• 9:,_. 
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god according to the established forms, both in your private 
colleges, and the university church. At present, take it for 
granted, that our forefathers had some good reason for steadily 
adhering to and supporting these venerable institutions. Take 
it for granted, at present, I repeat it, and those whom I perceive 
to object to these words will themselves tell you, that it has not 
been my way to take things for granted: but it is not your time 
to become parties in controversial matters of religion.7 
This authoritarian attitude would have been shared by William Paley. 8 
Coleridge's contact with Paley was not personal, but he would certainly have 
studied Paley 1s Principles of Moral Philosophy,9 and in one letter from 
Cambridge he recommended Paley's Reasons for Contentment to the Evans 
f ·1 10 arru y. Paley wanted to uphold the status of an authoritative moral 
sanction and was hostile to the iconoclastic efforts of the dissenting 
rationalists, but, paradoxicall y, Paley adopted this position because he 
distrusted reason altogether. He was explicitly sceptical about the 
authority of reason of any kind inr·controlling human behaviour, and he 
precisely indicated the way in which he considered that rational innate 
moral sense had become, in the process of transmutation from Shaftesbury 
to Hutcheson to his own contemporaries and himself, simply a taste or a 
f 1 . 11 ee ing . Paley considered that men behaved habitually without conscious 
7. An Account of Proceedings in the University of Cambridge. (B.C). p.186. 
8 . For source for Paley, see (B.C). 
9. By 1785 the work was already a text-book and subject for disputation in the Unive r sity of Cambridge. See Edmund Paley's account of the life and writings of \'/illiam Paley in Works. (B.C(. Vol.I. p.129. 
10. See Griggs. 24, p. 48 . 
11. See The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Bk . I. Ch.V. The Moral Sense. in Works. (B.C). Vol.IV. p. 13. 
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reference to rational laws of either an internal or external kind. 12 The 
problem of moral control therefore became the problem of inducing habits 
which would necessarily realise the 'right' ends. The significant value-
judgement now had to occur in reiation to the selection of the kind of 
behaviour which could be induced rather than in the continuous regulation of 
. f" t· 13 speci ic ac ions. Paley was inclined to make this prime value-judgement 
pragmatically . Objective sanctions had no absolute value , but they 
functioned in maintaining a harmonious social structure. Hence Paley 1 s 
conservatism - his insistence that people should remain in the social 
station into which they were born, and his sense that social aspiration 
induced by imagination caused restlessness and rootlessness. 14 
I t seems probable that Coleridge was attracted by the iconoclastic form 
of Frend's thinking, and the attempt of the Unitarians generally to render 
rational dogma rationally acceptable to the individual. It also seems 
probabl e that he was sympathetic with the form of Frend 1 s desire to find 
an absolutist subs titute. Coleridge diverged from Frend in accepting 
Paley 1 s scepticism about reason whilst at the same time rejecting Paley 1 s 
pragmatism. Coleridge was pursuing an absolute obligation which was 
neither a 'more rational' a uthority nor a pragmatic vindication of the status 
quo. Coleridge emerged from 'the Reading incident' in search of a source 
of obligation which was pre-rational. Paley had resolved the duality 
12. See The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Bk . I. Ch. VII. Virtue. in Works. (B.C). Vol. IV. p. 30. 
13. See The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Bk. I. Ch. VII. Virtue. in Works. (B.C). Vol. IV. p. 30. 
14. For the first point, see The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy. Bk. II. Ch. IX. Of the duty of parents. Works. (B.C). Vol. IV. p. 231. For t he second point, see Reasons for Contentment. Works. (B.C). Vol. III. p. 318. 
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between reason and emotion in favour of emotions or unc onscious habits, 
but he had merely rendered the original or precursive choice either 
pragmatic or seemingly arbitrary. The development of Coleridge's thinking 
was to seek to locate the obligation of the essential physical self. 
Priestley had expressed distrust of the man whose actions are at odds with 
his principles predominantly because this situation indicates that rational 
self-cont rol is dangerously subservient to the influence of non-rational 
habi ts. Coleridge is equally concerned that there should be integrity 
between thought and behaviour, but, for Coleridge, instinctive behaviour 
has priority. Coleridge is dismayed by a person whose language and deeds 
are not integrated because he sees that the true nation of the person may 
be corrupted by the habitual acceptance of false i deas. For Priestley, 
correct principles constitute the good man and false principles mus t 
necessarily destroy virtue, whereas, for Coleridge, the natural goodness of 
human feelings is reinforced or eroded by good or bad principles 
respectively. 
In mid-April, 1794, Coleridge returned to Cambridge from his barracks 
in Reading. 15 As punishment for his escapade, he was confined to the 
precincts of the college for a month, and requested to translate into 
English the works of Demetrius Phalareus. After his confinement, Coleridge 
left Cambridge, probably on June 15th, to visit his school friend Robert 
Allen. He stayed in Oxford until July 5th, after which he went on a wa l king 
t . m 1 · th J h H k C ' . d f . d 16 our in .wa es wi osep uc s, a amori ge rien. During his stay in 
Oxford, Coleridge met Robert Southey for the first time, and wrote an 
15. For a biographical account of the events leading to the Reading 
incident, see L. Hanson. (B.Di) pp . 29-35. 
16. For Hucks's account of the walking tour, see J. Hucks. (B.C). 
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excited letter to his new friend from Gloucester on July 6th, just a day 
after leaving Oxford. In this letter there are many grandiose flourishes, 
but I want to draw attention only to the way in which he satirically 
castigates his travelling companion's attitude: 
It is wrong, Southey! for a little Girl with a half-famished 
sickly Baby in her arms to put her head in at the window of an 
Inn - 'Pray give me a bit of Bread and t eat'! from a Party dining 
on Lamb, Green Pease, & Sallad - ~Thy?? Because it is impertinent 
& obtrusive! - I am a Gentleman! - and wherefore should the 
clamorous Voice of Woe intrude upon mine Ear!? 
My companion is a Man of cultivated, tho' not vigorous, under-
standing - his feelings are all on the side of humanity - yet such 
are the unfeeling Remarks, which the lingering Remains of 
Aristocracy occasionally prompt. When the pure System of 
Pantocracy shall have aspheterized the Bounties of Nature, these 
things will not be so -! 17 
The feelings of Hucks are distorted by the habitual words he uses to express 
them. He is really humanitarian but he uses the language of privileged 
Aristocracy. Coleridge is wanting to expose aristocratic attitudes, but 
he also cites the incident as an example of the corrupting power of the 
surface image, as an example of how the habits of t hinking that is not 
integrated with feeling can negate the efficacy of the feeling . He wants 
pure, natural humanitarian feeling, not a feeling which is modified by the 
language of class consciousness. In the situation described, poverty was 
considered to be disruptive of charm, and Coleridge attacks this attitude 
and wants a direct confrontation with the experience. The girl's poverty 
i s wrong absolutely, not aesthetically . Af ter the Reading incident, 
Coleridge attacked every kind of hypocrisy or dissimula tion, every use of 
a thumb t ha t would distance the individual sensibility from other 
17. Gri ggs. 50 . p . s3. 
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sensibilities. It was with Southey that he worked out the implications 
of this new emphasis. 
Coleridge met Southey when his own belief in the primacy of feelings 
had been momentarily subdued by his sense of shame at 1·the Reading incident'. 
At school, Southey had been demonstrative in his allegiance to 
Republicanism, and he had been expelled for writing against corporal 
. t. h l . 18 punishmen in a sc oo magazine. This expulsion, as he realised, might 
well have endangered his career, with the result that he determined to 
become a •reed' and no longer an 'oak 1 • 19 As an 1 oak 1 he had been unafraid 
of public reactions to his republicanism, but as, under family pressure, 
he directed his thoughts at Oxford towards a career, he began to hope that, 
as a 1reed 1 , it might be possible for him to become pliant, to retain 
ideological commitment to republicanism and at the same time accept a 
20 government post. It was Coleridge's intention in his friendship with 
Southey to show tha t such a compromise indicated the superficiality of 
rational ideology, and to prove that 1words 1 modified attitudes so t hat 
'right' ideological 'words' or 'principles' must be integrated with 'right' 
attitudes. Equally, it was Southey's intention to show that fixed 
rational principles were requi red to maintain the constancy and moral 
responsibility of the individual, and to i mply that 'the Reading incident' 
18 . For Southey's youth, see W. Haller (B.Di), and for an emphasis 
upon his childhood in moulding his personality see G. Grigson 1 s 
introduction to his A Choice of Southey' s Verse. London. 1970. 
19. This is Sout hey's own language . See Sout hey to Grosvenor Bedford. Oct. 21st, 1792 . Curry, K. (ed.) New Letters of Robert Southey. (B.C). Vol. I. p. 10. 
20. Southey ' s friendship wi th Grosvenor Bedford pushed him in t his direction. 
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indicated t hat Coleridge lacked rational self-restraint. 21 Southey saw 
the issue as a conflict between two opposed determinants of human 
behaviour - reason and emotion, whereas Coleridge did not think in terms 
of this conventional duality but instead saw the emotions as the instruments 
of 'right' reason, and gradually came to see 'emotion' as the essential 
self. Self-knowledge - ontological sensitivity, gradually supplanted 
rational knowledge - epistemology, as the guiding motivation for moral 
behaviour. This is the fundamental development which I shall follow in 
the chapters of this Part, and the description of the t~ansition from 
epistemology to ontology, or, pe r haps, simply from dualism to monism, 
should provide a substantial background to the dramatic presentation of 
22 1 two worlds I in I The Ancient Mariner 1 • 
21. For Southey's sense that he had rescued Coleridge from licentiousness, 
see Southey to Grosvenor Bedford. Sept. 27th, 1794. Curry, K. (ed.) New Letters of Robert Southey. (B.C). Vol. I. p. 80. 
Coleridge had recently met Grosvenor Bedford. (See Griggs. 55. 
P• 98.) 
22. For 'two worlds', see A.O. Lovejoy. "Coleridge and Kant's Two Worlds." (B.Dii). 
83 
CHAPTER I 
Coleridge, Southey, and Pantisocracy 
The discussion of the Pantisocracy scheme inevitably focussed 
attention on the differences in moral theory between Southey and Coleridge. 1 
When t he perfectibility of man was being analysed, and a community was 
being planned in which that perfectibility mi ght be realised, it became of 
paramount importance to assess the relative significance of human reason 
and feeling for the achievement of the desired end. 
Southey wrote to his brother: 
On October 12th, 1794, 
This Pantisocratic system has given me new lif e new hope new 
energy . All the faculties of my mind are dilated. I am weeding 
out the few lurking prejudices of habi t and looking fo rward to 
h . 2 appiness. 
Latent in t his enthusiastic comment is the seed of disagreement. For 
Coleridge, habits are not to be weeded out, but to be redeployed;3 they 
are the instruments of transformation,4 whereas for Southey they are vices 
which inhibit a rational conversion. 
In t he months that followed Southey's letter, the discussions between 
Southey and Coleridge revolve around the nature of t he t heoretical basis of 
1. For the practical details of the Pantisocracy sc~eme, see H. M.Ellis 
(B.Dii); O.F.Emerson (B.Dii); Siste r Eugenia (B.Dii); M. W.Kelley 
(B.Dii); and T,Cooper (B.C ) . See a lso t he relevant chapter in 
W. H,Armytage. (B,Di). 
2. Curr y , K. (ed.) New Letters of Robert Southey. (B .C). Vol.I. pp . 81-2. 
3. This is t he Paleyan position . For an early example of the way i n 
whi ch Coleridge had made it hi s own , see his le t ter to George 
Coleridge, postmarked Feb. 9th, 1793, in whi ch he discusses his 
feelings for his brothers. (Griggs . 26. pp . 53- 4) . 
4. My use of t he word 'transformation' in this context has reverberations 
which derive from H.R.Niebuhr (B,Di). See particularly Chapter 6. 
Christ t he Transformer of Culture. (pp.190-229), I t is significant 
that, as exempla of the conversionists 1 position, Niebuhr discusses 
the Gospel of John and also the t heology of F . D.Maurice . Coleridge ' s 
position is Johannine, and Coleridge also exercised a deep influence 
on F.D .Maurice . (See C.R.Sanders (B.Di).) 
. ~-. ..... --~-·•r :-
........ 
84 
Pantisocracy, and also around Coleridge's relationship with Sara Fricker. 
In discussion, these t wo issues, the one abstract and the other practical, 
were closely related. The bald facts of t he practical situation are that 
Southey was in love with Edith Fricker and in one letter, from an 
'ebullience of scematism' as he later wrote,5 Coleridge declared his love 
for the sister, Sara Fricker, preswnably , if the above remark is to be 
believed, because of the convenience of such an arrangement in conj unction 
with t he scheme to emigrate to America. 
Coleridge's resolve in this matter was shaken by the fact t hat in mid-
October Coleridge received a letter from Mary Evans which revived the 
feelings that he had held for her. 6 Complicated issues were at stake for 
Coleridge which carried the issue far beyond the choice between t wo women. 
Coleridge wished to be seen to be a man of honour and a man of strong will, 
which meant that having declared his love for Sara he was concerned to 
demonstrate to Southey that he could accept an obligation. Here, Southey's 
influence was supreme . He believed t hat he had initially rescued 
Coleridge from libertinism,7 and this was an interpretation which Coleridge 
accepted. To remain constant to Sara in spite of his feelings for Mar y 
Evans was t herefore to show that Southey ' s rescue had not been in vain and 
t hat his wayward £eelings were now under his own control . Coleridge was 
wishi ng to prove t hat a consciousness of obligation was active within 
himself, whereas the truth of the situation was that Southey remained the 
embodi ment of that obligation, continually reminding Coleridge of his 
responsibility either by his presence or by letter, so that Coleridge felt 
5. 
6. 
7. 
See Griggs. 93. p . 164; and 73. p . 132 . 
See Griggs. 65. pp. 112-3. 
See Part II. I ntroduction. 
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obliged not by the situation as such, not by his relation with Sara 
Fricker, but by the person of Southey who was the actual manifestation of 
that very aspect of personality which he had himself tried to induce in 
Coleridge. Thus Coleridge was at the same time obliged by his commitment 
to a friend and · by his commitment to a specific conception of his own self, 
and t hese t wo commitments were t he external and the internal versions of 
t he same commitment to the belief in the supremacy of rational principle 
over feeling. However, once in this position which seemed to be a 
climactic test of Southey's influence, Coleridge did not retreat to his 
earlier advocacy of pure feeling but instead used the Sara Fricker 
relationship to test his own systhesis of the view of Southey with his own. 
Coleridge wi shed to demonstrate that the quality of his feeling for 
Mary Evans could be transferred to Sara Fricker by a process of habitual 
allegiance to his obligation such that the obligation ceased to have that 
weight and assumed the form of a natural feeling. The relationship with 
Sara Fricker was being used, however unconsciously, as a means of 
attempting to show that the acceptance of an obligation that is alien to 
feeling in t he interests of a general good did not involve the stoical 
rejection of feeling as Southey would i mply, but could, through the 
habitual cultivation of t he obligation, involve finally the integration 
of f eeling and obligation by a process of necessary association. This 
was the Godwinian assumption, 8 and it was an assumption that Hartley 
8. The re l a tion between 'reason' and 'feeling ' in Godwin's ' Political Justice' is problematical. D.H.Monro's (B.Di) interpretation of Godwin is t hat, correctly understood, Godwin could not conceive of 
any conflict between the t wo. ( see p.13). Ideally t hey were co-incident, and, further, Godwi n does not seem to have accepted any 
gulf be tween the ideal and the actual. Southey tended to see Godwin 
as a Stoic whereas Coleridge seems to have accepted Godwin's ideal 
whi l s t realizing that such an ideal would have to be achieved and 
could not just be assumed. Coleridge's sense of the detachment of Godwin ' s ideal from the actual leads to his eventual hostility to Godwinism (see Part II. Chapter 4. ) See also B.S.Allen. "William Godwin as a Sentimentalist" (B.Dii) and D. Fl eisher (B.Di). 
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rendered theoretically explicable,9 but the relationship with Sara Fricker 
provided Coleridge with an opportunity for experimentation. 
At no point in his correspondence does Coleridge attempt to disguise 
the nature of his feelings for Sara Fricker and Mary Evans. On October 
21st, 1794, he quotes Mary Evans ' letter for Southey's benefit, and then 
adds: 
No name was signed; - it was from Mary Evans. - I received 
it about three weeks ago. I loved her, Southey! almost to 
madness. Her Image was never absent from me for three Year s 
for more than three Years. - My Resolution has not faltered -
9. Hartleian associationism seemed to provide the clue for the 
movement from the actual to t he ideal, since it seemed to give 
scientific force to the possibility of progressive amel i oration. The probl em of the origin of Coleridge's allegiance to Hart l ey is acute. In December, 1794, he declared himse l f to be more Hartleian tha n Hartley (see Gri ggs. 74. p. 137), but how much before this Coleridge had accepted Hartley 1 s views is uncertain, 
and, equally, it is unclear from what source Coleridge gained his knowledge of Hartley. Hartley had been a member of Jesus College, Cambridge, from 1722-1730 (see A.Gray & F.Brittain (B.Di).) It seems that Coleridge knew the translation of the German edition 
of The Observations on Man (see H. N.Fairchild (B,Dii).), but it 
would also seem unlikely that he would not know Priestley's edition 
of the same work, I have not embarked upon a comparison of Priestley's selection with the original or with the Pistorius 
editioh, since, unfortunately , Coleridge nowhere makes it clear in 
what way he read or understood Hartley. 
Coleridge claimed to have gone further than Hartley in 
accepting the •corporeality of thought', but I want to see this 
statement solely as evidence of Coleridge's early sympa thy for 
' materialism' probably of a Priestleyan kind, and I do not want to delve . into Coleridge's precise attitude to Hartley. Assignment 
of influence is obscure, but I think it i s accurate to say that Coleridge seems to have been committed to the Hartleian view, firstly, tha t Locke's association of 'ideas' might be seen as the direct association of physiological sensations, and, secondly, 
that the divine power in me liorating cosmic conditions in a process beyond hwnan endeavour mi ght in fact be operative in meliorating human personalities. 
See Hartley's Observations on Man (B,C), and Original Letters (B.C). See also B.Rand (B.Dii ) and R. Marsh (B,Dii). 
I shall refer, later, to the possible specific role that Hartley ' s theory may have played in the writing of 1rhe Ancient Mariner. See D.Waples (B.Dii). 
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but I want a Comforter. - I have done nothing - I have gone into 
Company - I was constantly at the Theatre here till they left us -
I endeavoured to be perpetually with Miss Brunton - I even hoped, 
that her Exquisite Beauty and uncommon Accomplishments might have 
cured one Passion by another. The latter I could easily have 
dissipated in her absence - and so have restored my affections to 
her, whom I do not love - but whom by every tie of Reason and 
Honor I ought to love. I am resolved - but wretched! - But Time 
shall do much - you will easily believe that with such feelings 
I should have found it no easy 'l'ask to write to --- • I should 
have detested myself, if after my first Letter I had written 
10 coldly - how could I write as warmly, 
Sou~hey's attention is explicitly drawn to Coleridge's awareness of a 
conflict between feeling and obligation. An inadequacy in Coleridge's 
scheme concerning the r4lation between f eeling and principle at this date 
is made clear when he explains to Mary his past attitude towards her. In 
contrast with his fee l ing for Sara, Coleridge's feeling for Mary seemed 
spontaneous and instinctive, but in the following description he does not 
see it as su.ch: 
For four years I have endeavoured to smother a ·very ardent 
attachment - in what degree I have succeeded, you must know better 
than I can. With quick perceptions of moral Beauty it was 
impossibl e for me not to admire in you your sensibility regulated 
by Judgement, your Gaiety proceeding from a cheerful Heart acting 
on the stores of a strong Understanding . At first I voluntarily 
invited the recollection of these qualities into my mind - I made 
them the perpetual Object of my Reveries - yet I entertained no 
one Sentiment beyond that of the immediate Pleasure annexed to the 
thinking of You. At length it became an Habit. I awoke from 
the Delusion, and found that I had unwittingly harboured a Passion 
which I felt neither the power or the courage to subdue. My 
associations were irrevocably formed, and your Image was blended 
10. Griggs. 65. p. 113. 
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with every idea. I thought of you incessantly: yet that Spirit 
(if Spirit there be that condescends to record the lonely 
Beatings of my heart) that Spirit knows, that I thought of you with 
the purity of a Brother. 
than a Brother's ardor! 
Happy were I, had it been with no more 
The Man of dependent fortune while he fosters an attachment 
commits an act of Suicide on his happiness. I possessed no 
Establishment - my views were very distant - I saw, that you 
regarded me merely with the kindness of a Sister - What expectations 
could I form? I formed no expectations - I was ever resolving to 
subdue the disquieting Passion: still some inexplicable Suggestion 
palsied my Efforts, and I clung with desperate fondness to this 
Phantom of Love, it's mysterious Attractions and hopeless Prospects. 
It was a faint and rayless Hope! Yet it soothed my Solitude with 
many a delightful day-dream. It was a faint and rayless Hope! 
Yet I nursed it in my Bosom with an Agony of Affection, even as a 
Mother her sickly In.£a.nt. -
But these are the poisoned Luxuries of a diseased Fancy! 
Indulge, Mary! this my first, my last request - and restore me to 
Reality, however gloomy. 11 
In spite of the underlying emotion conveyed by this letter, Coleridge's 
argument indicates that he has no conception of a feeling which is un-
learned or unacquired. He talks about feelings within a theoretical 
associationist framework. He is so conscious that his relation to Mary 
was partl y the result of his thinking and dreaming of t hat relationship 
t hat he begins to wonder whe ther the feeling had any real existence at all, 
or whe t her, perhaps, it was entirely self-induced by a process of 
association from his thoughts. On the strength of these comments the 
apparent difference in kind between his feelings for Mary and Sara beco~es 
a difference of degree. Coleridge says that Mary's associations are 
irrevocable, but the passage does show how Coleridge can believe that with 
11. Griggs. 71. p. 130. 
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time, patience, and resolution, Mary's associations can be ousted and 
replaced by Sara's. The importance is that people are treated as ideas 
of perception in the intellect, so that, for Coleridge at this time, views 
concerning personal relationships are inseparable from epistemological 
opinions. The feelings about which Coleridge talks at this time are 
intellectually conceived feelings. Coleridge's theory does not allow him 
to recognise the unwilled emotion that he clearly felt. 
At the time of the discussion of Pantisocracy it becomes apparent 
that the seeming conflict between reason and feeling is not a simple one. 
Coleridge is able to believe in t he integration of reason and feeling 
because he sees both as products of mental activity. That mental activity, 
it is true, is conceived in such a way that the whole of sense experience 
is thought to be received into the mind so that, therefore, changes in 
a ttitude are not induced by, for instance, rat~onal education alone, yet 
Coleridge makes no allowance for purely physical feelings which may be 
beyond the control of the mind. His attitude here is consonant with 
contemporary physiological opinion, 12 but t hat opinion is rapidly changing 
in the 1790 1 s and we shall see that Coleridge was aware of the possible 
autonomy of physical functions through his acquaintance with the sick 
Charles Lloyd and his knowledge of the ideas of Thelwall, Beddoes, and 
others. 13 I n 1794, however, Coleridge avoids the duality between mind 
and body "@y subsuming both reason and feeling under the mind. The duality 
in Southey 's thinking exists because he identifies the mind with reason 
12. See, for instance, Erasmus Darwin. Zoonomia; or, the laws of 
organic life. London. 1796. Second edition, corrected. 
Section XVI. Of Instinct. p. 167. 
13 . See F. Fearing (B.Di) and also G. Gordon-Taylor & E. W. Walls (B.Di). See Part II. Chapter 9. for further references to medical 
developments in the 1790 1 s • 
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and, uncertainly, the body with feeling. The source of Southey's 
confusion is in not knowing whether feeling is mental or physical with 
the result that he tries to reject it altogether. We must now return to 
Coleridge's letters to demonstrate these points. In a letter of Tiecember 
9th, 1794, Coleridge again clearly reveals to Southey the nature of his 
thinking concerning Sara Fit:iCker. With reference to her, he writes: 
With regard to neglect respecting---, do you accuse me justly? 
I have written 5 or 4 letters since my absence - received one. 
I am not conscious of having injured her otherwise, than by having 
mistaken the ebullience of schematism for affection, which a moment's 
reflection might have told me, is not a plant of so mushroom a 
growth - had it ever not been counteracted by a prior attachment/ 
but my whole Life has been a series of Blunders! 
upon me - for I am a most miserable Dog -
God have mercy 
The most criminal action of my Life was the 'first letter I 
wrote to---.' I had worked myself to such a pitch, that I 
scarcely knew I was writing like an hypocrite. -
However it still remains for me to be externally Just though my 
Heart is withered within me - and Life seems now to give me 
disgust rather than pain - 14 
Nothing could be clearer than this statement. Coleridge acknowledges his 
mistake, and says that had it not been for the counter-action of Mary Evans 
the mistake might not have been disastrous. He still assumes here, with 
despondency, that Mary's associations are irrevocable, so that all that 
remains is for him to be externally just and to accept that his feelings 
mus t perish. On receiving confirmation from Mary in December that she 
was engaged to be married, 15 Coleridge replied in the same mood of 
fatalism: 
14. Griggs. 73. p. 132. 
15. See Griggs. 76. p. 144 • 
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To love you Habit has made unalterable. This passion however, 
divested, as it now is, of all Shadow of Hope, will lost it's 
disquieting power. Far distant from you I shall journey thro' 
the vale of Men in calmness. 
be actively virtuous. 16 
He cannot be wretched, who dares 
.... 
Writing to Southey on December 29th, Coleridge repeats his conviction that 
the habit of love for Mary is irreversible in almost the same words as in 
the letter to Mary, and then he continues: 
Southey! my ideal Standard of female Excellence rises not above 
that Woman. But all Things work together for Good. Had I been 
united to her, the Excess of my Affection would have effeminated 
my Intellect. I should have fed on her looks as she entered into 
the Room - I should have gazed on her Footsteps when she went out 
from me. To lose her! - I can rise above that selfish Pang. 
But to marry another - 0 Southey! bear with my weakness. Love 
makes all things pure and heavenly like itself: - but to marry a 
woman whom I do not love - to degrade her, whom I call my wife, 
by making her the Instrument of low Desire - and on the removal 
of a desultory Appetite, to be perhaps not displeased with her 
Absence! - Enough! - These Refinements are the wildering Fires, 
t hat lead me into Vice. 
Mark you, Southey! - I will do my Duty. 17 
Again, Coleridge makes no attempt to hide the gulf that lies between his 
feeling and his duty, but, even here, his comment on the possible effect 
of marriage to Mary Evans exposes his assumption that a relation to a 
person is the same as the reception of a sense impression so that the mind 
might be rendered excessively effeminate. 18 Coleridge expresses his view 
16. Griggs. 76. p. 144. 
17. Griggs. 77. p. 145. 
18. Underlying this comment, too, is the assumption which Mary Wollstonecra£t tried to combat in the Vindication of the Rights of Woman (B.C), that the opposition between reason and feeling is parallelled by t he opposition between manhood and womanhood. (see. p. 73 and p. 166). 
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of the situation less dramatically in a letter to George Dyer, 19 written 
late in February, 1795: 
In the Autumn of last year, you know, we formed our American plan, 
and with precipitance that did credit to our hearts rather than 
heads, fixed on the coming April as the time of our embarkation. 
This following circumstances have rendered impracticable - but 
there are other engagements not so dissoluble. In expectation 
of emigrating on the Pantisocratic Plan I payed my addresses to 
a young Lady, whom 
e. ' ou, ) 
- Independently of the Love and Esteem which her Person, and 
polished understanding may be supposed to have inspired into a 
young man, I consider myself as under particular Ties of Gratitude 
to her - since in confidence of my Affection she has rejected the 
Addresses of two men, one of them of large Fortune - and by her 
perseverant attachment to me disobliged her Relations in a very 
uncomfortable Degree. Perpetually obliged to resist the 
entreaties and to sndure the reproachful admonitions of her Uncle 
&c, she vainly endeavours to conceal from me how heavy her heart 
is with anxiety, how disquieted by Suspense - To leave her for two 
or three years would, I fear, be sacrificing her health and 
happiness - In short, why should I write circuitously to you? 
So commanding are the requests of her Relations, that a short Time 
must decide whether she marries me whom she loves with an 
affection to the ardor of which my Deserts bear no proportion -
or a man whom she strongly dislikes, in spite of his fortune and 
solicitous attentions to her. These peculiar circumstances she 
had with her usual Delicacy concealed from me till my arrival at 
. 20 Bristol. 
The last sentence partly explains the difference of tone in this letter, 
although the different recipient may explain it almost as much. 
Practical aspects are considered in this letter and, as a result, there 
19. George Dyer (1755-1841) - •author•. 
also (B.C). 
20. Griggs. 81. p . 151. 
' 
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is more substance to Coleridge's sense of obligation. For the first time, 
the real situation seems to oblige Coleridge more than the pressure of 
Southey's influence. 
Coleridge' s correspondence for the middle part of 1795 is thin and 
we have no record of his feelings towards Sara Fricker between the date 
of the above letter and the da t e of the wedding on October 4th 1795, 
except, by the way, in a comment to Southey in August praising marriage 
as the highest of sublunary delights where, significantly perhaps, there 
is no mention of the person of Sara but rather of the abstraction, 
. 21 The main corroboration of the view that Coleridge was trying 
marriage. 
to accomplish his duty by a transference of feeling rather than a 
renunciation of it comes in Coleridge's letter of November 13th, 1795 to 
Southey in which he announces and explains the breakdown of their friend-
ship . It is important to realise here that Coleridge is anxious to 
prove that he did not fail in his duty but, nevertheless, his choice of 
expression is revealing: 
Previously to my departure from Jesus College; and during my 
melancholy detention in London, what convulsive Struggles of 
Feeling I underwent, and what sacrifices I made, you know. The 
liberal Proposal from my Family affected me no farther than as 
it pained me to wound a revered Brother by the positive and 
immediate Refusal, which Duty compelled me to return. But 
there was a I need not be particular You remember what a 
Fet.ter I burst, and that it snapt, as if it had been a Sinew of 
my Heart . However, I returned to Bristol, and my addresses to 
Sara, which I at first payed from Principle not Feeling , from 
Feeling & from Principle I renewed: and I met a reward more than 
proportionate to the greatness of the Effort. I love and I am 
beloved, and I am happy! 22 
21. See Griggs. 87. p. 158. See also my letters to the Times Literary Supplement on this matter during October, 1969. 
22. Griggs. 93. P• 164. 
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The tone of the last sentence is not simply of ecstasy in love, but of a 
victory. (.;oleridge is proclaiming that through his perseverance his 
theory has been vindicated in that the determined conjunction of feeling 
with principle in his approach to Sara Fricker has resulted in .a feeling 
of love for her where there had originally been nothing but a sense of 
duty. Simultaneously Coleridge is drawing Southey's attention to his 
constancy in not shirking his duty, involving himself in a great effort, 
and is also drawing his late friend's attention to the efficacy of the 
associationist method. 
However, this is to leap ahead in time, and we must return to the 
discussions of Pantisocracy in the Autumn of 1794. Coleridge's effort 
with regard to himself, as we have seen in relation to Sara Fricker, and 
also with regard to the Pantisocratic scheme was to break down the 
opposition between feeling and duty. He was conscious of the difference, 
but by making duty habitual he wished to transform it into a natural 
feeling. Coleridge's problem was that he could not, in all cases, 
dispense with the need for a primary obligation which could then be 
rendered feeling-ful. 23 By what criterion, for instance, could he assess 
that the obligation posed by Sara was one which merited the transference 
of his feelings? Coleridge believed in a mechanism for transforming 
obligations into feelings, but had no grounds for establishing which 
obligations were of ultimate value. To take an extreme case - a 
hypothetical but portentous one - i f Southey had asserted that Coleridge 
had to kill Mary Evans in order to demonstrate the constancy of his design 
to renounce personal feelings for the benefit of a greater good, on what 
theoretical grounds could Coleridge have questioned this obligation? In 
practice it certainly seemed as if Coleridge met his obligation to Sara 
23. This is the problem which emerges from Paley 1 s moral philosophy. 
See Part II. Introduction. (13)n. 
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Fricker mainly because it was an obligation rather than because of the kind 
of obligation t hat it constituted. 
Even the practical considerations mentioned in the letter to George 
Dyer were not such as to have obligatory weight unless one were predisposed 
that they should. Even if Coleridge did not isolate his difficulty in 
theoretical terms, the corollary to his thinking at this period revolves 
around the problem of how one can know whether the necessary primary 
obligation is correct. Is reason the originator of obligation, or is there 
a basic feeling prior to obligation which is different in kind from the 
feelings which eventually transform that obligation? Coleridge's main 
position is that the uncorrupted relation between a mother and a child 
establishes correct obligation and correct feeling simultaneously, so that 
this pristine relationship is the actual manifestation of the fusion of 
feeling and duty about whi ch Godwin theorised in such an utopian manner. 
Coleridge 's rigid conception of Pantisocracy was, essentially , that in the 
absence of adverse influences and associations this pure fusion might be 
preserved throughout life. On this view, there is little theoretical 
problem about babies in the Pantisocracy - indeed, they are the hope of the 
future perfectibility of the whole society when they, in turn, become 
parents, but the crucial difficulty is that an ideal society cannot commence 
ex nihilo. Coleridge believed that the correct feelings could be induced 
in adults by the method that he was practising in relation to Sara Fricker, 
and he also believed that as long as the society preserved modes of 
behaviour which corresponded with the correct feelings there could be no 
danger that these feelings would be corrupted by association. Hence 
Coleridge had three main fears for the success of the Pantisocratic scheme. 
The f irst w~s that perhaps the women adults would not sufficiently 
assimilate the correct feelings, with the result that their infants would 
be corrupted from the moment of birth; the second fear was that un-
egalitarian social structures might be introduced which would necessarily 
pervert proper feelings; and the third fear was that children might be 
accepted into the community who were old enough to have gathered bad 
associations from a 'morbid' environment and yet not old enough to have the 
constancy of will which was necessary to transform those false principles 
into good. Several points emerge. On the first count, it is clear that 
Coleridge has no view at this time of the innate goodness of the infant 
child, with the result that the interest which he takes in the child is 
finally subservient to the interest in the parent because the fusion of 
feeling and obligation in the child is learned and therefore dependent on 
the degree of fusion achieved by the parent. Thus for the child, as for the 
parent, the criteria for the choice of the primary obligation remain 
obscure. Ideally, for Coleridge, the life of the child is the pure 
enactment of a choice already made by the parent - singular since 
Coleridge seems to pay no regard to the associative significance of the 
father, but this purity is of process, of becoming , and ·bears no relation to 
the moral worth of the being that is integrated in this manner. The nature 
of the being depends on tha nature of the obligation initially accepted, 
and Coleridge offers no theoretical grounds for the nature of that first 
choice. It was on the second and third counts that there was greatest 
disagreement with Southey. The latter wished to take his household with 
him to America and did not imagine that his servants would need to be 
freed. 
Southey could not see Coleridge's point here, or did not wish to see 
it, because he had never fully accepted that the performance of a social 
role might corrupt the mind more powerfully than rational education could 
- ~ .. -.... ----- __,,. 
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. ·t 24 improve 1. Similarly, when it came to the point, Southey was not 
prepared to renounce family feelings for a more general benevolence. 25 We 
thus have the ironical situation that Coleridge attacks Southey for being 
swayed by feelings into wishing that his relations ahould be allowed to 
go to America. The irony is more poignant because at this time Coleridge 
is prepared to admit the value of family feeling, and this would probably 
be one of the points on which he considered himself to be at variance with 
Godwin. The difference between Southey and Coleridge on this issue is 
that Southey is thinking more in terms of natural feelings such as filial 
affection, whereas Coleridge conceives of the family environment as a 
convenient embodiment of 'habit'. For Coleridge, the family constitutes 
a useful group which fosters the learned feelings of the child in a setting 
beyond the associations of the mother alone, before the child then moves 
out into a wider society. The family is an instrument for the trans-
formation of society, 26 whilst, in relation to the Pantisocracy, Southey's 
commitment to his family seemed to be elevating a means to the position of 
an end, and Coleridge clearly felt that the importation.of Southey's family 
into society would be the importation of a body of prejudication rather 
than an associative force for social welfare. 
24. Because, in other words, Southey had never been able to accept Hartley, in spite of the fact that Coleridge had obviously 
encouraged him to borrow Hartley's Observations on Man immediately from the Bristol Library. Southey borrowed vol. I from July 8th 
- Augus~ 7th, 1794, and again from January 21st - J~rch 27th, 1795 , 
and vol. 2 from August 7th - August 22nd, 1794. (See G. Whalley. 
"The Bristol Library Borrowings of Southey and Coleridge 1793-8". (B.Dii).) 
25. It was this renunciation of 'family feeling' that Southey felt, 
wi t h justification, t hat Godwin required. 
26. Compare wi th Coleridge's thinking in the Political Lectures. See Part II. Chapter 2. 
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Three letters written in the autumn of 1794 give the main suggestions 
for the pic ture of Coleridge's attitude at this time which has just been 
presented. The first was written to Southey from Cambridge on October 21st 
and i t begins with the reference to Mary Evans' letter which has already 
been noticed. The second letter, also to Southey, followed immediately 
after the first on October 23rd and indicates a greater concern for the 
philosophical basis of the Pantisocratic venture resulting from a cross-
examination to which Coleridge was obviously subjected in the evening of 
October 22nd. The third l etter was also written to Southey from Cambri dge 
on November 3rd, 1794. In the first of t hese three l e tters, Coleridge 
wri tes: 
- I was vexed too and alarmed by your letter concerning Mr & Mrs 
Roberts, Shad & little Sally - I was wrong, very wrong in the affair 
of Shad - & have given you Reason to suppose, that I should assent 
to this Innovation - I will most assuredly go with you to America 
on this Plan - but remember, Southey! this is not our Plan - nor 
can I defend it. 1Shad 1s children will be educated as our's - and 
the Education we shall give them wi ll be such as t o render them 
incapable of blushing at the want of it in their Parents' . 
PERHAPS! With this one Word would every Lilliputian Reasoner 
demolish the System. Wherever Men can be vicious, some will be. 
The leading I dea of Pantisocracy is to make men necessarily 
virtuous by removing all Motives to E-vil - all possible Temptations. 
'Let them dine with us and be treated with as much equality as they 
woul d wish - but perform that part of Labor for which their 
Education has fitted them' - Southey should not have written this 
Sentence - my Friend, my noble and high-souled Friend should have 
said - to his Dependents - Be my Slaves - and ye shall be rrry 
Equals - to his Wife & Sisters - Resign the Name of Ladyship and 
ye shall retain the thing. - Again - Is every Farnily to possess 
. f th U 1 E 1 th H 1 t E l't' ? 27 one o ese nequa •qua s - ese e o ga i e-s .••••• 
27. Griggs . 65. pp. 113-4• 
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Coleridge attacks Southey for modifying the original plan. The difference 
of opinion settles upon the idea of necessity. Southey had obviously 
proposed that Shad should go to America. Coleridge had already agreed to 
this in a previous letter - 'Shad is my brother' . 28 In the letter to which 
Coleridge is replying, Southey clearly had envisaged education as the 
equaliser of the Pantisocratic society and had imagined that otherwi se 
everyone should remain i n his or her social stratwn. This deduction from 
Coleridge's quotations certainly reflects Southey's belief in reason, and 
that education alone will gradually establish an egalitarian society. By 
contrast, Coleridge conceives of a society that will necessarily inclucate 
equality. For necessity to take effect, every aspect of life must be 
equal so that practice is established by experience rather than simpl y by 
reason. If there is the possibility of vice, then there will be vice, and 
hence any source of possibility must be removed. Coleridge is taking 
seriously Southey's emphasis on motive and external impulsion, but, unlike 
Southey, he recognises other than rational motives; he sees that ways of 
life induce certain habits, and he returns to his earlier clear conviction 
that names condition attitudes. 
In the letter written two days later, Coleridge expresses his anxiety 
more forcefully. He writes: 
Last night, deqr Southey! I received a special Invitation from 
Dr. Edwards (the great Grecian of Cambridge and heterodox Divine) 
to drink Tea and spend the Evening - I there met a counsellor whose 
name is Lushingtbn - a Democrat - and a man of the most powerful 
and Briarean Intellect - I was challe~ged on the subject of 
Pantisocracy, which is indeed the universal Topic at this University -
A Discussion began and .continued for six hours. In conclusion, 
Lushington & Edwards declared the System impregnable, supposing 
the assigned Quantum of Virtue and Genius in the first Individuals. 
28 ~ See Griggs. 59. p. 103. 
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I came home at one o'clock this morning exulting in the honest 
Consciousness of having exhibited closer argument in more elegant 
and appropriate Language, than I had ever conceived myself 
capable of. 
Then my heart smote me - for I saw your Letter on the propriety 
of taking Servants with us. - I had answered that Letter - and feel 
conviction that you will perceive the error, into which the 
Tenderness of your Nature had led you. But other Queries obtruded 
themselves on my Understanding - The more perfect our System is -
supposing the necessary Premises - the more eager in anxiety am I -
that the necessary Premises should exist. 29 
There is confusion, here, over the usage of 'feelings'. Coleridge is 
claiming that Southey has been misguided by tender feelings and is thereby 
endangering the system. Particular feelings which may be natural never-
theless endanger general feelings. Here it becomes clear that Coleridge 
sees a conflict in kinds of feeling, whereas Southey sees the conflict as 
between feeling and duty. For Southey, the duty is an end, whereas for 
Coleridge the rationally conceived goal must be vivified by feelings which 
have been transferred from a limited particular context. The apparent 
irony that Coleridge is attacking Southey for being betrayed by feelings 
appears in the letter of November 3rd. Co l eridge writes: 
My feeble and exhausted Heart regards with a criminal indifference 
the Introduction of Servi tude into our Society-; but my Judgement 
is not asleep: nor can I suffer your Reason, Southey! to be 
entangled in the web, which your feelings have woven. Oxen and 
Hors~s possess not intellectual Appetites - nor the powers of 
acquiring them. We are therefore Justified in employing their 
Labor to our own Benefit - Mind hath a divine Right of Soverei gnty 
over Body - But who shall dare to transfer this Reasoning from 
'from Man to Brute I and I from Man to Man ( 1 ) ! To ·be employed in 
the Toil of the Field while We are pursuing philosophical Studies -
can Earldoms or Emperorships boast so huge an Inequality? Is 
29, Griggs. 66. pp . 118~9. 
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there a human Being of so torpid a Nature, as that placed in our 
Society he would not feel it? 
Slaves - His Soul is a Slave.30 
A willing Slave is the worst of 
and a little later in the same letter he adds: 
I wish, Southey! in the stern severity of Judgement, that the two 
Mothers were not to go and that the children stayed with them -
Are you wounded by my want of feeling? No! how highly must I 
think of your rectitude of Soul, that I should dare to say t his to 
so affectionate a Son ! That Mrs Fricker - we shall have her 
teaching the Infants Christianity, - I mean - that mongrel whelp 
that goes under it's name - teaching them by stealth in some 
ague-fit of Superstition! 3l 
Coleridge is prepared to defend family feeling as it is created in an 
ideal vacuum, but not as a pre-exis tent structure whi ch cuts across wider 
horizons of sympathy. Co l eridge wants to harness the power of fami l y 
feeling and in doing so he wishes to detach that power from the context 
which is its source. The analogy is significant since it is one whi ch 
Coleridge himself makes a little later when he describes the possible 
function of the press in a 'morbid' society.32 
These three letters provide the climax of the theoretical debate 
concerning Pantisocracy between Coleridge and Southey. However, even 
before the end of 1794 enthusiasm for the scheme was beginning to fade. 
30. Griggs. 68. pp . 121-2. 
31. Griggs. 68 . p . 123. 
32. See The Plot Discovered. p . 45 • (Patton & Mann. P• 313). 
..- .. -- . ,._ -
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CHAPTER II 
1795: The Political Lectures 
As we have seen, the discussion concerning the underlying philosophy 
of Pantisocracy reached its climax in the autumn and early winter of 1794. 
The difference between Coleridge and Southey at this time led, first of all, 
to compromises in the scheme, and, finally, to the break-down of the friendly 
relationship between the t wo poets. During the course of 1795 each became 
eager to pin the label of a postate on the other. There is no need to 
attempt to act as judge in this case. Such an appraisal of the situation 
has no importance for this study. Instead we need to decide what, finally, 
was the influence of Southey's thought and behaviour on the personality of 
Coleridge, or, more significantly, on the way Coleridge viewed his own 
personality and conceived the nature of personality abstractly. We also 
need to look at the way in which Coleridge set about the task of adapting 
the ideas which he had formulated for the creation of a 'new' society to 
the ordinary society which he and Southey chose to call 1morbid 1 • 1 The 
answers to these questions are most clearly found in the Political Lectures 
which Coleridge delivered in the early part of 1795. 
Coleridge delivered three political lectures in the period between 
late January and early March, 1795. The first was published late in 
February under the title A Moral and Political Lecture, and it was revised 
and republished in November as the Introductory Address to Conciones ad 
Populum. This l atter publication contained a lecture entitled On the 
Present War which consisted of the second a'nd possibly parts of the third 
lecture that had been delivered in February. Coleridge's 'third' 
political lecture of 1795 which was, therefore, in fact, the fourth, was 
de livered as a Lecture on the Two Bills on November, 26th, 1795, and 
1. For Southey's realisation that Godwin 's theories were utopian, see 
a letter to Grosvenor Bedford of October 1st, 1795. In C.C. Southey. 
The Life and Correspondence. Vol. I. p. 247, (B.C). 
-• T - '1''-: ,• 
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published as The Plot Discovered, a f ter revision and expansion, in the same · 
2 
month. 
Although The Plot Discovered was the last lecture to be 'delivered', 
it provides t he most useful introduction to the na ture and scope of 
Coleridge's thinking in the whole group . It was 'delivered' against 
minis terial t r eason. Habeas Corpus had been suspended on May 17th, 1794 , 
and state trials for treason were held between October and December of that 
year. Tooke,3 Hardy4 and Thelwall5 were acquitted, but the government 
continued to encroach upon the liberty of the people. Government attempts 
to limit the liberty of the press and freedom of speech QOnstituted the 
2. (See Patton & Mann. pp . xxv-xxxiii). I use the Introductory Address as my source for what, throughout, I call A Moral and Political Lecture, and I use The Plot Discovered as my source for the lecture which was deliver ed as a Lecture on the Two Bills. Since the publication of Lectures 1795 on Politics and Religion (ed. L. Patton & P. Mann) it has become pos sible to compare the published texts with the notes for the lectures as delivered. I 
s hall attempt to draw attention to any significant alterations in the passages to which I refer in my text. In my treatment of t he lectures in the text, therefore, I work from the publications with 
which , presumably, Coleridge was satisfied in November, 1795, 
although I discuss them as a group as if t hey all belong to the February/March period of the year. Hence I treat the Political Lectures chronologically before the Theological Lectures in spite 
of t he exception of The Plot Discovered. Thematic considerations 
over-ruled the strict chronology which is followed in the new 
edition. Close attention to Coleridge's revisions, may indicate t hat t here is significant change from February to November, 1795, but for the purpose of my di s cussion of the rela tionshi p between Coleridge's political and t heological positions I have been prepared to become temporarily , and , perhaps necessarily , a-histori cal in my analysis . 
3. John Horne Tooke (1736-1812 ) . 
4. 
5. 
Thomas Hardy (1752-1832) 
Vol. 24. PP • 357-8. 
See Part II. Chapter 5 • . 
. , ... 
. . 
'radical politician'. D. N.B. 
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real treason in Coleridge's view. The Treason and Convention Bills were 
introduced on November 6th and 10th respectively, by Lord Grenville and 
William Pitt , and were put into effect on December 18th. At the time of 
Coleridge's l ecture, the Treason Bill had passed its t hird reading in the 
Lords and its second in the Commons , and the Convention Bill had passed its 
first reading in the Commons and had not yet been introduced into the Lords. 6 
The most immediately striking feature of The Plot Discovered is the 
similari ty of many of the attitudes to the orthodox line of rational dissent 
of which Coleridge would have been particularly aware from the speeches of 
William Frend whi ch he had heard as an undergratua te. 7 1rhe rational 
position with its specific connotations as manifested in Unitar ianism is 
evident in the following opening passa ge: 
"THE MASS OF THE PEOPLE HA VE NOTHING TO DO WITH 'rIIE LAWS, BUT TO 
OBEY THEM!" Ere yet this foul treason against the majesty of 
man, ere yet this blasphemy against the goodness of God be registered 
among our statutes, I enter my protest! Ere yet our laws as well 
as our religion be muffled up in mysteries, as a CHRIS'rIAN I protest 
8 against this worse than Pagan darkness! 
In objecting to the idea of obedience to laws with which people have nothing 
to do, Coleridge is rebelling against the notion of objectivity. This form 
of mindless obedience that is required is treason against the majesty of man 
because it scorns his reason, and it is blasphemy against God because He 
endowed man wi th reason above t he beasts. Coleridge obj ects to ' mysteries' 
because both Law and Religion must be rationally explicable. Elaborating 
6. For a general survey of the political atmosphere of the 1790 1s, see J.H.Plumb (B.Di) Part III. The Age of Pitt. Also see C. Hobhouse (B.Di). 
7. 
8. 
See Par t II . Introduction. (6) n. 
The Plot Discovered. P• 3. (Patton & Mann. p . 285). 
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his position, Coleridge continues: 
In all ministerial measures t here are t wo reasons, the real, and 
the ostensible. The ostensible reason of the present Bill we have 
heard; the real reason wi ll not elude the search of common 
sagacity. The existing laws of Treason were t oo clear, t oo un-
equivocal, Judges indeed (wha t will not Judges do? ) Judges might 
endeavour to transfer to these laws their own flexibility ; Judges 
might make strange interpretations. But English Juries could not, 
woul d not understand t hem . Hence instead of eight hecatombs of 
condemned traitors behold eight triumphant acquitted felons! Hine 
illae l acrymae. The present Bills wer e conceived and l aid in the 
dunghill of despotism among t he other yet unhatched eggs of t he old 
Serpent . In due time and in fit opportunity they crawled into 
light. Genius of Britain! crush t hem!9 
The new measures wer e really taken to obscure t he existing laws of Treason. 
Implicit in Coleridge's a ttitude, t herefore, is t he feeling that law mus t 
be as clear and as univer sally known a s possible. In this, Coleridge is 
like Frend. Paley had advocated f lexibility and expediency, but Coleridge 
is hosti le to t his position because he identifies expediency wi th malice on 
10 t he part of t he government. Like Frend again, Coleridge here expresses 
belief in Juries, not i n Judges, and he regards the recent trial s as the 
vindication of the Jury sys tem. The f ollowing words CO Ql d be Frend 1 s: 
But I hear it suggested, t hat t he t wo Acts wi ll not be administered 
I in all t heir possible stretch of implication! Pale-hearted men, who 
cannot approve, yet who dare not oppose a most foul ministry, is it 
come to t his, tha t Britons should depend on clemency not justice, 
that Britons should whine to Ministers to stand between them and the 
1 ?11 aw. 
9 . The Plot Discovered. pp. 6-7. (Patton & Mann. p . 288). 
10 . For Paley's attitude, see The Principles of Moral and Politica l Philosophy. Bk . VI. Section VIII. Of t he adminis tration of justice. in Works. (B.C). Vol. IV . p. 419. 
11. The Plot Discovered. pp . 11-12. (Pat ton & Mann. p . 291) 
---
" 
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'I'his is the rigid l egalism that Frend had represented in opposition to 
Milner in Coleridge 's days as an undergraduate. 
Nevertheless, this lecture also contains Coleridge's t ypical 
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ins is tence on the primacy of feeling . Coleridge argues t hat , in origin, 
Majesty meant the unity of the people, the weight imparted by t he majority. 
The ancient Lex Majestatis or Law of Treason was intended against those who 
injured the People. It is in t his context that he claims that the f eelings 
of the people are sacred, and tha t the bi lls now under consideration 
prohibit the expression of t he se feelings. Coleridge says: 
The Bill now pending is indeed a s full-foliaged, as the Manchineel 
tree; (and like the manchineel, will poi son those who are fools 
enough to slumber beneath it) but its import is briefl y this 
f irst, t hat the people of England should possess no unrestrained 
right of consulting in common on common grievances: and secondl y, 
that Mr. Thelwall should no longer give politica l l ectures. 12 
Coleridge develops this r efere nce to Thelwall. His main argument is that 
t he voice of an individual is suppressed by a government whi ch is awar e t ha t 
it is the voice of the whole people and not jus t of a n individua l. In 
making t his point, Coleridge makes explicit several as sumptions concerning 
true and f alse feelings . He remarks : 
The public amusements at the Theatre are a lready under ministerial 
controQl. And if the tremendous sublimity of Schiller, if 1 the 
Robbers' can be legally suppressed by t ha t thing yclept a Lord 
Chamberlain, in point of literary exhibition it woul d be un-
reasonable for Mr . Thelwall to complain. But in proportion a s he 
feels himself of little consequence he will perceive the situation 
of t he ministry is desperate. Nothing ~ould make him of i mportance 
but that he speaks the feelings of multitudes. The feelings of men 
are always founded in truth. The modes of expressing them may be 
blended wi th error, and the feelings themselves may lead to the most 
abhor red excess. Yet still they are originally right: they teach 
12. The Plot Discovered. p . 19. (Patton & Mann . p . 296) 
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man that something is wanting , something which he ought to have. 
Now if the premier with the influence of the wealthy and the 
prejudices of the i gnorant on his side, were evidently struggling 
to supply these perceived desiderata, could an unsupported malcontent 
oppose him? Alas! it is the vice of this nation, that if a 
minister merely promise to increase the comforts or enlarge t he 
liberties of the people, he instantly conjures up such a wild and 
overwhelming popularity, as enables him to execute with impunity the 
most ruinous schemes against both. But William Pitt knows, that 
Thelwall is the voi ce of tens of thousands, and he levels his 
parliamentary thunder-bolts against him with the same emotion with 
which Caligula wished to see the whole Roman state brought together 
in one neck , that he might have the luxury of beheadihg it at one 
moment. But we shall revert to this clause in due time, and gird 
ourselves up to this consideration of the restrictions of the right 
of petitioning. 13 
In the few sentences discussing feeling, Coleridge begins to grapple with 
the problem which is to concern him most when he later enters into 
correspondence with Thelwall. Coleridge had always assumed that correct 
feelings would necessarily manifest themselves in correct behaviour, and that, 
therefore, to assess the behaviour of a person was the same thing as to assess 
the feelings of that person. The problem was that Hartleian association 
tried to combine this theory of an internal necessity of expression with the 
theory that expression and external impression also necessarily affected the 
personality. With regard to expression the Hartleian position was circular 
since if there was an internal necessity of association of which expression 
was the end-product, that product could hardly corrupt the process of which 
it was itself the culmination. 
With regard to external impression, the Hartleian position tended to 
overlook the continuity of such impressions. Hartley .tended to postulate 
13. The Plot Discovered . pp. 19-20. (Patton & Mann. pp. 296-7) 
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two significant static moments, the first of which was the moment when the 
mind initially received associations from external impression, and the 
second of whi ch was the moment when the mind reached a stage of final 
perfection after a process of internal amelioration developing from those 
initial i mpressions. No allowance was made for inter-play between inner and 
outer. 14 Coleridge had held both aspects of the Hartleian view and was 
confronted by the problem that I have detailed. He had always wanted to 
insist that external i mpressions modified internal f eelings, but he had hardly 
reconciled this view with his belief in an inner necessity . The progress of 
the French Revolution seemed to illustr ate clearly that correct feelings 
could be corrupted disastrously. Was Coleridge to conclude that there can 
be disparity between an original feeling and its expression, or was he to 
retain a belief in necessity which would lead him to deduce that the 
atrocities of the French Revolution proved the falsity of its underlying 
feelings? The passage cited above shows that he chose the former course, 
that his tenacious grip on necessity loosened slightly. He accepts that 
'modes of expressing ' feelings may be in error, and that the feelings them-
selves, although pure and truthful, 'may lead to the most abhorred excesses•. 
The sol~tion tha t Coleridge finds here has a Miltonic ring, as do many of 
the sentiments expressed in the lectures. Miltonic platonism was the main 
14. See the following passage from Hartley•s Observations on Man (B.C). 
Part II. Proposition 69. p . 291: 
"For though our Affections are not directly and immediately 
subject to t he voluntary Power, yet our Actions are; and 
consequently our Affections __ also mediately. He that at first 
practises Acts of Benevolence by Constraint, and continues to 
practise t hem, will at last have associated such a Variety of 
Pleasures with them, as to transfer a great instantaneous 
Pleasure upon them and beget in himself the Affections from 
which they naturally flow . In like manner, if we abstain 
f rom malevolent Actions, we shall dry up the ill Passions, 
which are their Sources." (My italics). 
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concrete source for the kind of Shaftesburyanism that began to transform 
Coleridge's Rousseauistic leanings and to plug the hole that experience of 
personal and political realities had made in Hartleian necessarianism. 15 
Feelings still do not have the status of innate ideas, but Coleridge uses the 
idea of ignorance and error to explain the corruption of pure feeling , 
Rational misunderstanding corrupts purity of heart. But if correct 
generalised feelings are learnt and are the particular hwnan feelings 
directed to a different, rationally ascertained, context, how can one be sure 
that this first rational direction is not a misunderstanding of the general 
situation? If Coleridge is to retain his belief in learnt feelings and the 
possibl e manipulation of feelings, he must now be prepared to accept tha t 
these original fee lings may be mislearnt and falsely manipul ated. By 
accepting that reason can destroy the purity of feeling , Col eridge must 
a s sert t he purity of feeling before experience and before reason if he is to 
remain an optimist, and if he is t o accept the a priori goodness of feeling 
he must accept human feelings as they are, in their particular, natural 
context before their manipulation for the purposes of a rationally 
considered social utility . Paradoxically, the rejection of Hartley's kind 
of necessarian position involves the rejection of the possibility of 
15. See Part II. Chapter 3. (7)n and (8)n. Milton was certainly 
not the only origin of the change in Coleridge's thinking in 1795, 
but this is not the place to develop arguments fo r other possible 
inf luences. Coleridge's reading of Akenside may have familiarised 
him with Leibniz, and hi s reading of Cudworth must also have 
presented the case of the Platonic tradition in England. For 
Coleridge's reading at thi s time, see G, Whalley. "The Bri stol 
Library Borrowings of Southey and Coleridge 1793-8," (B, Dii). 
See R, Cudworth (B.C) and J, A, Passmore (B,Di); C. E, Lowrey 
(B,Di ) ; Paul Jane t (B ,Di ) . 
See IvI . Akenside (B,C) and R. W. Chapman (B,Dii); J. Har t (B. Dii); 
G, R. Potter (B.Dii); W. L. Renwick (B.Dii ) . 
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transforming humans and human society. 
Not only does Coleridge accept the disjunction of feeling and behaviour, 
but also the discussion of sedition causes him to recognise that the truth 
of feeling is prior to verbal expression and is often distorted by it. 
Coleridge says in this context: 
Our ancestors were wisely cautious in framing the bill of treason; 
they would not admit words as sufficient evidences of intention. 
How often does the tongue utter what the moment after the heart 
disapproves! these indiscretions are blameable in the individual, 
but the frequency of t hem was honourable t o the nation at large, as 
i t demonstrated the unsuspecting spirit of a free government, too 
proud to be jealous! 16 
Coleridge starts from the same point in arguing that it is specious to 
suppose that a malicious kind of censure can be isola ted for punishrnent: 
Al l censure tends to excite dislike; to forbid all discourses a nd 
publications that may tend to produce dislike of his Majesty, is in 
other words, to bestow on the fi rs t magistrate of a free country an 
immunity from all censure . I am aware, it will be objected, that 
such discourse or book must have been u t tered or published 
maliciously. But will the of fender himself plead ·guilty to thy 
malicious intention? and if he himself does not plead guilty, what 
witnesses can be brought against the secrets of the heart? The 
law must in these cases judge of the intentions by the effect; and 
where the effect is strong and clear, a co-19-plaisant Judge will 
always find himself incapable of conceiving , how it could be 
produced, if not maliciously. 17 
In both these passages there is the sense that the real human motiva tions 
are s ub-verbal and that a good government should allow for the inter-play of 
persons rather than conduc t a f fairs on the basis of an inter-play of words. 
16. The Plot Discovered. p. 11. (Patton & Mann. p . 291) 
17. The Plot Discovered. pp . 14-15. (Patton & Mann. p . 293,) 
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The immediate effect of Coleridge's acceptance that feeling could be totally 
corrupted by erroneous reason was to ensure that correct reasons were 
inculcated rather than to investigate the nature of the feeling which was 
before experience. Coleridge had under-rated reason when it was opposed 
to feeling as a rival de terminant of the nature of a person, but as 
Coleridge's view of feeling gradually became equated with his conception of 
being itself, so he became prepared to accept the subsidiary modifying 
influence of reason, and to see that if the feeling self is beyond or before 
experience then the only way to alter persons is to influence reason's 
subsidiary r ole. Hence Coleridge's combination of a strong belief in both 
feeling and reason in his Political Lectures. 
The introduction to A Moral and Political Lecture begins with an 
analysis of t he audience of the lecture and also of the present state of the 
French Revolution. In this analysis Coleridge uses phrases which are some-
times reminiscent of Southey. The important point is that Coleridge now 
systematically accepts the need for 'fixed principles' to modify the force 
of the feeling self, whereas Southey had tried to make rationality the 
essence of being. Coleridge begins the lecture which he delivered first of 
the three in the following manner: 
Companies resembling the present will, from a ?ariety of circumstances, 
consist chiefly of the zealous Advocates for Freedom. I t will 
therefore be our endeavour, not so much to excite the torpid, as to 
regulate the feelings of the ardent: and above all, to evince the 
necessity of bottoming on fixed Principles, that so we may not be 
the unstable Patriots of Pa s sion or Accident, nor hurried away by 
names of which we have not sifted the meaning, and by tenets of whi'ch 
we have not examined the consequences. The Times are trying; and 
in order to be prepared against their difficulties, we should have 
acquired a prompt facility of adverting in all our doubts to some 
grand and comprehensive Truth. In a deep and strong Soil must that 
Tree fi x its Roots, the hei ght of which is to "reach to Heaven, and 
,_.. ..----·,.r; 
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the Sight of it to the ends of all the Earth". 
The Example of France is indeed a "Warning to Britain". A 
Nation wading to their Rights through Blood, and marking the track 
of Freedom by Devastation! Yet l et us not embattle our Feelings 
against our Reason. Let us not indulge our malignant Passions 
unde~ the mask of Humanity. Instead of railing with infuriate 
declamation against these excesses, we shall be more profitably 
employed in developing the sources of them. French Freedom is the 
Beacon, which while it guides to Equality, should shew us the 
Dangers that throng t he road. 18 
Coleridge is making a plea for rationality and sanity in hi ghly emotional 
times. He has recourse to the form of an objective criterion in that he 
argues that actions should be assessed in the light of a 'comprehensive 
Truth 1 • This form, in fact, embraces the product of Coleridge's thinking 
concerning the supremacy of feeling , for the 'comprehensive Truth ' to which 
Coleridge refers without elaboration, must, by implication, involve the 
principle that person-to-person relationships are of prime importance before 
all verbal rationalisations. This understanding of Coleridge's assumption 
is able to make sense of the second paragraph of his lecture. The original 
feelings which were the foundations of the French impetus for freedom should 
not be rejected because our feelings are outraged by the atrocities in 
France. Our reason must channel our feeling so that we accept that French 
feeling went astray because it was not controlled by reason. If our 
feelings in reaction are not contr olled as the original French f eelings 
should have been, then our reacti0n is in danger of being as atrocious as 
are the manifestations of French lack of control. It would not matter that 
our feelings could react under 'the mask of Humanity'; indeed, French 
feeling went sour under the same mask. The criterion which mus t be 
consulted is not the kind of abstraction, like 'Humanity ', which becomes 
18 . Conciones ad Populum. pp .8-9 , (Patton & Mann. pp . 33-4) 
1 
I 
I 
113 
detached from feeling , but the grand belief in feeling itself as a 
'comprehensive Truth', the belief in a sub-verbal form of hwnan empathy. 
Coleridge's hatred of abstractions is not unlike Burke's, 19 but he would 
differ radically from Burke because.he would argue that, mistakenly, Burke 
had rejected the 'thing ' as well as the 'name ' of J?reedom. French Freedom 
had taken a wrong turning and had become systematised and inhuman, but this 
did not mean that true human relationships in f reedom were impossible. 
French Freedom had become corrupted because the abstraction had become the 
belief of an intel ligent elite, whilst t here had been no a ttempt to foster 
the practice of 'openness' by sharing freedom through a process of 
democratization. Coleridge makes this point in his next paragraph: 
The Annals of the French Revo l ution have recorded in Le t ters of 
Bl ood, that the Knowledge of the Few cannot counteract the Ignorance 
of the Many; that the Light of Philosophy, when it is confined to 
a smal l Minority , points out the Possessors as the Victims, rather 
than the Illuminators, of the Multitude. The Patriots of France 
either hastened into the dangerous and gigant i c Error of making 
certain Evil t he means of contingent Good, or were sacrificed by the 
Moo, with whose prejudices and ferocity their unbending Virtue 
forbade them to assimilate. 20 
Coleridge proceeds to examine the dilemma of some of the French leaders. 
Hi s comments on the Girondists are interesti~g because, certainly viewing 
from a later date, they might also seem to be self-regarding: 
19. 
20. 
21. 
Men of .genius are rarely either prompt in action or consistent in 
general conduct: their early habits have been t hose of contemplative 
indolence; and the day-dreams, with whi ch they have been accustomed 
to amuse their solitude, adapt them for ·splendid speculation, not 
temperate and practicable counsels. 21 
For Burke, see (B.C), and also C.Parkin (B.Di); A.Cobban (B.Di). 
Consiones ad. Populum. P• 9. (Patton & Mann . P• 34). 
Conciones ad Populum. p.10 . (Patton & IvJann. P• 34). 
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The phrase Coleridge uses to describe Brissot22 - 'a sublime visionary! 23 -
forces the likeness home, but clearly at the time of speaking Coleridge 
wishes to hold such speculators in contempt. His main objection to 
Robespierre is that his idealism became abstracted from practical possibility: 
I rather think, that the distant prospect, to which he was 
travelling, appeared to him grand and beautiful; but that he 
fixed his eye on it with such intense eagerness as to neglect the 
foulness of the road. If however his first intenti ons were pure, 
his subsequent enormities yield us a melancholy proof, that it i s 
not the character of the possessor which directs the power, but the 
power which shapes and depraves the character of the possessor. In 
Robespierre, its influence was assisted by the properties of his 
disposition. - Enthusiasm, even in the gentlest temper, wi ll 
frequently generate sensations of an unkindly order. If we clearly 
perceive any one thing to be of vast and infinite importance to our-
selves and all mankind, our first feelings impel us to turn with 
angry contempt from those, who doubt and oppose it. The ardor of 
undisciplined benevolence seduces us into malignity: and whenever 
our hearts are warm, and our objects great and e~cellent, 
intolerance is the sin that does most easily beset us. But this 
enthusiasm in Robespierre was blended with gloom, and suspicious-
ness, and inordinate vanity. 24 
Coleridge himself had become an enthusiast of Pantisocracy to such an 
extent that he had become intolerant of Southey's warmth of feeling for his 
family. Later in the lecture Coleridge does not let Southey's type of 
apos tasy escape unmentioned, 25 but his comments here illustrate his own 
22. Jean-Pierre Brissot (1754-1793). Biographie Universelle. Vol.5. 
PP • 568-70. 
23. Conciones ad Po::eulum. p. 10. (Patton & Mann. P• 35). 
24. Conciones ad Po::eulum. P• n. (Patton & Mann. P• 35). 
25. See Conciones ad Po::eul um. p. 19. (Patton & Mann. p. 40) and also 
Conciones ad Po::eulum. p . 32. (Patton & Mann. p . 48). This last 
passage runs: 
"All t hat can delight the poor man's sens es or strengthen 
I 
I, 
newly moderated attitt1de. Love and tolerance are t he keynotes of this 
lecture, and an emphasis on acceptance of persons regardless of their 
sentiments or their behaviour, both of which are st1perficial adjuncts to 
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the real self. Coleridge's lectures themselves are evidence of a practical 
desire to communicate, .and this desire is sustained later in the publication 
of I The Watchman 1 • 
In the analysis of kinds of Democrats which follows the account of the 
progress of the French Revolution, Coleridge begins by condemning the fact 
that both theology and political ideology are judged as abstractions without 
reference to per s ons. The limited ground that is shared with Burke is 
again apparent: 
The majority of Democrats appear to me to have attained that 
portion of knowledge in politics, which infidels possess in religion . 
I would by no means be supposed to imply, that the objections of 
both are equally unfounded, but that they both attribute to the 
system which they reject, all the evils existing under it; and 
that both contemplating truth and justice "in the nakedness of 
abstraction", condemn constitutions and dispensations without having 
sufficiently examined the natures, circumstances, and capacities of 
th . . . t 26 eir recipien s. 
Coleridge distinguishes three kinds of false Democrat. The first class 
comprises those whose opinions depend entirely on the reports of what is 
happening in France, and who therefore oscillate without fixed principles. 
his understanding, you preclude; yet with generous 
condescension you would bid him exclaim "LIBERTY and EQUALITY!" 
because, forsooth, he shoul d possess the same Right to an Hovel 
which you claim to a Palace". 
In a note, Patton & Mann suggest that this may be directed against 
Burke , but it is possible that an attack nearer to home is intended 
i f the s imilarity between the argument employed here and t hat used 
against Southey in Griggs. 65 . p .114 is noted. Hence Coleridge had 
used this argument against Southey as early as October, 1794 . 
26. Conciones ad Populum. p. 14. (Patton & Mann). p . 37. 
------ ----· .... -
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The second class comprises militant enthusiasts. The idea of force gains 
popularity in unenlightened minds and amongst those who are underprivileged. 
Coleridge accepts that these people are beyond the reach of rational 
persuasion. In the following pa~sage, tolerance figures as the ideal and 
Coleridge begins to realise that in some circumstances this i deal can only 
be communicated by subsidiary fee l ings rather than subsidiary reason. 
Feelings must now come to the aid of the insistence on personhood which had 
been derived from them. In other words, Coleridge still has insufficient 
faith in the ability of the true feeling self t o assert itself so that when 
rational control is inapplicable, indirect control by feeling must be 
exerted from without. This is a retreat to the Rousseauistic position as 
manifested in 1Emile 1 • 27 Col eridge says: 
The purifying alchemy of Education may transmute the fierceness 
of an i gnorant man into virtuous energy - but what remedy shall 
we apply to him, whom Pl enty has not softened, whom Knowledge has 
not taught Benevolence? This is one among the many fatal effects 
which result from the want of fixed principles. Convinced that 
vice 1s error, we shall entertain sentiments of Pity for the 
vicious, not of Indignation - and even with respect to that ba d 
Man, to whom we have before alluded, altho' we are now groaning 
beneath the burthen of his misconduct, we shall harbour no 
sentiments of Revenge; but rather condole with him that his 
chaotic Iniquities have exhibited such a complication of 
extravagance, inconsistency, and rashness as may alarm him with 
appr e~ensions of approaching lunacy ! 28 
We shall see shortly that Coleridge develops practical plans for the 
communication of his ideal to the underprivileged, but implicit in the fixst 
sentence of the above pa ssage is the inherent danger of the r etrea t to which 
27, See J.-J. Rousseau. Emile, ou de l'education. (B.C). 
28. Conciones ad Populum. p. 18. (Patton & Mann. p. 39), 
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I have drawn attention, that the new ideal of person-to-person relationship 
and tolerance has to be taught as much as 'the mask of Hwnanity' and is as 
detached from persons and practicality. This becomes clear when, after 
distinguishing the third class of Democrat as comprising those who want to 
be equal with those above them in status but want to keep the poor under-
neath a category into which, perhaps, Southey was seen to fa11 29 
Coleridge then describes the characteristics of the true Democrat. 
Coleridge's enthusiasm runs away with him and he falls into the trap that 
he had earlier exposed: 
We turn with pleasure to the contemplation of that small but 
glorious band, whom we may truly distinguish by the name of thinking 
and disinterested Patriots. These are the men who have encouraged 
the sympathetic passions till they have become irresistible habits, 
and made their duty a necessary part of their self-interest, by the 
long continued cultivation of that moral taste which derives our 
most exquisite pleasures from the contemplation of possible 
perfection, and proportionate pain from the perception of existing 
depravation. Accustomed to regard all the affairs of man as a 
process, they never hurry and they never pause. Theirs is not that 
twilight of political knowledge which gives us just light enough 
to place one foot before the other; as they advance the scene still 
opens upon them, and they press right onward with a vast and various 
landscape of existence around them. Calmness and energ-J mark all 
their actions. Convinced that vice originates not in the man, but 
in the surrounding circumstances; not in the heart, but in the 
understanding; he is hopeless concerning no one - to correct a vice 
or generate a virtuous conduct he pollutes not his hands with the 
scourge of coercion; but by endeavouring to alter the circumstances 
would remove, or by strengthening the . intellect, disarms, the 
temptation. The unhappy children of vice and folly, whose tempers 
are adverse to their own happiness as well as to the happiness of 
others, will at times awaken a natural pang; but he looks forward 
29. See note 25 above. 
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with gladdened heart to that glorious period when Justice shall 
have established the universal fraternity of Love. These soul-
ennobling views bestow the virtues which they anticipate. He 
whose mind is habitually imprest with them soars above the present 
state of humanity, and may be justly said to dwell in the presence 
of the Most High. 30 . 
Two major points of interest emerge from this passage. The first I have 
already suggested and that is that in describing the characteristics of the 
true Democrats, Coleridge isolates for praise a group of people that 
constitutes an elite and a state of mind that can only be called 'visionary'. 
The detachment and impracti cality that Coleridge had attacked in Brissot 
and the Girondists are favourably attached to the true Democrat, so much so 
that Coleridge can take delight in the prospect of soaring 'above the 
present state of humanity'. However, we are faced here with a seeming in-
consistency only because we have not understood that the 'visionary' aspect 
of the true Democrat is seen by Coleridge as only one aspect, and this is 
the second point of major interest. The key to the distinctive feature of 
the true Democrat as envisaged by Coleridge is the sentence: 'Calmness and 
energy mark all their actions'. Energy is gradually taken by Coleridge, 
especially through contact with Thelwall, to be synonymous with 'being '. 
Also through contact with Thelwall, this concept of being comes into contact 
with physiological theory through such related designations as 'vital 
energy', 'animal vitality', and 'animal magnetism'.3l The question which 
is now to concern Coleridge most forcibly , both abstractly and personally, 
is how, on the one hand, the calm contemplation of right ends can be indulged 
without the loss of energy, and, on the other, how energetic activity can 
be achieved without losing the consciousness of its aims and purposes. To 
30. Conciones ad Populwu. pp. 20-21. (Patton & Mann. p. 40). 
31. See Part II. Chapters 5 and 9. 
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put the matter personally, Coleridge wanted to be a speculator and an 
activist. He idealised the conjunction of the two in his picture of the 
true Democrat, but much of his thinking from this point onwards revolves 
around the fear that the t wo may be mutually exclusive. 
Coleridge returns to the problem of communication. He comments: 
That general Illumination shoul d precede Revolution, is a truth 
as obvious, as that the Vessel should be cleansed before we fill 
it with a pure Liquor. But the mode of diffusing it is not 
discoverable with equal facility. We certainly should never 
attempt to make Proselytes by appeals to the selfish feelings -
and consequently, should plead for the Oppressed, not to them. 
The Author of an essay on politica l Justice considers private 
Societies as the sphere of real utility - that (each one illuminating 
those immediately beneath him) , Truth by a gradual descent may at 
last reach the lowes t order. But this is rather plausible than 
just or practicable. Society as at present constituted does not 
resemble a chain that ascends in a continuity of Link.s.3 2 
Godwin 's solution is not satisfactory,33 and Coleridge goes on to claim that 
the best method of communication is to go among the poor like the 
Methodists. 34 Religion is the most efficient way of communicating a sense 
of duty to the lower classes. In an ideal world, domestic affection would 
stimula te correct attitudes, but, in reality, many family responsibilities 
are so burdensome amongst the poor that true feelings become distorted and 
can only be resurrected by reference to a future ideal beyond ordinary 
experience. The language of the following passage is Paleyan, which 
indicates that Coleridge is hovering on the brink of contradiction: 
32. Conciones ad Populum. p . 25. (Patton & Mann. P• 43). 
33. See W. Godwin (B.C). Bk . IV. Chapter I I. Section III . Of 
Political Associations. pp. 205-219 . for the discussion of this 
issue. 
34. See Conciones ad Populum. p . 26. (Patton & Mann. p. 43). 
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Domestic affections depend on association. We love an object 
if, as of ten as we see or recollect it, an agreeable sensation 
arises in our minds. But alas! how should he glow with t he 
charities of Father and Husband, who gaining scarcely more, than 
his own necessities demand, must have been accustomed to regard 
his wife and children, not as the Soothers of finished labour, but 
as rivals for the insufficient meal! In a man so circumstanced 
the Tyranny of the Present can be overpowered only by the tenfold 
mightiness of the Future. Religion will cheer his gloom with her 
promises, and by habituating his mind to anticipate an infinitely 
great Revolution hereafter, may prepare it even for the sudden 
reception of a less degree of amelioration in this World.35 
Coleridge i s unhappy with the situation of the poor family, but he places 
greater faith than before in the potentiality for goodness of the healthy 
family . He now regards under-valuation of t he family as the first step away 
from particular, personal feeling towards the abyss of abstraction. In the 
following passage in which Coleridge is moving towards the concl uding advice 
of his lecture, he tries to tie up some of t he loose threads of his t houghts. 
He insists tha t fixed principles are necessary , but he is anxious to argue 
t ha t these principles must be t he precursors of action and not static 
conceptions acting as detached arbiters of behaviour. I ndeed, principles 
~hould not even be the precursors of action but should be participants in it 
undergoing constant reformulation. Coleridge is concerned to avoid a 
duality of calmness against energy, wisdom against ardour. 
consolidates the pri nci pl es which underlie fur t her action. 
Action 
Even mistaken 
a c t ion i s better t han no action at all, since a mis t ake may lead to active 
wisdom whereas a position which eschews action will be valueless even if it 
is wise . For Coleridge, a lack of concern for immediate family through a 
concern for general benevolence i s indicative of a s tagnant wisdom that has 
35. Conciones ad Populum. p . 28. (Patton & Tufano. p. 45). 
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become cut off from the roots of human feeling . Coleridge proclaims: 
But if we hope to instruct others, we should familiarize our 
own minds to some fixed and de terminate principles of action. The 
World is a vast labyrinth, in which almost every one is running a 
different way, and almost every one manifesting hatred to those who 
do not run the same way . A few indeed stand motionless, and not 
seeking to lead themselves or others out of the maze laugh at the 
failures of their brethren. Yet with li t tle reason: for more 
grossly than the most bewildered wanderer does he err, who never 
aims to go right. It is more honourable to the Head, as well as to 
the Heart, to be misled by our eagerness in the pursuit of Truth, 
than to be safe from blundering by contempt of it. The happiness 
of Mankind is the end of Virtue, and Truth i s the Knowledge of the 
means; which he wil l never seriously attempt to discover, who has 
not habitually interested himself in the welfare of others. The 
searcher after Truth must love and be beloved; for general 
Benevolence is a necessary motive to constancy of pursui t; and this 
general Benevolence is begotten and rendered permanent by social and 
domestic affections. Let us beware of that proud Philosophy, which 
affects to inculate Phi lanthropy while it denounces every home-born 
feeling , by which it is produced and nurtured. The paternal and 
filial duties discipline the Heart and prepare it for the love of 
all Mankind. The intensity of private attachments encourages, not 
prevents, universal Benevolence. The nearer we approach to t he 
Sun, the more intense his heat: yet what corner of the system does 
he not cheer and vivify?36 
Some of the complexity of Coleridge's position can be gathered from the 
difference of emphasis between two of his final exhortations. 
end of the lecture he says: 
Towards the 
The Man who would find Truth, must likewise seek it with an humble 
and simple Heart, otherwise he will be · precipitant and overlook it; 
or he will be prejudiced, and refuse to see it. To emancipate 
itself from the Tyranny of Association, is the most arduous effort 
36. Conciones ad Populum. pp . 28-30. (Patton & Mann. pp .45-46) . 
. . 
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of t he mind, particularly in Religious and Political disquisitions. 
The asserter of the system has associated with it the preservation 
of Order, and public Virtue; the oppugner Imposture, and Wars, and 
Rapine. Hence, when they dispute, each trembles at the consequences 
of the other's opinions instead of attending to his train of 
arguments. Of this however we may be certain, whether we be 
Christians or Infidels, Aristocrats or Republicans, that our minds 
are in a state unsusceptible of Knowledge, when we feel an eagerness 
to detect the Falsehood of an Adversary's reasonings, not a sincere 
wish to discover if there be Truth in them; when we examine an 
argument in order that we may answer it, instead of answering 
because we have examined it.37 
Here Coleridge is drawing attention to the difficulty of having a tolerant, 
feeling-ful relationship with other people on account of the distorting and 
distancing effect of rationally held opinions. It is this emphasis on the 
puri t y of being before words and before behaviour that seems to be the basis 
for the deve lopments in Coleridge's thinking which take him beyond the 
defence of toleration. By contrast, the final words of the lecture seem 
to advocate the new emphasis by recourse to old terminology. Coleridge 
says: 
For this "subdued sobriety" of temper a practical faith in the 
doctrine of philosophical necessity seems the only preparative. 
That vice is the effect of error and the offspring of surrounding 
circumstances, the object therefore of condolence not of anger, is 
a proposition easily understood, and as easily demonstrated. But 
to m~ke it spread from the understanding to the affections, to call 
it into action, not only in the great exertions of Patriotism, but 
in the daily and hourly occurrences of social life, requires the 
most wa tchful attentions of the most energetic mind. It is not 
enough that we have once swallowed these Truths - we must feed on 
them, as insects on a leaf, till the whole heart be coloured by 
37. Conciones ad Populum. p. 30. (Patton & Mann . p. 47). 
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their qualities, and shew its food in every the minutest fibre. 
Finally, in the words of an Apostle, \"latch ye! Stand fast 
in the principles of which ye have been convinced! Quit your-
selves like Men! Be strong! Yet let all things be done in the 
spirit of Love. 38 
Coleridge again shows his anxiety that principles should be applied. The 
quotation from the Apostle shows Coleridge's concern for the conjunction of 
feeling and principle in action. However, he here retains aspects of the 
necessarian view which justify tolerance on the grounds that all men are 
externally determined, whereas we have seen that Coleridge was really 
grappling with tolerance as a positive expression of the relation of persons 
to persons. It is inter esting that Coleridge uses an organic image39 to 
describe the process of transformation that he had originally held, from 
principle to confirmed feeling, at the time when he was on the verge of 
recognising feeling itself, not as a faculty of being , but somehow as the 
organic essence of being. 
38, Conciones ad Populum. p. 34. (Patton & Mann. p·. 49). 
39, Coleridge uses the same image in a letter written at the height of 
his Pantisocratic thinking in October, 1794 (See Griggs. 65. 
p. 115), This supports my feeling that the final passage of the 
lecture covers up new insights with old language. 
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CHAPTER III 
1795: The Theological Lectures 
Coleridge's mention of the value of Christianity in transforming the 
condition of the poor and uneducated at the end of A Moral and Political 
Lecture1 was not at all casual. The Political Lectures of 1795 were 
followed by the Theological Lectures. 2 The lectures probably formed the 
basis for many of the sermons that Coleridge gave on The Watchman tour early 
in 1796, sermons which he described as being ' preciously peppered with 
Poli ties 1 • 3 
The interest of the lectures lies in the way in which Coleridge relates 
'philosophical' and 'historical' arguments. Coleridge's inability to be 
accurately historical in his 'historical' arguments, or to understand 
problems in past history as di fferent from problems in the present, has two 
significant implications. The first is related to the role assigned to 
t heological knowledge or speculation in the 'Political Lectures'. 
Coleridge refuses to accept t he historical life of Christ as more than an 
exemplary moral life. The life of Christ illustrates the potential 
existence of every human who establishes a relationship with God. The 
achievement of Christ did nothing to alter the need for every individual in 
the present to seek to gain communion with God. The kind of knowledge of 
God t hat Coleridge wanted to obtain in order to regulate his actions was not 
provided without inaividual effort, nor was it gained by speculation alone. 
Coleridge's attitude to the historical Christ complicated the problem of the 
1. See Part II. Chapter 2. (34)n. 
2. For details of the dates of the lectures , see Patton & Mann. 
PP• xxxv-xxxvii . 
3. See Gri ggs. 98. p. 176. 
- _ -a•-------l-, ·-,-1 
relation between thought and action. Secondly, however, Coleridge saw 
human history as the product of the Divine will, with the result that he 
investigated the dispensations of Moses and Christ as evidences of God's 
developing plan for the transformation of human society. This position 
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should have involved an assessment of the wisdom of God in adjusting his 
revelations to suit the needs of man at different times, but Coleridge was 
unable to sustain this relative judgement. Consequently, Coleridge saw the 
past devices employed by God as still apt in the present for different 
psychological needs, and in seeing God as a social planner with humanitarian 
ideals, Coleridge unconsciously identified himself with the Creator. In 
the 'Theological Lectures', Coleridge's unconscious and familiar sense of 
identity with God's predicament runs alongside his explicit sense of the 
difficulty of the unaided progress of the individual towards a relationship 
with God. The important feature of these lectures is the combination which 
they contain of an implicit one-ness with God and the beginnings of what is 
later to become an elaborate theory describing the way in which one-ness may, 
with difficulty, be achieved. The lectures illustrate both Coleridge's 
unconscious logical deduction of identity with God and also his rational 
. attempt to describe a necessary experiential approach towards identity. 
The main line of Coleridge's 'philosophical' argument is found in the 
first lecture which is primarily concerned with the origin of evil. 
Coleridge's first assertion is that it is absurd not to acknowledge t he 
necessity of a First Cause. He then answers two atheistic objections -
the first, 4 that the idea of God as First Qause must imply contradicto~y 
attitudes with regard to materialism and immaterialism, and the second,5 
4. 
5. 
See l\iIS . PP • 14-15. 
See MS. PP • 17-18. 
(Patton & Mann. pp . 96-97). 
(Patton & Mann. pp . 100-103). 
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that the phenomena of Nature are explicable without reference to a Deity. 
Coleridge makes the important distinction between the existence and the 
essence of God. It is this distinction which separates Coleridge from 
pantheism. God's existence can be d4duced from natural phenomena, but these 
phenomena are completely distinct from God's being. 
Coleridge places the emphasis upon a form of intuition rather than 
deduction since he wishes to ensure that the being of God is beyond rational 
comprehension. Coleridge retains this emphasis when he treats the problem 
of evil. Coleridge admits that this problem might cause difficulty, but 
he argues that the tendency of the natural world is always to good, and 
therefore he claims that that to which the world tends manifests the 
character of the creator. Evil cannot and strictiliy does not exist. If 
the tendency is deliberate, however, why could not good have been bestowed 
immediatel y? 
The way in which Coleridge answers this question suggests the background 
influence of Milton as much here as in the Political Lectures. 6 Coleridge 
argues that virtue gained through experience is qualitatively superior to 
virtue which is bestowed.? Hence God is mindful of man's pleasure in 
6. 
7. 
K. Coburn suggests that Coleridge was reading 1roland I s edition of 
Milton's Prose, Amsterdam, 1698, during 1795. See Note-books. 
Vol.I. Note 39. For references to Milton in the 1~ote-books, see 
Note-books. Vol.I. Notes 106-110; 113-115; 118-119, (these last 
t wo referring to Areopagitica - see note (7 ) below) . 
Compare, for i nstance, the Miltonic attitude s uccinctly expressed 
in Areopagitica. See Milton's Prose Writings. int. K.M. Burton. 
London. 1958, p. 158: 
"Assuredly we bring not innocence into the world, we bring 
i mpurity much rather; that which purifies us is trial, and trial 
is by what is cont rary . That virtue therefore which is but a 
youngling in the contemplation of evil, and knows not the utmost 
that vice promises to her followers, and rejects it, is but a 
blank virtue, not a pure; her whiteness is but an excremental 
whiteness". 
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wishing to let man attain wisdom by overcoming error. 1rhe very existence 
of error is thus an indication of God's wise benevolence, and he is to be 
admired for it, not blamed. The evil which exists is subsumed under God's 
superior purpose. Accepting the existence of this qualified evil, the 
prob_lem, for God and man, is to · overcome error. The natural state is 
clearly not effectively self-evident. Reasoning is not sufficient to 
effect the change from misunderstanding to understanding. 8 It is at this 
point that Coleridge begins to fuse the abstract 'philosophical' arguments 
that have preceded with an account of God's action in history, an account 
which itself, significantly, employs language that had already been applied 
in the Political Lectures to take adjustment of the Pantisocratic ideal to 
suit a morbid society. Coleridge writes: 
We may safely therefore conclude that the existence of moral evil 
does not impeach the divine power or benevolence. But by the 
effect of Error the World may be so sunk as to resist all the 
impressions of natural Wisdom. Would you employ Reasoning? 
Where are the Reasoners? Would you employ Reasoning? Where are 
the minds susceptible of it? There is a state of Depravity from 
which it seems impossible to recall mankind except by impressing 
on them worthy notions of Supreme Being, and other hopes & other 
fears than what visible objects supply. But unsusceptible of the 
effects of Reasoning Understanding so depraved will yield only to 
the overwhelming of super natural Intervention. The wisest of the 
ancient Legislators had recourse to religious Imposture a fact 
which proves that they felt the necessity of the Revelation which 
they. did not possess.9 
Coleridge uses his distrust of the authority of reason that had resisted the 
persuasion of Southey as a means of interpreting the behaviour of God in 
8 . I n this situation, Priestley had reluctantly accepted the significa nce of Divine Revelation. 
9. MS . pp. 23-24, (Patton & Mann. p. 111 ) . 
--, -
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history. Reason had to be supported by t he i mpression or the actuality 
of Revelation. It seems to be of little importance to Coleridge whether 
the Revelation is 'real'. For God to communicate his true self to t he 
earlier ages of the world, he had t o adopt an artificially aut horitarian 
stance which would elicit a response because it was adapted to the needs of 
t hat point in history, just a s parents have to use artificial means to 
educate their children in correct values. In both cases the harshness of 
legality is gradually removed by the power of association so that virtue is 
no longer induced, but assumes the status of na turalness . This is the form 
of Coleridge's psychological t hought which, applied to human affairs alone, 
raised the problem of the establishment of criteria by which to assess the 
virtue of the precedent r a tiona l principles. In t hat context Coleridge 
had been forced to acknowl ~dge the priority of the self, although he was 
d t t th t th lf . ht b . t 1 . t lO unprepare o accep a e se m1g e 1nna e y v1r uous. However, 
in this historical context of God's dealings with man, God is himself the 
originator of t he authoritarian stance so that its moral validity needs no 
questioning. · This point is important since, as Col eri_dge I s historical 
account loses its objectivity in the course of the Theological Lectures so 
_the way be comes open for the' authority of the unknowable God of history to 
be conferred upon the unknowabl e self at the base of the action of an 
individual. The passage in which this possibility begins to appear to be 
logically possible runs as follows: 
The World has its Ages as well as Individuals. I ts Infancy, and 
its Childhood and its Youth - By what do we most wisely educate 
our Children? Do we tell them of the beauty of Virtue chiefly? 
or do we te l l them to do what is right for its own sake? a child 
would not unders tand, and therefore coul d not be influenced by 
10. See Part II. Chapter I. 
- - . ,_.., ..- ~~ .... ·,. 
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them. It is with Virtue precisely as it is with money. 
Originally money is not valued but for its use in the precuring 
of some thing else, but in old age, many love and pursue that as 
an end which was at first only a means. So Virtue is first 
practised for the pleasures that accompany or the rewards that 
follow it - and Vice avoided as hateful from the punishment 
attachment. But in length of time by the magic power of 
association we transfer our attachment from the Reward to the 
action rewarded and our fears and hatred from the Punishment to 
the Vice Punished. Hence it is that gross self-interest rises 
gradually into ¥ure Benevolence, and Appetence of Pleasure into 
Love of Virtue. 1 
After this introduction to the transition from 'philosophy' to 'history', 
Col eridge begins the specific account of the Mosaic Dispensation which spans 
the first two lectures. I n this account Coleridge ha s two dominant 
interests and intentions. First of a ll, Coleridge is concerned to 
demonstrate that the Mosaic Dispensation was a manifestation of the wisdom 
of God in that he revealed himself in a way which was so perfectly suited 
to the stage of man's development at the time of the revelation. Coleridge 
intends to present the Dispensation as a part of God's plan for human 
history. He says: 
In order to take a fair survey of the i.iosaic Dispensation we should 
consider its great Design - the preserving one people free from 
I dolatry in order that t hey might a saf e Receptacle of t he necessary 
precursive Evidences of Christianity! 12 
However, at the same time, Coleridge is interested in. the Dispensation a s a 
paradigm for the effective introduction of a genuinel y republican society. 
In this regard, Pantisocracy is never far from Col eridge's thoughts. In the 
ll. J\JIS . pp . 26-27. (Patton & Mann. pp . 113-114) . 
12. MS. p . 28. (Patton & Mann. p . 116). 
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following passage he seems to be aware that his scheme might have been more 
fortunate if temporary laws equivalent to those of Moses had been 
established: 
If any among us had the legislative Power committed to us for the 
next hundred years at the end of which we meant to introduce a 
pure Republic or perhaps an abolition of a~l individual Property -
What a variety of laws should we be obliged to make useful only 
as tending to a better form of Things. We are not hastily to 
conclude an Ordnance or action trifling simply because we at 
first sight do not perceive its Uses - l3 
The firs t of Coleridge's interests is submerged by the second. He praises 
those features of social life under t he rule of Moses which correspond with 
his ideals for a present-day republic. Coleridge 's assessment is absolute, 
not relative, even though God 's wisdom was ostensibly manifested by the 
applicability of his revelation to a particular time. 
Jewish conditions in the following way: 
Coleridge praises 
The terms of this Law are beautiful and so replete with practical 
Wisdom and Benevolence that it would be almost criminal to leave 
any ·part of it unobserved. Liberty was proclaimed through the 
whole nation - the whole nation were informed by divine authority 
that it was unlawful to acknowledge any human superior. Every 
Hebrew was thus the Subject of God alone. Nor was an end proposed 
without means established - the Lands were restored. Property is 
Power and equal Propert y equal Power. A Poor Man is necessarily 
more or less a Slave . Povert y is t he Death of public Freedom -
it virtually enslaves individuals, and generates these Vices, 
which make necessary a dangerous concentration of power in the 
executive branch. If we except the Spartan, the Jewish has been 
the only Republic that can consistently boast of Liberty and 
Equality. Another effect of the generaili Restitution was that Error 
while it was thus prevented from becoming subversive of the state, 
13, MS. p. 29, (Patton & Mann. p. 116). 
... 
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ceased likewise to be necessarily ruinous to the Indi vidual. 14 
Coleridge commends the wisdom of the historical laws of Moses, and the con-
comitant institutions which he planned. The strength of them was that both 
laws and institutions were wholly designed to maintain the absoluteness of 
each individual in society before the absolute God. C:f.1he abolition of 
private property had been one of the main emphases of the Pantisocratic 
scheme, but Coleridge had wished to manipulate the envi ronment without any 
enactment of laws. 15 As a model, Coleridge here seems to be admitting that 
the dispensation of Moses valuably illustrates a combination of wisdom and 
practicality. In his praise of Moses, Coleridge often steps outside the 
historical perspective. When he reaches the precept of Mosaic .Law that no 
land should be sold, Coleridge generalises the point in such a way that he 
can be seen to be discussing an abstract, timeless relationship between God, 
Man, and the Soil: 
There is nothing more pernicious than the notion that anyone 
possesses an absolute right to the Soil, which he appreciates -
to the system of accumulation which flows from this supposed right 
we are indebted for nine-tenths of our Vices and Miseries. The 
Land is no ones - the Produce belongs equally to all, who contribute 
their due proportion of Labour. Nature seems to say to us, I have 
invited you to sojourn with me awhile - I have prepared you a 
beautiful Feast, but he is ungrateful and a thief who takes what 
16 he cannot use and hides what his Brethren want. 
It is not ju~t this underlying symbolic awareness that distorts the 
historical objectivity of Coleridge's account. He also explicitly compares 
14. lVIS . pp. 39-41. (Patton & Mann. pp . 125-126), 
15. Coleridge does not explicitly say that t here should be no laws in the Pantisocracy, but in his positive plans, such as they are, there is not a mention of the formulation of a lega l code. 
16. MS . PP• 41-42, (Patton & Mann. pp. 127-128). 
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conditions under Moses with the condition of contemporary England. 
Coleridge praises the rotatory system of military service used by the Jews, 
mentions that it was also possible for a Jew to gain exemption from such 
service, and he contrasts these aspects with the English standing army and 
with the English press-gangs . Coleridge uses the example of t he Mosaic 
situation as a direct means of attacking the English Government: 
Moses, it should seem had received no divine Revelation of that 
great Mystery recently delivered by an English Statesman that Power 
was for the People not from the People, and that whether Murders 
and Famine are to be hazarded by a national War is a point more 
advantageously discussed by a few Place-men than by the unbribed 
many, unbribed, yet deeply interested. 17 
The ef fect of Coleridge's parallelism becomes significant when he discusses 
the role of religion under the Tu osaic Dispensation: 
To preserve one nation free from Idolatry in order t hat it might 
be a saf e receptacle for the precursive Evidences of Christianity, 
was t he principal design of the Mosaic Dispensation. Now what 
means could have been contrived better adapted for this purpose 
than by scattering one Tribe among all the rest, . and making these 
depend for their Hread on the general Ooservance of the worship 
of the one true God. 18 
For Coleridge, the redeeming virtue of the Levites was that they had no 
property so that their intellectual authority was controlled by social 
dependence. Moses had recognised the need for religious instruction and 
practice amongst the people and he met that need without raising a priest-
hood which could form a capitalist elite. Coleridge compares the Levites 
with t he modern clergy, and it is the result of such a comparison which 
1 7 • MS • p . 46 . (Patton & 1/Iann. pp . 130-131) . 
18. Ii!$ . PP • 52-53. (Pat ton & Mann. p . 137). 
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must have disposed Coleridge to favour the activities of the Methodists in 
s pite of t he fact that he did not like their doctrinal position. 19 
Coleridge seems to accept that he had been mistaken in wishing to establish 
a refined religion in his Pantisocratic society without first introducing a 
system of acceptable religious half-truths which would finally tend towards 
the refinement that he had desired. Again, Coleridge shows himself to be 
learning from Moses the value of a preparatory disclosure of wisdom: 
The Jews were established by Moses in a lovely Climate & that time 
a most fertile soil - the Land was equally divided - and the Toil 
necessary for the cultivation of it could not employ one fifth of 
their Time - but they were ignorant and could not therefore fill 
it up by literary occupation - they were fond of novelty - and 
would therefore have applied their idleness to the pursuit of the 
alluring Ceremonies of Idle Worship Was it not then benevolent 
to prevent as much as possible the vice by removing the Temptation? 
By giving the Jews a splendid religious Establishment applied to 
the true God - and adopting the more innocent of the idolatrous 
ceremonies while those tha t led to Vices were severely inter-
dieted? One of t he chief and most influencing Principles of 
I dolatry was a Persuasion that the temporal Blessings of Life, 
Health, Length of Days, fruitful Seasons, Victory in Wars, and such 
advant a ges were to be expected and sought for as the Gifts of some 
inferior 8: subordinate Beings, who were supposed to be the Guardians 
of Mortal Men; this therefore independent of t he arguments in the 
first Lecture was a sufficient Reason for promising all these as the 
effect of Obedience to the one true God Whatever you woul d 
vainly expect from Astoreth, you may safely ask for f rom Jehovah. 
Again we know that our inward fee lings a re greatly increased and 
CTade more permanent as well as more vivid by frequent outward and 
visible expressions of them. Now every Age has its peculiar 
Language. And sa crifices unspotted and selected with laborious 
minuteness of examination was the ordinary Symbol (in the early ages ) 
19. See Part II. Chapter 2. 
Methodism in The Watchman. 
(34)n, and also Coleridge 's comments on 
No , I. (Patton . p . 13) . 
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of dependence and gratitude and love. This Language therefore 
which the surrounding Nations impiously addressed to wood and stone, 
the Jews were ordered to pay to the unimaged Creator of all Things. 20 
The underlying comparison with the Pantisocratic dream is clear from the 
. 21 opening comments of the above passage. Coleridge praises the pragmatic 
wisdom of Moses, in contrast with his own lack of wisdom, in that Moses 
recognised that religion was required and so transformed the erroneous 
-
religions of the surrounding nations into means of supporting t he absoluteness 
of Jehovah. Worshi p of Jehovah is given an odd status in Coleridge's 
interpretation because he imposes the pattern of his secular ideal society 
upon the Jewish state. Coleridge expl ains that worshi p was encouraged for 
pragmatic reasons as a means of supporting the wise emphases of the Law, and 
in doing so he i gnores his own insistence t hat the Law itself was Jehovah 1 s 
revelation of himself through Moses. Worshipful behaviour is seen as a 
support for the way of life which will make a worshipful relation with 
Jehovah natural rather than enjoined. Coleridge's parallelism between Mosaic 
times and the present blinds him to the fact that his original justification 
of the Mosaic Law had been that it was adapted to a specific historical 
situation, whi ch, in turn, leads him to confuse ends and means . Is religious 
worship to be encouraged simply to enforce the freedom and equality of 
society as an end, or is that 1 end 1 really the means to an unenforced 
worshipful relationship with God which has as its necessary corollary the 
unenforced retention of a state of freedom and equality? The fundamental 
20. MS. pp. 58-60. (Patton & Ma nn. pp. 140-141). 
21. Compare, particularly, the assessment of the apportioning of time and labour in the first sentence with a similar assessment made by Southey in a letter of August 22nd, 1794, to H. W. Bedford. Curry, K. New Letters of Robert Southey. (B.C) . Vol. I. p. 70. 
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problem of Coleridge's discussion of t he Mosaic Dispensation is that 
Coleridge is himself unable to distinguish between preparatory and complete 
worship of God since his conception of completi on is conditioned by the 
experience which he feels that h~ has attained. Instead of .rejecting a 
historical perspective tota lly in whi ch case Coleridge would see Moses as a 
man under God manipulating other men by laws preparatory to them also being 
under God, Coleridge in fact seems to retain his perspective with relation 
to the person of Moses. Moses seems to be i denti f ied with his legislation 
and is thus seen in history a s a preparatory individual rather t han as an 
equal. The crucial point, indeed, is that whereas Coleridge's theory should 
lead him to identify himself with Moses, he does unconsciously perform the 
role of God within it. In accepting the value and wisdom of the social 
policies and techniques of Moses, Coleridge does seem to assume that Moses 
was capable of no other kind of social organisation, so t hat when Coleridge 
realises that the method of Moses has a place in the transformation of 
contemporary society , he places himself in the same relation to that society 
as he places God to human history. God chooses t he technique of self-
revelation that is suited t o a particular time in history; Coleridge is able 
to choose from all the techniques that God has ever chosen for t he purpose of 
transforming contemporary society since that society contains within itself 
all aspects of the human past and since Coleridge is one with God the First 
Cause by deduction from the effects of Divine activity within that past and 
also by deduction from the tendency of effects towards moral good in the 
natural world. 
Coleridge's third lecture deals with the New Dispensation, and there-
fore we have to consider the status of Chris t in Coleridge 's theological 
position. At the beginning of the lecture, Coleridge adopts the pose of 
an ignorant individual who is confronted by accounts of the development of 
136 
the Christian sect. He places himself in the position of a contemplator 
of history which is comparable with the position he adopts in contemplating 
the na tural world, and he finds confirmation of the Cause through the Effects 
. . · 1 22 in a simi ar way. 
Coleridge then demonstrates the authenticity of the New Tes tament, 
confuting, in so doing, arguments which attempted to prove t hat the Gospels 
were forgeries or to show that the contradictions in the Gospe l accounts 
damage their authority. Coleridge then proceeds to defend prophecy. He 
writes: 
Prophecies are necessary to Revealed Religion as perpetual 
Testimonies. At the first promulgation of a divine Mission 
Miracles are its best and only Tests. But the full force of such 
preter-natural Evidence can operate on the Eye-witnesses only, 
Their influence gradual l y decreases and becomes more and (more ) 
faint and then the Accomplishment of predicted Events is substituted 
and discovers to us the truth of the Revealed Doctrines to us by a 
sufficient t hough not so overpowering a Light. So often when yet 
the Sun is hign in heaven we may observe the Moon like a thin 
white cloud, pale faint and shadowy; but when the Sun sets, and the 
Night comes on, it acquires a gradual increase of Splendor till at 
length it reigns the presiding Luminary, and the Traveller journeys 
onward through the illumined Darkness unendangered and rejoicing . 23 
Here Coleridge explains the wide historical perspective that forms part of 
his whole attitude. History, in this view, is the gradual unfolding of the 
nature of God. The fulfi lment of prophecies shows that the development of 
history is planned by God. Coleridge proceeds to describe the Stoic and 
t he Epicurean phi losophies and the status of philosophy in social life 
immediately before the time of Christ. As el'sewhere, Coleridge is inclined 
22. See MS , pp, 77-78. (Patton & Mann. pp . 176-177). 
23, MS. PP• 94-:-95, (Patton & Mann, pp , 151-152). 
-
T 
r 
[ 137 
to describe the past with s pecific reference to the present, even t hough his 
intention is t o show how necessary historically was t he Dispensation of 
Christ, and how admirably suited it was to meet the needs of its context. 
Speaking of t he Stoics, Coleridge says: 
The first of t hese believed a God indeed or a t least seemed to 
believe one - but it was a material God, a principle of fire, to 
whi ch t hey sometimes ascribed Intelligence, and sometimes obscurely 
denied it - and when they allowed an intelligent God, t hey by no 
means supposed him a first Cause, but the result of the organisation 
of the Universe, in the same manner as our minds have been supposed 
to be t he effect of the peculiar organi sation of our Bodies. 24 
Coleridge t hen goes on to describe the behaviour of the Stoics, and it 
becomes clear that Coleridge has the Godwinians in mind when he attacks 
Stoicism: 
Suicide an action base and cowardly, and which above all other 
implies a mind totally dead to the happiness or misery of mankind 
t hey regarded as a Virtue of the highest Class - and so totally 
regardless were they of the domestic Affections, that one of their 
Sect t he Censor Cato was accustomed to prostitute his Wife to any 
of his Friends, who desired it. 25 
Coleridge then describes the ends and the means of Christ's mission in 
the fo llowing way: 
1rhe end of the mi ssion of Christ was to recall men to a practi ca l 
belief in the power and perfection of Deity . In order to this it 
became necessary in all his actions the hand of God and not the 
authority of men should be evident. Hence it was ordered that he 
should be poor and uneduca ted, and consistently with the same pl a ce , 
the per sons whom he chose for Par~ners and Companions in this work 
24 . MS . p . 101. (Patton & Mann. p. 156). 
25 . MS . P • 102. (Patton & IV[ann . p . 157 ) . Compare Coleridge on 
Godwinism in The Watchman. no, 3, See Part II, Chapter 4. 
(2) and (3), 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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were of the lowest Class as well as i n Station as Abilities -
subdued to him by t he evidence of his Miracles, yet ignorant of 
h . 1 A. 26 is rea im. 
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Christ had to be wholly human so that his amazing actions could be seen t o 
be the power of God working through man. Therefore Christ w~s poor and 
uneducated, and his followers were attracted to him, not by understanding 
but by the impression of his supernatural authority. Miraculous activity 
was, for Christ, a necessary imposture in the same way as the Divine 
Legation of Moses was a necessary imposture for God in order that he might 
reveal himself to man. Significantly, whereas God had used miraculous 
means of revelation to show himself to mankind through Moses, and Moses had 
employed the mystery of the worship of God in order to subdue men to his l aws 
and thence to God, Coleridge represents Christ as using miraculous means to 
subdue men to his own person and thence, presumabl y, to God. Therefore, 
whilst Col eridge was able to accept the technique of Moses as a model and 
still place the person historically, this separation is not possible for 
Chri st because in the case of Christ the technique is the person. It is 
this which is the central point about the new dispensation. Christ uses 
the techniques of t he Mosaic dispensation in order to gain credibility for 
himself rather than for God. In Coleridge's interpretation the new 
dispensation is seen to comprise the wisdom of past revelations. Hence, 
the disciples are attracted to Christ in a child-like way , even though this 
is the dispensation whi ch was intended to be a progression from the 
dispensation of Moses, and in order to show that God's techniques of self-
revelation are cumulative, Coleridge passes over the fact t hat Christ 
eschewed miracl es in his temptation in t he wilderness. As was the cas e 
26 . MS. p . 106. (Patton & Mann. pp . 160-161) . 
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with Moses, s o with Christ, Coleridge's his torical account is distorted by 
his open or implied parallels with the present. We have already seen that 
Coleridge's account of Stoicism suggested a parallel with Godwinism, and, in 
his account of the life of Christ, Coleridge sees him as an opponent of 
Godwinian theory: 
The most expansive Benevolence is th(at) effected and rendered 
permanent by social and domestic affections. We find in Jesus 
nothing of that Pride which affects to inculcate benevolence while 
it does away every home- born Feeling , by which it is produced and 
nurtured. The filial and paternal affections discipline the heart 
and prepare it for t hat blessed state of perfection in which all 
our Passions a re to be absorbed in the Love of God . But if we love 
not our friends and Parents whom we have seen - how can we love our 
universal Friend and Al mighty Parent whom we have not seen. Jesus 
was a Son, and he cast the Eye of •renderness and careful Regard on 
his Mother Tuiary, even while agonising for the Cross - Jesus was a 
Friend, and he wept at the Tomb of Lazarus. Jesus was the friend 
of the whole human Race, yet he disguised not the national feelings, 
when he foresaw the particular distresses of his Countrymen. 27 
Having made this point about Christ most forcibly , the third lecture 
terminates uncertainly. Coleridge commends those aspects of Christ which 
seem to him to be relevant to the contemporar y situation in England, 
especially Christ's emphasis on respect for the equality of persons rather 
than the Mosaic command for equality of property, but we remain uncertain 
of t he status of Christ in relation to God and also in relation to 
succeeding generations of men. Coleridge's discussion in the next lecture 
of the manuscript entitled 'The Gnostic Heresies' removes much of the 
uncertainty. 
Coleridge begins this lecture by summarising the views of t he Gnostics: 
27. MS. p . 109 • (Patton & Mann. pp. 162-163). 
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I They held that matter was self-existent and its intractability 
the Cause of Evil. From God, or the supreme mind they supposed 
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a derivation of Aeons or Intelligences by efflux or emanation. The 
genealogy or pedigrees of Intelligences male and female formed the 
greater part of their baseless System. These Intelligences, 
different in rank & dignity they supposed occasionally to assume the 
foTm of man in order to instruct the world. Such t hey imagined 
Christ to have been, and Simon Magus pretended to be one of these 
great Powers. Among the lowest of these Emanations they classed 
the human Soul, which they held to be imprisoned in the Body; and 
t hat t hese Souls were divided into Classes, t he one good and the 
other bad, which difference they received from their nature and 
would retain t o all Eternity. 
Their opinions concerning Christ were these - the earlier Gnostics 
held the Christ to be a Spirit distinct from the man Jesus, entering 
into him at his Baptism, and quitting him before his Agony. To 
this Christ or superangelic Being they affirmed t hat the Man Jesus 
addressed himself on the Cross, when he exclaimed; My God! My 
God! why hast t hou forsaken me? Some of them belieged that even 
the Body which he assumed was not a body of f lesh & Blood, but a 
phantom - that it was not born of IVIary, but only exhibited by her -
and in c_onfirma tion t hey feigned t hat Mar y after the Deli very was 
found to be a Virgin. This was not however the universal Opinion. 
However they a ll of them entertained so mean an opinion of matter 
that they denied the Resurrection, affirming that the Body was 
indeed miracQlously conveyed away from the Sepulchre but t hat the 
Christ who appeared to the disciples was a Spiri t, who assumed the 
form of the crucified Jesus and impressed the idea of reality on 
th . b . 1 '28 eir senses y a mirac e. 
Coleridge has t wo centra l objections to the Gnos tic position: he rejects 
their doctrine be.fause it des.t:roys _ the un;bty ofrGod and, re la tedly , because 
it allows for the presence of subordina te divine beings in the universe. 
Coleridge then proceeds to describe t he Gnostic genealogy of Chri s t, but he 
28 . MS. pp. 115-117. (Patton & Mann. pp . 197-198) . 
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launches his main attack on the Gnostic Christology in an exposition of 
the first chapter of the Gospel of John which he treats as a deliberate 
response to the Gnostic threat. In using the Gospel to confute Gnosticism, 
Coleridge also imposes a Socinian emphasis on the writing of the Evengelist: 
In contradiction to this St. John asserts, that in the beginning 
there was Intelligence, that this Intelligence was together with 
God, not an emanation from him, and that this Intelligence was God 
himself. All things were made by it and without this Intelligence 
was not anything made that was made, contradicting the Gnostic, who 
asserted, that there were many things in the constitution of the 
world, which could not have proceeded from Wisdom. The texts 'It 
was in the World and the World was made by it, and the World knew 
it not' and 'it was made Flesh and dwelt among us' imply - t hat the 
divine Intelligence never ceased to govern the world which it had 
created, though almost all mankind worshipped blind and senseless 
Deities; and that this same Intelligence was imparted by 
immediate Inspiration to the Man Jesus, who dwelt among us. 
These passages were written to condemn the doctrine of the 
superangelic nature of Jesus - St. John here asserting that the same 
intelligent Energy which operated in Jesus had been in the World 
before his existence, teaching the Law to Moses and· foreknowledge 
to the Prophets. 29 
Coleridge is careful to insist that Christ was the communicator of the divine 
energy, and in no way that energy itself. 30 Hence, for Coleridge, Christ 
has no authority other than as an example of the possibilities which are 
available to a human when he is informed with the divine intelligent energy. 
29. MS. pp. 119-120. (Patton & Mann . pp. 199-200). 
30. For a consideration of Coleridge's debt to Priestley in his interpretation of the Gnostics, see Patton & Mann, particularly 
the notes to pp. 195-201. The most i mportant influence was Priestley's An History of Early Opinions Concerning Jesus Christ. (4 vols. Birmingham. 1786.) 
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Christ has no historical status, but is a contemporary model. The 
possibility of being Chr ist-like depends on the present relationship of the 
self with the divine, and not at all with the attitude adopted towards 
Christ. In holding this position, Coleridge is forced to discuss the new 
Testament doctrine of atonement.31 · The problem of the historical status 
of Christ i s the problem whether atonement with God was achieved once and for 
all in human history by Christ, or whether atonement must be achieved by 
all individuals for thems elves, taking Christ's atonement simply as a model. 
In discussing this point, Coleridge obscures historical distinctions by 
arguing t hat t he form of an action is unaffected by its content: 
In order to understand the expressions in Scripture that relate 
to Atonement, we must examine the meaning and use of the Sacrifices 
and Victims. In a moral Sense a Sacrifice is nowhere considered 
by the Prophets as a cause operating on Deity , but merely as the 
means of meliorating our own Hearts. The feelings are increased 
and made permanent by the f r equent outward expression of them. 
I n t he earlier ages Victims were the universal Language of 
Gratitude and Dependence - and their uses were precisely the same 
a s thos.e of Prayer and Thanksgiving in the present day - to warm 
and purify t he weak Mortal not to wor k a change in the immutable 
God.32 
Coleridge argues that prayer and thanksgiving have reference to the 
individual and induce an attitude towa rds God, in t he same manner as did 
sacrifices in earlier ages. The relation between the individual and God 
is, t herefore, no more directly personal in the new dispensation t han in the 
Mosaic. The same gesture towards the absolute is differ ently expressed. 
Hence the apparent historical development is ~n reality non-existent, or at 
31. For Priestley's consideration of the doctrine of atonement, see 
The Script ures Doctrine of Remission. passim. (B,B), 
32 . MS. pp . 121-122 • (Patton & Ma nn . pp . 2G2-203). 
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any rate, is only evidenced by an insignificant alteration in the mode of 
addressing God. We can see here, too, a latent difficulty in the terms of 
Coleridge's thinking in the 'Pol itical Lectures'. In that context, 
Coleridge had wanted to strike a balance between wisdom and ardour, between 
control t hat was rationally unimpeachable because pre-rational and a 
vi tality of pure being. God was seen to be the repository of pre-rational 
wisdom, yet it now seems to become clear that the objectivity of the absolute 
God is uncertain. Coleridge's conviction is that gestures of worship 
towards God encourage a true experience of God which is t he origin of 
wisdom, but it is clear that the ges t ure of worship is an ardent act which 
is itself not subject t o moral assessment. The sacrifices of earlier times 
may have been inhumane, but they were the 'same' as prayer and thanksgiving. 
I n the theological context i t does not seem as if Coleridge's God is able to 
perform the task he had assigned him in the political context. 
Contemplation of the pre-rational wisdom of the being of God does not 
control ardour of being, because contemplation is itself an ardent activity. 
The wisdom of God is not i nherent in man: it has to be sought, and in 
seeking for it wisdom can have no control over the process. Coleridge 
cannot use religious wisdom as a means of controlling political enthusiasm, 
because religious wisd om is itself the product of re ligious enthusiasm, and 
both enthusiasms are the ges tures of the a-moral ardour of being . By 
denying that atonement with God has been achieved in history by Christ and 
asserting that it must be achieved by the incentive of each individual being , 
Coleridge shuts out the possibility that religious belief might offer wisdom 
in a way which woul d make it unique.33 In t he Political Lectures 
33. We shall return briefly to this dilemma when Coleridge becomes 
interested in the writings of 17th Century English Divines. See 
Part II . Chapter 8. 
- - _., - ~ ·, . 
~
144 
Coleridge had segregated wisdom and ardour as two distinct categories which 
he hoped would inter-act wisdom was found in God, and ardour manifested 
itself in political behaviour. This segregation could not neatly be 
preserved because Coleridge could not adopt the position that wisdom might 
be received from God rather than found in Him. Hence, although Coleridge 
could not accept that virtue or wisdom might be existent in the being of the 
pure self , he equally could not accept that they might be received from the 
being of the pure God unless the individual established a relationship which 
would enable him to be a recipient. Certainly the grace of God would flow 
abundantly through the individual who was in communion with God, but 
Coleridge's attitude to the atonement indicates .that he believed that the 
necessary relationship with God had not been vicariously achieved by Christ 
for the whole of mankind. Personal wisdom could only be achieved, 
strengt hened by divine wisdom, through an ardent act of the individual being 
directed towards God. Yet the human understanding intervened on two counts, 
imposing error. First of all, rational misunderstanding corrupted the 
sanctity of t he self with the result that ardent activity was predisposed to 
error, and, secondly, rational misunderstanding obscured the Cause behind the 
Effects, with the result that, were not t he origin of activity already 
corrupt its misdirection would als o be inevitable. 
Coleridge does seem to accept that t he rigor ously personal relationship 
between man and God t hat he advocates for which Christ i s t he model i s als o 
somehow t he result of Christ's historical achievement. Historically Christ 
did achieve a f i gurati ve atonement which maqe it pos sible for people t here-
after to achieve their own atonement. Just as t he functi on of ~oses in 
history ha d been to introduce laws which would render themselves obsolete, so 
t he function of Christ was to use ~osaic techniques t o introduce himse l f and 
t hen to render himself obsolete also. Chr i st cr eated the condit i ons f or 
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his own acceptance Mosaically, and, by a cumulative process, it was now the 
responsibility of each individual person to use the techniques of Moses and 
Christ as they were suitable in order to create the conditions for t he 
unity of self and God. The historical function of Christ, f or Coleridge, 
was, therefore, to destroy history or, rather, to focus the whole of history 
in the present. This seems to be the sense of the fol lowing passage where 
Coleridge makes a distinction between a 'moral' and a 'ceremonial' 
interpretation of atonement, and where this latter phrase clearly indicates 
a symbolic understanding of 'history' that also suggests that the 'historical' 
perspective' which we have discussed and from which Coleridge often diverges 
is overtly acknowledged to be a mental construct as lacking in tangibility 
as the moral world from which Coleridge excludes the possibility of moral 
evil. Coleridge writes: 
Wherever t :1erefore, whether in the Pr ophets or in St. Paul the 
Messiah is represented as having sacri f iced himself for us it must 
be understood - as a necessary means relative to man not a mo tive 
influencing the Almighty. To awaken Gratitude, to confirm Purity, 
to ev.idence sincerity the pious Jew for himself offered a part of 
his propert y , the first fruits of his Flock - to effect t he same 
ends in others Christ offered himself, i.e. he evidenced his 
sincerity by voluntarily submitting to a cruel death, in order that 
he might confirm t he Fai th or awaken the Gratitude of Men. Such 
is t he moral sense of Atonement in Sc:r;Lptu;res. 1rhere is likewise 
a ceremonial Sense. Bo th among the J·ews and Gentiles no one was 
allowed to make prayer and thanksgiving in the temple until a 
sacrifice had been offer ed. Our Saviour who exposed himself to 
Death in the promulgation of tha t spiritual Law, which doing away 
all rites and ceremonies gave t o us the Liberty of worshipping God 
in al l times and places, may be figuratively yet truly styled a 
universal Sacrifice . Such seems the fair interpretation of the 
Scriptural Passages that relate the Doctrine of Atonement.34 
34. MS . pp. 122-123. (Pat ton & Mann. pp. 203-204). 
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With the casual, but significant, phrase 'figuratively yet truly', 
indicating a submergence of objective factuality in mental figuration, 
Coleridge terminates his discussion of atonement. The position he has 
adopted in this discussion comes into close relation with the 'philosophical' 
discussion of evil in the first lecture when Coleridge turns his attention 
next to the issue of Redemption. Coleridge's introduction of this problem 
suggests that he does not really regard redemption as a valid issue separate 
from atonement. 111he separation of the two implies a false di vision of God 1 s 
Being from God I s Justice.35 Man will be redeemed, for Coleridge , no t by 
accepting that evil must be punished in order to satisfy God's desire for 
justice, but by recognising , through atonement, that evil is an error which 
wil l be seen to fade away· when God's being is truly experienced. Since, as 
we have seen, ardent behaviour may be a means of achieving atonement even 
if t he behaviour is immoral, it is the ver3r behaviour which orthodox 
Christians would regard as being in need of redemption that Col eridge would 
regard as being an indirect means to its achievement. This is not to say 
that Coleridge countenanced the i dea of immorality , for that clearly would 
have been out of character, but it is to suggest t hat his t heory was 
·antinomian in tendency since it showed no concern for the ' morality' or 
'immorality' of acts which were the necessary preludes to unity with God. 
The remainder of the manuscript of the Theologica l Lectures contains 
t wo sermons and several fragments. These often re-work materi al found in 
t he lectures proper, but the re-working is interesting because it shows 
conclusi vely t hat Coleridge kaleidoscopes his 'historical' insights so tha t 
he ceases to distinguish between moments of time and distinguishes instead 
35. Coleridge attacks the 'legalism' of Bishop Butler (see MS . p . 124. 
(Patton & Mann. pp . 204-205).) and then he moves into an a tta ck of 
orthodox Christian ' mystification' (see MS . pp . 127-128. (Patton & 
Mann. pp . 207-208).) 
-·· . ~ 
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between conditions whi ch foster different psychological states. The first 
of the two sermons is on Equality, Inequality, and the ends of Government . 
The following passage again makes the point which had been made in the third 
lecture, that Christ used miraculous means with his disciples in order to 
gain acceptance. However, Coleridge's expression of the point in t his 
instance brings out the parallel between the mission of Christ and that of 
the true democrat against both t he extreme revolutionaries and the elitist 
systematizers: 
Jesus Christ therefore commanded his disciples to preserve a 
strict equality - and enforced his command by the only thing 
capable of giving it effect. He proved to t hem the certainty of 
an Hereafter and by the vastness of the Future diminished the 
Tyranny of the Present. If not with hereditary faith but from 
the effect of our examination and reflection we are really 
convinced of a state after Death, then and then only wi ll self-
interest be wedded to Virtue - Universal Equality is the object 
of the Mess[iah's] mission not to be procured by the tumultuous 
uprising of an indignant multitude but this final result of an 
unresisting yet deeply principled Minority, which gradually 
absorbing kindred minds shall at last become the whole. To 
appreciate justly the value of t his Panacea, we should behold 
the dreadful effects of the disease which it removes.36 
Coleri dge then gives an account of the origin of inequality in the emergence 
of landed property. Coleridge's explanation is at first simply efonomic. 
He attributes the loss of equality to the development of manufacturers which 
led to the emergence of cities, both of which were progressive fac tors in 
the disruption of the previous state of socie t y which had not valued property 
sol ely because it was a pastoral and nomadic state: 
36. MS. PP • 140-141. (Patton & Mann. pp. 218-219). 
-· ---~ 
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In the early ages of the World the right of landed :property 
mus t have been none or transient - a man was proprietor of the 
Land only while his Flocks were feeding on it. The weapons 
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necessary for hunting and the Utensils for domestic accommodation, 
introduced the separate arts of manufacturers and t he Necessity of 
Barter, but the Occupations of the Manufacturer ill accorded with 
the wandering Life of t he Shepherd - towns and Cities were soon 
built - these stationary settlements must necessarily have given 
an additional Value to the Lands in their vicinity, and introduced 
the pursuits of Agriculture - t hese introduced the right of landed 
property, and made it appear consistent with the prevailing Ideas 
of J ustice _37 
This is an ' historical' account unaffected by any moral judgement except 
t ha t the historical progress produces economic forces which gradually destroy 
a situation of virtuous equality. We must r ecall t ha t it was the object of 
Coleridge's account of the rise of inequality to show the value of the 
Iff essianic mission in working t owards the restoration of equality. Coleridge's 
move f rom the past to the present tense in the previous passage made it un-
clear whe ther he regarded the Messianic mission as completed or in the 
process of f ulfilment. 38 A little later in the same sermon Coleridge 
explains how commerce stimulates a series of artif icial wants, and in this 
explanation Town and Country become the correlatives of alienation from and 
unity with God as states of mind: 
1rhe smoaks that rise from our crowded Towns hide from us the face 
of Heaven. In t he country , t he Love and Power of the great 
Invisible are everywhere perspicuous, and by degrees we become 
partakers of that which we are accustomed to contemplate. The 
Beautiful and the Good are miniatured on the Heart of the 
Contempl ater as the surroundi ng Landscape on a Convex Mirror . 
37 . MS . pp . 141 -142, (Patton & Mann. p . 219), 
38. See the last sentence of (36) . 
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But in Cities God is everywhere removed from our Sight and Man 
obtruded upon us - not Man , the work of God, but the debased 
offspring of Luxury and Want. At every step some Instance of 
bloated Depravity or squallid wretchedness meets us till at last 
we have doubts of providential Benevolence - and selfish Man 
accuses ·God for Miseries, which, if he had been employing himself 
as God and Nature ordained, he would not have been present to 
behold. 39 
Although Coleridge makes no explicit connection, the ideas of Town and 
Country cannot remain a-moral in the economic, historical interpretation, 
nor can their historical connotations be i gnored in an assessment of t he 
moral implications of present forms of social life . The ability to see the 
Cause clearly in the Effects is associated with feelings for the natural 
beauty of t he countryside and is als o identified with the early ages of man 
when t he manufacturers had not developed whi ch necessitated cities. Since 
this latter development in history becomes identified with two forms of 
social existence in the present, and these two forms are seen in moral terms 
with regard to a relation with God, it follows t hat God ' s gradual 
transformation of mankind so as completely to reveal himself in history can 
be achieved by each individual's internal transformation of himself. In 
this context, discussing what should be the attitude of the Chris tian to 
property and commerce, Coleridge int~restingly interprets a passage from the 
Gospel of Luke: 
And in Luke the 20th 21.22. they asked Jesus: "Is it lawful for 
us t o give Tribute unto Caesar or no? And he said unto them. 
Shew me a penny whose Image and Superscription hath it? They 
answered and said Caesars And he sai'd unto them - render unto 
Caesar t he Things that are Caesars, and unto God the things that 
are Gods" A wise Sentence - That we use money is a proof t ha t 
39, lvIS. pp. 147-148, (Patton & Mann. pp . 224-225.) 
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we possess individual property, and Commerce and Manufactures -
and while these evils continue, your own vices wi ll make a 
government necessary - and it is fit t hat you maintain that 
government. Emperor and King are but the lord Lieutenants of 
conquered Souls - secondaries and vicegerents who govern not with 
their own right but with power delegated to them by our Avarice 
and Appetites! Let us exert over our own hearts a virtuous 
despotism, and lead our own Passions in triumph, and t hen we 
shall want neither Monarch nor General. If we would have no 
Nero without, we must place a Caesar within us - and that Caesar 
must be religion!40 
Religion must be pl aced within. It is almost as if Coleridge is implying 
that it was the achievement of Christ in history that allowed God's plan 
for history to develop in such a way that present man, in history, can have 
a relationship with God which is outside history because completely 
internalised. The religion which we must carry wi t hin ourselves must have, 
as content, God's dealings with man in history, but the purpose of that 
content is no longer to affect social life but to be the means of affecting 
a change in the self by providing t he materials for t he individual to re-
live in himself the transformation of history t ha t culminates in himself. 
It becomes clear that the initiative has passed from God to man in the task 
of revealing the true nature of God. In the last sermon the process by 
which the historical becomes internalised and equated with the self in its 
relation with the absolute is f inally complete. Coleridge begins the 
sermon with a description of the feelings of perplexity concerning 
i mmortality held by most individuals. Coleridge continues in the following 
manner, and the whole passage must be quoted with its numerous echoes of -
statements in the lectures so as to show how Coleridge makes all cohere 
40 . MS. pp . 153-154• (Patton & Mann . pp . 228,,.._~29). 
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in the individual self: 
These feelings the hand of our universal Parent seems to have 
worked up into our constitution - at least we are so framed and 
placed in each circumstance that every contempl ative mind necessarily 
acquires them. And from these natural longings after Immortality 
Man has been justly characterized a Religious Animal. The know-
ledge of a Deity was probably given to him at his creation. But 
independently of this the Similitude of the works of Nature to his 
own works and at the same time their infinite superiority would lead 
him by the most simple analogy to the belief of an intelligent and 
powerful Cause. Observing every where proofs of design he would 
gradually form a faith, that God or Nature had done nothing without 
design - and therefore that ardent desire of a future state, which 
Nature had planted in his breast, would seem to him t o prove t he 
Truth of it. In the pastoral state where the motives to evi l were 
few and the imagination of men strong and vivid, these probabilities 
however slight in their fabrication would be adequate to al l the then 
uses of Religious Influence. But when Towns and Cities were built, 
and the a ccumulative system had introduced more enormous Inequal i ty 
with its accompanying Vices and Miseries then the Depravity of the 
Heart spread a darkness over the understanding, and the Fears and 
the Appetites of mankind distorted the simple faith of Nature into 
the grossest and most malignant Superstition. Reasoning from our-
selves up to Deity we even attribute to him our own feelings. In 
rural scenes, Love and Power are everywhere conspicuous and by 
degrees we become partakers of that which we are accustomed to 
contemplate. The Beautiful and the Good of Creation are miniatured 
on our Hearts, as the surrounding Landscape on a convex mirror. But 
in Cities the sights of Mi sery constantly obstructing wi ll 
insinuate doubts of providential benevolence, and t hey who from 
infancy have been taught to look up with fear and veneration to weak 
aRd wi cked ~en, because they (are) great and wealthy, will find a 
diminished difficulty in believing the Deity to be capricious or 
malignant. The uncorrupted Shepherd's Belief of God origina ted in 
the incessant perception of his benevolence - t he Religion of the 
succeeding Generation in Terror and the Hopes of averting supposed 
maligni t;y . Thus wretchedness and Tyranny assisted to corrupt 
. . -
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Religion, and corrupted Religion aids and confirms Tyranny and 
Wretchedness. There is a state of depravity from which it is 
impossible to recall the human heart except by impressing on it 
worthy notions of the Supreme Being and other wishes and other fears 
than what visible objects supply. But unsusceptible of the effects 
of Philosophical Reasoning the Heart so depraved will yield only to 
the overwhelming Influence of Miracles. The wisest of the anci ent 
Legislators had recourse to religious [mposture, a fact which shews 
the necessity of a Revelation. This Revelation or reteaching of 
the Religion of Nature, we believe the Almighty to have vouchsafed 
in the teaching of Jesus, whose example the Text exhorts us to 
imitate - and whose character is itself a miracle demonstrative of 
the Truth of his Religion.41 
Co l eridge's argument begins by claiming that in earlier times the deduction 
of t he existence of God from the design of the effects in the universe was 
adequate for the requirements of men. Coleridge then reproduces his 
description of the rise of cities as an economic, historical phenomenon 
obscuring God from men, a lthough even here he confuses his argument by 
describing the process of obscuration in personal terms as a darkening of 
t he understanding . The shift away from the historical perspective is then 
confirmed by Coleridge's move to the present tense as he describes the up-
lifting effect of the natural scenes of the countryside and the depraving 
effect of the urban life. Having idealised the life in the presence of 
nature for the present, Coleridge then transposes this i deal back again into 
the past when he talks of the uncorrupted Shepherd who, historically, 
became depraved on losing contact with natural scenes. At this point 
Coleridge reproduces the passage which he had used in the first lecture when 
he moved from his consideration of the origin of evil to his discussion cif 
41. MS. PP• 156-159. (Patton & Mann. pp. 349-350). 
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the Mosaic Dispensation.42 Then he had justified God's intervention in 
history on the psychological grounds that men, in a state of depravity, need 
the evidence of miracles. However, in this second use of the passage, 
Coleridge is introducing the new Dispensation, not the Mosaic, thus showing 
that Coleridge is not genuinely interested in analysing t he two dispensations 
in relation to their historical contexts. Instead, the new term in the 
whole of the above passage is the one in which Coleridge claims that in the 
pastoral state of man the capacity of man to relate to God was high not just 
because the motives to evil were few, but also because the imagination of 
men was strong and vivid. Parts of the remaining fragments in the 
manuscript seem to suggest t ha t Coleridge wishes to emphasize the role of 
imagination in the present in recreating internally those conditi ons no 
longer possible in actuality from which the Cause can be deduced. Whereas 
Coleridge praises the imagination of earlier ages in deducing the Cause from 
effects, he now seems to a~sign to the imagination a role whi ch is one step 
fur t her from reality. The imagination now has to create the phenomena 
which it then is to interpret. 
to express his feelings: 
In t wo adjacent fragments, Coleridge tries 
.But we were not made to find Happiness in the complete 
gratification of our bodily wants - the mind must enlarge the 
sphere of its a ctivity, and busy itself in the acquisition of 
intellectual aliment. To develop the powers of the Creator is 
our proper employment - and to imitate Creativeness by combination 
our mos t exalted and self-satisfying Delight. But we are 
progTessive and must not rest content with present Blessings. Out 
Almighty Parent hath t herefore given to us Imagination that 
stimulates to t he attainment of real excellence by the contemplation 
of splendid Possibilities, that still revivifies the dying mo:\}ive 
42. See Part II. Chapter 3. (9) 
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within us, and fixing our eye on the gl i t tering Summits that rise 
one above the other in Alpine endlessness still urges us up t he 
ascent of Being, amusing the ruggedness of the road wi t h the Beauty 
and grandeur of the ever-widening Prospect. Such and so noble are 
the ends for which this restless faculty was given us.- 43 
or, as Coleridge re-phr ases the second part of the above comment: 
our eyes on the glittering Swnmits that rise one above t he other in 
Alpine endlessness, still urges us up the ascent of Being, amusing 
the ruggedness of the road by the beauty and wonder of t l1e ever 
widening Prospect. The noblest gift of Imagination is the power 
of discerning the Cause in the Effect a power which when employed 
on t he works of the Creator elevates and by t he variety of its 
pleasures almost monopolizes the Soul. We see our God every-where -
the Universe in t he most literal sense i s his written language. If 
we could s uppose an Atheist educated from Infancy in the total 
disbelief of an intelligent first Cause, all t he magnificent work 
woul d be a blank and even to the Deist scarcely better - His God 
is but a philosophical Hypothesis - all t ha t connects the Creator 
with his creatures he denies - his attributes are doubtful - and 
when he surveys the vast theatre of Lif e he considers himself as 
thrown on it by a careless Manager and snatched just as t he Curtain 
was drawn 44 
These passages contain, alongside each other, t wo attitudes to Imagination. 
The second att i tude confines imagination to the role assigned to it f or the 
early ages of man. I t was this imagination that enabled man to contemplate 
the f irst cause in Nature. This kind of imagination still exists and 
Coleridge seems tempted to rest content wi th the idealistic assumption that 
it is only this kind of imaginati on that is necessary in the present for God 
to be fully revealed. But at the same time Coleridge is aware that God has 
43. MS. PP • 170-171. (Patton & Mann. pp . 235-236, - given as part of 
t he beginning of the Lecture on the Slave-Trade). 
44, MS . p . 1 7 4. (Patton & Mann . pp . 338-339) , 
-· ...... -
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been devising more sophisticated techniques of self-revelation as the 
condition of man has become more complicated, to such an extent that man 
has now become as God in being t he instigator of his own self-revelation. 
Unless Coleridge is to identify God with t he self of man, Co l eridge now has 
to elevate an aspect of the self, the Imagination, which imitates God in his 
creativeness by constructing an internal landscape of beauty from which the 
second kind of imagination can, in a conventional manner, deduce the 
exis tence of God for the benefit of the self. It is only by means of this 
elevated imagination that God can be given the 'objectivity', the sense of 
'otherness', that the self needs in order to achieve its own purity without 
a kind of spiritual narcissism.45 
45. There is not much documentation which specifically relates to the 
development of Coleridge's doctrine of the Imagination. It seems 
to me that the doctrine does originate in a non-aesthetic context. 
This is the point that I emphasize on several occasions in Part IV. 
I am anxious to insist that Coleridge's use of 'imagination' at 
this time, and my isolation of two kinds of 'imagination' should 
not immediately be related to the ' primary' and 'secondary' 
imaginations of the Biographia Literaria. I later use the primary/ 
secondary distinction since I find it formally accurate as an 
explanation of Coleridge's view, but this does not at all i ndicate 
that I am condoning an aesthetic interpre tation of 'imagination'. 
This point would need to be debated at further length, however , 
since Coleridge was enthusiastic about Akenside's The Pleasures of 
Imagination at this time (see Part II. Chapter 2. (15)n), and was 
also reading Volume V of Edward Young's Works (B.C) which, however, 
does not contain his Conjectures on Original Composition which has 
such an influence in the development of the idea of creativity for 
German Romanticism. (For Young, see H.H.Clark (B.Dii); J.L.Kind (B . Dii); and W. Thomas (B.Di).) 
Until 1796, a t the earliest, theories of art and creativity do 
not seem to have occupied Coleridge significantly if one is to judge by his letters and by the areas of his intellectual effort. 
For the development of the idea of imagination leading to 
Coleridge, see W.L.Kennedy (B.Di) and a:lso E.L.Tuveson (B.Di). 
------~- - -
- - - . --
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CHAPTER IV . 
' The Watchman' (March 1st - May 13th, 1796) 
1 At the time of The iatchman, Coleridge seemed to be endeavouring to 
oppose an abstracted belief in energy on two fronts. On the one hand, he 
advocates that God should be worshipped as pure being since, he argues, this 
can be the only form of worship which is not self-indulgent, and, on the 
other hand, he insists that the realities of poverty and sickness should be 
continually emphasized in order to prevent energy from being directed 
towards a complacent abstraction of general benevolence that is detached from 
the actual social facts. Coleridge wishes to attack abstraction from a 
position of religious and social positivism. 
1. Details concerning the conception of The Watchman enterprise can 
be found in Patton. pp. xxxii-xxxv. Apart from the practical 
considerations mentioned there, the production of a provincial journal does seem to follow logically from Coleridge's eulogy of 
the Press in The Plot Discovered. pp . 44-45· (Patton & Mann. 
p. 313). I am suggesting, here, that Coleridge's action in 
producihg a newspaper is an attempt to put into practice the 
theoretical adaptation of Pantisocratic ideals to ·the actual 
social state that he adumbrated in the Political Lectures. He 
is attempting to be wise in his comments and also active in his 
presentation. This raises the problem of the relation between 
social concern and documentation and the writing of 'literature'. 
1796 seems to me to be the crucial turning-point of Coleridge's 
early life in that his theory pushes him towards political activism 
at the same time as he wishes to retain a detached 'wisdom' and 
to write about his experience. In 1796 we see the attempt to be 
active thwarted by the stronger desire, instead, to describe the 
dilemrrias of the activist, and this frustration leads to the 
'retreat' to Nether Stowey at the end of the year and the 
inevitable renunciation of social involvement that follows. For 
further elaboration, this problem demands knowledge of Coleridge's 
contemporary concept of 'art' and an understanding of his 
motivation to produce 'literature' - to be a poet. Without this 
knowledge, this fascinating question cannot be resolved. For a 
pertinent discussion of this same issue, see R. Williams. Orwell. 
(B.Di), particularly Chapter 3. Being a Writer. 
I a t tempt to suggest further clues towards what might have been the 
essentially personal dilemma of Coleridge in this matter at the end 
of the present chapter, but, otherwise, I confine myself, somewhat 
reluctantly, to the more secure consideration of what Coleridge said 
about wisdom and activism, rather more than of what he did or failed 
to do. 
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The argument against abstraction based on the pure being of God is 
most clearly seen in Coleridge's attack on Godwinism in an article entitled 
"Modern Patriotism11 in the third number of The Watchman. 
addresses the putative patriot in the following manner: 
Coleridge 
You have studied Mr. Godwin's Essay on Political Justice; but 
to think filial affection folly, gratitude a crime, marriage in-
justice, and the promiscuous intercourse of the sexes right and 
wise, may class you among the despisers of vulgar prejudices, but 
cannot increase the probability that you are a PATRIOT . But you 
act up to your principles. So much the worse! your principles 
are villainous ones! I would not entrust my wife or sister to 
you - Think you, I would entrust my country? The PATRIOT indulges 
himself in no comfort, which, if society were properly constituted, 
all men might not enjoy; but you ge t drunk on claret, and you 
frequent public dinners, where whole joints are stewed down into 
essences - and all for your country! You are a Gamester - you 
a Patriot! A very poor man was lately hovering round a 
Butcher's shop - he wanted to buy a sheep ' s liver; but your foot-
man in livery outbid him, and your spaniel had it! I doubt your 
Patriotism. You harangue against the Slave-Trade; you attribute 
the present scarcity to the war - yet you wear powder, and ~at 
pies and sugar ! 
little. 2 
Your patriotism and philanthropy cost you very 
·coleridge describes Godwin 's principles as 'villainous•. He is now force-
fully aware that abstract freedom between persons can evade the real problems 
of society. Those who are abstractly patriotic in their 'advanced' moral 
behaviour are avoiding the real issues of practical patriotism. There are 
two dangers under discussion. The first, whi ch was recognised in the 
Political Lectures, is that energy of behav~our integrated with false 
principles is harmful; and the second, which is the distinctive fear of the 
early 1796 period, is that belief in energy itself, ~ure being, will result 
2. The Watchman. p. 73. (Patton. pp . 9899) . 
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in excesses of lust and violenceo The problem is that in order to cure the 
second danger, one seems driven into the first. To escape this impasse, a 
principle is required that will prevent excess of feeling, but which will 
also necessarily be a correct principle. The problem arises because 
Coleridge will not believe in inna te virtue, the intrinsic goodness of being. 
Hence Coleridge finds that the following positive suggestions are necessary: 
If I might presume so far, I would inform how you might become 
a Patriot. Your heart must believe, that the good of the whole 
is the greatest possible good of each individual: that therefore 
it is your duty to be just , because it is your interest. In the 
present state of society, taking away Hope and Fear, you cannot 
believe this - for it is not true; yet you cannot be a Patriot 
unless you do believe it. How shall we reconcile this apparent 
contradiction? You must give up your sensuality and your 
philosophy, the pimp of your sensuality; you must condescend to 
believe in a God, and in the existence of a Future State! 3 
Coleridge had first argued for belief in the existence of a Future State as 
if it were a necessary delusion for the purpose of transforming society in 
certain exceptional cases, but it becomes clear that since he cannot accept 
completely the virtue of the unconditioned self, he must ·wish it to be 
controlled by reference to an external unconditioned Good, which must be an 
absolute God without any rational accretions.4 \Vhen Coleridge offers his 
3. The Watchman. pp . 73-74• (Patton. pp. 99-100). 
4. This dev~lopment of Coleridge's thinking, already implicit in the 
Theological Lectures, can be traced through his comments in letters 
at this time, notably in his qualified praise of Bishop V/atson's reply 
to Tom Paine's The Age of Reason. (see Griggs. 116. p.197. a letter 
to Benjamin Flower of April 1, 1796). There is undoubtedly a move 
away from Priestleyan rationalism in the Spring of 1796 - see, for 
instance, Coleridge's reactions to his wife's ' mis-carriage' in a 
letter of March, 20th to John Edwards. (Griggs. 112. p. 193): 
"Has not Dr. Priestley forgotten tha t Incomprehensibility is a s 
necessary an attribute of the First Cause, as Love, or Power, or 
Intelligence?" 
I t seems likely tha t Coleridge approved of Watson's negative effort -
his anti-rationalism, whilst, surely, still disapproving of his 
- - ~ . - -
~ 
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positive sugges tions for the creation of a modern patriot, he uses a 
dramatic and, from his point of view, an extremely pertinent image in 
describing Godwinism as the pimp of sensuality. Godwinian rationality does 
not stand over and against pure feeling ensuring that it does not become 
excessive for the simple reason that Godwinism is a human rationalisation that 
is the pandar to the very excess that it is designed to control. Coleridge 
has lost, in other words, his belief in the distinctive authority of reason. 
Reason had inherited Southey's authority in a subsidiary role,5 but Coleridge 
now denies it that authority and claims that reason is the product of human 
feeling with the result that it cannot exert any control over feeling. The 
only possible control over the pure self is to be exerted by a pre-rational 
God . Coleridge does not offer belief in God as a temporary consolation of 
value in inducing acceptance of the adversities of the present state, 
although his language might still suggest this Paleyan interpretation, but 
instead he believes that a relationship of faith with an unconditioned Deity 
is the only way to effect the change from the actual present situation to 
the ideal one of heart-felt relations between persons . . The crucial point 
is that belief in God becomes a necessary pre-requisite for the transformation 
of society, whereas, before, it had been regarded as a necessary fiction for 
the poor and uneducated who were unable to be altered because of their 
adverse social conditions and their lack of reasoning power. 
5. 
positive Trinitarianism. (For Watson, see R. Watson (B.C); and for 
Paine, see T. Paine (B.C); for another reply to Paine, see 
Priestley's A continuation of the Letters • . . (B.B); Coleridge ' s 
attitude to Lessing at this time is obscure, but his veiled comment 
in the letter to Flower may imply that he felt able to ac cept 
Lessing 1 s anti-rationalism wi thout regarding himself as an 'infidel'. 
For Lessing , see G. E.Lessing (B .C), and also H. E.Allison (B.Di) and 
G. Pons (B.Di). 
See Part II. Chapter 2 . (17)ff. 
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In "Modern Patriotism" Coleridge strongly attacked Godwinism because, 
under the appearance of benevolence, it licensed self-indulgent behaviour. 
Coleridge recommends religious faith because it provides absolute 
obligation which must prevent sensuality, not rationalise it. However, if 
Coleridge is concerned, early in 1796, with excesses of sensuality, partly 
arising from the French atrocities of the time, 6 his attack on the problem 
from a point of view of social positivism leads to another danger, of which 
he is aware. This is the danger of abstract sensibility. Coleridge wishes 
to advocate concern for the immediate social problem, but he is afraid that 
this awareness might itself become systematised. He f eijrs the cult of 
sensibility almost as much as he fears sensuality. It is in grappl ing with 
this problem t hat it becomes clear that Coler idge's theological s peculation 
about God does not provide him with the kind of divine authority that he 
desires in the politica l context. 
The essay "On the Slave Trade", is the re-working of a lecture that 
Col eridge had delivered in mid-1795, 7 and it confuses the issue slightly 
because, at that date, Coleridge had been anxious to counter the emphasis 
on the particular which ignored general benevolence. 1rhis was the emphasis 
which preceded his realisation, in "Modern Patriotism", that it was possible 
for a generalised system to lose contact with the particular. Coleridge 
begins the essay "On the Slave Trade" with a discussion of the faculty of 
imagina tion._ Coleridge sees the imagination as t he cause that leads men 
to propose to themselves those imaginary wants which are the origin of 
inequality in society. Equally, however, Coleridge sees that it is the 
6. The Terror was over, but for the political atmo~phere of early 
1796, see Patton. pp . xxxviii-xli. 
7. For the original Lecture on the Slave Trade, see Patton & Mann . 
PP • 235-251. 
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function of the imagination to make 'abstract' sympathy as immediate as 
particular feelings between persons. In this second role, the imagination 
allows the individual to become as God in viewing all humanity as equal. 
Just as, in a theological context, the imagination allows God's dealings in 
history to be present to the individual, so, in a social context, the 
imagination allows the sufferings of men in all places, once know~, to be 
present to the individual and to be felt with equal intensity. Ideally, 
the imagination breaks down barriers of Time and Space and allows the 
individual, like God, to be omniscient and omnisensitive. 
The distinctive feature of the development of Coleridge's thinking in 
this direction in 1796 is, as we have seen, that he questions the authority 
of a general systematisation which is a human construct. Coleridge there-
fore raises the role of imagination so that it assimilates the being of God 
to the self rather than the fallible human consciousness of a general 
benevolence. Hence Coleridge is able to attack Godwinism and advocate a 
belief in the Being of God as the true source of benevolence. The result 
of this shift is that sensibility is not opposed to benevolence on the 
grounds that it springs from an emphasis on particular feeling without 
attempting to apply that feeling to~ wider sphere, but instead on the grounds 
that sensibility is an emphasis on feeling which itself has become detached 
from t he particul ar, has become an artificially stimulated emotion rather 
than one genuinely arising from the reality of social conditions. 8 
Coleridge pushes religious positivism beyond self -indulgent human reason, 
8 . In this context, Coleridge attacks Goethe's Werther in The Watchman. 
No. 4. p. 108. (Patton. p. 139), and also prefers the Isaac 
Jenkins of Thoma s Beddoes to the Le Fevre episode in Sterne's 
Tristram Shandy (see The Watchman. p. 268. Patton. p. 313). For 
the Beddoes tale, see T. Beddoes (B.C), and for the Le Fevre episode, 
see L. Sterne, Tristram Shandy. ed. G. Saintsbury. London. 1965. 
B.VI. Chapters 6-13. pp . 305-318. 
1~ 
and he pushes social positivism beyond self-indulgent human feeling. On 
both extremes, Coleridge wishes to combine ardour wi th a consciousness of 
unconditioned being , either human or divine. On both extremes Coleridge's 
a ssumption is the same, t hat a relationship with God as He is or with men as 
they are will lead the individual self to act benevolently. The forms of 
t he t wo positivisms are the same . Coleridge ' s separation of Theology and 
Politics, however reluctant it may have been previously, is now breaking 
down. An abstract, cognitive experience of God is no longer seen as a 
prerequisite for a true relationship of persons ~o persons since both 
activities are now seen as the product of an integration of wisdom and 
ardour in the being of the individual. In the Political Lectures, 
Coleridge reached t he position where he wished to idealise 'wise ardor' - the 
conjunction of contemplation and action. Because they were political 
lectures, he was obviously primarily concerned wi t h activity, and, in this 
context, wisdom was seen as a necessary restraining influence . There was 
the accept ance that a duality of wisdom and ardour was to be avoided, but 
Col eridge seemed t o assume that wisdom and ardour were isolable 
characteristics which could inter-act. The emphasis of the Theological 
Lectures was , on the other hand, obviously pl a ced on the achievement of 
wisdom in relation to t he true God. Coleridge was , however, forced to 
conc lude that activity is the means to wisdom. The i deal pattern 
envisaged in the Political Lectures cannot be rea l i s ed, whilst Coleridge's 
speculation about an intelligent Deity does not itself procure divine 
i ntelligence. Such intelligence and wisdom can only be gained by t aking 
decisive action. With Coleridge's emphasis on practicali ty in The 
Watchman there emerges a significant shift of emphasis. A relationship with 
God is not sol ely seen as a prerequisite of a relationship with other persons, 
but, instead, Coleridge begins to see the possibility that practical social 
action is the prerequisite of knowledge of God. Certainly t his second 
emphasis becomes as important as the first . This is again saying t hat true 
wisdom and valuable action are inter-active, but the main point is that in 
Coleridge's consideration of practical issues in The Watchman t his insight 
gradually ceases to be a theoretical one reached from both theological and 
political t hought , and istead becomes one which seems to have the possibility 
of practical application.9 
On the same day that the sixth number of The Watchman appeared, 
10 Coleridge was writing to Thomas Poole: 
To tell you the truth, I do not think the Watchman will succeed -
hitherto I have scarcely sold enough to pay the expenses - no 
wonder when I tell you, that on two hundred which Par s ons in 
Paternos t er Row sells weekly, he gains eight shillings more 
than I do - 11 
On May 5th, before th~ publication of the tenth number, Coleridge told 
12 Poole that he intended to end The Watchman at the :twelfth number, but the 
tenth, published on May 12th was the last. In spite ot Coleridge's 
intention to unite wisdom and ardour in his newspaper, he had found, from the 
.outset, that the pressure to remain abreast of i ffi!llediate affairs as well as 
9. See note (1) above, In 'personal' terms, it is difficult to find 
a ny way of assessing whether Coleridge did in fact commit the 
precursive deed which he f elt was theoretically necessary for the 
attainment of the 'wise' position t hat he rather assumed that he 
had reached. 
10. For Thomas Poole, see Part II . Chapter 10 (5)n. 
11. Griggs. 119. p. 202. 
12. Griggs. 124. p . 208 
----.----
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the pressure to comment on them immediately, prohibited reflection. There 
seem to be t wo sources of Coleridge's anxiety during the period i:ril. which 
The Watchman was appearing. Firstly, he was harassed by the awareness that 
hi s wife was dependent on the profit he could gain from his own mental 
activity with the result that there was a domestic obligation to write 
qui ckly and produce work in quantity. Secondly, Coleridge was dismayed that 
he had to meet t he demand for immediate news to such an extent that it became 
less possible for him to find time to write the accounts of the basic 
principles underlying behaviour which he believed to be necessary. Hence 
there was the dual pressure, not only to be productive but to be productive 
in a certain way. For his own welfare he needed to wi t hdraw to the country 
and to gain subsistence by physical not mental exertion. There is evidence 
to suggest that Coleridge's desire to move to the country was stimulated by 
an interest in the possibility that 'nature' might be therapeutic and hence 
of positive social value. 13 There is a possibility that Coleridge saw his 
'retreat' to the country-side not at all as an 'escape' but as a form of 
behaviour which was significant and active. His initial ideal may wel l 
13. This evidence would focus upon Coleridge 's interest in Count 
Rumford's work (see The Watchman. No . 5) which caused him to 
wish to advocate the establishment of parks in cities (see Griggs. 
123, p . 206. - written on April 30th, 1796 whilst The Watchman. 
No. 5 appeared on April 2nd). This attitude towards the 
therapeutic value of 'nature' in the midst of towns, of repose in 
' nature' that was not total retreat or was a retreat only in the 
sense that the York Retreat was an asylum was in danger of becoming 
the kind of aristocratic cult described in D. Mornet. Le Sentiment 
de la Nature en France ••• Deuxieme Partie. Chapitre Premier. 
Bergerades. p. 76. (B.Di). There is further evidence in 
Coleridge's undoubted knowledge of Edward Long Fox's asylum in 
Bristol (see An Answer to 'A Letter to Edward Lon Fox M.D. 1 (B.A); 
Patton & Mann . pp . 319-332 which would impl y that Co l eridge was 
more attracted by the medical r a t her than the aesthetic value of 
'nature' - at least initially. 
For Count Rumford, see B. Thompson. (B.C) and E,Larsen (B.Di). For 
Edward Long Fox, see Patton & Mann . p. 321n and see also Griggs. p .254n. 
For t he state of psychotherapy in the period, see K. Jones (B.Di) 
and R. Hunter & I. Mafalpine. (B.Di). 
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have been corrupted as he lost sight of 'retreat' to 'nature' as a way of 
controlling his political behaviour and came to see it as a way of life 
itself. Another way of stating the case is to suggest that instead of 
seeing his ' retreat' as an enactm~nt of the secondary imagination t hat 
enabled God to be deduced by the primary, he came to see it as a means of 
acquiring direct access to God through primary imagination. The move to 
Nether Stowey was, t herefore, in the end, a retreat from mentali.sm to 
actuality14 on Coleridge's own part, although he began to see that his own 
actual situation might then have mental significance for friends through 
whom he could be vicariously active in society and truly active in 
influencing their activism. 
The narrative of t he events in Coleridge's life for the remaining 
months of 1796 is the narrative of his attempts to find an adequate income 
by means which would not compromise t he freedom of his mind t o reflect. 15 
Initially, Coleridge had several plans to become a tutor or to open a 
school, but, by the very close of the year he moved to Nether Stowey to live 
primitively near Thomas Poole. Coleridge was not a tutor at Nether Stowey 
but, for the early part of 1797, Charl es Lloyd, a former pupil was a lodger 
in the small cottage. Lloyd was the son of Charles Lloyd, the Quaker, 
banker and philanthropist of Birmingham, and, partly on account of t he 
14. Althoug~, arguably, mentalism was a possible way of dealing with 
the growing problems of urban actuality whilst the retreat to 
'actuality' was thoroughly reactionary and indicated the defeat 
of Coleridge's strong inclinations towards social involvement. For a stimulating account of the relation between 'mysticism' (which, perhaps, is where 'mentalism' leads) and social concern, 
see J. A. Passmore (B.Dii). 
15. See discussions in the following letters : Griggs. 131; 135; 136; 138; 139; 140; 141; 142; 151; 157; 162; 163; 166; 169. 
. -
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strict discipline of the family, the son was unstable and of a nervous 
disposition. At the time when Coleridge was seeking repose for himself 
from intense activity, he found himself involved partl y in Quakerism which 
seemed to offer an atmosphere of passive serenity, and partly in evidence 
of instability arising from severe emotional strain. Observation of 
Lloyd's behaviour under strain would have caused Coleridge to take account 
of activity which was seemingly unconscious or irrational. Coleridge was 
forced to seek the advice of Thomas Beddoes in treating Lloyd. From this 
quarter, Coleridge was informed of the current theories in medicine of 
insanity, and, hence, inevitably, of theories concerning the nature of life 
and the unconscious. Meanwhile, throughout the period from the end of 
The Watchman to Coleridge's departure for Germany in 1798, he was in 
correspondence with two men who pushed his inclina tions in opposite 
directions - John Thelw~ll and Charles Lamb. The former became almost a 
symbol of activism and the latter of passivi ty. This conflict is still 
the main theme of Coleridge's thinking in this period, but the scope of his 
thought is considerably broadened by the concatenation of the ideas and the 
persons of the four men now mentioned. The stran<is of Coleridge's thinking, 
or, at least, some of the possibilities which were manifested to him and 
impinged to varying degTees, can be examined by studying Coleridge's 
relationships with these four men during the period of almost t wo years 
from mid-1796 to mid-1798. 
CHAP'rER V 
1 John Thelwall 
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Thelwall 1 s ideas are interesting in relation to Coleridge for three 
main reasons. First of all , Thelwall is extremely interested in analysing 
relations between persons or creatures which are somehow sub-rational, but, 
secondly, he also retains the sense that social benevolence must be learned. 
On the one hand, Thelwal l has a stronger inclination to trust natural 
affection than Coleridge, an inclination which leads him to follow up the 
subject as a matter of physiological enquiry, 2 and yet, on the other hand, 
Thelwall believes that the correct mode of social and political behaviour 
must be rationally deduced and cannot be arrived at by letting persons act 
instinctively . Thelwall tries to deduce a code of behaviour from his 
understanding of the laws of nature, whereas Col eridge would want to deduce 
the Being of God from those same natural laws. This difference becomes an 
important subject of contention between the two men.3 The third 
interesting feature of Thelwall's ideas received most attention in his novel 
in three parts entitled The Peripatetic4 and is related to the other two. 
1. 
2. 
4. 
.. 
For sources for Thelwall, see (B.C). See also C. Cestre (B.Di); 
Mrs. J. Thelwall (B.Di); E. Thompson (B.Di); and B.S.Allen. 
"Godwin I s Influence upon John Thelwall". (B .Dii). 
In his essay on Animal Vitality which, unfortunately , is no 
longer. extant. One can deduce his interests from those of the 
lecturers to whom he listened a t Guy's Hospital, although the 
records of Guy's are not useful in locating precisely the contents 
of the lectures that he may have attended. (See Anon. (B . Di) 
for the Guy's records). 
For Coleridge's recognition of this fundamental diff erence, see 
Griggs . 133. p . 122. 
Published in London in 1793 • 
..... 
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Thelwall was interested in modes of human therapy.5 Beyond the period with 
which we are concerned, Thelwall directed his energies into elocution as a 
form of s peech therapy, and in The Peripatetic he gradually unfolds, as plot, 
t he sufferings of his old friend Belmour who now wanders around the country-
side in melancholic despair, and much of the action of the work focuses upon 
the occasional attempts of the travellers to cure Belmour's depression and 
divert him from his intention to commit suicide. Thelwall is interested 
in the relation between calm and wild feelings, and he wants to examine 
whether depression can be diverted by reason or whether nature itself must 
effect a cure. 
It is only possible here to make reference to the way in which Thelwall ' s 
The Peripatetic may have aroused Coleridge's interest in connections between 
medical and political theories. It is possible that Thelwall's interest in 
'animal vitality' may have helped to bring home to Coleridge that his own 
theory of human feeling was a rationalisation of forces of human attraction 
which were ontological and not conceptua1. 6 Certainly this i s a 
realisation t ha t was induced, as we shall see, by Coleridge's acquaintance 
with medical science through friendship with Thomas Beddoes. However, 
Coleridge's correspondence with Thelwall centred, at least initially, upon 
politica l issues, and in this sphere Thelwall 1 s views, particularly with 
reference to what he called the 'prospective principle of virtue •, 
stimulated Coleridge's thinking and impinged upon it to some degree. 
5. This is clearly related to the interest of Coleridge mentioned in 
Part II . Chapter 4. (12)n. 
6. Thelwall ' s interests, in other words, may have helped to break 
down the i mpasse of intellectuality described wi t h reference to 
Coleridge's feelings for Mary Evans and Sara Fricker. See 
Part II. Chapter I . ( ll )ff. 
--~ 
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Thelwall reveals the essential aspects of his own political creed in 
praising the French Revolution in number VII of The Tribune. He writes: 
That which I glory in, in the revolution of France is this, That 
it has been upheld and propagated as a principle of that revolution, 
t hat ancient abuses are not, by their antiquity, converted into 
virtues; t hat it has been affirmed and established that man has 
rights which no statutes or usages can take away; that intellectual 
beings are entitled to the use of their intellects; that the object 
of society is the promotion of the general happiness of mankind; 
that thought ought to be free, and tha t the propagation of thought 
is the duty of every individual; t hat one order of society has no 
right, how many years soever they have been guilty of the pillage, 
to plunder and oppress the other parts of the community , whose 
persons are entitled to equal respect, and whose exertions have 
been much more beneficial to manki nd . 7 
There are three main emphases inherent in this political creed. 
t wo are complementary in that Thelwall wishes to ensure that the 
The first 
institutions of society do not impose prejudices either by the aut hority of 
precedent or of a present privileged status, and, at the same time, he wishes 
to ensure that the force of mind and feeling of individuals within society 
that enables them to enjoy institutional freedom is not enervated by any 
kind of mental oppression from objective reason. Although these t wo 
empha ses become the same, Thelwall sees himself as fi ghting on two f r onts, 
for the liberation of the individual and for t he liberalising of soci a l 
institutions. Thelwall's t hi rd main emphas i s is t hat the end of libera tion 
is t he ' general happiness of mankind'. 
I t is in Thelwall's attacks on Burke8 t hat his hostility to 
traditional political authority is mos t apparent. 
7. 
8 . 
The Tribune . Vol. I. pp . 155-156 . 
For Burke , see Part II . Chapter 2. (19)n . 
In his Sober Reflections 
Thelwall reveals the essential aspects of his own political creed in 
praising the French Revolution in number VII of The Tribune. He writes: 
Tha t which I glory in, in the revolution of France is this, That 
it has been upheld and propagated as a principle of that revolution , 
t ha t ancient abuses are not, by their a ntiquity, converted into 
virtues; t hat it has been affirmed and established that man has 
rights which no statutes or usages can take away; that intellectual 
beings are entitled to the use of their intellects; that the object 
of society is the promotion of the general happiness of mankind; 
that thought ought to be free, a nd tha t the propagation of thought 
is the duty of every individual; t hat one order of society has no 
right, how many years soever they have been guilty of the pillage, 
to plunder and oppress the other parts of the community , whose 
persons are entitled to equal respect, and whose exertions have 
been much more beneficial to mankind.7 
There are three main emphases inherent in this political creed. 
t wo are complementary in that Thelwall wishes to ensure that the 
The first 
institutions of society do not impose prejudices either by the authority of 
precedent or of a present privileged status, and, at the same time, he wishes 
to ensure tha t . the force of mind and feeling of individuals within society 
that enables them to enjoy institutional freedom is not enervated by any 
kind of mental oppression from objective reason. Although these two 
emphases become the same, Thelwall sees himself as fi ghting on two fronts, 
for t he libera tion of the individual and for t he liberalising of social 
institutions . Thelwall's t hird mai n emphasi s is t hat t he end of libera tion 
i s t he ' gener a l happiness of mankind '. 
I t is in Thelwall's attacks on Burke8 t hat hi s hostility to 
traditiona l political authority i s mos t apparent. 
7. 
8 . 
The Tr i bune . Vol. I. pp . 155-156 . 
For Burke , .see Part II . Chapter 2. ( 19)n . 
In his Sober Reflections 
on the Seditious and inflammatory Letter of the Right Hon. Edmund Burke, 
to A Noble Lord, publi shed in 1796, Thelwall writes: 
I repeat it, therefore, I do not stand up as the advocate of 
hereditary distinctions, or hereditary honours. All honour, and 
all shame, are, in my calculation, merely personal. Goods and 
chattels may be heritable property; and in such a society as we 
are members of, I am convinced that it is necessary they should 
be so. But moral and intellectual distinctions, (the fountains 
of all real honour) are neither heritable nor transferabl e; nor 
is it in the power of human laws to make them such. 
and they end with the immediate possessor.9 
They begin 
170 
Thelwall's second major attack on Burke, this time a reply to t he Letters 
10 on the Prospect of a Regicide Peace, which he published, also in 1796, 
under the title The Right s of Hature, against the Usurpations of 
Establishments, shows more clearly the positive ideas which underlie hi s 
hostility to the authority of precedent. Against Burke, Thelwall writes: 
The right of t hese establishments to originate could only arise 
from the nature and circumstances of man, for whom, and E.Y_ whom, 
they originated. If it was right that they should originate by 
man, man had a right to judge of the propriety of their 
originating ; and, consequently, of the propriety of the 
establishments themselves: and, if that propriety arose out of 
the nature and circumstances of man, his right to judge of their 
propriety necessarily included a right to judge of his own nature 
and circumstances, and to modify the establishments accordingly. 
The conclusion is --- that either the nature of man is changed 
( for his rights grow out of his nature, and without change of 
nature there can be no change of rights) or else he is still at 
liberty to judge of his own nature and circumstances, and to 
9. Sober Reflections. p. 44. 
10. Published in London in 1796. 
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originate such establishments as that nature, and those 
circumstances require. In other words --- Establishments cannot 
decide upon First Principles; but First Principles must decide 
upon Es tablisbments. 11 
In asserting so vehemently that rational investigation must be exercised in 
the present, Thelwall, however, is unconscious t hat, by implication, he is 
denying the continuity of human history, and also, wi th regard to the 
individual, a sense of permanent identity. The significance of Thelwall's 
position when he transfers his iconoclasm from the rejection of historical 
precedent to the rejection of retrospection for the individual is most 
important for it explains how Coleridge could see The~wall as a symbol of 
ac tivi sm. The seventh number of The Tribune is devoted to the publication 
of a lecture whi ch Thelwall entitled "On t he Moral and Political Influence 
of the Prospective Principle of Virtue" . Thelwal l begins the lecture by 
reiterating his belief in the value of reasoning in the present, but in 
this context Thelwall is most concerned with the exertion of individual s, 
which he considered to be the only security against institutional tyranny. 
Thelwall writes: 
Let it be remembered, however, Citizens, tha t novelty is of 
itself no proof of falsehood, that the opinions of six moments 
and of six thousand years, if such an opinion should be found, 
stands precisely upon the same basis, the basis of reason and 
argument; and, t herefore, must be brought to the same test of 
exper~mental investigation, or else must be permitted to fall 
at once, and be abandoned as unworthy our adoption. 12 
For the purposes of this a r gument Thelwall makes no distinction between 
11. The Rights of Nature. Letter II. First Principles: or, 
Elements of Natural and Social Ri ghts . pp . 16-17. 
12. The Tribune. Vol. I. p. 148 • 
. -
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energetic reasoning and energetic behaviour . He assumes that the rational 
recognition of a duty is automatically followed by its performance. Hence 
activity must be equally committed to the present. Thelw~ll elaborates: 
I f, Ci tizens, virtue consists in promoting the happffiness of 
mankind - if virtue, i n reality, means neither more nor less 
than intentionally doing that which is best for general happiness 
and welfare, it results, I conceive, as an inevitable consequence, 
that all virtue must be of an active, not of a passive nature; 
and, therefore, that it is the duty of every individual to keep his 
eye steadily fixed upon that whi ch is before him, and to lose none 
of the powers and energies of intellect in unavailing glances upon 
what is past, and never can return. 
Citizens, this argument will lead us to many conclusions hostile 
to the general sentiments of mankind. Superstition, with her hood 
and cowl, presents herself before us at every step, with her 
doctrines of repentance, contrition, retaliation, and retributive 
justice, and points us back again to the dark and gloomy paths of 
error, which we, and which others may have passed; and bids us, 
in sackcloth and ashes, consume our f a culties in unavailing 
lamentations, which can never undo the acts t hat are pas t, but 
which have but t oo powerful an influence to unfit us for what is 
to come. 13 
As Thelwall boldly states elsewhere, in The Rights of Nature: 
All retrospective principle is crime: and to its criminality 
adds folly. 14 
Errors are not to be mourned . Energy is to be re-directed on the basis of 
a new rational deduction of duty, regardless of the consequences of the 
previous false action. Thelwall concludes thjg;J passage with the foll owing 
exhortation: 
13. The Tribune. Vol. I. PP~ 149-150. 
14. The Rights of Nature. Letter I. Introductory Remarks; on the Spirit and Teinper of Burke's letters on t he Prospect of a Regicide Peace. p. 36. 
' - ' 
--
... 
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Citizens, whatever may have been errors, let us recollect, t hat 
there is a nobler path for man to tread. Whatever wrongs he may 
have committed, whatever errors he may have fallen into, while 
energy remains, t here may be reparation to society. Virtue and 
beneficence are still attainable; and the same energies which, 
under the delusions of error, made him criminal, guided by the 
light of truth, might produce such qualities and such effects a s 
would make full compensation to the world. 15 
Throughout his political lectures Thelwall makes the point t hat the 
rational activity that must be cultivated in the present is t he analysis of 
the position of man in the universe. In the fi rst political lecture, 
Thel wall uses the image of the chain of being to emphasize his point: 
At any rate then, as we would wish to be peaceable and virtuous 
members of t he community, it is necessary above all things that 
we inform our minds by diligent cultivation: that we enquire into 
the nature and obligations of our own existence - dive as far as 
our intellects will permit, into the discoverable laws of the 
universe, compare the different parts of the whole system, and 
endeavour to discover what link in t his vast chain is filled by 
man - what are his duties, his powers, his capacities, how far he 
is i mprovable by knowledge and exertion, and what are the proper 
pursuits, i n which, as the result of these premises, he is bound 
16 to engage. 
1r he l wall argues that the result of such a rational analysis mus t be an 
acutely felt vision of the unity of the univers e and of the interdependence 
of all created beings. He says of a person who has used his reason in this 
manner: 
He looks in the face of his fellow creature; and he sees indeed 
a brother - or a part rather of his own existence; another self 
15, The Tribune. Vol. I, p. 151, It becomes clear tha t, in The 
Peripatetic, Belmour's mi s take causing his insanity was excessive 
'retrospection'. 
16. Political Lectures. (No. 1.) p . 10. 
' . ' 
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He contemplates in every individual the faculties of sufferance 
and of enjoyment, and feels one nerve of sympathy connecting him 
with the whole intellectual universe, and giving him an inti mate 
share in all t he blessings which he hopes, by his exertions, to 
impart to the human race. 17 
In t he hands of Paley the argument from design became an instrument for 
advocating t he conservation of the social status quo, but, at the end of his 
s peech in the Copenhagen-fields, Thelwall' s phrasing shows that in wishing 
to avoid conservatism he does invite the inhumaneness of an utilitarian 
assessment: 
\le wish for principles that will give to every man an hon0r ary 
estimation, proportioned onl y to the purity and itility of his 
conduct; and which will, consequently, insure the felic i ty of 
mankind. Let us then proceed with regularity wi th one heart, 
one voice, one soul: as if we were, in reality, but one existence, 
and each particular individual felt the strong conviction, that we 
are but so many joints, members, and nerves of the same system, to 
promo t e the happiness, welfare, and glory of which is at once our 
desire and our interest. 18 
Thelwall ' s respect for other creatures seems to extend only to those others 
who are actively endeavouring to make themselves fit members of the who l e. 
Wordsworth would have to defend 1rhe Old Cumberland Beggar as vigorously 
against Thelwall as against any other less sentimental utilitarian. 19 
17. Political Lectures. (No. 1.) p. 11. 
18. The Speech of John Thelwall •.• Monday , October 26, 1795. P• 24. 
19. 
-
The Old Cumberland Be~r, line 67: 
this Man useless. - •.• " (see W. ifordsworth (B.C). 
I am thinking of 
"But deem not 
P• 444) • 
On the other hand, Wordsworth's attitude in a later poem (Gipsies, 1807) is not unlike Thelwall's: 
••• - oh, better wrong and strife (By nature transient) t han this torpid life; Life which the very stars eeprove 
As on their silent tasks they move! (B .C) p. 153). 
-- T 
(see W. Wordsworth. 
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Thelwall 1 s vision of hum.an activity becomes dangerously schematic. In 
The Tribune, number VII, Thelwall concludes his lecture in the following 
enthusiastic terms: 
Be gone, ye i dle, melancholy sensations; ye feelings that can 
produce no fruit. I call upon Roman energy I call upon 
Spartan fortitude, which characterised the pure and virtuous 
republicans of the ancient world; upon these I call to steel 
my heart with firmness. Let me, so long as I exist, impart (such 
as it is) my advice, my little knowledge, my best assistance to my 
fellow citizens; and let me not, by unavailing regrets, and 
retrospective views, consume the energies to which I have no 
exclusive right - which are your's - which are the property of my 
country - of all mankind. 
For I am not a solitary individual. I stand not upon a world 
where I behold no inhabitant but myself. I am but a part - a 
little, little member of the great animal of human society - a 
palpilliary nerve upon one of the extremities! and I mus t do 
t hat duty to the whole, for which by my structure and organization 20 I am adapted. 
In these sentiments we can see a foreshadowing of Social Darwinism, but, to 
use a phrase of Coleridge's, they indicate, for the 1790 1s, an 'ebullience 
of schematism' which was often the fatal tendency of the enthusiastic 
d . l 21 ra ica s. In constructing an intellectual system which might control 
instinctive energy, Thelwall moves away from his awareness of the purity of 
human s;ympa thy. Co l eridge would have been interested in Thelwall's belief 
in activity, .but it seems likely that he would have regarded Thelwall's 
system as an example of the kind of abstraction which he most specifically 
20. The Tribune. Vol. I. p. 163. 
21. Or, at any rate, it was this that Coleridge considered to be their fatal tendency. 
I 
I I 
11 
I 
attacked in "Modern Patriotism" in The Watchman. 22 It was that very 
article which was the subject of early discussion between Coleridge and 
Thelwall. 23 
22. See Part II. Chapter 4. (2) and (3). 
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23. See Gr iggs . 122. pp.204-205; and 127. p . 213. See also 
Thelwall's letter to Coleridge written between these two letters on 
May 10th, 1796 . (A Letter to S. T. Coleridge. (B.C). The other 
point of contention in the early correspondence between the two men 
was connected with Thelwall's reaction to Coleridge's mention of him 
in the Political Lectures. (see Part II . Chapter 2. (13), 
which Thelwall felt was ambiguous. 
I 
I 
177 
CHAPTER VI 
The correspondence between Coleridge and Thelwall in late 1796 
Through the. summer of 1796 Coleridge was endeavouring to find a settled 
occupation for himself. First of all he accepted a post on the Morning 
Chronicle in London, and then, at the same time, he was offered a tutorship 
at Darley. Both possibilities faded, and it was then suggested by a Dr. 
Crompton that he should open a school in Derby. Whilst this plan was 
progressing, Coleridge met the Lloyd family at Moseley. Here, in late 
Sept ember, he heard the news that Sara had given birth to David Hartley 
Coleridge, and here also he learnt that the Derby plans had collapsed. 
Coleridge arranged to act as tutor to Charles Lloyd, and the two young men 
returned to Bristol imrnediately. 1 On arrival in Bristol Coleridge received 
a letter from Charles Lamb informing h.im that Mary Lamb had killed their 
2 
mother. The next day Coleridge wrote the letter of consolation which Lamb 
had requested and which he treasured always thereafter.3 In the beginning 
of October, Coleridge wrote to Charles Lloyd, senior, to inform him t hat he 
intended to retire to the country for the good of his own health and also 
that of Lloyd's son.4 From t his point until the end of the year Coleridge 
was negotiating to find a cottage in the country, and, with the aid of Thomas 
Pool e, this plan was realised at the very end of the year. Having withdrawn 
from Londorif Thelwall, too, was casting about for a settled occupation and 
situation, and, to judge by Coleridge's replies in the last few months of the 
1. For these events, see the letters mentioned in Part II, Chapter 4. (14)n. 
2. Corr. 8. PP • 39-41. 
3, Griggs. 143, PP• 238-239. 
4. Griggs. 144. pp . 240-241. 
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year,5 was asking Coleridge's opinion of various pro j ects and seeking the 
help of any contacts which Coleridge might be able to provide. We shall 
look more closely at t he influence of Lamb and Lloyd, but these basic facts 
are necessary to explain Coleridge's shift towards a concern for religions 
consolation. 
In a letter of November 13th, Coleridge firmly mentions the difference 
of opinion which divides himself from Thelwall, He wrli.tes: 
We run on the same ground, but we drive different Horses . 
I am daily more and more a religionist - you, of course, 
more & more otherwise. 6 
Coleridge was writing in reply to a request from Thelwall for assistance, 
and Coleridge makes practical comments on Thelwall's schemes . A more 
friendly tone enters this letter, and Col eridge presses Thelwall for 
information about himsel f . There is the slight sense that Coleridge is not 
simply concerned to advise Thelwall how to act, but is rather more deepl y 
concerned to take Thelwall in hand so as to mould him into an ideal patriot. 
There is the i mpression that Coleridge is wanting to recommend a course of 
study to Thelwall which will temper his activity with wisdom. If Thelwall 
gained this impression hi mself, he certainly was not annoyed for he answered 
Coleridge's questions within a week , and asked Col eridge to reciprocate with 
a comparable self-portrait. Unfortunately, we do not have Thelwall's 
account of himself, but, to judge by his occasional comments in his lectures, 
he would almos t certainly have emphasized that his knowledge of books, 
especially the Classics, was poor,7 and it would also seem likely that he 
5. 
6. 
See Griggs . 153, P• 254; and 156. p. 258 , 
Griggs. 153, p . 25 3, 
7, In The Natural and Constitutional Rights. p , 5, he typically 
described himself as 'a plain, unlearned man '. 
179 
would have presented a picture of himself as a restl~ss man of action. It 
certai nly seems feasible t hat it suited Coleridge's thinking at the time to 
see himself as the very reverse of Thelwall. Coleridge says of himself: 
As to my shape , 1 tis a good shape enough, if measured - but my 
gait is awkward, & the walk , & t he Whole man indicates indolence 
capable of energies. I am, & ever have been, a great reader -
& have read almost every thing - a library-cormorant - I am deep 
in all out of t he way books, whether of the monkish times, or of 
the puritanical aera - 8 
Coleridge proceeds to describe some of his abstruse reading , and then he 
encloses a poem written on the birth of his son which poetically employs 
the platonif doctrine of Pre-existence.9 
Coleridge's next letter to Thelwall, written on December 17th, continues 
to accentuate the difference between the active and the passive man. 
Coleridge describes his plan to live in the country , and then continues: 
8 . 
Now in favor of this scheme I shall say nothing : for the mor e 
vehement my ratiocinations were previous to the experiment, the 
more ridiculous my failure would appear; and if the Scheme deserve 
the said ratiocination, I shall live down all your objections. I 
doubt not, t hat the time will come when all our Utilities will be 
directed in one simple path . That Time however is not come; and 
imperious circumstances point out to each one his particula r Road. 
Much good may be done in all. I am not fit f or public Li f e; yet 
the ligh t shall stream t o a far distance from the taper in my 
cottage window. Meantime , do you uplift the torch dreadlessly , 
and shew -to mankind the face of t hat Idol, whi ch t hey have . 
worshipped in Darkness!lO 
Griggs . 156. p. 260 . 
9. " ... a nd Some have said 
We liv' d ere yet thi s f leshly robe we wore". (Grig~s. 156. p . 261) . 
10 . Griggs. 164 . p . 277. 
I. 
180 
There then follows a long argument in which Coleridge defends the charge of 
anti-religious Bigotry which he had brought against Thelwall. Coleridge 
t akes t his opportunity to make a final private defence of Christianity, and, 
in doing so, he tries to modify Theiliwall's confidence. 
Co l eridge replies to one of Thelwall's comments, that Christianity is 
a mean religion. Coleridge reduces Christianity to two heads of belief -
tha t God is Omnipresent, and t hat future existence is real. Coleridge 
accepts that t hese tenets may not be sublime, but he goes on to argue that 
the language of Revelation and Hebrews is sublime, and that the imager y of 
Mi lton is superior to t hat of Homer and Virgil. After quoting Biblical 
passages to enforce his point, Coleridge than moves to an attack on 
Thelwall's alleged contempt for Old Age with its implication that Christian 
morals are only s uitable f or the seni l e and vi cious. 11 Coleridge responds 
vigorously to wha t he takes to be Thelwall's meaning : 
'Vis ions fit for Slobberers'. If infidelity do not lead to 
Sens uality, which in every case except your's I have observed 
it to do, it always takes away all respect for t hose who become 
unpleasant from the infirmities of Disease or decaying Nat ure. 
Exempli gratia - t he Aged a re ' Slobberers' - The only Vision, 
which Chri s tianity holds forth , is indeed pe culiarl y adapted to 
these Slobberers - Yes! to t hese lonel y & despised , and 
perishing SLOBBERERS it proclaims, that their 'Corruptible shal l 
put on Incorruption, & their Mortal put on I mmortality! 
' Morals for the Magdalen & Botany Bay '. Now , Thelwall ! I 
presume · :that t o preach moral s to the virtuous i s not qite so 
requisite, as to preach them to the vicious. 'The Sick need a 
11. In a l a ter manuscript note cited by Griggs. pp. 281-282, Thel wall 
claimed not to be able to understand the 'contempt' that was 
imputed to him, but there is suffi cient evidence to suggest that he 
might have been contemptuous of useless old peopl e (see Part II. 
Chapter 5. (19)n.) • 
. '. 
Physician'. Are morals, which would make a Prostitute a Wife, 
& a Sister; which would restore her to inward peace & purity; 
are morals, which would make Drunkards sober, the ferocious 
benevolent, & 1rhieves honest, mean morals? Is it a despicable 
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trait in our Religion, that it's professed obj ect is 'to heal the 
broken-hearted, and give Wi sdom to the Poor Man? It prea ches 
Repentance - what repentance? 
of the same crimes? No. 
Tears , & Sorrow, & a repe tition 
A 'Repentance unto good works' 
a repen tance tha t completely does away all supersti tious terrors 
by teaching, that the Past is nothing in itself; t hat if the 
Mind is good , t hat it was bad, imports nothi ng. 12 
As Coleridge 's argument moves t owards considera tion of repentance, he finds 
ground whi ch might seem congenial to Thelwall. Coleridge is openly 
hosti le to the kind of repentance which Thelwall mi gh t have regarded as 
retrospective. Col eridge 's dislike of tears and sorrowful regret 
corresponds13 with Thelwall's dislike of enervating remorse, 14 and , s imilarly, 
Coleridge wants to advocate a form of repentance which has the effect of 
erasing t he past compl etely. Thelwall would have approved of this effect, 
but t he point that Coler~dge is trying to make is that the past can be 
erased i f error is genuinel y regretted in a positive fashion and not just 
sel f -indulgently . For Coleridge, the pos s i bility of new action in the 
present:::i:sthe eff ect of repentance f or pas t error. Coleridge 's pr i nciple 
of virtue i s, in Thelwall' s term, prospective, but it is prospective in t wo 
stages. In order t o repent genuinely a person has t o make an effort to act 
correctly, since, if he does not, the repentance is merely retrospective , 
12. Griggs. 164. pp . 281-282. 
13. Co l eri dge's dislike here , which clearl y i s a representation of 
Thel wall's view of Christian repentance, is in harmony with his 
dislike of excessive 'sensibility '. (See Part II. Chapter 4. 
(8)n. ) . 
14. See Part II . Chapter 5. (15) . 
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but, when he has made this first gesture his new action cancels out the 
error of the past. Thelwall 1 s theory, in contrast, attempts to see these 
two stages as one, both condensed into Coleridge's first stage. For 
Thelwall, it is the prior cancellation of past error that allows the 
individual to make the prospec tive gesture which is, for Coleridge , the sign 
of genuine repentance. Significantly, the area of debate here is the same 
as that regarding Redemption in Col eridge ' s Theological Lectures. The 
prior cancellation of error which Thelwall wants to assume stands in 
opposition to the achieved cancellation which Coleridge requires in exactly 
the same way as the orthodoc doctrine of Christ's prior redemptive death 
stood in opposition to the· individually achieved redemption advoca t ed by 
Coleridge . 15 The main difference between the posi tions of Thelwall and 
Coleridge on this matter is that the latter would argue that in Thelwall' s 
t heory all actions always have an equal chance of being wise or grossly 
false, whereas his own theory should mean t he continual i mprovement of 
action. Coleri dge 's first action alone has t he arbitrariness which he would 
see in all Thelwall's actions. 
Coleridge then proceeds to argue, against Thelwall, that Christiani~y 
is a religion suitable for Democrats. In the manner of the '•rheol ogical 
Lectures' Coleridge shows how the behaviour that is required of a Christian 
is identical with that required of a Democrat, emphasizing, for t he benefit 
of Thelwall, that Christianity teaches 'in the most explicit terms the 
rights of Man' ~16 Coleridge also emphasizes that the Christian is expected 
15. See Part II . Chapter 3. (35)f. 
16. See Griggs . 164. p. 282. I think that this is the only time 
t hat Coleridge uses this expression, whi ch indicates that he has 
unders tood Thelwall's position and is therefore arguing ad hominem. 
- - ,- -
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to be prepared to suffer for what he believes, and he makes this poi nt in 
language whi ch recalls Thelwall's description of his own suffering in 'Poems 
written i n close confinement•. 17 Coleridge obviously pl a ces this emphasis 
deliberatel y, and i t becomes very clear t hat he is trying to refute 
Thelwall's contention that speculation is destructive of energy . Coleridge 
writes: 
Here is truth in theory; and in practice a union of energetic 
action, and more energetic Suffering . For activity amuses; but 
he , who can endure ca lmly, must possess the s eeds of true Greatness. 
For all his animal spirits will of necessity fa i l him; and he has 
only his Mind to trust to. These doubtless are morals for all 
the Lovers of Mankind, who wish to act as well as speculate; and 
t hat you should allow this, and yet not three lines before call 
the same Morals mean, appears to me a gross self-contradiction, 
t t . ~ f B ' t 18 symp oma i~ o i go r y . 
Coleridge's use of suffering here links, as we shall see, with the 
tranquillity experienced by Lamb and enjoined by Coleridge. In enduring 
suffering, physi cal animal spirits may fail, but a mental assurance can 
maintain energy in this situation. It begins to seem as i f Coleridge i s 
17. Coleridge writes ( Griggs . 164 . p . 282): 
"··· yet to hold t he promulgation of Truth to be a Law above Law, 
and in t he performance of this office to defy ' ~ickedness in 
hi gh places, ' and cheerfully to endure i gnominy, & wre tchedness, 
& torments & death , rather than intermit t he performance of i t; 
yet while enduring ignominy, & wretchedness, & torments & death 
to feel nothing but sorrow, and pity, and love for those who 
inflicted them; wishing their Oppressors to be altoge t her such 
as they, 'excepting t hese bonds 1 • " 
In "Stanzas on Happiness" from Poems wri tten in close confinement, 
Thelwall writes: 
"What t ho' Oppression's i ron fang 
Arrest hi m, yet in youthful bloom? 
He owns perhaps one kindred pang ; -
And then - exulting! mee t s his doom" 
18. Griggs. 164. p. 282. 
- . 
-
~
I 
I 
184 
now finding a distinct place for 'suffering' in the process of transformation 
from sin to redemption. It is this sense of a process of human transformation 
whi ch Coleridge now wants to insist upon in contrast with Thelwall's view of 
a series of distinct, independent rational choices of action. 
wri tes : 
Co l eridge 
Christianity regards morality as a process - it finds a man 
vicious and unsusceptible of noble motives; &_gradually leads 
him, at least, desires to lead him, to the height of dis-
interested Virtue t ill in relation & proportion to his faculties 
& powers , he is perfect ' even as our Father in He~ven is perfect'. 
There is no resting- pl ace for Morality. Now I wi ll make one other 
appeal, and have done for ever wi th the subject. There is a 
passage in Scri pture whi ch comprizes the whoroe process, & each 
component part , of Christian Morals. Previously, let me expl ain 
the word Faith by Faith I understand, first, a deduction from 
experiments in favor of the existence of something not experienced, 
and secondly, the motives whi ch attend such a deduction. Now 
motives being selfish are only the beginning & the foundation, 
necessary and of first-rate importance, yet made of vile materials, 
and hidden beneath the s plendid Superstructure. -
' Now giving all diligence, add to your Faith Fortitude, and to 
Fortitude Knowledge, and to Knowledge Purity, and to Purity 
*:eatience, and to Patience **Godliness, and to Godliness Brotherly-
kindness, and to Brotherly-kindness Universal Love 1 • 19 
I n order to define ' Patience' Coleridge adds a note referring 1r helwal l to a 
passage in his A Moral and Political Lecture where he has seen it as a 
characteristic ·of the 'true Democrat ' that he should so combine wisdom with 
ardour that the urge for immediate action would be restrained by a wider 
. . 20 
vision. Coleridge now calls this ability 'Patience' and notes that it 
19. Griggs. 164. p. 282. 
20. See Conciones ad Populum. p . 20. (Patton & Mann. p . 12). 
See also Griggs p . 283n. 
--
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was t his quality that Robespierre lacked. 21 
note in definition of 'Godl iness•: 
Si milarly, Coleridge a dds a 
the belief, t he habitual, & efficient belief, that we 
are always in the presence of our universal Parent. 22 
In illustration of this sense of 'Godliness', Coleridge provides a 
27 
translation of part of Voss's Luise. J However, Coleridge ' s continued 
elaboration of hi s meaning in t he main text of the letter, shows that he 
pushes 'Godlines s ' beyond the definition tha t he has already given, t o the 
point that his meaning becomes almost blasphemous. 24 Col eridge e l abora t es 
in t he following way: 
I hope, wha tever you may think of Godliness, you will like t he 
note on it. I need not te l l you, t hat Godliness is Godlike-
ness, and is paraphrased by Peter - 'that ye may be partakers 
21. The interpretation of the fate of Robespierre (see Griggs. 164. 
p . 283n) is an interesting pointer to divergences of moral theory 
amongst the English radicals of the 1790 1s. Col eri dge believed 
that Robespierre was necessarily corrupted by choosing t he wrong 
means to the right end, whereas, for ins tance , Southey felt tha t 
Robespierre had been corrupted by external conditions. For 
Southey 's summary of thes e divergent views, see his l etter to 
Horace Walpole Bedford , Augus t 22nd, 1794. Curry, K. New 
Letters of Robert Southey . Vol. I. pp . 72-73. 
22. Griggs . p . 283n, 
23 . For earl y German influence in England and on Coleridge, see J . L. 
Haney (B.Di) and (B.Dii). In the same footnote to this letter , 
Coleridge also mentions :Moses Mendelssohn. For Mendelossohn and 
his influence, see M. Simon (B.Di); A. D. Snyder (B .Dii); and 
G. J. Ten Hoor (B.Dii). 
24 . Corr. 9 . PP• 49-50, See Part I I. Chapter 8 . ( 8). 
.. 
of the divine nature'. - i.e. act from a love or order, 
happiness, & not from any self-respecting motive - from the 
excellency, into which you have exalted your nature, not from 
the keenness of mere prudence. 25 
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By ' Godliness' Col eridge here means the process of becoming united with God -
a state of being from which there follow attitudes to mankind and the 
uni verse which are t hose of God. When this 1 Godlike-ness' occurs, love 
flows from the excellence of being, from transformed nature, not from 
rational prudence. In using the word 'prudence', Col eridge deliberately 
addresses himself to Thelwall for whom it was a favourite term for 
t . t 26 res rain- • For Thelwall, t he impetus for human behaviour in the universe 
comes from a rational deduction of utility, whereas, f or Col eridge , 
behaviour must be the natural result of a pr ocess which starts with rational 
deductions and ques tionabl e motives and is then transformed. As we shall 
see, Coleridge's view of possible one-ness wi th God is given substance, 
towards the end of 1796, by orthodox accounts from seventeenth century 
divines concerning the nat ure of contrition, and also by his experience, at 
first and at second hand, of human suff ering. 27 The abstrac t view of the 
need for any action as a precursor of wise union with God which Coleridge 
reached in the Theological Lectures is given s ubstance by the i dea of Faith 
as a gesture and also of suffering as the resul t of an invol untary action. 
1rhe voluntary action of uncertain motivation (Faith) and t he involuntary 
action whi ch is a-moral are both basic and inexplicable, and when Coleridge 
comes to examine t he distinction between voluntary and involuntary t hrough 
25. Griggs. p . 284. 
26. See, fo r instance , Thelwall 1 s i nvocation to t he 'guardian principle 
of PRUDENCE ' in Poli tical Lectures. (No . l). p. 40. 
27. See Part II. Chapter 7. 
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witnessing Lloyd's fits and somnambulism, ~he t wo types of inexplicables 
begin to seem the same. 
Coleridge has now reached the climax of his answer to Thelwall. He 
repeats the quote from 2 Peter, and then concludes his case with the 
following personal remarks: 
Putting Faith out of the Question, (which by the by is not 
mentioned as a virtue but as the leader to them) can you mention 
a virtue which is not here enjoined - & supposing the precepts 
embod(ied) in the practice of any one human being , would not 
Perfection be personified? I write these things not with any 
expectation of making you a Christian - I shou(ld smile) at my own 
folly, if I conceived it even in a friendly day-dream. But (I do 
wish to see a progression in your moral character, & I hope to see 
it - for while you so frequently appeal to the passions of Terror, 
& I ll nature & Disgust, in your popular writings, I must be blind 
not to perceive that you present in your daily & hourly practice 
the feelings of universal Love). 'The ardor of undisciplined 
Benevolence seduces us into malignity' - And while you accustom 
yoQrself to speak so contemptuously of Doctrines you do not accede 
to, and Persons with whom you do not accord, I must doubt whether 
even your brotherly-kindness mi ght not be made more· perfect . That 
is surely fit for a man which his mind after sincere examination 
approves, which animates his conduct, soothes his sorrows, & 
heightens his Pl easures . Every good & earnest Christian declares 
that all this is true of the visions (as you please to style them, 
God knows why) of Christianity Every earnest Christian t here-
fore is on a l evel with slobberers. Do not charge me with 
dwelling on one expression - t hese expressions are always indicative 
of the habit of feeling . You possess fortitude, and purity, & 
a large portion of brotherl y-kindness & universal Love - drink with 
unquenchable thirst of the two latter virtues, an(d) acquire 
patience; and then, Thelwall ! should your Sys tem be true, all 
that can be said, is that (if both our Sys t ems should be found to 
increase our own & our fellow-crea(tures') happiness) Here lie 
or did lie the all of John Thelwall and S. T. Coleridge - they 
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were both humane, & happy, but the former was the more knowing: 
& if my System should prove t rue, we, I doubt not, shall both meet 
in the kingdom of Heav(en), and I with transport in my eye shall 
say - 'I told you so, my dear fellow'. But serious l y , the faulty 
habit of feeling, which I have endeavoured to point out in you, I 
have detected in at least as great degree in my practice & am 
t 1 . t bd' . t 28 s rugg ing o su ue i • -
The potential ground for the elision of faith and involuntary action which is 
a-moral is seen in Coleridge ' s assertion that faith is not itself a virt ue, . 
but rather a neutral, precursive force . In these concluding remarks there 
is also further demonstration that Coleridge attempts to answer Thelwall from 
an understanding of the latter ' s posi tion . Coleridge argues that a 
Christian belief which i s demonstrably efficacious for man must be, in 
Thel wall ' s term, ' fit 1 , 29 and, therefore , since it has a pl ace in a general 
ut ili t arian pattern of happiness it should be energe t i cally cul tivated . 
Agai n, whilst Col eridge is prepared to present himself as a passive person, he 
is not prepared to let Christianity be stigmatised as visionary or in any 
way unconducive to activity . In spite of Col eridge ' s increased emphasis 
upon 'Godliness ' , he is still predominantly interested in .purity of being as 
a means to social we l fare . Coleridge is not at all attempting to dissuade 
Thelwall from activity, but, on the contrary, to prepare him better for it. 
There is distinctly the sense that, having renounced the attempt to fuse 
speculation and political activity in his own person, to unite wisdom and 
political ardo~r, Coleridge now wishes to portray himself as a man of wisdom 
who can act as mentor to a man who is fundamentally a man of action. It is 
this role of mentor that Coleridge gradually a~sumes during 1796 and which, 
perhaps , he came to regard as his most useful and realistic active function. 
28. Griggs. 164. PP• 284-285. 
29. See Part II. 
or adaptation. 
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Chapter 5. (19), for Thelwall's sense of fitness 
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Thi s role emerges most strongl y in rela tion to the t wo younger men of his 
acquaintance, Charles Lamb and Charles Lloyd. 
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CHAPTER VII 
Evi dences of Ins tabili ty: Charles Lamb and Charles Lloyd, 1796-7 
1 The first extant l etter of Lamb to Coleridge is dated May 27th, 1796, 
although it is very likely that they had been in correspondence before that 
time. They certainly had me t since the time that they left Chris t' s 
Hospital, and it was wi t h Lamb that Co l eridge had conversed at the end of 
1794 in London when he had been censur ed by Southey for his reluctance to 
return to Bristol to fulfil his duty with regard to Sara Fricker. 2 It would 
seem f rom Lamb's letter of May 27th that he and Coleridge had been in 
similarly depressed spi r its at that time for much the same reason. Lamb 
recalls that period eighteen months earlier and his enquiry after Coleridge' s 
for tunes since t hat time i ndicates that there had been no contact between the 
t wo men in 1795 . It seems possibl e that t he publ ication of •rhe Watchman 
brought news of Coleridge to Lamb's a ttention again, for he says t hat he is 
' gl ad to hear ' that Co l eri dge i s emp loyed in producing "Evidences of 
Reli gion".3 . Lamb then continues: 
1. 
2. 
Coleridge , I know not what suffering scenes you have gone t hrough 
at Bristol. My life has been somewhat di versified of late. 'l'he 
six weeks that finished last year and began this, your very humble 
servant spent very agreeably in a madhouse, at Hoxton . I am got 
somewhat rational now, and don 't bite any one. But mad I was; 
and many a va~ary my imagination pl ayed wi th me , enough to make a 
volume, if all were t ol d.4 
For sources for Lamb, see (B.C). See also G. Whalley . 
"Coleridge 's Debt to Charles Lamb". (,B.Dii). See also J . S. 
Iseman (B.Di) and B. Lake (B.Di). 
See Part II. Chapter 1. 
3. This is E. V •. Lucas ' s explanation of the revived correspondence. 
4. Corr . 1. p.2. 
-- . ~·~ -- -
- -··--
.... 
191 
Si1.ortly afterwards, Lamb hints at t he cause of his madness. He -writes: 
Coleridge , it may convince you of my regards f or you when I t ell 
you my head ran on you in my madness, as much almost as on 
another person, who I am inclined to think was the more 
i mmediate cause of my temporary frenzy.5 
In other words, Lamb found himself in a real life situation not unlike that 
6 of Coleridge i n 1794 in relation to Mary Evans. 'I'he acuteness of 
Coler i dge ' s fee ling at t hat time had probabl y dimi nished considerably by 
1796, but Lamb continues t o remind Co l eridge of t he occasion of t heir 
meeting . Writing in June , Lamb recalls: 
You came t o town, and I saw you at a time when your heart 
was yet bleeding with recent wounds. Li ke yourself, I was 
sore galled with disappointed hope. You had 
--- "many an holy l ay 
That, mourning, soo t hed the mourner on his way" . 
I had ears of sympathy to drink t hem in, and they yet vibrate 
pleasant on the sense. When I read in your little vol ume, your 
nine teent h effusion, or t he t wenty-eighth or twenty-ninth, or 
wha t you call t he "Si gh", I thi nk I hear you again . I i mage to 
myself the little smoky room at t he Salutation and Cat , where we 
have sat together t hrough t he winter nights, beguiling t he cares 
of life wi t h Poesy . Vfuen you lef t London I fe lt a dismal void 
i n my heart.7-
The strength of Lamb's remembrance of t his i ncident is significant. He 
seems to have been a timid and lonely person, and t he i mpression emerges tha t 
he deliberately cultivated memories so that they might function a s present 
consolations. In the above pa s sage, Lamb uses phrases which suggest that 
5. Corr. 1 . P• 3. 
6. E. V. Lucas argues t hat ' another person' was a girl cal l ed Ann 
Simmons. (See The Letters of Charles Lamb . ed. E. V. Lucas. 
(B.C). Vol.I. p. 4) . 
7. Corr. 3, pp . 17-18. 
. . 
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he consciously re-creates the past so that the image which he conjures once 
again has a real sensational effect. Lamb's imagination is employed in 
bringing past persons into the present, 8 and Coleridge becomes concerned, 
later, t o transfer this creative activity so that God rather than men may 
become vita lly present to Lamb. 
We have seen that Lamb experienced some form of madness himself at the 
end of 1795, and he also seems to have been very interested in t he lunacy of 
William Cowper,9 but his acquaintance with madness was to be more terrible 
than anything he had so far witnessed or experienced, and on this occasion 
he was not to be consoled simply by the poetic diversions provided by a 
friend. In a letter of September 27th, Lamb broke his solemn news to 
Coleridge: 
My dearest Friend, White , or some of my friends, or the public 
papers, by this time may have informed you of the terrible 
calamities that have fallen on our family. I will only give you 
the outlines: - My poor dear, dearest sister, in a fit of insanity, 
has been the death of her own mother. I was at hand only time 
enough to snatch the knife out of her grasp . She is at present 
in a madhouse , from whence I fear she must be moved to an hospital. 
God has preserved to me my senses: I eat, and drink, and sleep, 
and have my judgment, I believe, very sound. My poor father was 
slightly wounded, and I am left to take care of him and my aunt. 
Mr . Norris, of the Bluecoat School, has been very kind to us, and 
we have no other friend; but thank God, I am very calm and 
composed, and able to do the best that remains to do. Write as 
religious a letter as possible, but no mention of what is gone 
8. The memory of his grandmother seems to 'have functioned for Lamb 
in the same sort of way. See his early poem '"rhe Grandame" 
(Complete Works. p . 688) 
9. See Lamb's lines "To the Poet Cowper 11 enclosed in Corr. 7. p. 37 • 
. . 
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and done with. With me "the former things are passed away", 
and I have something more to do than to feel. 
God Almighy have us all i n His keeping! lO 
As we have observed, Coleridge received Lamb's notification of the 
calamity on returning from Moseley wi th Charles Lloyd, and we must now look 
at his companion before we proceed to look at the way in which Coleridge 
responded to Lamb's request for consolation. 
As early as 1794, Ll oyd11 was writing to his younger brother: 
Do not give way to useless speculation. I advise you 
particularly to read Rousseau's "Emilius", in French if you can, 
and pray, out of regard to Charles, who now earnestly entreats, 
pay particular attention to the Savoyard vicar's confessions of 
faith, in the 2nd or 3rd vol. Ge t that book at all events. Do 
not attend to the intricacies of sectarian peculiarities; be a 
good man, retain a pure heart, but oh! avoid alike the Quaker and 
the Libertine, the Methodist and the Atheist. 12 
Lloyd was clearly eager to be active and had little sympathy for the strict 
and uncomprehending attitude adopted by his parents . 13 Lloyd seems t o 
have believed in the energy of Rousseauistic feeling and to have regarded 
the attitudes of his parents as wholly restraining . He is conscious of 
his own instability. 
'complaint': 
Writing to Manning in May 1799, he talks of his 
10. Corr. 8. pp. 39-41, For a newspaper report of the tragedy , see The 
Morning Chronicle for Sept. 26th, 1796, quoted in E. V.Lucas (ed.)~-
The Letters of Charles Lamb. Vol. I. p, 40. 
11. For sources for Lloyd, see (B.C ) . See also C.Lamb. ed. E. V .Lucas. 
Charles Lamb and the Lloyds. (B.C) • . See also :NI .Carr (B.Di). 
12. Charles Lamb and the Lloyds. pp. 13-14, 
13. In a letter of Jan. 
Beaiy. 4 , p. 19). 
his parents for the 
his own . 
6th, 1799, (Lloyd-Manning Le.tters. ed. F .L. 
Lloyd blames the uncomprehending attitude of 
condition of his sister which was similar to 
- I have been more affected with my complaint than ever 
insomuch that for nearly 24 hours together I never have been 
able to sit down lest I should immediately fall into a state 
of insensibility - I have written a novel which I like & 
which I very much wish you to see - l4 
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If we turn to Lloyd's Poems on Various Subjects, published in 1795, we 
can see the manner in which he dramatised his own state of mind. Lloyd's 
identification with the conventional image15 of the melancholy solitary is 
most apparent in the opening lines of his rendering of Petrarch's 'Solo e 
pensoso i piu deserti campi ••• 1 in his tenth sonnet: 
I 
Where Nature frowns uncultur'd and forlorn 
I love alone to wander, sad and slow, 
O'er tracts by friendly footsteps never worn, 
16 With eyes averted desolate I go. 
Although Lloyd praises the tranquil power of nature in his early poems, 
the predominant feeling is one of anger at the moral mediocrity of human 
behaviour towards other humans. Nature is a retreat from anger, but Lloyd 
is much more concerned to explore anger and its causes than to idealise the 
retreat. In a long poem entitled "The Melancholy Man"_, 17 Lloyd details 
the symptoms of the disease. He sees melancholy as the result of thwarted 
idealism, and he assumes that the man who is made melancholy is the most 
14. Lloyd-Ivla.nning Letters. 12. p . 35. 
refers was his second - Isabel. 
The novel to which Lloyd 
15. Belmour, for instance, is described in almost the same way in 
Thelwall's 1rhe Peripatetic Vol. I. pp . 61-62: 
" ··· since, without a t all observing who I was, or even 
lifting his dejected eyes from the earth, he turned with 
sullen insensibility away, and endeavoured to avoid a 
rencounter". 
16. Poems on Various Subjects. Sonnet X. p . 16 . 
17. Ibid. PP • 55-61. 
-· .--
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sensitive and the most worthy. Although Lloyd never makes it explicit 9 
there is here the same feeling that underlies the thinking of John Thelwall. 
Lloyd assumes that only a man of active feeling is truly human. He it is, 
who is able to realise fully God's intention in creating the category of 
man in the universe of beings. The frustration of angelic feeling in such 
a man reduces him to an order of being which is less than human. At the 
beginning of the poem, Lloyd ostentatiously refers to the melancholy man as 
a 'distracted Thing•, 18 and the loss of a fanciful vision leaves the man 
conscious yet as inanimate and unfeeling as a 'stone•. 19 In "The 
Melancholy Man", Lloyd seems to have distanced himself from the madness that 
he describes, and he seems able to retain a sense of the true value of 
humanity in the light of which he can view melancholia with disapproval. 
Yet the depth of depression to which Lloyd could shrink is shown in "Stanzas 
. Ma . II 20 on seeing a niac, where he begins by adopting the attitude that he had 
taken in "The Melancholy Man" - showing disapproval of the descent from 
humanity, but ends by realising that such a descent is the only effective 
way by whi ch to avoid the disappointments which arise from an optimistic 
belief in human possibilities. Whereas Thelwall had been prepared to assume 
the fusion of a rational deduction of desired ends with natural feeling in 
his theories, Lloyd seems to have experienced acutely their disjunction in 
practice. In theory, reason and feeling might inter-act until they are 
united, so that a vision of harmony and happiness might stimulate activity 
which would contribute to the realisation of the vision, but in practice, 
Lloyd says, the rational goal never seems any nearer fulfilment whilst the 
18 . Ibid. stanza 2. 
19. Ibid. stanza 12. 
20. Ibid. pp . 99-101. 
. ~ - . 
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benevolent feelings which it stimulates are consistently spurned. Lloyd 
presents himself as a confirmed sceptic, and it is clear that he required 
intellectual satisfaction before his depression could be removed. 
Coleridge at first took charge of Lloyd in September, 1796, as his 
tutor but it soon became clear that tuition and therapy were to be closely 
mixed. Coleridge was able to see how far consolation might be rational. 
But before we turn to Coleridge's attempts to console both Lamb and Lloyd, 
we must see the full extent of Lloyd's illness whilst he was with Coleridge, 
and also observe that Coleridge himself was not far from a similar state of 
instability and restlessness. 
On November 5th, 1796, Coleridge wrote to Thomas Poole, describing in 
detail the great pain that he was suffering. He concludes his account: 
- I am not mad, most noble Festus! - but in sober sadness I 
have suffered this day more bodily pain than I had before a 
conception of-. My right cheek has certainly been placed 
with admirable exactness under the focus of some invisible 
Burning-Glass, which concentrated all the Rays of a Tartarean 
Sun. My medical attendant decides it to be a_l together 
nervous, and that it originates either in severe application, 
or excessive anxiety. My beloved Poole! in excessive 
anxiety, I believe, it might originate! I have a blister 
under my right-ear, and I take 25 drops of Laudanum every five 
hours: the ease & spirits gained by which have enabled me to 
write to you this flighty , but not exaggerating, account-. 
With _a gloomy wantonness of Imagination I had been coquetting 
with the hideous Possibles of Disappointment - I drank fears, 
like wormwood; yea, made myself drunken with bitterness! for 
my ever-shaping & distrustful mind still mingled gall-drops, 
till out of the cup of Hope I almost uoisoned myse l f with 
D . ,21 espa1r. 
21. Griggs . 151. p . 250. 
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Coleridge feared disappointment in his desire to live in the country near 
Thomas Poole. However, Coleridge ' s attention must have been diverted from 
himself to the condition of Lloyd whi ch, as he says in a letter of November 
14th to Charles Lloyd, senior, was 'unsatisfactory ' . 22 Coleridge was so 
· 23 concerned that he called in Dr. Beddoes. In explaining this choice to 
Lloyd's father, Coleridge shows that he realised that Lloyd required a 
special kind of treatment: 
I chose Dr. Beddoes, because he is a philosopher, and the know-
ledge of mind is essentially requisite in order to the we ll-
treating of your Son 's distemper ..•• Such is Dr . Beddoe 1 s written 
opinion. But he told me, that your Son's cure must be effected by 
Sympathy and Calmness - by being in company with some one before 
whom he thought aloud on all subjects, and by being in situations 
perfectly according with the tenderness of his Disposition .•• 24 
Beddoes' s actual diagnosis is missing , but the account of Lloyd's illness 
which Coleridge gave Thomas Poole the next day is probably derived from it. 
Coleridge writes to Poole: 
22. 
23. 
24 . 
25. 
Charles Lloyd has been very ill, and his distemper (which may 
with equal propriety be named either Somnambulis~, or fri ghtful 
Reverie, or Epilepsy from accumulated feel ings) is alarming. He 
falls all at once into a kind of Night-mair: and all the realities 
round him mingle with, and form a part of, the strange Dream. All 
his voluntary powers are suspended; but he perceives every thing 
& hears every thing , and whatever he perceives & hears he perverts 
into the substance of his delirious Vision. He has had two 
prin~ipal fits, and the last has left a feebleness behind & 
occasional flightiness. Dr. Beddoes has been called in. -
I want consolation, my friend! my Brother! 
rne .25 
Write & consoilie 
Griggs. 154. p. 256. 
For Beddoes, 
Griggs. 
Griggs. 
·- .. 
. 
154. 
155. 
see Part II. Chapter 9. 
P• 256. 
P• 257. 
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During the next few weeks, Coleridge's anxieties increased. He seems to 
have tried unsuccessfully, to rid himself of the responsibility of looking 
after Lloyd, taking the move to the country as his opportunity, and, at the 
same time, he was in a frenzy from his sensing t hat Poole was luke-warm 
about Coleridge's desire to settle at Nether Stowey. The cottage scheme 
had come to symbolise rest for Coleridge and he is distracted by the 
possibility that his hopes may be dashed. However, the uncertainty passed 
and Coleridge moved to Nether Stowey at the end of 1796. After staying for 
a week with Poole whilst a room was prepared for him in Coleridge's cottage, 
Lloyd rejoined Coleridge at the beginning of 1797. He seems to have been 
well at first, but by the middle of March, Coleridge is writing to Cottle: 
I write under great anguish of mind, Charles Lloyd being very 
ill. He has been seized with his fits three times in the space 
of seven days; and just as I was in bed, last night, I was called 
up again - and from 12 o'clock at night to five this morning he 
remained in one continued state of agoniz'd Delirium. What with 
the bodily toil exerted in repressing his frantic struggles, and 
what with the feelihgs of anguish for his agonies, you may suppose 
that I have forced myself from bed with aching temples & a feeble 
frame. I was not in bed till after five. - 26 
.Lloyd was not domesticated with Coleridge for much longer. It is likely 
that he left Nether Stowey in March, probably as soon as he was sufficiently 
recovered to return to Birmingham. 27 The circumstances of the separation 
are obscure, but there was certainly gradual estrangement, which may well 
have been encouraged by Southey with whom Lloyd became more f riendly and 
with whom he was in residence when, in November, 1797, he completed his 
26. Griggs. 181. p. 315. 
27. This is Griggs ' deduction. See Griggs . p . 320n. 
- .. - -. '• 
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novel Edmund Oliver which Coleridge was to see as an attack upon himself 
when it was published in 179s. 28 Lloyd was to deny that he had at all 
been the cause of an estrangement which also caused Lamb to separate himself 
from Coleridge temporarily, but, later, Lamb implied that it was a part of 
Lloyd's illness that his good faith was not entirely to be trusted. 29 We 
must now look at the view of consolation that Coleridge developed and tried 
to put into practice when he was so suddenly confronted with the sufferin§S 
of his two young ac~uaintances at the end of 1796, and when he , too, was at 
times clearly on the brink of similar instability. 
28 . See Griggs. 243, PP • 404-405. 
29. See Griggs. pp . 405-406n. 3. 
. . 
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CHAPTER VIII 
Coleridge and Consolation, 1796-1797 
Coleridge seems to have been inclined to find one explanation for the 
sorts of instability with which he was confronted. Just as, in The 
Watchman, Coleridge had been aware of the dangers of unbridled sensuality 
and of artificial, .'.literary' sensibility, so now he becomes aware of the 
threat to stability of unbridled actual sensibility. 
Colson, dated September 4th, 1796, Coleridge writes: 
In a letter to John 
My Colson! this is a hard World because of Error & Vice - and 
you, I imagine, are placed in a situation to see much misery, & 
alas! a heart to sympathize - perhaps too keenly. Good young 
man, dear ingenious Child of Sensibility! waste not yourself in 
vain efforts - for the sake of the miserable, whom your heart throbs 
to relieve, be prudent with regard to yourself - but above all 
things, I intreat you, my dear Colson! to preserve your faith in 
Christ! 1 
Coleridge now fears excessive sensibility, but his answer is not to retreat 
to a belief in the controlling significance of r eason that Southey had 
earlier placed in opposition to his own extreme expression of feeling, but 
instead to assert the importance of Christian faith. Coleridge's answer 
becomes apparent in a discussion of Charles Lloyd in a letter of September 
24t h, 1796 , to Thomas Poole. Coleridge first describes Lloyd's condition: 
Charles Lloyd wins upon me hourly - his heart is uncommonly 
pure, - his affections delicate, & his benevolence enlivened, 
but not sicklied; by sensibility. 2 
At the end of this letter, Coleridge quotes two sonnets by Lloyd, and he 
1. 
2. 
- --
Griggs. 141. pp . 234-235° 
Griggs. 142. p. 236. 
--~ 
introduces them to Poole in the following manner: 
I shall write on the other side of the Paper two of Charles 
Lloyd's Sonnets which he wrote in one evening at Birmingham -
The latter of them alludes to the conviction of the truth of 
Christianity, which he had received from me, for he had been, 
i f not a Deist, yet quite a Sceptic - 3 
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The contrast between the sonnets which Coleridge quotes and Lloyd's earlier 
poems indicates the way in which Coleridge attempted to fortify Lloyd's 
sensibility. Lloyd's second sonnet ends: 
Omniscient Father! I have been perplex ' d 
With Scoffers link'd! yea, called them my Friends 
That snare the Soul - but Doubt & bl ack Despair 
Are past! Ji.~y heart, no longer sorely vex'd, 
May now unshroud itself - it's aim extends 
To Heaven! - For thou, my best Friend! dwellest there! 4 
It is religious cons olation tha t Lamb requests from Coleridge a few days 
later, and Coleridge provides it in his important letter which Lamb always 
treasured. Writing concerning Mary'd deed, Coleridge begins his letter to 
Charles Lamb: 
Your letter, my f riend, struck rue with a mi ght y horror. I t 
rushed upon me and stupefied my feelings. You bid me wri te 
you a religious l e tter. I am not a man who would attempt to 
insult t he greatness of your anguish by any other consolation. 
Heaven knows that in the easiest fortunes there is much dis-
satisfaction and weariness of spirit; much that calls for the 
exercise of patience a nd resignation; but in storms like these, 
t hat shake the dwelling and make the heart tremble , there is no 
middl e way betweeh despai r and the yielding up of t he whole spirit 
under the guidance of faith. And sw::e l y it is a mat ter of j oy 
tha t your faith in Jesus ha s been preserved; the Comforter that 
3. See Griggs . pp . 237-238, 
4, See Griggs. p . 238, Notice the emphasis on the pa ternality of God. This is a crude form of Coleridge's concentration upon Divine Being . 
... 
----
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should relieve you is not far from you. But as you are a 
Christian, in the name of that Saviour, who was filled with 
bitterness and made drunk.en with wormwood, I conjure you to have 
recourse in frequent prayer to 'his God and your God;' the God 
of mercies, and father of all comfort. Your poor father is, I 
hope, almost sensel ess of the calamity; the unconscious 
instrument of Divine Providence knows it not, and your mother is 
in heaven. It is sweet to be roused from a frightful dream by 
the song of birds and the gladsome rays of the morning. Ah, how 
infinitely more sweet to be awakened from the blackness and 
amazement of a sudden horror by the glories of God manifest and 
the hallelujahs of angels.5 
Coleridge then continues: 
As to what regards yourself, I approve altogether of your 
abandoning what you justly call vanities. I look upon you as 
a man called by sorrow and anguish and a strange deso l ation of 
hopes into quietness, and a soul set apart and made peculiar to 
God! We cannot arrive at any portion of heavenly bliss without 
in some measure imitating Christ; and they arrive at the largest 
inheritance who imitate the most difficult parts of his character, 
and, bowed down and crushed underfoot, cry in fulness of faith, 
'Father, t hy. will be done 1 • 6 
Coleridge concludes his letter with this injunction: 
I charge you, my dearest friend, not to dare to encourage gloom 
or despair. You are a temporary sharer in human miseries that 
you may be an eternal partaker of the Divine nature. 7 
In trying to suggest reflections on both Mary's deed and Charles 1s 
suffering, Coleridge makes two different points. He first claims that 
Mary's action unconsciously fulfills a pre-existent providential scheme, and 
he, secondly, wishes to claim that human suffering is beneficial as part of 
5. 
6. 
7. 
Griggs. 143 . pp . 238-239. 
Griggs. 143. p. 239. 
Griggs. 143. P• 239 . 
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a progression towards union with God. It is this union of human being and 
Divine being for which Coleridge is now striving, and, in October, 1796, he 
is planning to retreat from cities and from involvement in political affairs 
so as to provide for himself the sort of rural environment that makes 
contemplation possible. Coleridge, in other words, is now attempting to 
put into practice the self-conditioning which, in the Theological Lectures, 
he had come to see as being the function, mentally, of the imagi nation. In 
letters written at the end of October, Lamb is uncertain of both Coleridge's 
aim and method of proceeding . On October 24th, he writes to Coleridge: 
I read your letters with my sister, and they give us both 
abundance of delight. Especially they please us when you talk 
in a religious strain: not but we are of fended occasionally with 
a certain freedom of expression, a certain air of mysticism, more 
consonant to the conceits of pagan philosophy than consistent with 
the humility of genuine piety. To instance now, in your last 
letter you say, "It is by the press that God hath given finite 
spirits, both evil and good, (I suppose you mean simply bad men 
and good men), a portion as it were of His Omnipresence!" Now, 
high as the human intellect comparatively will soar, and wide as 
its influence, malign or salutary, can extend, is there not, 
Coleridge, a distance between the Divine Mind and it, which makes 
such language blasphemy? Again, in your first fine consolatory 
epistle, you say, "you are a temporary sharer in human misery, 
that you may be an eternal partaker of the Divine Nature." What 
more than this do those men say who are for exalting the man Christ 
Jesus into the second person of an unknown Trinity? - men whom you 
or I scruple not to call idolaters. Man, full of imperfections 
at best, and subject to wants which momentarily remind him of 
dependence; man, a weak and i gnorant , being , "servile" from his 
birth "to all the skiey influences", with eyes sometimes open to 
discern the right path, but a head generally too dizzy to pursue 
it; man, in the pride of speculation, forgetting his na ture, and 
hailing in himself the future God, must make the angels laugh. 
Be not angry wi t h me Coleridge: I wish not t o cavil; I know I 
- -----,-_.;..-· 
~
cannot instruct you; I only wish to remind you of that 
htunility which best becometh the Christian character. God, 
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in the New Testament, (our best guide), is represented to us in 
the kind, condescending, amiable, familiar light of a parent; 
and in my poor mind 1 tis best for us so to consider of him, as 
our heavenly father, and our best friend, without indulging too 
bold conceptions of his nature. 8 
Lamb's reactions to Cole~idge's speculation clearly indicate that the 
position which was latent in the Theological Lectures - that man may become 
as God, was now being explicitly argued by Coleridge. Equally clearly , 
Coleridge was aware of the possible implications of identity with God. If 
union with God may be achieved, Coleridge is aware that man may possess the 
distinctive attributes of God, including His Omnipresence and, perhaps, His 
Omniscience. The implications of the goal are clear and important, but it 
is consideration of suffering and consolation t hat seems to have provided 
Coleridge with a theoretical framework within which he could see that the 
goal might be achieved. We need now to look carefully at the nature of 
Coleridge's thinking at this period. 
In a letter to Thomas Poole, dated November 1st, 1796, Coleridge 
casually mentions the areas of his intellectual interest at the time. He 
writes: 
I do not particularly admire Rosseau - Bishop Taylor, Ol d 
Baxter, David Hartley & the Bi shop of Cloyne a re my men.9 
In t he same letter, again casually, Coleridge discusses the ideas of 
Fenelon: 
Al most all the f ollowers of Fenelon believe that men are 
degraded Intelligences, who had once all existed, at one 
8. Corr. 11. pp . 49-50. 
9. Gri ggs. 146. p . 245 . 
time & together, in a paradisiacal or perhaps heavenly 
state. 10 
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In a footnote to the first list of authors, E. L. Griggs comments that 
Jeremy Taylor, Richard Baxter, David Hartley, and George Berkeley, 'form 
11 indeed a heterogeneous group', but sense can be made of this grouping as 
well as of the contemporaneous knowledge of Fenelon and of Coleridge's 
reading , at the time, of the Philosophical Principles of Chevalier Ramsay, 
of the Works of John Woolman, and of Mrs. Inchbald's novel Nature and Art. 12 
There are two main emphases that I want to bring out. Firstly, 
Coleridge now states that he dis l ikes Rousseau. There is, in other words, 
a specific disenchantment with excessive feeling and sensibility, but this 
does not involve a retreat to reason. On the contrary, Coleridge wishes 
to argue for the possible identity between pure human being and the being of 
10. Griggs. 146. p. 246. 
11. Gri ggs. p. 245n. 
12. Coleridge borrowed Vol. II of George Berkeley's Works (1784 in 2 
vols.) from the Bristol Library from March 10-28, 17-96. For 
Berkeley, see (B.C); also see H. M. Bracken (B. Di); A. A. Luce 
(B,Di); R. A. Watson (B.Di). 
I follow Griggs in assuming that 'old Baxter' is Richard Baxter, 
although Coleridge's reading at this time might suggest Andrew 
Baxter. K. Coburn refers to Coleridge's remembrance of reading 
Andrew Baxter in the Summer of 1795 (Note-books. 174n, 20). The 
advantage of the Richard Baxter interpretation is that it seems to 
fit the theme of the seventeenth century divines, but a case could 
be made for arguing that Coleridge was pursuing an interest in 
dreams in Andrew Baxter, Erasmus Darwin, and also in parts of 
Ramsay •s ·Philosophical Principles. 
For David Ha r tley , see Part I I, Chapter 1. (9)n. 
For Jeremy Taylor, see (B.C). See also H. R.Williamson (B . Di); 
and T.Wood (B.Di). I discuss those works which Coleridge later 
adorned with marginal notes. Professor-Whalley advises me that 
there is no evidence to suggest that the marginalia belong to the 
1796 period, and hence I treat Coleridge's comments with caution. 
However, I think it probable that Coleridge was not simply acquainted 
with the one set of sermons of Taylor which he borrowed from the Bristol 
Library from Sept. 22nd to Oct. 12th, 1796. 
For John Woolman, see (B.C), and also J.P.Whitney (B .Di). 
For Mrs. Inchbald, see (B.C). 
For Ramsay, see (B.C), and also G.D.Henderson (B.Di). Coleridge 
was borrowing Ramsay's Philosophical Principles from the Bristol 
Library from 2-16, Sept. and from 12-26, Oct., 1796. 
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God. Coleridge now begins to become interested in passivity and 
receptivity as a means of consolation, but, more significantly, and this is 
my second point, I want to suggest t hat , following up his sense of the inter-
relation of wisdom and ardour, Coleridge wants to indicate that the process 
of reconcilement with pure being enforced by suffering is the means to 
wisdom and knowledge. 
In a footnote to a letter written to Coleridge on December 10th, 1796, 
Lamb comments: 
I will get Nature and Art: have not seen it yet, nor any 
of Jeremy Taylor's works. 13 
Obviously Coleridge had recommended Mrs. Inchbald's novel to Lamb at the 
same time as he also recom.uended Jeremy Taylor's works. Mrs. Inchbald 
presents happiness as t he inevitable corollary of humble, natural simplicity, 
and 'remorse' of pretension. In the novel a brother who chooses to pay 
attention to I persons I ra t i1er than I things I is rewarded, l4 whereas the 
other brother's choice leads him to suffer irredeemable remorse. As always, 
Coleridge is · concerned with transformation and is not content with a 
conclusive moralistic attitude. For Coleridge, 'remorse' must somehow be 
redeemable, whilst, at the same time, he sees it as the necessary pre-
requisite for wisdom and knowledge . Mrs. Inchbald's novel presents two 
'sentimental' t hemes and projects a wholly secular morality . The possibility 
of redemption or t :ransformation, however, raises again a problem of 
Christian theology which Coleridge had discussed in his Theo logica l 
Lectures. I su,:~;gest that interest in the theme of 'remorse' must have 
complemented Coleridge's interest in the works of the English casuistical 
13. Corr. 17. p. 68. 
14, See Mrs . Inchbald. Nature and Art . Vol. II. p . 128 . (B. C). 
207 
divines of the second half of the seventeenth century, notably the two 
authors, Jeremy Taylor and Richard Baxter, whom he mentioned in his letter 
to Thomas Poole. In the context of Coleridge's interest in Woolman, the 
title of Taylor's most known work, 'Holy Living' would have been sufficient 
attraction for Coleridge, but, elsewhere, the Bishop of Down and Connor 
discusses problems which certainly engaged ~oleridge at a later date, for 
his marginal comments are extant. In a manuscript comment facing the title 
page of Jeremy Taylor's The Worthy Communicant, Coleridge makes the crucial 
theological point quite explicit: 
In general, the more I reflect on this work, the stronger is my 
conjecture, that the doctrine of Work, i.e. Roman or Pagan 
Christianism is at the foundation. The demands seem every 
while to lie between two intolerabl e Theses: either that God's 
Justice is merciless and disproportionate to the capabilities of 
our Nature - or that the Cross of Christ is of no effect. For 
if in order to use any of the means of Grace/ since if not this 
one, why any? Prayer, for instance? the man must be fit to die, 
and have already conquered Sin, in a very subordinate degree can 
it be deemed a means of Grace in any other sense than as Angels 
might need it - for they too go on from Grace to Grace. 
Surely, true Sanctification is an effect, and a part of the 
Redemption, not a cause. Redemption is a free Gift - not Wages, 
no, nor even Reward. 15 
Coleridge's conclusion here may not be the view to which he would have 
subscribed in 1796, but his summary of the dilemma is surely valid for the 
early period. · It is worth noting the language in which Taylor describes 
the manner in which a man should approach Holy Communion: 
Now let us by the aids of memory and fancy consider the children 
of Israel in the Wi lderness, in a barren and dry Land where no 
water was, march in dust and fire, not wet with the dew of Heaven, 
15. J. Taylor. The Worthy Communicant. 
title page. 
MS note opposite the 
wholly without moisture, save only what dropt from their own 
brows; the air was fire, and the vermin was fire; the flying 
serpents were of the same cognation with the firmament, their 
sting was a flame, their venome was a feaver, and the feavor a 
calenture, and their whole state of abode and travel was a 
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little image of the day of Judgment, when the Elements shall melt 
with fervent heat; These men like Salamanders walking in fire, 
dry with heat, and scorched with thirst, and made yet more thirsty 
by calling upon God for water; suppose, I say, these thirsty soul s 
hearing Moses to promise that he wi ll smite the rock, and that a 
River should break forth from thence, observe how presentl y they 
ran to the foot of the springing stone, thrusting forth their heads 
and tongues to meet the water , impatient of delay, crying out that 
the water did not move like light , all a t once: and then suppose 
the pleasure of their drink, the unsatiableness of their desire, 
the immensity of their appetite; they took in as much as they could, 
and they desired much more . This was their Sacrament of the same 
Mys tery, and this was their manner of receiving it; and this 
teaches us to come to the same Christ with the same desires. For 
if that water was a type of our Sacrament, or a Sacrament of the 
same secret blessing, then that thirst is a signification of our 
duty, that we come to receive Christ in all the ways of reception 
with longing appetites, preferring him before all the interests of 
the world, as birds do corn above jewels, or hungry men meat before 
1 t . 16 ong ora ions . 
'l'he rigour of Taylor I s position terrifies Coleridge. Taylor makes 
explicit a distinction between contrition and attrition: 
As soon as we are smitten with the terrours of an afflicted 
conscience, and apprehend the evil of sin, or fear the Divine 
judgments, and upon that account resolve to leave our sin, we are 
not instantly worthy and fit to communicate. Attrition is not 
a competent disposition to the blessed Sacrament; because 
although it may be the gate and entrance of a spiritual life, 
16. J . Taylor. The Worthy Communicant. PP• 96-97. 
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yet it can be no more, unless t here be love in it; unless 
it be contrition, it is not a state of favour and grace, but 
a disposition to it. 17 
Again, Coleridge retorts forcefully in his marginal comment which, once 
more, is fragmentary: 
But this is dangerous doctrine unless it be added, that there 
Attrition with a sense of its imperfection and can earnestly 
desire to raise it into contrition, and t hat into a Love of God, 
is itself a beginning & a mode of Contrition. - 18 
'l'he i mportant point here is t hat Coleridge wants to entertain the 
possibi lity that redemption may be progressively achieved, that attrition 
may become contrition, and t hat remorse may be transformed so that it may 
become the origin of wise knowledge of the being of God. I am suggesting , 
t herefore, that Coleridge was led by contemporary secular and essentially 
Rousseauistic thinking about 'remorse', and by the Quaker fusion of fee ling 
d 1 . . .. t 19 an re i gious passivi y, to re-think the i ssues concerning Redemption 
that had been raised in the Theological Lectures. It became possible tha t 
'remorse', with all its associations derived from a 'sentimental' context, 
might be a purifying suffering which was a means to redemption and union 
wi th God. Hence, Coleridge ' s emphasis upon consolation at this time caused 
him, for the benefit of others, to want to justify suffering as part of a 
process culminating in union with God, at the same time as his reading of 
Thelwall's The Peripatetic would have made him aware of a possible natural 
17. J. Taylor. The Worthy Communicant. p . 294. 
18 . TuIS note for The Worthy Communicant. p . 294. 
19. For related passages in J.Woolman (B. C) , see pages 5-6; 11; 37. 
See also t he passage from Woolman which Lamb quotes i n Corr. 19. 
p . 74, See als o W. Penn (B. C) . 
- ·----=-- - =-- ·. . 
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process of t herapy independent of any rational schema. Towards the end of 
1796, Coleridge was therefore able to consider the transformation of remorse 
both in instinctual and in intellectual terms. The distinctive feature of 
t he intellectual comprehension was tha t it did not simply impl y an 
integration of personality as an end, but a l so implied that the integration 
necessarily involved a heightened knowledge . Coleridge's reading of the 
Chevalier Ramsay may have pushed his thinking in this latter direction. In 
the writing of Ramsay, quietism is fused, not with seventeenth century 
theology but with eighteenth century empirical philosophy. In this context, 
'remorse' may not be the means to 'redemption' so much as the means to 
knowledge of 'things-in-themselves •. 20 
Like the quietists, 21 Ramsay recommends total passivity, but the 
following passage indicates that this emphasis is here linked to an 
epistemological terminology: 
Hence in all states, fal len and unfallen, a ll finite intelligences 
in or der to enjoy t he supreme fe licity and perfection of their 
na tures, that is, the supernatural knowledge and love of the 
absolute Infinite, must expose their faculties to his immediate 
influence, by a free conversion of all t heir powers to the eternal 
source of life, light and love. They must remain freely passive 
before him to receive his divine irradia tions and motions. They 
have all but one essential, primitive and original law, in order to 
be continued in, or restored to their supreme happiness; which is 
to stand still before the BEING OF BEINGS, that he may flow into 
them, i~radia te t heir understandings, animate their wi lls, and 
22 become their only Reason and their only Law. 
20. Perhaps this phrase has an illicit, but, nevertheless, deliberate 
Kantian ring . 
21. See for instance the prayer of Mme. Guyon cited in. Pierre Janet (B.Di). pp , 95-96 . 
2 2 • Ramsay . ( B • C) . Vol. I. P • 307, 
The free passivity about which Ramsay writes is achieved in a form of 
prayer which does not require linguistic expression: 
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True spiritual prayer does not consist in the multiplicity of 
words, nor in fine speculations, nor in enthusiastic raptures, 
nor in soft, tender, and deli.cious sensations: but in a constant 
tendency of the soul to its first principle. It is thus that it 
recalls its wandering thoughts and affections, that it reunites 
its different powers , that it retires into its spiritual nature, 
to adore in silence him that surpasses all expression and all 
conception. It is thus that it exposes its degraded, weakened, 
and sick faculties to his luminous and purifying influences, 
which elevate, fortify, and cure them. This is t hat adoration 
in spirit and in truth of which the gospel speaks. 23 
The knowledge that is attained in this manner cannot be linguistically 
defined, but neither is it delusive: 
True, supernatural, living faith is not a speculative conviction 
of any system of truths how sublime soever; a l l these the devils 
be lieve and know better than any mortal; but it is as the apostle 
defines it 'the evidence of things not seen'. It is a divine 
light in the sot1l tha t opens its intellectual view not to see 
visions, revelations, and fanatical chimeras; but-to discover the 
laws of eternal order; the all of God, the nothingness of the 
creature, and the immutable relations betwixt both. It is a vital, 
quick, spiritual sensation by whi ch the soul sees God in all, and 
all in God, not in the Ivialebranchian sense, but by receiving all 
from him as our source, and in referring all to him as our end. In 
fine it is a constant submission, evacuation, and sacrifice of all 
our finite, imperfect, feeble activities and thoughts to the dictates 
and orders of his eternal wi ll, whe ther manifested by inspired 
revelation, enlightened reason, or the dispensations of his 
providence , and a ft1ll persuasion that they are conformable to 
infinite wisdom, goodness, and justice, however contradictory they 
maJ appear to our bounded reason, and t o our natural self-love. 24 
23. Ramsay. (B.C). Vol. I. p. 401. 
24. Ramsay. (B. C). Vol. I. pp. 403-404. 
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Ramsay's work assumes that the spiritual influence to which he refers is of 
a physical nature. Ramsay identifies his s piritual influence with Sir 
I saac Newton' s 'ethereal fluid'. 25 Here Ramsay resolutely parts company 
from Bishop Berkeley , but it is not all easy to be sure where Coleridge mi ght 
26 
stand. Ramsay writes of Berkeley: 
The Doctor does not pretend t ha t it is finite spirits that 
excite in us all these perceptions, but God alone: we have 
already shown that the infinite mind cannot be the immediate 
cause of these ideas, sensations and modifications ; and there-
fore t here must be a t hi rd substance betwixt God and human souls, 
t hat really acts upon us to produce in us different sensations , 
according to our different organs, states and situations. 27 
It is t his possibility of a physical, non-linguistic relationshi p between 
beings which underlies Thelwall's sense of the possibility of natural therapy 
t ha t stood, for Coleridge, in opposition to the linguistically formulated 
Christian scheme of redemption. Ramsay offers the possibility t hat the 
physical relationships within the universe can also be subsumed under a broad 
systematic explanation that i s integrated with a Dei stic world-view. For 
Ramsay , Ber keley ' s position is too mentalistic, but I suggest t hat Coleridge 
retained his fundamental allegiance to Berkeley 's phi losophical position 
since it made logically possible the i dentification of the Divine mind with 
the human mind. However, from a posi tion of Berkeleyan union with God, 
25. See I. Newton (B.C). PP• 349-353 , 
26. The issue at stake here is great. I wish to claim t ha t Coleridge's 
monistic position was still fundamentally materialist and not 
irnmaterialist, and that the spirit world of The Ancient Mariner is 
at first placed as a human ' fiction' even if Col eridge came to 
believe in the physical exis.tence of spiritual forces by the time 
of writing his ' gloss' for the poem. 
27, Ramsay. (B . C) . Vol. I. p . 241, 
·-· -- - -
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Coleridge is now able to survey two sys tems of explanation concerning t he 
relation between man and God: the first is a Christian scheme of 
redemption that ha s been imposed on observation of the caus es and effects 
of 'remorse', and the second is a scheme which contains material of an a-
moral description of the physi cal world that has been grafted to a pre-
existent conception of universal harmony and order. I want to suggest that 
these t wo different world-views are subtly inter-mingled in 'l'he Ancient 
Mariner, Coleridge 's experience of the suffering of his friends caused him 
to formula te theo r ies which mi ght help them to recover mental stability, 
but I want finally to indicate that, particularly through contact with Dr . 
Beddoes, Coleridge's curiosity was aroused concerning the medical 
explanations for the states whi ch he hoped to appease. These expla nations 
also contribute to the complexity of Col eri dge 's whole t hinking . 
CHAPTER IX 
1 Beddoes and Medicine, 1796-1797 
On December 31st, 1796, Coleridge wrote to John Thelwall: 
The passage in your letter respecting your mother affected me 
greatly . Well, true or false, Heaven is a less gloomy idea 
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than Annihilation! Dr . Beddoes, & Dr. Darwin2 think that Life 
is utterly inexplicable, wri ting as Materialists You, I under-
stand, have adopted the idea that it is the result of organized 
matter acted on by external Stimuli. As likely as any other 
system; but you assume the thing to be proved - the 'capability 
of being stimulated into sensation' as a property of organized 
matter - now 'the Capab. 1 &c is _!!!Y definition of animal Life 
Monro3 believes in a plastic immaterial Nature - all-pervading 
And what if al l of animated Nature 
Be but organic harps diversely fram'd 
That tremble into thought as o'er them sweeps 
Plastic & vast &c -
(by t he bye - that is my favorite of .!!!Y poems - do you like it?) 
Hunter4 that the Blood is the Life - which i s saying nothing at 
all - fo~ if t he blood were Life, it could never be otherwise than 
Life - and to say, it is alive, is saying nothing - ·& Ferriar5 
1. For Beddoes , see (B.C). 
2. 
3. 
For Erasmus Darwin, see (B.C). 
Darwin . (B .Di). 
Also see D. King-Hole. 
Alexander Monro, secundus . 
Vol. 38. pp . 180-181. 
(1733-1817 ) - 'anatomist'. 
Erasmus 
D. N.B. 
4. John Hunter ( 1728-1793) - 'anatomist and surgeon'. 
PP• 287-293. 
D.N.B. Vol. 28 . 
5. John Ferriar (17 61-1815) - 'physician'. D.N. B. Vol. 18 . pp. 389-390. 
See a l so (B.C) and F. liI .Brocl bank (B.Di). 
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believes in a Soul, like an orthodox Churchman So much for 
Physicians & Surgeons Now as to the Metaphysicians, Plato says, 
it is Harmony - he might as wel l have said, a fiddle stick's end -
but I love Plato - his dear gorgeous Nonsense! And I, tbo' last 
no t least, I do not know what to think about it - on the whole, I 
have rather made up my mi nd that I am a mere apparition a 
naked Spirit! And t hat Life is I myself I! which is a mighty 
clear account of it . Now I have written all this not to expose my 
ignorance (that is an accidental effect, not the final cause) but 
to shew you, that I want to see your Essay on Animal Vitality6 
of which Bowles, 7 t he Surgeon, spoke in high Terms Yet he 
believes in a body & a soul. 8 
Interest in the origin and nature of 'Life' had developed i n the Eighteenth 
Century as the Newtonian influence on biology, mos t evidenced in the work, in 
England, of Stephen Hal es,9 had di minished . Equally, the work of two Swiss 
6. No longer extant. There is, equally, no certainty that Coleridge 
ever saw this essay. 
7. Bowles was a surgeon at Bristol. 
8 . Gri ggs. 170. P• 294. 
The evi dence of this letter suggests that Coleridge was aware of 
materialist arguments and of beliefs in 'plastic immaterial Nature' 
as mentioned not simpl y by Monro but possibly by Cudworth. The 
significant point is that he does not express commitment to either 
the materialist or the immaterialist position. Coleridge ' s 
attitude to the lines from 'This Lime-1rree Bower my Prison' would 
seem to be that they contain fine poetic truths but not necessarily 
philosophic truths. Since Coleridge presents his own philosophical 
position .later in the letter, it seems reasonabl e to suppose that 
his own lines mi ght contain 'gorgeous nonsense' a s much as Plato's 
opi nions. I discuss Co l eridge's growing separation of poetry from 
philosophy in Part II . Chapter 10. Two other phrases of this 
letter deserve comment. Firstly, Coleridge's portrayal of himself 
as an 'appari tion' - that he is himself an exposed vital force, a pure 
being, a 'naked Spirit' implies a separation of primary and secondary 
qualities of being . Secondl y , the phrase 'Life is I myself I' implies 
that Life is individual self-assertion and is in a different category 
from 'scientific' analysis of a materialist or an imrna t eria list being. 
In Kantian terms, Coleridge is referring to a Transcendental Self, and 
the position towards which he i s groping mi ght now be described as 
'existentialist•. (See K.Jaspers. (B .Di) - particul arly on Descartes). 
9. For Hales, see (B.C). 
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10 11 biologists, Abraham Trembley and Charles Bonnet, on generation had 
broken free, in the middle of the century, from the stagnant, classificatory 
attitude of Linnaeus12 and his followers. 
Wnereas investigators in the first half of the century had been 
prepared to assume the existence of 'vital spirits' or ' animal s pirits', it 
was this very 'vitality' that scientists in the second half of the century 
were anxious to examine . An illustration of the Brunonian13 doctrine of 
'life' given by a Ivlr . Christie in William Cullen Brown ' s preface to the 
'forks of Dr. John Brown', published in 1804, vividly conveys the way in 
which Brown combined the t wo main explanations of the problem which were 
current during Coleridge's youth and so achieved a high degree of 
popularity as well as of notoriety . Mr, Chri stie writes: 
Suppose a fire to be made in a grate, filled with a kind of fuel 
not very combustible, and which coul d only be kept burning by 
means of a machine containing several tubes, placed before it, and 
constantly pouring streams of air into it. Suppose also a pipe 
to be placed in the back of the chimney, through which a constant 
supply of fresh fuel was gradually let down into the grate, to 
repair the waste occasioned by the flame, kept up by the air 
machi ne. 
The grate will represent the human frame; t he fuel in it, the 
matter of life, the excitability of Dr. Brown, and the sensorial 
power of Dr. Darwin; t he tube behind supplying fresh fuel, will 
denote t he power of a ll living systems, constantly to regenerate 
10. For Trembley , see J. R. Baker (B.Di). 
11. Charles Bonnet (1720-1793) - 'philosophe et 
Biographie Universelle, and also J.R,Baker. 
Geneva, (B.Di) , , 
na turaliste'. See 
Abraham Trembley of 
12. For Linnaeus, see B.D.Jackson, (B.Di). 
13. John Brown 
medicine' • 
J. D. Comrie 
--- - ~ ~ 
~ 
(1735-1788) - ' f ounder of t he Brunonian sys tem of 
D~N.B. Vol. 7, PP • 14-17, See (B. C) . See also 
(B.Di). p . 205, and A. Hayter (B .Di), pp . 26-27, 
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or reproduce excitability; while the air machine, of several 
tubes, denotes the various stimuli applied to the excitability 
of the body; and the f lame drawn forth in consequence of that 
application represents life, the product of the exciting powers 
acting upon the excitability. 
As Dr. BROWN has defined life to be a forced state, it is fitly 
represented by a flame, forcibly drawn forth from fuel little 
disposed t o combustion, by the constant application of streams of 
air poured into it from the different tubes of a machine. If some 
of these t ubes are supposed to convey pure, or dephlogisticated air, 
they will denote the highest class of exciting powers, opium, musk, 
camphor, spirits, wine, tobacco, Etc . the diffusible stimuli of 
Dr . Br own, which bring forth for a time a greater quantity of life 
t han usual, as the blowing in of pure air into a fire will 
temporari l y draw forth an uncommon quantity of flame. If others 
of the tubes be supposed to convey common or atmospheric air, they 
will represent t he ordinary exciting powers, or s timuli, applied to 
the human frame, such as heat, light, air, food, drink , Etc. while 
such as convey impure or inflammable air, may be used to deno te 
wha t have formerly been termed sedative powers, such as poisons , 
contagious miasmata, foul air, Etc . 14 
For Brown, this simple structure was all-inclusive since the 'remote' cause 
of every disease is reduced to one of only four possibi lities: either 
'excitability' or the 'exciting ' force is too strong or too weak . For 
Brown's Edinburgh opponent, William Cullen, 15 this structure was so gross l y 
over-simplified , the causality was s o 'remote', t hat Brown's theory was of 
no use at all in assigning the ' proximate' cause of any specific disease. 
Nevertheless, ' Brunonianism' had metaphysical attractions, f or it attempted 
to join t he emphases which had previously prevailed in separation. 
14 . J. Brown. (ed. W. C. Br owrt ) . Works . (B.C) . pp . ccxxi ii-ccxxv. 
15 . William Cullen (1710-1790) - ' physician'. D. N.B. Vol. 13. 
pp . 279-282. See also (B.C); and J. D.Comrie (B.Di ) . p. 202 • 
. - ~·- -
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t he first hal f of the century mechanistic t heories had seen t he life of an 
individual as a microcosm of an universe i n which God was a First Cause and 
was also, perhaps, immanent. In other words, t he body was thought to be a 
mechanism which was somehow initially set in motion and which was also, 
perhaps, dependent on the continued activity of a soul. The tendency of 
mechanis tic t heor y was to strip t he •soul' of religiously spiritual 
connotations, and ye t a secularised •soul' was still found to be necessary 
either to explain the way in which the mechanism began to perform or to 
explain , as well, its conti nued performance. In seeking a positivist 
physiological explanation of 'life', t wo emphases emerged. Fi r st of all, 
a developing under standing of combustion and respi ra tion stimulated an 
interest in t he inter-relation between the various constituents of the 
atmosphere as they were isola ted and the functioning of the huma n body as it 
was gradually viewed in a bio-chem.ical rather than a mechanical way. 
Secondly, mechanistic t heories concerning the relation between the body and 
the 'soul', however understood , had assumed that there was a significant 
relationship between volition and t he functioning of the body . Even when 
the 'soul' became transformed into •excitability• or 'irritability', it was 
· assumed t ha t all physical sensations were interpreted by the mind and that 
physical responses to sensation were not immediate, and t hat, equally , all 
human behaviour was, in some way , 'willed'. It gradually became clear, 
however, th~t some mus cul ar activi t y was independent of the mind, and 
bio logis ts proved experimentally that movement and, possibly, 'life ' 
persisted and could be sustained or re-generated by electric shock . 
The increasing understanding of electricity and •animal magnetism • l ed 
the way to a bio-physi cal conception of the relation. between man and the 
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b 1 · f th r· t h · 16 universe as opposed to the io-chemica conception o e _irs emp asis. 
Two important points emerge from the two trends that I have mentioned. 
In the period with which I am dealing, and reaching a climax of excitement 
in the 1790 1 s, natural science seemed to be empirically under-scoring the 
naturalistic view of man's pl ace ·in the universe which was being projected 
in the 'sentimental' literature. It was offering a description of how 
things physically are which corresponded to the description offered by, 
amongst others, Thelwall and Coleridge of how things morally ought to be, 
but, morally, were not. Both 'scientific' descriptions emphasized, in their 
different ways, firstly, that man is a natural part of a natural universe, 
and, secondly, that man's participation is unconscious. 17 
Some of these points can be illustrated with reference to one particular 
disease about which Beddoes18 wrote, and references to which Coleridge would 
16. For the bio-physical relationship in various forms, see Albrecht 
von Haller (B.C). For a general discussion see F. Fearing (B.Di) 
and also L.S.King (B.Di). For Mesmerism, see D.H.Walmsley. (B.Di). 
For the specific connections of these movements with Coleridge, see 
Coleridge's reference to animal magnetism in his Reply to a l etter 
to Edward Long Fox, and also see an article by Lane Cooper in Late 
Harvest . (B.Di). 
17. For a discussion of the 'unconscious ' before Freud, see L.L .Vfuyte. (B.Di) . 
18. Beddoes was essentially a bio-chemist, or an iatro-chemist, and his 
interests can be seen most clearly in his translations of Spallanzani 
and Bergmann and his popularisation of the work of Mayow. 
Interestingly, Priestley made breakthroughs in the chemistry of 
combustion and respiration, but he does not seem to have seen these as 
a pot~ntial base for a monist world-view, partly, I suspect, because 
his assumptions were still mechanist rather than vitalist. One problem 
of this discussion, of course, is that the segregation of bio-chemical 
and bio-physical can now be seen to be tenuous. However, it was only 
with Volta's efforts that the segregation which, for convenience, I 
have made breaks down by reason of electrochemical experimentation. The 
mechanist/vitalist duality is a convenience if used with care, but I 
certainly do not subscribe to Whitehead 1s view that the essence of 
Romanticism i s a reaction against mechanism towards organicism. In 
Science and the Modern World (B.Di), Whitehead seems to me to have 
maligned Coleridge. For me, t he strength of Coleridge's position is 
that he stands outside crude oscillations between types of rationa l 
explanation. 
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certainly have found whilst reading accounts of Travels and Voyages. 19 In 
1792, Beddoes published his Observations on the Na ture and Cure of Calculus, 
Sea-Scurvy, Catarrh and F~ver . In the section devoted to a discussion of 
the scurvy, Beddoes mentions the work of several earlier writers, and 
attention to these wri ters gives us a miniature survey of the state of 
medicine in the period . 20 
21 An author whom Beddoes cites lavishl y is Thomas Tr otter, whose 
Observations on the Scurvy was published in the same year as Beddoes' work. 
Towards the end of his account, Trotter indicates that he shares the 
enthusiasm of the decade in which he writes for the efficacy of air. The 
following sentiments show why Beddoes was happy to support •rrotter' s 
analysis: 
The history of pure, vital air, comprehends the respiration of 
animals, the heat of the blood, and probably t he higherto un-
explored subject of secretion. In vegetation it is equally 
useful: it is a component principle of water; it alone supports 
combustion; by it metals are calcined; it is the oxygenous 
princ.iple in nature; in short its influence is unbounded, and 
the modifications of its agency are beyond calculation. 22 
Trotter argued t hat fruit and vegetables were efficacious in preventing 
scurvy because they conveyed oxygen to the body. He did not, in other 
words, confine the activity of oxygen simply to the respiratory process . 23 
19 . For Col eridge ' s reading of Travel accounts, see J.L.Lowes (B.Di). 
20. 'l'he main authors whom Beddoes mentions are T. Trotter, J .Lind, and 
F .Milman. ( See be low) • 
21. Thomas Trotter (1760-1832) - ' physician to the fleet and author'. 
D. N.B. Vol. 57. pp. 254-255. See also (B.C). 
22. T. Trotter. (B . C). p. 147. It was interest in the medical function 
of various airs that caused Beddoes to found his ' pneumatic 
Institution' in Bristol. 
23. Equally, he was not prepared to accept that the affect of fruit and 
vegetables was purel y nutritional, as had been James Lind. 
- - --
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If t he position adopted by Trotter is the culmination of the bio-
chemical medical emphasis in its application to scurvy , there was a l so one 
main writer of t he period who related the opposing emphasis to the same 
disease . The full title of Francis Milman's 24 work, published in 1782, was 
An Enquiry into the Source from whence the Symptoms of the Scurvy and of 
Putrid Fevers , arise; and into the Seat which those Affections occupy in 
the Animal Oeconomy. ivlilman is concerned to elaborate a theory of Life. 
Whereas the bio-chemists tended to insist upon the prime importance of the 
external exciting forces, such as the air, which associated with the neutral 
structure of the body, the bio-physicists, by contrast, insisted on the 
priority of the vitality of the body, particularly of t he ' muscular fibres'. 
Milman adequately presents this view in the following long passage: 
Though the manner in which the various motions of the body are 
executed, as well as the more intimate structure of its fibres, 
may be for ever concealed from us; yet there are certain properties 
of these taught us by experiment, the existence and true use of 
which are as wel l ascertained as any part of human knowledge. 1rhat 
property of the muscul ar fibre, by which, on the appruication of a 
stimulus, it is enabled to move and to contract itself, is known to 
be derived from a principl e inherent in t he fibre, and, to a certain 
degree, independent even of life. For, though the destruction of 
this principle in the animal system i s certain and i mmediate death, 
yet t here are many causes which may take away life, and may leave 
this principle surviving in the muscul ar fibre; so t hat when all 
motion in the machine has ceased, and internal stimuli can be no 
longer applied, we can, for several days, by external stimuli, 
excite the muscular fibres to contraction, in consequence of this 
principle not being yet extinct in them. 
24. Francis Milman (1746-1821) - ' physician'. D.N~B. Vol. 38 . p.l. 
-
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But though thi s property does not always end immediately wi th 
li fe , it begins with it; and it has therefore been called the 
vital power (a name which I shall continue to use) and the muscular 
fibre endowed with it has been termed the moving fibre. 1rhe 
voluntary and involuntary motions of the body are all dependent 
upon this principl e. It i.s in consequence of it, t hat the 
muscul ar fibres of the p:eart, being stimul ated by the blood flowing 
into its auricles and ventricles, are made to contract and to 
propel the bl ood. The same vital power in the voluntary muscles, 
being ac ted upon by t he nervous fluid (whatever the nature of this 
may be) directed to them by t he wi l l, renders them obedient to its 
purposes. The vital power is the efficient cause, whilst the 
stimuli applied (as for example the blood flowing into the cavities 
of the heart, in the first instance, and the nervous f luid in the 
second) are only the exciting causes of muscul ar motion: for , where 
the vital power is des troyed, no motion can be excited in the 
muscular fibre, by any stimulus whatever . 25 
The above passage reflects some of the uncertainties of this approach. 
Milman is uncertain to what extent the 'principle inherent' is 'independent 
even of li f e', and he is noticeably unsure of the relation between 
'voluntary' ~nd I i nvoluntary' mo tions since he is not prepared to sa-;/ any-
thing of the nature of the 'nervous fluid' which , he claims, conveys the 
intentions of t he 'will' to the muscles. Nevertheless, Mi lman uses this 
physiological structure to explain the nature of scurvy, first of al l 
emphasizing the symptom of .lassitude t hat had been observed by other writers . 
Milman remarks: 
The paralysis in the scurvy has long been remarked to be of a 
peculiar kind, and seems to afford a strong instance of that sort 
of paralysis mentioned by Fontana , as depending on the destruction 
of the vital power in the muscle, and not upon any injury of the · 
nerve going to it. The scorbutic paralysis has been distinguished 
25. F .Milman (B.C). pp . 60-63, 
i 
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from such an affection depending on the nerves by this circumstance, 
"quad, licet robur et firmitae pereant membris affectis paralysi 
scorbutica, tamen in plerisque a liguis motus maneat e t quidem per 
intervalla ille motus augeatur et minuatur denue". The scorbutic 
paralysis easily gives way to remedies ~ whereas the paralysis f rom 
a n injury of the nerves is a chronical obstina te complaint, not 
of t en cured. 26 
Still using Fontana as his authority, Milman concludes: 
Fontana shows, that where the force of the muscular fibre is 
impaired, it is owing to an injury of tha t property of i t, its 
vital power. He shows, tha t where the vital power is diminished, 
or destroyed, it is accompanied with a proportional weakness of the 
fibre, with a diminished cohesion between its particles , with a 
lengt hening , and a soft l ax state of it, and a great tendency to 
put r efa ction. The same affections being conspicuous in the disease 
of which I am s peaking, I think myself warranted i n referring them 
to the same cause, and to conclude, t hat the scurvy is not a disease 
of the fluids, but of the solids; that its seat is in t he muscular 
fibre, tha t its proximate cause consists in a gradual diminution of 
the vital power by the remote causes of this disease; tha t t he 
torpor, weakness, etc. observed in a ll the functions , a re the first 
eff ects of the proxima te cause, the diminution .of the vital power; 
and t hat the subsequent diminished cohesion between the particles 
of the muscular fibres, and the tendency of these to putrefaction, 
are links of the chain, and are ultimately derived from the same 
sour ce.
27 
Milman's emphasis might seem to detach the physical condition of the 
individual .from t he physical universe, but within thi s emphas i s cosmological 
connections were made a s readi l y as in the bio-chemical approach. 
26 . Ibid . pp . 98-99 , Feli x Fontana (1730-1805). Italian naturali s t. 
Biographie Universelle. Vol. 14. pp . 334-336 . 
27. F. Mi lman (B.C). pp . 103-104, 
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Writing in 1765, Andrew Wilson, 28 whose work was later cited by the 
reputable Dr. Goodwyn, 29 comments: 
But, if we consider the similitude between that activity 
subsisting in animal fibres and electricity, and consider, at 
the same time, that most animal substances are el ectrics per se; 
one can scarce miss concluding that the animal fibres and oils are 
electrics per se, in a state of electricity; that is having that 
power not only excitable in them, but they actually in the 
exertion of it, as really as a chrystal globe is during friction; 
tho' modified in a way and manner peculiar to living animals, nay, 
in many instances, remaining in their substance after death or a 
separation of parts: •.. 30 
The bio-physical explanation of scurvy suggested a connection with 
electrical phenomena in the 'external' world as much as the bio-chemical 
explanation sugges ted a connection between health and atmospheric 
conditions. 31 
Avenues of medical investigation in the 1790 1 s could be pursued 
indefinitely, but my main intention has been to show that within the two 
main t ypes of empirical enquiry there lurked a common ~endency towards 
systematisation. I have also wanted to indicate that the generalised 
theories of explanation, whether involving 'oxygen ' or 'electricity' as a 
popular panacea, were used to describe distinct diseases and were also used 
28. Andrew Wilson (1718-1792) - ' philosophical and medical wri ter'. 
D. N.B. · Vol. 62. pp . 76-77. 
29. Edmund Goodwyn (1756-1829) - ' medical writer '. 
p . 151. See (B.C). 
D. N.B. Vol. 22. 
30. A. Wilson. Short Remarks (B.C). PP• 65-66 . 
31. Both approaches suggested interpretations of the phenomenon of 
'resuscitation', and both, therefore, contributed to the popularity 
of t he Royal Humane Society, of which John Thelwall was a member. 
- - ~ 
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as means to the solving of the central difficulty, which was the definition 
of the nature of 'life'. Precision and discrimination in diagnosis were 
still comparatively rare with the result that it was possible to seek to 
explain the cause of, for instance, scurvy or consumption with reference to 
either of the generalised theories, or, for that matter, with reference to 
a combination of the two. IVIilman 1 s reference to 'scorbutic paralysis' 
indicates the way in which a link could be forged between scurvy and various 
kinds of spasms and fits, and behaviour which mi ght signify mental disorder 
or instability. Just as easily, Coleridge might make connections btweeen 
his reading about scurvy in the literature of voyages of discovery, his 
experience of the unwilled fits of Charles Lloyd, his knowledge of 'animal 
ma gnetism' and mesmerism or of Thelwall's 'animal vitality' as 'electric 
forces•, 32 his understanding of theories relating degTees of 'life' or 
consciousness to a connection between the amount of oxygen in the body in 
diseased or healthy states and the amount of 'pure air' in the atmosphere, 
amd his imagining of a mari ner 'fixed' mesmerically on a wide sea, 
listless, in a coma, without the stimulus of a refreshing breeze. 
Co leridge would have been encouraged to make such links by the imaginative 
32. A reviewer of Thel wall 1 s essay on Animal Vitality commented: 
After examining different opinions respecting the vital principle, 
lVIr. •r. proposes to simplify this difficult and involved subject, 
by 'regarding man as differing from other animals rathe r in the 
extent than in the nature of his powers;' and by considering hi m, 
together with other inferiour animals, 'as consisting of a simple 
organized frame, from the susceptibility and presence , or the non 
susceptibility, or absence of stimuli in which arises the whole 
distinction between the living body ,and the aead. 1 ••• On the 
nature of the specific stimulus the author has given us but very 
little information. According to him, it is something however 
contained in the atmosphere, and probably t he electrical fluid. 
A.R. in The Analytical Review. Vol. XIX. July, 1794 . PP • 265-266. 
- - - ----·--
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Dr . Beddoes who , writing in 1803, made the suggestive remark concerning 
epileptic patients t hat can end t his section. In t he third essay of 
'Hygeia', Beddoes wrote: 
Some experience an incessant r es tlessness , like t hat of t he 
wandering Jew. In whatever place they may happen to be, they 
are seized wi t h an irresistible desire of removing to another , 
where they hope to find comfort.33 
33. 1r . Beddoes. Hygeia: or Essays Mora l and Medical, on The Causes 
affecting t he personal state of our mi ddl ing and affluent classes. 
1802 . p . 37 . 
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'The Rime of the Ancyent Marinere' 1798 
I am a compleat Necessitarian - and understand the subject as 
well almost as Hartley himself - but I go farther than Hartley 1 and believe the corporeality of thought - nameiy, that it i s motion-. 
So much of Coleridge's letter to Robert Southey of December 11th, 1794, is 
familiar, but Coleridge continues: 
Boyer thrashed Favell most cruelly the day before yesterday - I 
sent him the fol lowing Note of cons olation. 
'I condole with you on the unpleasant motions, to which a 
certain Uncouth Automaton has been mechanized; and am anxious to 
know t he motives, tha t i mpinged on it's optic or auditory nerves, 
so as to be communicated in such rude vibrations through the 
medullary substance of It 's Brain, thence rolling their stormy 
Surges into the capillaments of it' s Tongue, and the muscles of it's 
arm. The di seased Vi olence of It ' s thinking corporealities wi ll, 
depend upon it, cure itself by exhaustion In the mean time , I 
trus t, t hat you have not been assimilated in degradation by losing 
the ataraxy of your Temper, and that the Necessity which dignified 
you by a Sentience of t he Pain, has not lowered you by the 
2 
accession of Anger or Resentment. ' -
Two important points emerge from Coleridge's statement of belief and from 
his humorous exemplification of it. Firstly, Coleridge considers himself 
to be a 'compleat Necessitarian', and he i mplies t ha t the completeness of 
his position is established by his belief in the 'corporeality of thought', 
Secondly, Coleridge seems to accept t hat t here i s a direct relation between 
sense-impressions and.behaviour, that the nature of sensible 'in-put' 
de termines the nature of active ' out-put '. 
1. 
2. 
- -- . 
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As we have seen, Co l eridge was 
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initially concerned with the relation between feeling and rational 
obligation, or between actions and thoughts. Southey was uninterested in 
integrating these two, but Coleridge insisted that thoughts had to be in tune 
with actions or they would eventually corrupt action. It was Coleridge's 
i deal that people should act freely without regulation, but he did not 
believe that knowledge how to act was innate. He therefore believed that 
it would be ideal if knowledge could be acquired by habit so that eventually 
the correct rational behaviour would occur without reference to rational 
authority. Whi lst Southey believed in the continual confrontation of reason 
and feeling , Coleridge believed in the gradual effacement of reason. At 
this stage, 'habits' and feelings were the instruments of prior reasoning. 
The theorising about the Pantisocracy involved consideration of the 
transformation of a sense of duty into a feeling . It was necessary for 
Coleridge to believe that right thoughts could necessarily be eventually 
transmitted as right feelings. Several things happened to this position 
when Coleridge's thinking turned to the state of society in England and in 
France. Wi th the gradual break-d own of Pantisocratic theorising in 1795, 
a new position was forced upon Coleridge by his desire to defend the French 
Revolutionaries. In the Political Lectures, Coleridge argues that action 
should be 'bottomed on' principles - on thought, on mental activity, but he 
also wants to say that French Revolutionary activity - 'The Terror', was 
wrong even though the mo tivating principles were right. As a means of 
exhortation, Coleridge wants to say that action follows necessarily from 
thought , but as a means of defence he also wants to say that error can occur 
in t he comrnunication of thought to action. Although the framework of 
necessarianism remained dominant in Coleridge's Political Lectures of 1795, 
nevertheless a wedge was driven between thought and action by the introduction 
of the idea of error • •ro remedy this situation, Coleridge saw the need for 
. -
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an obligation which was pre-rational . The en~uiry shifted from an 
acceptance of the opposition between reason and feeling in controlling human 
behaviour to a discussion of the nature of the obligation which preceded 
either form of control. I n t he Political Lectures, Coleridge was still 
inclined to conclude .that t he best patriots were those who possessed a sense 
of the providential control of the whole of na tural and human history, and 
who therefore acted in conformity with their conception of a rational sys tem. 
Recourse to pre-rational authority was a recourse to religious sanction, but 
Coleridge immediately found tha t religion meant rational or natural religion 
and t hat the Divine Will wa s a projection of hwnan desires . Priestley's 
conviction that human and Divine intentions coincided in desiring the 
happiness of creation is just one obvious example of the kind of reli gion to 
which Coleridge turned for moral authority . Two important points emerged 
in the Theological Lectures. First of all, it became speculatively pos sible 
for Col eridge to see himself as God, and, second l y, he came to consider a 
knowledge of God to be t he product not of autonomous thought but of 
precursive energetic action. This was the logical resul t, on the one hand, 
of his thorough-going Unitarianism and historical elisions, and , on the other, 
of hi s rigorously protes tant attitude towards the doctrine of atonement. 
Coleridge speculated theologically at this time , but part of hi s thinking 
involved a consideration of t he function of such t hought in controlling 
action. Articles in The Watchman pushed Coleridge further away from belief 
in rational thought as the basis of mora l obligation. He came to see the 
wise ardour of his true patriots as not wise at all, but as dangerous because 
the commitment of t he patriots was to their own reasoning . Instead, 
Co leridge emphasized the need for commitment to the being of God , and, 
socially, he saw the need for genuine responses to actual situations rather 
t han for t he attempted enactment of stereo- typed sympathetic responses. 
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Human benevolence depended on a genuine appreciation of human needs, and 
this actual commitment seemed to begin to assume the importance for Coleridge 
of the action which he had theoretically decided might be the necessary 
prelude to knowledge of God. Ho.wever, Coleridge did not push himself towards 
socia l activity, to an enactment of his theory, but, instead, withdrew and 
continued to theorise - investigating the implications of action vicariously 
by reference to John Thelwall, and considering his new friend's secular 
ideas. 
Thelwall believed that there did exist forces of energy in the universe 
which actively linked humans sympathetically without reference to language. 
Nevertheless, he had insuffi cient confidence in this naturalistic attitude. 
Instead, he argued that men should study the adaptation of the parts of 
Nature to the whole in order to deduce their role within that whole. Ivlen 
should continually be active in trying to participate in the natural organic 
processes of t he uni verse. Each failure in participa tion should be ignored 
and cast i mmediately into oblivion so as no t to prejudice the possibility 
of again achieving a sense of unity with the uni verse . · By this rational 
endeavour, Thel wall believed that the ontological unification could be 
achieved which, in any case, he partly believed to be a natural fact. 
'l1helwall, too, was perplexed by the relation between 1 things ' and the 
description of 'things '. The achieved sense of unification was , for 
Thelwall, the base of moral behaviour. 
By contrast, Coleridge believed that an incomprehensible Being could be 
felt as the creator and cause of Nature , anq that a more sure base for moral 
behaviour was the unification of man wi th God rather than with Nature. God 
was absolute, whilst Coleridge suspected that Thelwall 's organic nature was 
a human rationalisation. Equally, Co l eridge did not think t ha t Thelwall's 
commitment could be achieved by a series of rational efforts each of which 
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was wholly new and wholly isolated from i ts predecessor. Coleridge 
envisaged a cumula tive understanding of God which was reached not wholly 
rationally . Thinking in t he terms established by t he lectures of 1795, 
Coleridge certainly theorised t hat an action mus t precede thought of God. I 
suggest that Coleridge used Thelwall ' s emphasis on a - moral action as a guide 
f or the action whi ch he saw as the instiga tor of a process leading towards 
knowledge . Equally , I s uggest tha t Coleridge used Thelwall's vision of 
organic unity as a description of one stage in the progress towards unity 
with God. 
Like Thelwall, and also like Priestley , Coleridge was uncertain of the 
relationship between natural processes and systematised descriptions of those 
processes . Thelwall had explor ed t his probl em wi th reference to the healing 
of Be l mour in The Peripatetic, and, in t he late part of 1796 , Co l eridge was 
forced to confront the prob lem in hi s actual dealings with Lamb and Lloyd . 
In t he case of the Lambs , Coleridge tried to fuse t wo separate points. He 
claimed t hat Mary Lamb had been the unwi lling agent of Divine providence in 
killing her mother . Her ac t was involuntary and s he was , consequently, 
morally not responsibl e. Hence Col eridge adopted an attitude towards t he 
origin of the deed, and, also, in his comments to Charles Lamb, he sought to 
present a positive attitude towards the s uffering t ha t t he deed has caused. 
Co l eridge a ttemp ted to see the suffering as of precursive va lue for Charles 
in order to lead him to ' Godli keness '. We have only to join t he a ct of Mary 
to the remorseful response of Charles to have t he pl i ght of t he ancient 
r,1ariner. Bu t Co l eridge was not content to describe a natural process of 
redemption from ' remorse ' towards ' Godlikeness '. He was i nclined t o adapt 
this process to the description of Christian redemption t ha t he found, 
notabl y , in Jeremy Taylor' s accounts of t he relationship between moral 
reform - contrition, and salvation. The psychological process i s ma tched by 
• 
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the orthodox Christian system, and an involuntary action is equivalent to 
an act of faith. At the same time, Coleridge was not able to see 
involuntary deeds definitely within a theological necessarian context. His 
observation of Charles Lloyd's fits of delirium and his knowledge of medical 
speculation in the period must have suggested that 'involuntary actions' may 
be necessary in a material physical universe as a result of bio-chemical or 
bio-physical connections, so that the language of Christian explanation 
becomes an optional addition rather than a parallel account of fact. 
Coleridge certainly wanted to believe that Lloyd 's illness was t he result of 
hi s false beliefs, principles, or thoughts, - in other words , his false 
mental attitudes, but Coleridge's attempt to transform these, although 
moderate l y successful, did not meet with success in curing t he physical 
condition. It is difficult to know of the extent to whi ch Coleridge was 
aware of contemporary developments in anatomy, but it is possible that he 
knew, through Beddoes, of the isolation of reflex action, .of muscular motion 
independent of the will, which became publicly accepted shortly afterwards 
in the work of Bell and I/Iagendie. It is certain that Coleridge was 
interes ted in mesmerism and animal magnetism, both of which theories 
emphasized the possibility of the transformation of personality or the cure 
of minds by physical means. 
Coleridge was plagued by precisely the same questions as Priestley, 
notably the relation between facts and descriptions.of fac ts. However, The 
Ancient Mariner can partly be explained if we see that Coleridge tried to 
s tand aside as creator from the automomous world of t he maringr's voyage 
and point to the conflicting systems of things as they are and things as men 
think them to be. Priestley had tried to match the system inherent in 
things communicated by God with the system perceived by man, and had tried 
. . 
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to offer his different attempts at this goal as systematic structures to 
be appreciated by readers. By contrast, Cole~idge offers to his readers 
a vision of disjunction and disparity . Coleridge 's reader stands aside 
with the creator and watches the mariner's vain a ttempts at knowledge, and, 
at the same time, enters into the sufferings of the mariner until he feels 
that the detached first vision of the totality is itself in the same 
category as the illusions, delusions, deliria, nightmares, or visions of the 
character . 
I t is clear from these last comments t hat it is impor tant to see the 
whole poem as a dramatic presentation and to follow the changes of temporal 
perspective, to see, in other words, the relation between fact and the 
historical or present description of fact. The third stanza reads: 
But still he holds the wedding-guest -
There was a Ship , quoth he -
"Nay, if thou 1st got a laughsome tale, 
"Marinere! come with me". 
Here we have three voices: the narrator slipping between the present tense 
of 'he holds' and t he past tense of 'quoth he'; the ancient mariner himself 
recounting in the past tense; the wedding guest speaking in the present 
tense. The effect of the dramatic presentation in the opening stanzas of 
the poem is to convey the impression that some kind of mesmeric compulsion 
emanating from the mariner in the present causes the wedding- guest to listen 
to his tale. The sense of compulsion that the narrator describes in the 
following lines thus lends credence to the sense of compulsion which later 
emerges from the mariner's own account: 
The wedding-guest sate on a stone. 
He cannot chuse but hear: 
And thus spake on that ancyent man, 
The bright-eyed Marinere. 
After this introduction, the mariner begins his tale: 
• 
The Ship was cheer'd, the Harbour clear'd -
Merrily did we drop 
Below the Kirk, below the Hill, 
Below the Light-house top. 
The Sun came up upon the left, 
Out of the Sea came he: 
And he shone bright, and on the right 
Went down into the Sea. 
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The tale begins tediously so that it is not surprising that the next t wo 
stanzas indicate that the wedding-guest is frustra ted at missing the wedding 
for such an uninteresting account. However these opening stanzas of the 
mariner's narration convey an i mportant point about the whole: the sense is 
immediately imparted that the mariner pays meticulous attention to detail. 
The disappearance from sight of the Kirk, the Hill, and the Light-house top 
is recorded with precise, not to say trite, concern, and the same is true of 
the account of the rising and the setting of the sun. 1rhis precision is 
maintained throughout the narration so that the mariner is still concerned to 
indicate that t he Light-house top, t he Hill, and t he Kirk re-appear 
correctly in reverse order when he eventually returns to harbour. I want 
to suggest, ~herefore, that the mariner's account indicates that he is, at 
the time of re-telling his story, and was, at the time of the action which 
he describes, an accurate observer of phenomena. 
The mariner also indicates the possibility of precise chronological 
differentiation when he describes the arrival of the albatross: 
At length did cross an Albatross, 
Through the Fog it came; 
And an it were a Christian Soul, 
We hail'd it in God's name . 
It is not clea r whe ther t he 'as if' explanation of t he nature of the 
alba tross was given at the time of its appearance or whethe r it is a comment 
in the present, but t he mariner does resolutely introduce t he final line 
with 'We hail'd it' with reference to God's name. In other words, the 
mariner is attempting to give a factual account of the reactions of the crew, 
• 
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attempting to describe human behaviour as objectively as he seeks to describe 
natural phenomena. Nevertheless, he is partly betrayed by the opening words 
of the stanza. From the outset, the words 1At length' convey the assumption 
tha t the albatross saved the ship, or at least, that the arrival of the 
albatross was of significance. In his narration the mariner slips into an 
ordering of his past experience with these opening words, but, otherwise, the 
account seeks to retain objectivity. The mariner continues: 
·rhe Marineres gave it biscuit-worms, 
And round and round it flew; 
The Ice did split with a Thunder-fit, 
The Helmsman steer 1 d us thro 1 • 
The juxtaposi tion of the two parts of the stanza is tendentious, but the 
mariner does not assert that there was a causal connection between the 
hospitality of the crew towards the bird and the liberation of the ship from 
t he ice . The mariner simply reports the sequence of events, and in 
reporting fully the phenomena which he observes he provides the data for 
various deducti ons of a causal nat ure . The account continues: 
And a good south wind sprung up behind, 
The Albatross did follow; 
And every day for fooa or play 
Came to the lVIarinere ' s hal lo! 
In mist or cloud on mas t or shroud, 
I t perch'd for vespers nine, 
Whiles all the night thro' fog smoke-white, 
Glimmer'd the white moon-shine. 
Again, the mari ner does not assert that the albatross caused the wind to 
blow, but instead, he introduces the apparently inconsequential description 
of the 'white moon-shine'. The seeming inconsequential ity is significant 
for I want to argue that in his narration the mariner provides the material 
for t wo different causal explanations of his experiences, and that, further, 
he gradually adopts one explanation while being only dimly aware of the 
possibility of the other. Throughout his account the mariner feels 
compelled to describe the behaviour of the sun and the moon even though he 
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is unable to imwose a meaningful pattern on their movements, whilst he soon 
finds the pattern of CEJ.usality which involves the albatross a necessary and 
acceptable one. The uncertainty of the attitude towards the shooting of the 
albatross is apparent from the first presentation of the fact in the next 
stanza of the poem: 
"God save thee, ancyent M'arinere! 
"From the fiends that pl ague thee thus -
"Why look 1 st thou so?" - with my cross bow 
I shot the Albatross. 
Much ha s rightly been made of the fact that, mentioned in these bald terms, 
the shooting of the albatross appears to have been unmotivated and un-
premeditated. Much has also been made of the sense that the shooting was 
a trivial deed to induce the degree of guilt and punishment that we find in 
the rest of the poem. However, my point simply is that the mariner eschews 
causal explanation with regard to motive and behaviour as much as with regard 
to external phenomena. He is only concerned to recount physical events, and 
the corollary of this concern is that every event is, in itself, independent 
of cause and, because independent of judgement, morally neutral. The 
shooting of the albatross, in other words, is described by the mariner as 
nothing more or less than the shooting of an albatross. The construction 
of the poem, however, fuses two distinct time perspectives. The mariner 
recounts the shooting of the alba tross without elaboration, but the 
frightened interjections of the wedding-guest convey the impression that in 
the present moment of narration the mariner is filled with horror at what 
he now considers to have been a crime. The next few stanzas of the tale 
indicate that, at first, the interpretation of the nature of t he deed was 
fickle. 1r he mariner reports meticulously: 
The Sun came up upon the right, 
Out of the Sea came he; 
And broad as a weft upon the l eft 
Went down into t he Sea. 
• 
And the good south wind still blew behind, 
But no sweet Bird did follow 
Ne any day for food or play 
Came to the ~arinere's hollo! 
And I had done an hellish thing 
And it would work 'em woe: 
For all averr'd, I had kill ' d the Bird 
That made the Breeze to blow. 
Ne dim ne red, like God's own head, 
'I1he glorious Sun uprist: 
Then all averr'd, I had kil l 1d the Bird 
That brought the fog and mist, 
Twas right, said they, such birds to slay 
That bring the fog and mist. 
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The shooting of the albatross clearly made no immediate difference to the 
fortunes of the ship. The south wind continued to blow, and the albatross 
was missed as a 'swee t Bird', an amusing companion, not as a bird of good 
omen. Nevertheless there were superstitious predictions and the mariner 
is inclined to accept the criminality of his action, in spite of the fact 
that the accusation that he had killed the bird 'That made the Breeze to 
blow' was manifestly false. The tenses used in the first two lines of that 
same stanza are interesting for they indicate that the mariner is not 
observing from his present position that he 'had done an hellish thing' but 
is presenting, in i mplicit reported speech, the sentiments of the other 
sailors. There was no evidence whatsoever to suggest tha t the deed had 
been 'hellish', and had not the idea been planted it would have lost its 
power as a possible causal explanation when the fortunes of the ship did 
suffer. Indeed, before the becalming , the sailors are prepared to praise 
the mariner for ridding the ship of the albatross. 
The mariner now proceeds to describe th~ becalming of the ship. Again, 
his plain account provides material for an interpretation of events of which 
he is unaware: 
Al l in a hot and copper sky 
Th.e bloody sun a t noon, 
Right up above the mas t did stand, 
lfo bigger than the moon. 
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The mariner's earlier simile for the sun - 'like God 's own head', suggests 
a certain amount of symbolising activity on the part of the mariner, but he 
has only obscure intimations of a cosmic pattern . He finds more immediate 
explanations much more amenable and is prepared to accept the resurgence of 
the dormant belief in the causal significance of the albatross. He 
faithfully reports the sequence of events: 
And some in dreams assured were 
Of the Spirit that plagued us so: 
Nine fathom deep he had follow'd us 
From the Land of Mist and Snow. 
And every tongue thro' utter drouth 
Was wither'd at the root; 
We could not speak no more than if 
We had been choked with soot. 
Ah we l-a-day! what evil looks 
Had I from old and young; 
Instead of the Cross the Albatross 
About my neck was hung . 
The mariner describes the introduction of a new causal explanation. Some 
of the sailors dreamed that a Spirit was plaguing the ship. Although this 
interpretation gains credence, the mariner is still held responsible for the 
suffering of the crew and the albatross is hung around his neck instead of 
the cross. No connection has been established between the persistence of 
the evi l spirit and the shooting of the bird, but the symbolic action of 
exchanging the albatross for the cross identifies the shooting with t he 
crucifixion and so assigns the force of fact to the religious interpretation 
of events that had been fore-shadowed in the fact t hat the crew had 'hail'd 
it in God's name•. 
The mariner's reference to the dreams of the sailors prepares the ground 
for the developments which take place in the rest of t he poem. The 
mariner's account continues in Part III of the poem in the following way: 
I saw a something in the Sky 
No bigger than my fist; 
At first it seem'd a little speck 
And then it seem ' d a mist: 
It mov'd and mov 1 d, and took at last 
A certain shape, I wist. 
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F'or the first time the mariner recalls a sense of doubt concerning the exact 
nature of the phenomena which he observed. 
identification rather than of description. 
The problem is now one of 
1rhe mariner continues to 
describe the process of transition from perception to a conviction of 
identity: 
A speck, a mist, a shape, I wist! 
And still it ner ' d and ner'd; 
And, an it dodg'd a water-sprite , 
It plung'd and tack ' d and veer 1 d. 
With throat unslack'd, with black lips bak'd 
Ne could we laugh, ne wail: 
Then while thro' drouth all dumb they stood 
I bit rrry arm and suck 1 d the blood 
And cry'd, A sail! a sail! 
It is clear that the mariner is disposed to interpret his perceptions in 
such a way that he can offer the hope of rescue which would cancel out the 
effects of his criminality.· The reference to the water-sprites indicates 
that the mariner was inclined to understand the shape that he perceived as 
a source of salvation dodging the evil spirit that the mariner takes now to 
be fact. The mariner recaptures his own relief at the joy of the crew: 
Wi th throat unslack'd, with black lips bak'd 
Agape they hear'd me call: 
Gr~mercy! they for joy did grin 
And all at once their breath drew in 
As they were drinking all. 
The climax of hope is reached in the next stanza: 
She doth not tack from side to side -
Hither to work us weal 
Withouten wind, withouten tide 
She steddies with upright keel. 
and then the mariner reports his foreboding: 
The western wave was all a flame, 
1rhe day was well nigh done! 
Almost upon the wes tern wave 
Rested the broad bright Sun; 
When tha t strange shape drove suddenly 
Betwixt us and the Sun. 
And strait the Sun was fleck 1 d with bars 
(Heaven's mother send us grace ) 
As if thro• · a dungeon grate he peer'd 
~7i th broad and burning face. 
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With the mariner's present interjection in the second line of the second 
s tanza we sense his slight awareness of the possibility of some sort of crime 
committed against the sun, but the main point I want to make here is that 
from this stage in the mariner's narration neither he nor we can be sure that 
the 'events' which are described are public events at all. The mariner 
continues to describe the 'ship' as if it had objectively visited his own 
ship, but there is no longer the conviction that the spectre vision is shared 
by all the crew in the way that the alba tross was communally seen and 
accepted. The uncertain objective status of the spectre vision is emphasized 
by t he lack of comment upon the event by the rest of the crew. 1rhe mariner 
himself makes no distinction between the events which relate to the spectre-
ship and other events, but his tale leaves the lurking suspicion that he 
has described an hallucination of some sort and is unable to separate 
illusion from reality. The mariner recounts no horror in the crew at the 
spectre-ship. The other sailors simply respond out of a sense of 
frustra~ed hope. The mariner says: 
Wi -th never a whisper in the Sea 
Off darts the Spectre-ship; 
While clombe above t he Eastern bar 
The horned Hoon, with one bri ght S:tar 
Almost atween the tips. 
One after one by the horned Moon 
(Listen, 0 Stranger! to me ) 
Each turn'd his face with a ghastly pang 
And curs'd me with his ee. 
F'our times fifty living men, 
With never a sigh or groan, 
ri th heavy thump, a lifeless l wnp 
They dropp'd down one by one. 
Their souls did from their bodies fly, -
They fled to bliss or woe; 
And every soul it pass 1d me by, 
Like the whiz of my Cross-bow. 
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In the last stanza, the mariner interprets death in terms of the passing 
of souls from the body and, conventionally, in terms of f light to Heaven or 
Hell, which indicates that he is adopting a Christian framework of meaning 
for life. The second t wo lines also indicate the mariner's imaginative 
ability to relate the events which he observes to his own crime. His 
conviction of guilt is now complete - reinforced by the curse that mistaken 
hope had earned him. The sequence of events would suggest that the other 
sailors cursed the mariner for arousing their momentary 'joy' and it is the 
mariner himself who sustains the significance of the shooting of the 
albatross. 
At this point in the narrative, the wedding-guest once more intervenes: 
"I -fear thee, ancyent Marinere! 
"I fear thy skinny hand; 
"And thou art long , and lank, and brown, 
''As is the ribb'd Sea-sand. 
"I fear thee and thy glittering eye 
"And thy skinny hand so brown -
Fear not, fear not, thou wedding gues t! 
This body dropt not down. 
The wedding-guest makes deductions from his observation of the 'skinny' hand 
of the mariner, but the mariner immediately comes to the central point of 
the guest 's fear and assures him that he himself did not die. However, 
neither we nor the mariner can be certain of this assurance. The fear of 
the guest i s valid and the mariner's assertion cannot be verified. The 
guest can only listen to the mariner 's account of his sense-impressions and 
make whatever deductions that he may from them. After answering the 
wedding-guest, the mariner continues his narration: 
Alone, alone, all all alone 
Alone on the wide wide Sea; 
And Christ would take no pity on 
:My soul in agony . 
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Speaking from the present, the mariner in t erprets his past plight as one of 
estrangement from God. The sense that he is i n need of forgiveness follows 
the conviction that has been gradually imposed upon him by circumstances that 
his deed was a sinful one. The mariner then describes his feeling of 
estrangement from the rest of humanity: 
The many men so beautiful, 
And they all dead did lie! 
And a million million slimy things 
Liv'd on - and so did I. 
and he recalls that he felt the need to pray: 
I look ' d to Heav 'n , and try'd to pray; 
But or ever a prayer had gusht, 
A wicked whisper came and made 
My heart as dry as dust . 
The mariner describes hi s inability to pray in conventional terms and he 
does not r elate the failure of his prayerful intentions to his 'crime' in 
shooting the alba tross but instead to the distraction of a ' wicked whisper'. 
I suggest that the fee ling emerges that the appeal to heaven is not one whi ch 
arises from t he mariner's experiential sense of his dilemma which had already 
been expr essed through his identification wi th 'slimy things ' , but is instead 
an appeal to a conventionally structured account of experience about which 
the mariner is confused and for whom it i s in no way existentially 
meaningful. The appeal to heaven is a last resort and the inadequacy of 
prayer is seen conventionally since the reference to heaven has never touched 
t he specific details of t he mariner's guilt. Not only is t he mariner's 
sense of t he object of prayer vague in his mention of 1Heav 1 n', but his 
understanding of prayer itself is confused in tha t he is uncertain whether 
243 
he means prayer as a formulation of words emanating from conscious effort 
'and try'd to pray', or as an unconscious expression of pure being - ' or 
ever a prayer had gusht'. This distinction between two types of prayer 
highlights the distinction between the two sorts of at tempt made by the 
mariner to understand his experience. However, a development has occurred 
in the poem. The mariner began by recounting his past experience as 
objectively as possible. In doing t his he revealed the manner in which the 
reactions of the crew to the shooting of the a lbatross imposed an 
interpretation of that event whi ch was not inherent in it that caused him to 
see himself as guilty of a crime which was responsible for the misadventures 
of the ship. The superstition of the crew not only imposed a sense of 
guilt on the mariner, but also by analogy and symbolic gesture planted a 
framework of orthodox Christian explanation. The mariner finds this frame-
work congeni a l even though he does not understand its precise relation to 
himself. The force of this framework of explanation seems to increase 
through t he mariner 's account for the simple reason that the mariner is alone 
from Part III onwards. 1rherefore, t he conflict between interpretation and 
actual experience that had external reference i n the first t wo parts of the 
narrative in the conflict between the rationa lisations of the crew and the 
neutrality of the described events themselves, becomes internalised so that 
we find, more acutely than before, a conflict between the mariner's present 
rationality, which is a progress i on from that i mposed by the other sailors, 
and his desire to present an objective narration which does not even attempt 
to distinguish between mental and physical sensations. In other words, the 
corruption of plain historicity of 'Like noises of a swound' early in the· 
poem; which was the imposition of a later experiential knowledge on an 
earlier experience, now becomes more corrupted as a prior rational 
imposition gradually seeks the status of experiential knowledge and is then, 
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as such, imposed in turn by the mariner on his earlier experience. Perhaps 
this mirrors the way in which, for Coleridge, a Hartleian psychological 
expl anation of human devel opment was reinforced by an orthodox Christian 
schema of redemption until that schema itself achieved the status of 
explanation. 
Nevertheless, the mariner continues to attempt to des cribe phenomena 
faithfully and wi thout imposed explanation. 
he continues: 
The moving Moon went up the sky , 
And no where did abide: 
Softl y she was going up 
And a star or t wo beside 
Her beams bemock 'd t he sultry main 
Like morning frosts yspread; 
Shortly after the above stanza, 
But where the ship 's huge shadow lay, 
The charmed water burnt alway 
A still and awful red. 
Beyond the shadow of the ship 
I watch 'd the water-snakes: 
They mov' d in tra cks of shining white; 
And when they rear ' d, the elfish light 
Fell of f in hoary flakes. 
Within the shadow of the ship 
I watch 'd their rich attire: 
Blue, glossy green, and velvet black 
They coi l'd and swam; and every track 
Was a flash of golden fire. 
0 happy living things! no tongue 
Their beauty might declare: 
A spring of love gusht from my heart, 
And I bless'd them unaware! 
Sure my kind saint took pity on me, 
And I bless'd them unaware. 
The self-same moment I could pray; 
And from my neck so free 
The Albatross fell off, and sank 
Like l ead into the sea. 
A sense of t he significance of t he movement of the moon emerges from these 
stanzas since t he change in mood which leads to t he bl essing of the ' happy 
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living things' is introduced by reference to the moon's activity, but the 
mariner himself makes no attempt to explain the significance which his pre-
occupa tion suggests. 
of release from guilt . 
Instead, he is more concerned to analyse his feeling 
Here, the mariner again grapples with the problem 
set by the t wo kinds of prayer that I have already mentioned. The mariner 
is quite conscious that his act of blessing was itself unconscious, and his 
use of ' gusht' and 'hear t' once again places the act in the category of 
prayer of which he had previously found himself incapable. Importantly, the 
mariner then wishes to assign a cause for his 'unaware' behaviour. The 
account of the second two lines is followed by t he int erpretation of the 
third t wo lines, and the mariner explains the event by reference to 'my kind 
saint ' . Wherea s, before, ' Christ' had failed to take pity on the condition 
of the mariner, we now find that his 'kind saint' nas become pitif ul . The 
mariner's metaphysical references, in other words, are indiscriminate. In 
t he next stanza, the mariner asserts that the a-bili ty to pray in one manner 
i mmediately enabled him to pray in the other, and he implies that the 
sinking of the albatross into t he sea is an indication of · t he efficacy of 
prayer and a confirmation of forgiveness for his past deed. 
The beginning of Part V of the poem sustains the impression that peace 
has been achieved. The mariner comments: 
0 sleep , it is a gentle thing, 
Be l ov'd from pol e to pole! 
To Mary-queen t he praise be yeven 
She sent the gentle sleep from heaven 
That slid into my soul. 
The praise of ' l!Iary-queen' is a present interj~ction that again suggests tha t 
the mariner indiscriminately assigns theological responsibility for his 
sal vation. However, the manner in which the mar iner continues his account 
begins to suggest tha t it is perhaps premature to interpret the recent 
events as 'salvation'. If the ' guilt' of t he mariner was arti f icially 
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induced, it is equally possible that the schema of 'redemption' which he 
imposes is also inapplicable. Certainly, as Professor Harding has mentioned, 
the sense of libera tion at the end of Part IV is not sustained and is not at 
all conclusive.3 It may be that the sense of the harmony of creation is 
not intended to be the climax of individual suffering but that , instead, it 
is an indication of the kind of organic unity which can be achieved at 
sudden moments. For Thelwall, such moments are to be continually sought, 
but, as we have seen, for Coleridge, they are only moments in a process which 
leads beyond unity with Nature towards unity with God. 
continues: 
The silly buckets on the deck 
That had so long remain 1 d, 
I dreamt that they were fill'd with dew 
And when I awoke it rain 1d. 
My lips were wet, my throat was cold, 
My garments all were dank; 
Sure I had drunken in my dreams 
And still my body drank. 
I mov'd and could not feel my limbs, 
I wa s so light, almost 
I thought tha t I had died in sleep, 
And was a blessed Ghost. 
The mariner 
As in relation to external phenomena, so here there seems to be the 
possibi lity of a double interpretation of the mariner's experience. In the 
first stanza he simply records the juxtaposition of a dream of dew and the 
fall of rain and the use of the conjunction between the lines implies a 
causal connec~ion between the two •events• , but the picture which emerges of 
the mariner here is of a man who is confused and unable to discern what 
parts of bis 'experience' mi ght be actual as opposed to traumatic. The 
mariner describes symptoms which would suggest that he had been in a fever, 
3. See D.W.Harding. Experience into Words. (B . Di ) . p . 54. 
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and yet he expl ains his condition by reference to his activity in a dream 
state whilst he is also only able to describe tha t state by analogy with 
waki ng experience - 'Sure I had drunken in my dreams' . 1'he mariner is now 
as confused in his account of his own non-volitional behaviour seen from 
within as he had previously been in his account of the public reaction to 
t he non-volitiona l shooting of the albatross. The mariner's repetition of 
'Sure' enf orces the impression that he is searching for certainty through a 
glass darkl y . 'I1he third stanza above presents the mariner ' s attempt to 
describe the absence of sensation. In the first line the mariner records 
his lack of feeling and in the remaining lines he tries to define this state 
of non-feeling by analog;y with an imagination of wha t it might feel like to 
be dead and to be a ghost . This last analogy is offered with such seeming 
f actual force that it immediately plant s the i dea that the mariner may, 
after all, have 1 dropt down' . It seems possible that Col eridge's 
description in this part of the poem is based on his observation of the 
phys ical condition of Charles Lloyd and on Lloyd's own attempts to describe 
his sensa tions. Coleridge must certainly have been aware t hat Lloyd was 
of ten not conscious of his actions and hence not responsible for them, and 
also that t here was a disparity between his ( Coleridge's ) observation of 
events and Lloyd's attempted introspective accounts. Coleridge may have 
gained ideas from t he symptoms of Lloyd's epilepsy, especially if Beddoes 
had already hinted at a similarity between the restlessness of an epileptic 
and the story of the Wandering Jew which was anyway in Coleridge's mind before 
writing The Ancient Mariner.4 At the same time, Coleridge was temp ted to 
see such non-volitional behaviour either a s part of a divine plan in t he 
4. See Note-books ~ particularly 45n , 
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manner of viary Lamb's matri cide, or as an instance of t he spontaneous action 
which Thel wall recommended - the 'gush' from t he 'heart' - as a means to 
physical integration with the universe. I argue that Co l eridge took both 
the shooting of the albatross, and the 'gush' of love leading to a blessing 
1unawares' of creation as non-volitional actions which physically fostered 
the development of the individual will and the process leading to its unity 
wi th the Divine Will. 
After the account of his own sensations, the mariner now turns his 
attention to the physical events which affected the ship. He describes the 
advent of the roaring wind which affected the ship with its sound alone. He 
then moves into the historical present in his narrative and tries to describe 
the mysterious motion of the ship: 
The coming wind doth roar more loud ; 
The sails do sigh, like sedge: 
·rhe rain pours down from one black cloud 
And the Moon is at its edge. 
Hark! hark! the thick black cloud is cleft, 
And the Moon is at its side: 
Like waters shot from some high crag, 
The lightning falls with never a jag 
A river steep and wide. 
1rhe strong wind reach I d the ship: it roar I d 
And dropp 'd down, like a stone! 
Beneath the lightning and the moon 
The dead men gave a groan. 
They groan 'd, they stirr'd, they all uprose, 
Ne spake, ne mov 'd their eyes: 
It had been strange, even in a dream 
To have seen those dead men rise. 
The mariner has recourse to simile to present the nature of the phenomena 
that he has observed, and his similes are drawn from the context of a 
country landscape - 'Like waters shot from some high crag'. The mariner 
draws on a mass of disordered prior experience in order to try to come to 
terms with the task of describing the amazing phenomena which he witnessed. 
• 
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He remains naive before brute experience i n that he does not try to 
establish any causal connection between the arrival of the wind and the re-
vivification of the sailors, and the persistent alternative interpretation 
of events seems to be unconsciously expressed because it appeals to him 
melodramatical l y in a descriptive phr ase such as ' Beneath the lightning and 
the moon'. It is this same melodramatic inclination of the mariner tha t 
encourages the feeling that all the events of the account are now dream-
events when the mariner comments that 'It had been strange, even in a dream ' 
to have seen the rest of the crew rise up again. Al though the opening lines 
of Part V had suggested that the mariner was perhaps not fully aware of his 
own predicament, he now proceeds to describe the behaviour of the resurrected 
crew with self-confidence: 
The helmsman steer ' d, the ship mov'd on; 
Ye t never a breeze up-b l ew; 
The Marineres all 1 gan work the ropes, 
Where they were wont to do: 
·I'hey rais ' d their limbs like lifeless tools -
We were a ghas tly crew. 
'11he body of my brother ' s son 
Stood by me knee to knee: 
'l1he body and I pull' d at one rope, 
But he said nought to me -
And I quak'd to think of my own voice 
How frightful it would be! 
The mariner observes the determined progress of the ship in relation to which 
the other mariners are seen as automata possessing no free-will. The 
mariner then proceeds to describe the manner in which sounds rose from the 
bodies of the other sailors, and he again is forced to use familiar 
descri ptive language to come to terms with this new experience: 
-
Sometimes a dropping from the sky 
I heard t he Lavrock sing ; 
Some times all little btrds tha t are 
How they seem 1d to fill the sea and air 
With t heir sweet jargoning . 
.... 
~ • - - 'I,• -
And now •twas like all instruments, 
Now like a lonel y flute; 
And now it is an angel's song 
Tha t makes t he heavens be mute. 
It ceas'd: yet still t he sails made on 
A pleasant noise till noon, 
A noise like of a hidden · brook 
In the leafy month of June, 
That to t he sleeping woods all night 
Singeth a quiet t une . 
At this point the we ding- guest once more intervenes: 
Listen, 0 listen, t hou Wedding-guest! 
"Marinere! thou hast thy will: 
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"For that, which comes out of thine eye, doth make 
"My body and soul to be still". 
The comment of the wedding-guest is significant for it r einforces the 
impression of compulsion given in the opening sta nzas of the who l e poem, and 
indicates t he materiality of mesmer ic power in the •actual' world a t the 
very moment when a ma terial compulsive force might seem to explain events in 
the world des cribed by the mariner. I n answer to the wedding- guest, the 
mariner affirms t hat his t a l e i s of value and then returns to his account: 
The Marineres all ' gan pull t he ropes, 
But look at me they n'old: 
Thought I, I am as thin as air -
They cannot me behold. 
The mariner's interj ection ' Thought I ' focus es attention on his interpr etative 
frame of mind , and hi s conclusion gives the i mpression t hat his exi s tence 
might be as spi r itual as that of the other sailors. 
his a ttention t o the progress of the ship: 
Till noon we silently sail'd on 
Yet never a breeze did breathe: 
Slowl y and smoothly went the ship 
Mov'd onwar d from beneath. 
Under the keel nine fathom deep 
From t he land of mist and snow 
'.I'he spirit slid: and it was He 
That made the Shi p to go . 
The sails at noon left off their tune 
And the Ship stood sti l l also. 
The mariner now turns 
The sun right up above t he mast 
Had fix'd her to the ocean: 
But in a minute she 1gan stir 
With a short uneasy moti on -
Backwards and forwards half her length 
With a short uneasy motion. 
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The mariner records that the ship moved at first without wind and he at once 
assumes t hat the spirit of which some sailors had earlier been 'assured' was 
indeed propelling the shi p . This assumption reaches a climax of causal 
assertion with 'and it was He/ That made the Ship to go ' , but the mariner's 
continued account undermines that assertion. In a way tha t the mariner 
cannot explain, the motion of the ship seems to be connected with the motion 
of the sun . The mariner's comment that the sun, at noon, had 'fix'd' the 
ship to the ocean links its force with that of the mariner himself in 
holding the wedding- gues t 'wi th his glittering eye'. This is a link of 
which the mariner is unaware because it is achieved by the fusion of the 
narration of the poem with the mariner's narration of his tale. The 
mariner continues his a ccount in the following way: 
Then, like a pawing horse let go, 
She made a sudden bound: 
It flung the blood into my head, 
And I fell into a swound. 
How long in that same fit I lay, 
I have not to declare; 
But ere my living life return'd, 
I heard and in my soul discern'd 
Two voices in the air. 
The mariner dr~ws an analogy between the ship and a creature, and then he 
makes it explicit that he fell into a coma. For the first time he is 
prepared to accept that areas of his experience were not conscious. In t he 
second stanza he therefore admits tha t he has no possible criterion whereby 
he can determine the length of his coma, but he remains.confident tha t he is 
able to distinguish.between the levels of his own consciousness. The 
mariner's use of 'living life' implies a distinction be t ween consciousness 
·:··--. ~~-::.,._~ 
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and unconsciousness, and after the account of his vision which fol l ows he 
then confidently asserts that he ' woke '. 
vision spans Part s V and VI of the poem. 
The important account of the 
It begins: 
"Is it he?" quoth one, "Is this the man? 
"By him who died on cross, 
11 !Tith his cruel bow he lay' d full low 
"'rhe harmless Albatross. 
"The spirit who 'bideth by himself 
"In the l and of mist and snow, 
"He lov'd the bird t hat lov'd the man 
"Who shot him with his bow. 
f he other was a softer voice, 
As soft as honey-dew: 
Quoth he the man hath penance done, 
And penance more will do . 
The first voice which the mariner reports imposes an interpretation upon the 
pas t action of the mariner. 
mariner had come to accept. 
The voice reinforces the interpretation that the 
The reference to Christ makes an emotional 
connection between the death of Christ and the death of the albatross, and the 
mariner's bow i s now specifically described as 'cruel' and the bird as 
'harmless'. These last two emphases impose a gloss on the event which did 
not emerge at all from the mariner's earlier account. Earlier the shooting 
had not been especially cruel and the bird had not been especially harmless. 
In the second stanza, the reported voice continues to assert as fact 
elements that were before unspecified. The existence of the 'spiri t' is now 
taken for gTanted, but the nature of its existence is unsure for he is here 
represented as living by himself in the land of mist and snow, and not as 
following the ship 'nine fathom down' from that land . This voice also 
asserts that t he spirit loved the bird, and also that the bird loved the man, 
which, again, is not the relationship be t ween bird and sailors that first 
emerged . However, it emerges that the first voice is i gnorant in comparison 
wi th the second. The opening comment of the first voice had already planted 
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the impression that he is the lesser spirit. In asking ' I s this the man? ' 
the first voice intimates that his knowledge of the facts of the mariner's 
situation is derived from hearsay and not from direct observation. 
the second voice - 'as soft as honey-dew' - that sounds the note of 
It is 
authority. His opening comment, given by the mariner in reported speech, 
is ambiguous. The second voice imposes t he pattern of 'penance' on events 
but he gives no indica tion that he accepts the version of the 'crime ' given 
by the first voice. 'I'he continuation of the dialogue shows that the second 
voice is concerned with a very different realm of causal connection: 
FI RST VOICE 
"But tell me, tell me! speak again, 
"Thy soft response renewing -
"What makes that ship drive on so fast? 
"What is the Ocean doing? 
j SECOND VOI CE 
"Still as a Slave before his Lord, 
"The Ocean hath no blast: 
"His great bright eye most silently 
"Up to t he moon is cast -
"If he may know which way to go, 
"For she gui des him smooth or grim. 
"See , ·brother, see! how graciously 
"She looketh down on him. 
FI RST VOICE 
"But why drives on that shi p so fast 
"Withouten wave or wind? 
SECOND VOICE 
111rhe air is cut away before, 
"And closes f r om behind. 
"Fl y~ _ brother, fly! more high, more hi gh , 
"Or we shall be belated: 
"For slow and s low that shi p wi ll go , 
"When t ne Marinere ' s trance is abated". 
·I1he first voice asks exactly what is happening - what a re the causes of the 
events. The firs t voice is represented as having a r eceived impression of 
what has moral l y happened without a preci se understanding of t he relation 
be t ween the universe and its maker. The second voice, however, expl ains 
___ __,_, -
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that the ocean is as a slave before the moon. The eye of the ocean is cast 
on the moon, and the moon's compulsive inflQence is implied. 1rhe effect of 
this account by the second voice is to suggest a positive sense and 
significance for the descriptions of the sun and the moon offered by the 
mariner unconsciously . The i mplication of the second voice in the last 
stanza is that the spirits might themselves become becalmed by proximity to 
the ship when the mariner ' s trance abates. The more important implication, 
however, is that t he speed of the ship is related to the physical state of 
the mariner. This sense of a physical interdependence that is unconscious 
and can only be effectual through the unconscious is also fostered by the 
reference to the ocean ' s ' great bright eye' which induces the sense, again, 
that a physical mesmeric force embraces both the universe described by the 
second voice and the 'actual' world of relation between the mariner and the 
wedding- guest . The second voice accentuates the interpretation of the 
mariner's experience which is only implicit in his own rational account. The 
conversation between the two voices dramatises the two interpreta tions that 
have always co-existed in the mariner's account. The description of the 
vision, therefore, establishes the coherence of the naturalistic, non-
rational interpretation of events. This is not to say that the mariner's 
visionary dialogue establishes the truth of the second voice' s interpre tation. 
Coleridge uses the vision as a device for making clear the two interpretations 
to the reader w.ithout having to imply that both are equally clear to the 
mariner himself. 
I t remains important that t he mariner is unaware of the coherence of the 
SQn/moon imagery which has been established by the vision. He continues his 
account still in ignorance of the alternative explanation of his experience 
offered by the second voice: 
I woke , and we were sailing on 
As i n a gentle weather: 
'Twas night, calm night, the moon was high; 
The dead men stood together . 
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The mariner is unable to relate the progress of the ship to the abatement 
of his trance as the second voice had done. All t he mariner can do is 
report factually and by analogy, and he recognises that ' As in a gentle 
weather' is an 'as if' account but can do no hlore to explain the phenomenon 
of the ship's movement. In the t hird line , the mariner again mentions the 
moon, but he remains unaware of any specific significance and immediately 
turns his attention to the plight of the dead crew. 
All stood toget. er on the deck, 
For a charnel-dungeon fitter: 
All fix'd on me t heir stony eyes 
That in the moon did glitter. 
The pang , the curse, with which they died, 
Had never pass 'd away: 
I coul d not draw my een from theirs 
Ne t urn t hem up to pray . 
And i n its time the spell was snapt, 
And I could move my een: 
I look ' d f ar-forth, but little saw 
Of what might else be seen. 
He conti nues: 
The mariner still tries t o relate his state of mind to t he curse of the rest 
of the crew. The mariner sees the compulsion of their eyes as the factor 
which prevents him from turning his eyes heavenwards in prayer . Hence the 
mariner's urge to pray and to find forgiveness can be seen to persist long 
after the a ct of blessing of the 'happy living things '. In the next stanza 
the mariner sees t he curse of the crew as a spell. In its time this spell 
was broken and t ne mariner describes how he was able to move his eyes. There 
is a confusion between the eye of vision and the eye of perception. In the 
previous stanza, eyes were required for prayer, but in the thi rd stanza the 
mariner is conscious t hat his perception is restricted. •rhis suggestion of 
restricted understanding is an admission of inadequacy and confusion on the 
mariner's part. In t he protracted simile which follows in the next stanza 
the mariner indicates, in his narrative, that fear and guilt contribute to 
the ignorance of which he now feels acutely conscious: 
Like one , that on a lonely road 
Doth walk in fear and dread, 
And having once turn'd round, walks on 
And turns no more his head: 
Because he knows, a frightful fiend 
Doth close behind him tread. 
As the mariner continues his objective account he now becomes noticeably 
less wi lling to trust his visual perceptions, and he emphasizes other kinds 
of sensational evidence: 
But soon t here breath ' d a wind on me, 
Ne sound ne motion made: 
Its path was not upon the sea 
In ripple or in shade. 
I t rais'd my hair, it fann ' d my cheek, 
Li ke a meadow-gale of spring -
It mingled strangely with my fears, 
Yet it felt like a welcoming. 
Swiftly, swiftl y flew the ship, 
Ye t she sail 1d softly too: 
Sweetly , sweetly blew the breeze -
On ~e alone it blew. 
The description in the first stanza is, primarily, of the mariner's own 
sensation. The emphasis is upon 1 on me ' and the mari ner goes on to indicate 
that the wind was discernible in no way other than by reference to personal 
direct sensation. It is as if the mariner is now aware that it is unwise 
to go beyond such sensation in interpretation. In the second stanza he is 
forced to describe the impact of the wind physically on his face by using a 
simi le drawn from rural nature, but t he remaining lines show that he is 
preoccupied with an anal ysis of his emotional as well as his sensational 
response . The mariner is prepared to admit that his emotion is 'strange' 
and he is explicit about his sense of fear. 1rhe caution of t he mariner in 
moving from sensation to explanation is now emphasized by his reaction to 
the first sight of what seems land: 
O dream of joy! is this indeed 
The light-house top I see? 
Is this the Hill? Is this the Kirk? 
Is this mine own countree? 
e drifted o 1er t he Harbour-bar, 
And I with sobs did pray -
"O let me be awake, my God! 
"Or let me sleep alway!" 
Here the mariner's account moves into the historical present. 
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He is afraid 
that the view of his own country might be an illusion like the earlier 
appearance of the 'spectre-ship'. I n the second stanza, the mariner's 
prayer reveals that his confusion between dream and reality is acut e . On 
seeing his own country, he wishes the sight to be actual or who l ly fantasy 
not an uneasy mixture of the two. The mariner now proceeds to describe the 
bay into which the ship entered: 
The ha r bour-bay was clear as glass, 
~o smoothly it was strewn! 
And on the bay the moon light lay, 
And the shadow of the moon. 
The moonlight bay was white all o'er, 
Ti ll rising from the same. 
Full many shapes, that shadows were, 
Like as of torches came. 
A little distance from the prow 
Those dark-red shadows were; 
But soon I saw that my own flesh 
Was red as in a glare. 
The mariner recounts his sense-impressions and, in so doing, he provides 
material for a·possible interpretation of events which takes account of t he 
role of the moon. In the third stanza, however, the mariner recalls a 
feeling of uncertainty whether he might not after all be in the same 
condition as the rest of the crew. The mariner is unable to be sure whether 
the redness of his own fl esh is the same redness as that of the other sailors. 
•rhe mariner describes the ensuing events in which a seraph-man arose and 
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stood over the corse of each sailor, and he describes the way in which the 
lights of t he seraph-band function as signals to gain attention from the 
land. The mariner tells how he then heard the sound of oars: 
Ef tsones I heard the dash of oars, 
I heard the pilot's cheer: 
My head was turn 1d perforce away 
And I saw a boat appear. 
Then vanish'd all the lovely lights; 
The bodies rose anew: 
Wi t h silent pace, each to his pl a ce 
Came back the ghastly crew. 
rrhe wind, t hat shade nor motion made, 
On me alone it blew. 
The pilot, and the pilot's boy 
I heard them coming fast: 
Dear Lord in Heaven! it was a joy, 
The dead men could not blast. 
I saw a third - I heard his voice: 
I t is the Hermit good! 
He singeth loud his godly hymns 
That he makes in the wood . 
He 'll shrieve my soul, he'll wash away 
The Alb~tross 1 s blood. 
After the first line of the last stanza, the mariner moves to the historical 
present tense in his account. In the last two lines the mariner sees t he 
possibility of redemption through the her mit, and he uses the religious 
language of 'shrieve' and the Christ-like reference to 'he'll wash away/ 
The Alba tross's blood'. The mariner's belief in his need of redemption, in 
other words, still persists and he retains his conviction that the shooting 
of the albatross was a criminal act requiring forgiveness long after the 
symbolic absolution of the sinking of the albatross into the sea. 
In Part VII of the poem, the mariner continues his account with a 
present aside describing the hermit, and he then moves back into his tale 
by recording the conversation of his rescuers as they rowed towards his ship: 
The Skiff-boat ner 1 d: I heard them talk, 
" 'Thy, this is strange, I trow! 
"Where are those lights so many and fair 
"That signal made but now? 
"Strange, by my faith! the Hermit said -
11And they answer'd not our cheer. 
"The planks look warp'd, and see those sails 
"How thin they are and sere! 
"I never saw aught like to them 
11Unless perchance it were 
11 The skeletons of leaves .that lag 
11My forest-brook along: 
11When the Ivy-tod is heavy with snow, 
"And the Owle t whoops to the wolf below 
11That eats the she-wolf's young. 
"Dear Lord! it has a fiendish look -
(The Pilot made reply) 
"I am afear 1d - "Push on, push on! 
11 Said the Hermit cheerily. 
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'J1his recorded conversa tion valida tes t he observation of t he mariner in the 
mention of 'lights' . Once again the mariner is able to report an assessment 
of his situation whi ch is not solely his own , and he describes the way in 
which the hermit immediately has to seek to explain the appearance of the 
ship by reference to his own prior visual experience. The i mpl ications of 
the her mit's description are imprecise, but the mention of the 'thin' and 
'sere' obscurely suggests that the appear ance of the ship to the hermit i s 
not unlike the earlier appearance of t he 'spectre-ship' to the mariner. 
However, this pattern remains dormant,5 and the mariner continues his 
a.ccount: 
The Boat came closer to the Shi p, 
But I ne spake ne stirr 1 d! 
1rhe Boat came close beneath the Ship . 
And strait a sound was heard! 
Under t he water it rumbled on, 
Sti ll louder and more dread: 
I t reach 1d the Ship, it split the bay; 
The Ship went down like lead. 
5 . This kind of suggestion gives the poem much of its eerie power . 
I favour H. House's reading of the whole poem except that I want 
to claim that the areas of mystery which House regards as 
aes thetically effective are that but are also phi losophi cally 
significant. 
Stunn'd by that loud and dreadful sound, 
Which sky and ocean smote: 
Like one that had been seven days drown'd 
Hy body lay afloat: 
But, swift as dreams, myself I found 
Within the Pilot's boat. 
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The mariner recalls his own silence and motionlessness but he is unable to 
offer an explanation of his behaviour, except, in the third stanza, by 
analogy with the experience of dreams. Earlier the mariner had sought to 
explain dream experience by reference to 'actual' life, but the situation is 
now reversed, and in the present he is only conscious tha t he was conveyed 
unconsciously to the Pilot's boat. The mariner then proceeds to describe 
the terror of the pilot and the pilot's boy - a des cription which breaks 
down the barrier between the world of the tale and the world of the poem by 
establishing a likeness between the reactions of the wedding-guest and the 
frightened boy, until he is able to conclude: 
And now all in mine own Countree 
I stood on t he firm l and! 
The Hermit stepp'd forth from the boat, 
And scarcely he could stand. 
11 0· shrieve me, shrieve me, holy Man! 
1rhe Hermit cross' d his brow -
"Say quick", quoth he, "I bid thee say 
"What manner man art thou?" 
Forthwi t h this frame of mine was wrench'd 
With a woeful agony, 
W1J.ich forc'd me to begin my tale 
And then it left me free. 
The mariner begged to be shriven, but he recounts how he was forced to begin 
his tale . Almost incidental l y the mariner remarks that the telling of the 
tale left him 'free'. The freedom which is acquired in this manner is not 
regarded as significant by the mariner. 
mariner elaborates: 
Since then at an uncertain hour, 
Now oftimes and now fewer, 
Addressing the weddi ng-guest, the 
That anguish comes and makes me tell 
My ghastly aventure. 
I pass , like night, from land to land; 
I have strange power of speech; 
1rhe moment that his face I see 
I know the man tha t must hear me; 
To him my tale I teach. 
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The mariner is conscious that he has 'strange power of speech', but he sees 
this power in relation to others and not to himself . He sees the telling 
of his tale as an activity which teaches others. Nevert heless , he has given 
sufficient factual detail to encourage the deduction which he does not him-
self make t hat the telling is therapeutic and that it is through the telling 
of his tale alone tha t his sense of guilt is removed and he is temporarily 
shriven. The mariner's account of his present experiences is as 
inadequate as his account of those of the past, and, even in the present, he 
continues to provide a rational expl anation for his behaviour a t the same 
time as he presents the data for an alternative interpreta tion. In the 
summary of the voyage which the mariner now gives to the wedding- gues t we 
see the fusion of his i nterpretation of t he function of the ta l e with his 
interpretation of what had actually occurred to him, and in both 
interpretations he continues to rationalise the irrational forces which he 
has witnessed and still does witness in the present. 1rhe mariner ' s · 
peroration is stimulated by the noise from the wedding feast. He says: 
What loud uproar bursts from that door! 
rrhe Wedding-guests are there; 
But in the Garden-bower the Bride 
And Bride-maids singing are: 
And hark t he little Vesper-bell 
Vfuich biddeth me to prayer. 
0 Wedding-guest! this soul hath been 
Alone on a wide wide sea: 
So lonely 'twas that God himself 
Scarce seemed there to be. 
0 sweeter than the lVIa:t'.riage-feast, 
1Tis sweeter far to me 
To walk together to the Kir k 
.h th a goodl y company 
1r o walk together to the Kirk 
And all together pray, 
11hile each to his great Father bends, 
Old men, and babes, and loving friends, 
And Youths, and Maidens gay . 
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Following from the first stanza a bove, the mariner talks about his 'soul' and 
sees his isolation at sea as an isolation from God. It is the loneliness 
that the mariner emphasizes. He does not at all draw attention to the fact 
that mysteriously he was preserved and brought home. The reference to the 
absence of God, in the second stanza, is still incongruous, as was the 
reference to prayer in the mariner's account of the voyage. These stanzas 
represent the climax of the mariner's desire, first aroused by the 
superstition of the other sailors, to assimilate his experience to an 
orthodox Christian framework of explanation. In his account of the voyage, 
the mariner shows himself to have been concerned with his own inability to 
pray and to have been only interested in the persons to whom prayer might be 
directed as objects of substanceless invocation - 'Christ', 'my kind saint' 
or ' Mary-queen', rather than as possible moral agents . However, influenced 
by the conte'xt of church-attendance, the mariner now wishes to impose an 
explanation upon his past feeling so that he can recommend the value of 
church-going as a social custom to the wedding-guest. The mariner says that 
'God himself/ Scarce seemed there to be', and yet at no earlier point in his 
account had he given the impression that this seeming absence of God had been 
a meaningful description of his condition. 1r he mariner imposes this 
interpretation of his past experience because he wishes to argue that worship 
of God provides t he only redemption from his past guilt and suffering. The 
mariner wishes to reduce his experience to fit a ·simple formula which can 
argue that commitment to God cancels out the effects of alienation from Him. 
However, this simple rational formula is inadequate, and the mariner has 
continually provided enough material for it to be deduced that the shooting 
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of the albatross was never 'guilty', was never a 'sinful' deed that is now 
•redeemed' through faithful commitment to God, but was, instead, a non-
volitional act about which rational explanations accrued, inducing a sense 
of guilt which is now temporaril;y: removed by the non-volitional re-telling of 
the tale. Linguistic expl anations and religious worship, in other words, 
are both expedient fictions . It remains possible that man is a material 
agent in an universe which has purpose because of the intention of the 
Divine First Cause, or, equally, man may be immaterial in a world of spirits, 
but the important point here is that there are two levels of systematic 
ordering. There are two worlds - one of pre-ordained fact, which is the 
system of God, and the other of interpreted fact, which is the system of 
man. 
The mariner is anxious to communicate the message that he has learnt 
from his experiences and from his interpretation of those experiences. His 
homilectic intention becomes overt in the two stanzas which fol l ow: 
Farewell. farewell! but this I tell 
To thee, thou wedding-guest! 
He prayeth well who loveth well, 
Both man and bird and beast. 
He prayeth best who loveth best, 
All things both great and small: 
For the dear God, who loveth us, 
He made and loveth all. 
'l'he First Voice had insisted that the 'spirit' had 'lov'd t he bird', and the 
Second Voic~ ha d drt}vm a ttention to the relationship between the functioning 
of the Moon and the Ocean, but the 1i ariner now a sserts that i t is 'the dear 
God, who loveth us' and he seizes on the one point that he grasped from the 
blessing of all living things, that love precedes prayer, to construct a 
simplistic philosophy of life for the benefit of the wedding- guest. These 
lines do not contain the message of the poem but are placed in the poem as 
the message t hat the marine r himself struggled to deduce from his experience. 
F 
After these words, the narrator of the poem concludes: 
1rhe Marinere, whose eye is bright, 
Whose beard with age is hoar, 
Is gone; and now the wedding-guest 
Turn ' d from the bridegroom ' s door. 
He went, like one that hath been stunn'd 
And is of sense forlorn: 
A sadder and a wiser man 
He rose the morrow morn. 
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'l'he last stanza brings out the point that the impact of the tale is not 
rational. It woul d, perhaps, be too much to read 'And is of sense forl orn ' 
as meaning that the guest i s s t r i pped specifical ly of his faith in ' sense 
impression ' , but the point must be that the wedding-guest does not at all 
come away from his experience ' educated ' or ' taught' by the rational 
' message ' that the mariner imparts . 
The narration presents a relationship be t ween the guest and the mariner 
which is one of physical mesmerism. The guest ' s attention is held 
physically, and not held by the content of the tale. Similarl y, the mariner 
recounts a historical situation in which he was physically compelled t o act 
in certain wa.ys , even though in the course of his actions he created a 
language of description for these ac t ions which he now considers to constitute 
an adequate expl anation of the events which impi nged upon him and of his own 
deeds. l t would require discussion of the bal lad form of The Ancient 
Mariner to decide to Tihat extent the reader of the poem is me smerised, or, 
at least, restrained in his rationality by the rhythm of the verse. 
Perhaps the reader finds that at the end of the poem he is 'of sense f orlorn' 
and is able to identify himself, finally, with the wedding- gues t. But I 
s uggest that the reader may finally be as detached from the whole incident 
as is the narrator. The r eader not only responds to the tale of the 
mariner but also to the relation between the phenomena of t he tale and of 
reality intima ted by the narrator. It is open to the reader to question 
-
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the physical causal relationship established by the narrator as much as the 
orthodox Christian linguistic causal relationships accepted by the mariner 
in his tale and eventually in reality. The reader is first able to see the 
explanation of the mariner as a fiction, and is then, secondly, allowed to 
consider the possibility that the structure of the whole poem is an artifice 
of t he same kind as the mariner's. The reader may consider t he disparity 
between the nature of things and the naive, honest, persistent strivings of 
t he mariner towards comprehension, but he may also consider the total 
disparity between man's actual condition and his feeble understanding of it, 
and here the imitative world of the whole poem is not meant to escape 
censure. Coleridge's scepticism does not yet make an excep tion for art. 
The poem, like t he mariner's momentary vision, is one stage in the 
progression towards absolute unity with God. For Coleridge, the poem is one 
moment of knowledge for a man who is perpetually metaphysically curious, 
perpetually not 'capable of being in uncertainties, WJysteries, doubts, 
6 
without any irritable reaching after fact & reason.• This perpetual 
restlessness · is a disease - one which causes fever and nightmarish delusion 
and irresponsible behaviour, as much as and comparably with the disease of 
Mary or Charles Lamb or Charles Lloyd. Both diseases are similar in that 
persons do not act in the ways in which they choose, and in that their 
thoughts engage less with realities than with self-deceptions. Equally, 
this perpetual restlessness is like a thirst - like the symbolical 
thirsting of the children of Israel for communion with God mentioned by 
Jeremy Taylor. But what relation does that kind of symbol bear to 
6. J ohn Keats to George and Thomas Keats. December 21, 1817. 
Letters of John Keats. (selected and edited S ~ Gardner) . 
London. 1965. p . 68 . 
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Coleridge's own development'? Is it as superfluous as t he mariner's own 
language of redemp tion? Part of the problem of the poem is that Coleridge 
begins a s poet from the position which is the ideal culmination of the 
mariner's development as a person. I deally, Coleridge is describing the 
pr ogress i n human development to the position which is nov1 his and which 
specifically allows him to survey such a development. Rationally, Coleridge 
may have thought himself into unity with an oraniscient Deity, but although, 
as poet, Coleridge is abl e to stand aside from his creation with God-like 
detachment, he a ttempts to describe from this detachment the progress of an 
individual towards t he Godlikeness which i s a necessary base for his own 
aesthetic stance. As the detached presentation of the mariner's fate 
advances, so the scepticism concerning the progression towards God l i keness 
of the mariner inevitably undermines Coleridge's confidence in his stance as 
poet. The scepticism about the mariner must cause t here to be scepticism 
about t he poem itself. Progressively the poet is dethroned so that, for 
all its sophistication, the poem cannot be offered as of greater moral value 
tha n the homily of t he mariner, and the poet may be deluding himself as much 
as his character (either as the result of physical ill-health, or as the 
result of the adoption of a false schema of explanation) if he thinks tha t 
his tale is able to communicate any rational ' message'. 
-. 
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PART IV 
Four Critics of Coleridge 
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Introduction 
At the end of Coleridge as Critic, Sir Herbert Read commented: 
It had been very tempting - it still is tempting - to assign to art 
a teleological function. Schelling, in his earlier works, had not 
hesitated to do this - to make art the copula or connecting link 
between transcendental being and human consciousness - only in the 
work of art could man make an objective representation of the nature 
of the supreme reality. But that, as Coleridge and indeed Schelling 
himself were quick to perceive, would lead to an identification of 
the moral and the aesthetic. I personally believe that that 
identification is still possible, but for Coleridge, as later for 
Kierkegaard, there was inherent in the human situation an ineluctable 
Either/Or. For Coleridge a 'standpoint', or a 'starting-post' as he 
called it, was a psychological necessity - a knot must be tied in the 
thread before we can sew, as Kierkegaard expressed it; and 
Coleridge, at an early age, had made his standpoint the Christian 
revelation. He had a horror of any kind of self-consistent system -
that seemed to him merely a dialectical trick, a mechanical top 
spinning in nothingness, not touching the human h~art.
1 
I have attempted to describe Priestley's endeavour to create a 'self-
consistent system' from a conjunction of 'Christian revelation' and natural 
science. It is, perhaps, too easy to assert that Coleridge had made his 
standpoint the Christian revelation from an early age, but, certainly, 
Coleridge's theological convictions wer e independent of, or antecedent to, 
the rational apologetic of Priestley which initially attracted him. Whilst 
Coleridge 's c~nvictions may have been reinforced partially by Priestley's 
systematic presentation, he seems to have been always conscious of a gulf 
between rationalisation and intuitive certain~y. At the same time, 
Coleridge wanted himself to place a rational veneer on dangerously bare 
1. H. Read. Coleridge a s Critic. (B.Di). P• 31. 
. . . . - ~ "" 
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intuition. I have traced the concurrent progress of Coleridge's own 
rational account of the stages leading to 'Godlikeness' and of his scepticism 
concerning it. I have interpreted The Ancient Mariner as a poem which both 
presents a system and also implies that the system does not touch 'the human 
heart'. The poem suggests this dual response - both in relation to the 
understanding of the mariner and in relation to the wider understanding which 
it offers as a poem. In this latter relation, in other words, Coleridge 
was aware of a possible separation of the aesthetic as much as of the 
philosophically or theologically systematic from the moral. Coleridge, 
therefore, had as much horror of aesthetic autonomy as of systematic self-
consistency. 
As Head rightly remarks, it still is tempting •to assign to art a 
teleological function'. All interpretation of literature must assume a 
theory of literature, and I have tried to describe a process of 'double-
integration' leading to the formation of a poem. In this concluding Part, 
I shall briefly examine the work of four critics of Coleridge, namely, 
Professor D.W.Harding, Professor George Whalley, Professor D.G.James, and 
Dr. J.B.Beer. In differing ways, these critics have not recognised 
Coleridge's aesthetic scepticism, either because they have themselves adopted 
different aesthetic attitudes or because they have sought to adapt the 
attitudes of Coleridge to suit Twentieth century needs. These critics are 
systematisers of a sort, and, to some extent, propagandists, and it is 
important to see the relation between implicit theory and interpretation so 
as to imitate Coleridgean scepticism with regard to their systems and also, 
by comparison, with regard to my own systematically selective description. 
y:.. :-· .-- : . 
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CHAPTER I 
D.W. Harding 
Harding reveals his central interest in the foreword of 'Experience 
into Words', where he writes: 
The essays brought together here deal with the relation 
between the writer's words and some other, non-literary 
experience, whether his or his reader 1 s. 1 
The danger of which Harding seems unaware in his version of this approach, 
is that 'non-literary' becomes equated with psychologically-interpreted 
experience. Harding's account of experienoe1 , in other words, is a current 
psychological one. He does not much countenance other formulations of 
experience which might have bearing on the words which exist in poems. This · 
form of reductionism is most clear in Harding's brief remarks on Cowper's 
'The Castaway'. He writes: 
Some of the materials of the poem, it is true, may well have more 
obscure symbolic significance, the sea itself, for example. And 
there may be some doubt whether the calamity Cowper was referring 
to was his eternal damnation or his inevitable relapse into madness; 
we might perhaps say that he was unwittingly telling himself the 
2 
truth, that his madness and only his madness~ his damnation. 
However much the psychological interpretation of Cowper's sense of damnation 
may be the 'truth', it remains the case that Harding deliberately calls into 
question the general religious context within which Cowper tried to explain 
his own experience. In so doing Harding distorts the experience the 
transformation of which into words he is purporting to be examining. The 
significant point is that Harding attempts to impose an a-historical form on 
1. 
2. 
D.W.Harding. 
Ibid. P• 76. 
Experience into Words. (B.Di). P• 9. 
F 
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all historical exper~ence without taking into account the possibility that 
the ways in which experiences are described by experiencers determine, or 
certainly modigy, the nature of those experiences. There is, for instance, 
the possibility that Coleridge's own account of his experience is distorted 
by the following reading of The Ancient Mariner: 
The essence of the poem is a private sense of guilt, intense out 
of all proportion to public rational standards. The supernatural 
machinery of the poem allowed Coleridge to convey something of 
this - for the small impulsive act which presses a supernatural 
trigger does form an effective parallel to the hidden impulse which 
has such a devastating meaning for one's irrational, and partly 
unconscious, private standards. 
expression of real experience. 3 
It is a fiction that permits the 
Without asserting that this is a false picture of Coleridge's experience, the 
problem which arises is this: what, for Harding, is the status of 
Coleridge's intellectual formulation of the theory that a motiveless act of 
faith is a necessary precursor of knowledge of God? I suggest that Harding 
is not sufficiently interested in how the expression of experience in 
various contexts - political or theological, for instance - might present 
modifications of experience which then become transferred to the poem so that 
.it is not so much a direct expression of 'psychological' or 'real' 
experience as the manipulation of words that have already been applied in 
other contexts. Harding's emphasis is too individual, supposing a relation 
between an absolute self and the poem, and it does not allow for the 
existence of autonomous sets of associations of words or thoughts which, 
having attained independence by projection from the self are then re-
assimilated with it in such a way as to partially re-constitute it . 
When Harding proceeds to discuss the work of Maud Bedkin,4 he comes 
3. Ibid. P• 59. 
4. See M. Bodkin. (B.Di). 
r 
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close to meeting my objection: 
The literary question is how far it is profitable to come to a 
work of art with ideas drawn from other sources as to the significance 
of the symbols we are going to meet with. To some extent we must 
do this, some symbols being well-established parts of our cultural 
background. Voyaging into strange seas, for instance, the 
starting point of Coleridge's poem, has conventional implications 
and echoes that no one is likely to miss and that the poet would 
count upon in his readers. We can go a little farther, and usefully 
perhaps, with Maud Bodkin in noticing that wind and calm are, as she 
says, •symbols of the contrasted states he (Coleridge) knew so 
poignantly, of ecstasy and of dull inertia'. It seems doubtful, 
though, whether we are much helped at this point by reminders of 
the uses to which the symbol of wind has been put in other literature; 
it may perhaps enrich our emotional associations to Coleridge's wind 
and calm, but on the whole the emotional value of these natural 
events seems to be sufficiently conveyed by the context of the poem 
alone without going far beyond it to wider literary contexts.5 
However, Harding continues to ignore the intermediary context, to deny that 
there may exist wider literary contexts which are known to the poet and which 
form a part of 'his experience. Harding is ignoring the possibility that the 
symbols of the •collective unconscious' may, as he later suggests in 
6 
opposition to Jung, be described in terms of the conscious. It seems that 
in his anxiety to focus the atteniion of the modern reader solely on the 
text of a past poem so that accretions of interpretation do not obliterate 
its historic 'objectivity', Harding also wishes to suppose that, in creation, 
the poem becomes an 'object' to the poet himself. The poet can only feel 
obscurely satisfied with his achievement and has a no greater sense of his 
'intention' than does a modern reader. Harding writes: 
5. D. W.Harding • . Experience into Words. (B.Di). p. 69. 
6. Ibid. P• 194. 
F 
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If we accept the views of depth psycholog-y we have to consider 
the likelihood that much of the poem has a symbolic significance 
that the writer was not fully aware of and certainly did not 
circumscribe and focus sharply as the writer of an allegory or 
parable does •••• But still he must be given the credit and the 
responsibility for what is there in the poem and what it does to 
the reader. He was content, for reasons that may not have been 
fully conscious, to him, to leave the poem as it stands, and this 
is the poem he wanted us to read. We are face to face with what 
he actually said, not with what he could have consciously 
described as his intentions.7 
Harding does not succeed in answering the Jungians. Instead he transfers 
the area of conflict from the 'intention' to the 'satisfaction' of the poet. 
Since both are considered to be partly unconscious, the words of the poem 
can still, on Harding's new ground, be interpreted by reference to a 
'collective unconscious'. There is, indeed, a point at which the whole of 
experience can be explained in terms of the 'collective unconscious' such 
that distinctions between •subject' and 'object•, 'individual' and 
•traditional' experience, 8 completely disappear. In order that there should 
be meaningful communication, however, an isolation of conscious from 
unconscious must be made. This, I think, is W.K.Wimsatt's meaning when he 
writes: 
7. 
8. 
There is a gross body of life, of sensory and mental experience, 
which lies behind and in some sense causes every poem, but can 
nevel be and need not be known in the verbal and hence intellectual 
composition which is the poem. For all the objects of our 
manifold experience, for every unity, there is an action of the 
Ibid. p. 71. 
I am deliberately connoting T.S.Eliot. (B.Dii). 
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mind which cuts off roots, melts away context - or indeed we should 
never have objects or ideas or anything to talk about. 9 
Wimsatt, of course, is answering J.L.Lowes and not the Jungians, and he 
slightly begs the question in assertively differentiating between 'sensory 
and mental experience' and •verbal. and hence intellectual composition'. 
Wimsatt's 'and hence' exposes him since it is precisely the interest in the 
non-intellectual character of language which has developed since Wimsatt•s 
10 
essay in the work of, for instance, S.K.Langer that has caused Harding 's 
· 1 11 si emma. Nevertheless, Wimsatt does valuably draw attention to the fact 
that some differentiation is inevitable . If it is not made between 
Wimsatt's polarities, whatever they may mean, where should it be made? 
Either it has to be admitted that the poem is the poet's experience, which, 
clearly, Harding is not prepared to do because this admission must imply, in 
fact, that the poem is the experience of the reader, so destroying his t orical 
objectivity, or some differentiation must be made between poem and experience. 
9. W.K.Wimsatt. "The Intentional Fallacy". (B.Dii) p. 12. 
10. See S.K.Langer. (B.Di). Chapter 2. Speculations on the Origins 
of Speech and its Communicative Function. 
11. It could be added also, in passing, that Wimsatt was here shadow-
bo~ing with Lowes, since the 'experience' that Lowes described 
was 'intellectual' and hence, perhaps, admirably suited for 
transference to an 'intellectual' composition. It was precisely 
because Lowes' idea of experience was not psychological - if that 
is the same as 'sensory and mental' - that Harding finds his 
interpretation of The Ancient Mariner inadequate. 
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Quite simply, so it would seem, it 'experience into words' is to be discussed 
it must be made quite clear what is meant by both 'experience' and 'words'. 
Harding tries to differentiate by recourse to levels of consciousness, but 
hi s attempt is unsuccessful partly because it is insufficiently 
comprehensive. I wish to suggest, in other words, that Harding's current 
psychological account of the experience which goes into words is weak because 
be assumes a distinction between words in poems and words in other contexts. 
Harding falls back on a differentiation between Art and Life. The title of 
his book should, truly, have been 'Experience into Poems', but the book 
which, with more comprehensiveness, could have been written, would have been 
entitled 'Experience into Words into Poems•. 
I shall indicate that I suspect that Dr. Beer would want to argue that 
the subconscious intention which Harding sees at work in the formation of 
poetry was active in all Coleridge's experience. Beer, I think , would want 
to claim that all Coleridge's words were, in this sense, poetic. Harding, 
with difficulty, retains a distinction between Art and Experience, whilst, 
perhaps, Bee·r is inclined to see all Experience as Art. I share Harding's 
desire to retain some kind of dualism, and I think this desire can be 
supported by a limited acceptance of the comprehensive view which is implicit 
in Beer's writing. Accepting that •experience' is the sum of, amongst many 
other things, all words used and all actions taken, I wish it to be taken as 
my premise that I am wanting to look at the relation between words in poems 
and those words in other contexts which both contribute and also try to 
give meaning to the whole 'experience•. 
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CHAPTER II 
J.B. Beer 
Dr. Beer's attitude towards poetry emerges from the concluding remarks 
of Coleridge the Visionary. He writes: 
His constant insistence upon the role of imagination in human 
life and happiness is an insistence upon the one human faculty 
which has been patronized by a scientific age, but which still 
gives us constant reminders of its importance and of the deadly 
consequences which follow its neglect. 1 
The significant point is that Beer clearly regards imaginative life as an 
activity, and he sees imagination as a faculty which needs to be continuously 
effective in life and not as one that produces artefacts which can be set in 
opposition to life as a criticism of it. A little earlier Beer makes this 
point more forcefully and implies a dissatisfaction with a life/art dualism: 
1. 
2. 
In all these ways, Coleridge has been criticized by life, and we 
have seen how all these excellencies are to be found in his 
poetry by the sympathetic critic. Nevertheless, when we try to 
find Coleridge himself, we do not see, first and foremost, any of 
the figures which have been projected for our attention. We see 
instead a man who tried to take as his sphere all human experiences, 
whether in the world of measurable sense-perception or in the 
universe of the imagination, and to harmonise it into a single 
pattern. In this man, the shaping spirit and the inquiring spirit 
were equally strong, and he was never happier than when exercising 
both to the limit of their powers. If the life by which we are to 
judge poetry is the life of external sense-experience, he was at 
fault to do so: but if that life is to include all the shapings of 
the human imagination as well, then nis poetry not only criticized 
2 life, but is criticized by life to its advantage. 
J.B.Beer. Coleridge the Visionary. (B.Di) • . P• 295. 
Ibid. P• 278. 
Beer assigns a high status to imaginative activity because it synthesizes 
a broad sweep of internal and external experience so that i t shows an 
extended reality and is able to cricitize ordinary life. He is not at all 
saying, as I shall show that Professor Whalley does, that poetry reveals 
reality, but is simply arguing that the poet does justice to a fuller sense 
of what reality might be. The imagination of the poet does not 'body forth' 
reality. On the contrary, a new sense of 'life' and 'reality' is created 
by the imagination. Beer's implication is that 'facts of mind 13 are as 
significant parts of reality as other facts. 
Although I accept entirely Beer's emphasis, in contrast to that of 
Harding, that Coleridge's imaginative activity was engaged with the whole 
of experience with the result that no distinction can be made between 
'experience' and imaginative creation, my central objection to Beer, as it 
was also an objection to Harding, is that he does not sufficiently allow for 
the ineluctably 'given' quality of much of experience. It seems that Beer 
is inclined to view poetry as a form of 'mythopoeic' or, as Miss Sewell4 calls 
it, 'post-logical' thought to such an extent that this •standpoint' prevents 
him from seeing the possibility that such a form of creative thinking was, 
for Coleridge, in conflict with a received idea of Christian truth. 
At first sight it does not appear that Beer is at all likely to ignore 
any tension in Coleridge's position. Early in his book he answers Potter5 
in t~e following way: 
To make a Jekyll and Hyde of Coleridge, however, is to under-rate 
his sensitivity and range - and Potter himself half acknowledges 
this in an appendix to his book. In ,particular, it leads to a 
3. See Griggs. 156. p . 260. 
4. See E. Sewell (B.Di). 
5. See S. Potter (B.Di). 
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dichotomy between Coleridge the poet and Coleridge the religious 
thinker which involves a total misunderstanding of his position, 
and which has yet been encouraged in the work of some of his most 
sympathetic commentators. 6 
I could not agree more fully with this reaction to Potter's book. It begins 
to seem, therefore, that I depart from Beer mainly in my understanding of 
'religious thinker'. This becomes clearer when, in his summary of 
Coleridge's achievement, Beer rightly draws attention to the limitation 
imposed by Coleridge's theological assumptions: 
The attempt to find Truth, and thus create a complete poetic 
universe, is a more complicated issue, for here Coleridge was 
limited, far more than in the other cases, by the biblical-
visionary world in which he had grown up. Again and again, 
he was haunted by the hope that that world would be vindicated. 7 
By eliding 'biblical' and 'visionary' Beer is implying that the Bible was, 
for Coleridge, an over dominant source book for personal mythopoeic thinking, 
whereas I wish to suggest that a belief in a Hebraic God, if not in the •truth' 
of the Bible, had an impersonal quality which, certainly for the period 
leading up to 1797, called into question the value of imaginative activity. 
My objection to Beer can be succinctly expressed either by saying that 
he sees Coleridge as too Platonic or by saying that he sees him as too much 
like Blake. Wi th regard to the firs t instance Beer writes: 
6. 
Coleridge at his most creative period, moreover, was not merely 
the poet. At such times, his questing self also came to the fore. 
His 'disquisitive mind' was devoted to the pursuit of knowledge -
knowledge sought, not merely for the sake of writing poetry, but in 
conviction that ultimate truth was itself a poetic harmony. It 
J.B.Beer. Coleridge the Visionary. (B.Di). . P• 27. 
7. Ibid. p. 286. 
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is this dialectic within him between the angelic creator and 
the pilgrim scholar which sets him beyond the attitudes represented 
by Wordsworth and Keats respectively. 8 
I am not at all sure that there is evidence which can establish that the 
young Coleridge was convinced that 'ultimate truth was itself a poetic 
harmony' .9 It is this view of Coleridge which allows Beer to comment on 
his relation with Blake in the following manner: 
Both poets were one in their conviction that a spiritual reality 
lay behind the world of everyday: the only difference between them 
lay in their varying readiness to be influenced by rigorous 
scientific analysis. At this point of sympathy with Blake, 
Coleridge stands apart from most other English Romantics. In the 
end, he was not content with a poetry based purely on individual 
experience: he l ooked, on the contrary, for an all-embracing 
vision which should encompass all things in heaven and earth, 
reconciling the truths of science with those of religion •••• 
This search led him to a lifelong interest in allegory and symbolisms 
of all types, ranging from the stiff personifications of moral 
qualities which could be found in late Renaissance art to mystical 
theor~es of 'correspondences' between the physical world and the 
.. t 1 10 sp1r1 ua. 
Many points in Beer's reading of Coleridge need to be discussed in more detail 
than can be given here, and what follows is only the outline of the sort of 
change of emphasis which I would wish to make. My main point is simply that 
Beer tries to see Coleridge's imaginative activity as self-contained at a too 
early stage; _or, in other words, that he tries to suggest that Coleridge 
thought through the knowledge supplied to him in his reading in mythologies 
8 . Ibid. P• 29. 
9. This view of Coleridge seems to arise from the p~cture of Coleridge 
as a Philosopher presented by J.H.Muirhead (B.Di). 
10. J .B.Beer. Coleridge the Visionary. (B.Di). P• 31. 
8 
I I 
I 
I 
I 
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at a time when I suggest that Coleridge was still, predominantly, a detached 
11 
·observer of systems of belief as functions of various ages of man. This 
divergence from Beer's position involves the discussion of the problem 
whether Coleridge entertained an •esoteric ' set of beliefs alongside orthodox 
I t · I · t· 12 exo eric convic ions. If this view could be established, then there 
would be grounds for thinking that Coleridge was a 'religious thinker' both 
in my own sense of the term and in Beer's. However, I can only give one 
indication here of a difference of specific interpretation in the hope that 
this will suggest the wider significance of the position that I am wanting to 
insist upon. 
In continuation of the above passage in which Beer compares Coleridge 
with Blake, he then proceeds to quote from t wo important letters of Coleridge 
written at about the same time as Kubla Khan and The Ancient Mariner. The 
first is the fourth autobiographical letter of Coleridge to Poole, 
11. This suggestion can be supported by reference to Coleridge's projected 
educational schemes, especially the one described to Thomas Poole in 
a letter of May, 1796. (See Griggs. 124. p. 209). 
12. It is difficult to know how criteria for such a discussion can be 
established. I would agree with Beer that Coleridge was forming 
private or 'esoteric' beliefs at the same time as he was expressing 
orthodox unitarian arguments, but I am not convinced that the private 
beliefs which he wished to conceal were as mythologically based as 
Beer supposes. Instead, it seems more likely that his private 
beliefs were logical progressions from his public positions which 
he feared might be taken to be atheistical even though he himself 
felt that they could be reconciled with Christianity. See, for 
instance, Coleridge's remarks about Paine, and also his reaction to 
Lessing. In this last instance, it is uncertain whether Coleridge 
was aware of Lessing 1 s use of the writings of Reimarus. Certainly, 
Coleridge read Lessing closely as it seems possible that he found a 
reference to Hyde in the Fragments ( G •. E.Lessing. Zur Geschichte 
und Litteratur. (B. C) p. 223) which caused him to borrow Hyde's · 
De Religio vetarum. Persarum from the Bristol Library from July 4th 
to August 31st, 1796, after mentioning Lessing in a letter of 
April 1st (Griggs. 116. p. 197). For references for Paine and 
Lessing, see Part II. Chapter 4. (4)n. 
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October 16th, 1798, in which Coleridge recalls how his father had pointed 
out the stars to him when he was a child. Coleridge remarks: 
I heard him with a profound delight & admiration; but without 
the least mixture of wonder or incredulity. For from lny early 
reading of Faery Tales, & Genii &c &c - my mind had been habituated 
to the Vast - & I never regarded my senses i n any way as the criteria 
of my belief. I regulated all my creeds by my conceptions not by 
my sight - even at that age. Should children be permitted to read 
Romances, & Relations of Giants & Magicians, & Genii? I know all 
that has been said a gainst it; but I have formed my faith in the 
affirmative. I know no other way of giving the mind a love of 
'the Great', & 'the Whole,. 13 
The second letter which Beer quotes is the letter written at almost exactly 
the same time as the above, this time to John Thelwall: 
- I can at times feel strongly the beauties, you describe, in 
themselves, & for themselves - but more frequently all things 
a ppear little - all the knowledge, that can be acquired, child's 
play - the universe itself - what but an immense heap of little 
things? I can contemplate nothing but parts, & parts are all 
little - ! - My mind feels as if it ached to behold & know some-
thing great - something~ & indivisible - and it is only in the 
faith of this that rocks or waterfalls, mountains or caverns give 
me the sense of sublimity or majesty! 
things counterfeit infinity! - l4 
Beer then comments: 
But in this faith all 
In these two extracts, a delicate relationship between the human 
mind, the physical universe and the spiritual universe is s hadowed, 
the connecting link between them being the sense of the Vast and 
Infinite. To see how such conceptions, together with that of the 
One and the Many, came to take their part in his mature conceptio~ 
13. Griggs. 210. P• 354. 
14. Griggs. 209~ p. 349. 
of poetry we may turn directly to a letter written nearly twenty 
years later, in which he criticized Cottle's Messiah, and set 
forth his own ideal of epic poetry: 15 
281 
At this point Beer quotes Coleridge's letter of March, 1815, to Joseph 
Cottle, part of which reads as follows: 
Now what the Globe is in Geography, miniaturing in order to 
manifest the Truth, such is a Poem to that Image of God, which 
we were created into, and which still seeks that Unity, or 
Revelation of the One in and by the Many, which reminds it, that 
tho' in order to be an individual Being it must go forth from God, 
yet as the .E!::.ceding from him is to proceed towards Nothingness and 
Privation, it must sti ll at every step turn back toward him in 
16 
order to be at all -
Beer comments: 
This account of the poetic process gives us an important account 
of Coleridge's ideal in poetry: and the most reveal ing aspect of 
it is the constant analogy which he draws between poetic creation 
and the Divine Creation of the Universe - an analogy which suggests 
that his well-known statement concerning the primary Imagination in 
Biographia Literaria is no idle piece of high-flown rhetoric: 17 
To my mind none of this adds up, as I think that it is Beer's intention that 
it should, to an impression that, for Coleridge, 'ultimate truth was itself 
a poetic harmony'. The closeness of the phrasing of the letters to Poole 
and Thelwall must throw some doubt on the value of the first as 'autobiography' 
it seems likely that the picture which Coleridge presents of himself as a 
'dreamer' from early childhood both gives a sense of permanence to that aspect 
of himself which in later 1796 and 1797 Coleridge wished to regard as 
d . t 18 onunan , and also corroborates his educational theory that a young mind 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
J.B.Beer. Coleridge the Visionary. (B.Di). P• 
Griggs. Vol. IV. 956. P• 545. 
J.B.Beer. Coleridge the Visionary. (B.Di). p. 
See Part II. Chapter 6. 
.. 
. 
32. 
34. 
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can be habituated to find certain kinds of 'knowledge' acceptable. The 
element of self-justification comes in Coleridge's use of 'even at that age' 
and he also immediately turns to the educational question. However, it is 
not my main intention to undermine the weight which this letter might lend to 
the belief that Coleridge was, and had always been, a 'dreamer '. My main 
intention is to argue that Coleridge recommends the reading of fairy tales 
because such reading encourages the mind to pierce beyond phenomena to the 
Firs t Cause that lies behind them. It encourages the role of the imagination 
which Coleridge first described in his Theological Lectures. 19 It is not 
accidental that Coleridge refers, in the letter to Thelwall, to 'faith' as a 
prerequisite of a sense of sublimity and vitality in nature. It is because, 
at this stage, Coleridge retains a faith in something, even though the object 
of faith has become the 'vast' or the 'great' or the 'one' since nothing can 
be rational ly said of God, that he is able to consider the 'Genii &c &c' as 
means to an end. Imagination is still subordinate to an end beyond itself. 
This is no longer true in Dejection where the failure of imagination leaves 
an abyss. My point is that I do not see that, in 1797, Coleridge was 
interested in an eocistent 'spiritual universe', and I consider that the 
remarks concerning the •one' in the 1815 letter are misleadingly juxtaposed 
with t hose in the letter to Thelwall where they are not yet related to an 
aesthetic t heory. It is true that the 1815 letter helps to clarify 
Coleridge's ideas as they are expressed in the Biographia Literaria, but it 
is one of my strongest contentions that it is extremely dangerous to read the 
19. See Part II. Chapter 3. 
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theory of that work back into the poems of the annus mirabilis. 20 
Towards the end of his book, Beer writes: 
Side by side with his visionary world of speculation, there is in 
his mind a positivist world of rationalist investigation, which he 
no doubt hoped would eventually be harmonized with it, but which 
21 
none the less seems at times to contradict it flatly. 
My inclination is to stress this positivist aspect of Coleridge's interests. 
Underlying Beer's interpretation is the assumption, by contrast, that 
Coleridge was fundamentally a visionary. Hence the title of Beer's book, 
and hence, also, incidental remarks such as the following: 
Thus the rise and decline of the Aeolian imagery marks out 
accurately an important phase in Coleridge's intellectual 
development. In tracing it, we are able to see how what had 
seemed at its height to be an unshakable necessitarianism and 
materialism in religion and politics could move, as if carried 
I 
by a noiseless but irresistible current, back to the visionary 
philosophy in which he was always most at home. 22 
I am unhappy with an interpretation which, stated thus, seems to be a pre-
disposition. Nevertheless, I am aware of the force of Beer's argument in 
a passage such as the following: 
Up to the end of 1796, the books which he borrowed from the Bristol 
Library were not books on 'visionary' themes. They were mainly 
concerned with that loyalty to contemporary Unitarianism and 
Liberalism which fully engaged his energies for some time. After 
this, gradual signs of a change in interests beg1n to appear. The 
20. This contention does not derive from specific evidence of the 
'inaccuracy' of the account in the Biographia Literaria, but 
simply from a rigid historicity which wants to insist that the 
Biographia Literaria relates to the Coleridge of the second 
decade of the nineteenth century. 
21. J.B.Beer. Coleridge the Visionary . (B.Di). P• 287. 
22. Ibid. P• 98. 
quickest way of describing the change is to say that meta-
physics becomes dominant, although such a statement requires 
immediate clarification. 'Metaphysics and Poetry and "facts 
of mind"' is Coleridge's own phrase to describe his interests, 
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and this puts the metaphysics of the period in its proper context. 
Certainly the 'mist of Godwinian and Berkeleyan speculations' to 
which Lowes refers is .a serious misnomer. It clouds the fact 
that Berkeley had ousted Godwin from Coleridge's mind and that 
the two philosophies could not have existed there together.
23 
There is certainly a problem here and this is not the place to attempt to 
resolve it. I am not convinced that Beer establishes that when Coleridge 
stated that he was •a Berkeleyan' he meant that he had immersed himself in 
1Siris' to the extent that Beer supposes. 24 I am inclined to think that 
Berkeley supplied Coleridge with a new reading of the phrase 'in whom we live 
and move and have our being' which had been seized upon by Priestley to 
support a materialist monism and by Berkeley, from Malebranche, to support 
an immaterialist monism. 25 Berkeley's epistemology, I suggest, supported 
Coleridge's concentration upon the unity of the human mind and the divine 
mind - the sort of unity which led Lamb in 1796 to warn Coleridge against 
blasphemy. This kind of Berkeleyan thinking would have fused with 
Coleridge's int erests in Q.uakerism and the French Q.uietism of the end of the 
Seventeenth Century. Perhaps this emphasis, however, only serves to 
indicate again that I take Coleridge to have been naturally as analytical in 
his responses as imaginative. I am conscious that I have done less than 
23. Ibid. p. 106. 
24. It is true that Siris was contained in the Berkeley volume that 
Coleridge borrowed from the Bristol Library , but not 1Siris 1 
alone. (See Part II. Chapter 1 • (12)n.) 
25. For Berkeley's connection with Malebranche, see A.A.Luce (B.Di ) . 
- , 
- -
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justice to Coleridge's reading of Thomas Taylor26 and Boehme27 in particular 
with the result that my picture of Coleridge may be somewhat one-sided. 
However, those 1 exoteric 1 interests of Coleridge displayed particularly in 
the Political and Theological Lectures of 1795 may be complementary with the 
'esoteric' interests described by Beer. I have simply wished to counter-
balance his emphasis, and my reading of The Ancient Mariner will indicate 
that I consider that it was in that poem that Coleridge himself effected a 
complementation. 
26. For suggestions of Thomas Taylor, see Note-books, particularly 180n. 
27. For suggestions of Jacob Boehme, see Note-books, particularly 174n.4. 
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CHAPTER III 
D. G. James 
The work of Professor James is important for this study even though he 
1 
nowhere dealt in detail with Coleridge's poems. James was interested in 
the relation between private mythology and religious belief - the issue which, 
most of all, is raised by my discussion of Dr. Beer's book. In the Prologue 
to The Romantic Comedy (1948), James isolates three issues raised by the 
Romantic movement which are of enduring interest. He writes: 
These are, first, the need to employ mythology; second, certain 
beliefs about human knowledge and imagination; and third, a 
sense of the strange and unknown. 2 
James regards the first of these three as of most interest. He continues: 
But in those aspects of English Romanticism I have mentioned, and 
which are treated in this essay, it is the use of mythology which 
more than any other gives unity to what I have written. This, I 
think, is the crucial thing. We cannot come to proof and 
certainty; and therefore we cannot dispense with myth and story. 
Still, ' the narrative I have to tell does not end with story merely ; 
or, if it ends with story, it is story with which there goes along, 
also, authority.3 
The culmination of the account in The Romantic Comedy at which James 
hints in the Prologue - the story with authority, had already been anticipated 
in his Scepticism and Poetry (1937). In that work he is explicit about the 
1. This assertion certainly applies to James's major published work. 
2. 
I have not searched further for any critical consideration of 
Coleridge's poems in James•s work. 
D. G.James. The Romantic Comedy. (B.Di). p. x. 
3. Ibid. P• xi. 
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dogmatic needs of contemporary England. He writes: 
What is of the greatest importance is to try to realize the 
place of dogma in religion and its necessity for a religion. 
To many people to-day, we may be sure, religious dogma is an 
inexplicable mystery which they feel it necessary to condemn 
wholesale. 1lhat makes sogma an impossible stumbling-block to 
many such is of course its assertion of the miraculous; but 
what alone can dispel, to any degree, its impossibility in this 
respect is the realization of the inevitability of miracle for 
religion, and the understanding that a great religion demands, 
as a condition of its vitality, a structure of belief in what 
is shot through with the miraculous. Unless we can realize that 
this is so, we shall either stand outside Christianity and condemn 
it, as Keats did, or we shall, if our attitude be religious, be 
one of the many modernist apologists for Christianity who, we may 
believe, do harm to their religion by seeking carefully to extract 
from it all element of miracle. Such teachers may, indeed they 
often do, reduce dogma to the status of a symbol, beautiful and 
expressive perhaps, but yet only a symbol; and they thereby 
weaken its vitality and value. The historical basis which 
Christianity claims is fundamental to its existence, and to deny 
it is t~ rob Christianity of its potency in the world.4 
It is clear from this passage that James believes in the autonomy of 
religious dogma. The incarnation of Christ at a historical moment provides 
the explanation of experience in religious dogma with an authority that cannot 
be shared by other discourses which are the creations of different faculties 
of the human mind and hence differently divorced from reality. It is 
James's Kantian epistemological position which allows him to emphasize the 
discreteness of several discourses subordinate , to reality, and which allows 
him to assume that science and poetry are different forms of limited 
cognition. Imagination is the 'prime agent', to use James's borrowing from 
4. D.G.James. Scepticism and Poetry. (B. Di). pp. 245-246. 
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Coleridge,5 of all human knowledge of the world, and science and poetry are 
two discourses which have their own strict rules. 6 For James, the 
scientific imagination is necessarily mechanistic and he attacks Whitehead 
for attempting to change its nature. For James, science which attempts to 
use a non-mechanistic analogy either ceases or fails to be science: 
5. 
6. 
There is no point at which the mechanistic imagination of 
science can stop; for to make it do so is to abandon the hope 
of arriving at rules of universal application. And it is there-
fore mistaken to resent the incursion of the scientific 
imagination into biology and psychology. The scientific study of 
human behaviour is necessarily the study of the nervous system, 
imagined as a mechanism, and all observations about human behaviour 
which are not propositions about the body and the nervous system 
are not, whatever else they may be and whatever value we may ascribe 
to them, scientific. So far from its being the case that, as 
Whitehead suggests, the mechanical and materialistic imagination 
should be sacrificed even in the investigation of the physical 
world, it is rather the case that it is necessary and inevitable 
even in the investigation of the most complex organisms. Entities 
'The Prime Agent' is the title of the first chapter of James's 
Scepticism and Poetry. 
Much of James's position is held in opposition to I.A.Richards. 
The following passage, for instance, is directed against Richards: 
"We must, on the contrary, view poetic experience as an 
awareness of an imaginative object; and the central 
"experience" is not effects wrought in us, but beholdment 
by the imagination of an object. It is what is present to 
our minds which is vital in the experience, and not the 
emotional-volitional effects". (Scepticism and Poetry. p. 58). 
James and Richards both agree that 'poetry' and 'science' are 
discrete activities, but for different reasons. For James, the 
'content' of the disciplines is the basis of differentiation, 
whereas, for Richards, it is the divergent· intentions and 
expectations embodied in the manner of presentation. (See I.A. 
Richards. Practical Criticism. (B.Di). Part III. Chapter I. 
Four Kinds of Meaning. pp. 179-188). Hence, I suspect that 
Richards could not make the same kind of objection to Whitehead's 
scientific philosophy that James felt was possible and necessary. 
(See below). 
such as life and mind, because in them 'sensations' do not 
inhere, must be extruded, so far as is possible from the 
scientist's imagination of the world.7 
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It is ~n precisely these terms that James sees Coleridge's rejection of 
Hartleian associationism. James .writes: 
Now Coleridge once and for all threw over all that Hartley 
stood for, and ceased to hold an associationism, whether as a 
"way of surveying the mind" or in any other way; it is true that 
in so doing he adopted an idealism. But this, for our purpose, 
can be separated out from his view of the mind as an 'active 
agency'. And the choice is not between, as is suggested, the 
materialist and the idealist. The choice is between a materialist 
psychology which does not see its materialism merely as a necessity 
of scientific inquiry, and a psychology which sees materialism as 
a necessity to scientific method, and, by rejecting it, is content 
to be open to the charge of being 'unscientific 1 • 8 
In the period leading up to 1801 Coleridge gradually accepted, or so Hames 
assumes, the distinction between a scientific and a poetic imagination. The 
purpose of Scepticism and Poetry is to place these two subordinate cognitions 
in the context of dogmatic religious truth, whilst the purpose of The 
Romantic Comedy is to show that both logically and historically an 
authoritative dogma is a necessary progression from scientific and poetic 
imagination. To put the p~xadox bluntly, James tries to justify dogmatic 
belief existentially. In the two works that I have mentioned, James uses 
Coleridge as the main instrument in his didactic purpose. James uses 
Coleridge to demonstrate a transition from an allegiance to scientific 
imagination to an ellegiance to poetic imagination, which is the main concern 
of the first book, and also to demonstrate a transition from an allegiance 
7. 
8. 
D. G. James • . Scepticism and Poetry. 
see (B.Di). 
D. G.James. Scepticism and Poetry. 
(B.Di). p . 41. 1',or Whitehead; 
(B.Di). pp. 60-61. 
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to poetic imagination to an acceptance of Christian dogma, which is the 
concern of the second book. In the first, Scepticism and Poetry, James is 
anxious to assert that belief expressed in a poem9 is in a different 
category from belief that is related to dogma. He writesz 
Now the matter of the explicit expression of belief in poetry 
is by no means so important as Mr. Richards would have us believe. 
For the poet's belief can ultimately be interpreted to be only the 
presence to his imagination of a world which is the world in which 
he lives, and which, as he responds to it in his life, is his real 
world. The poet's belief in other words is not a matter of mere 
explicit assertion; it consists in his emotional-volitional 
response to the world of his imagination, which is shown by that 
response to be his real world. Whether or not the poet makes 
formal assertion of belief is not important. Mr. Richards, in 
accordance with his view of the place of belief in poetry, is 
strongly opposed to what he calls 'revelation' theories - views 
which hold that poetry can claim to give us truth. For our part, 
we should agree that the 'revelation' theory is a useless and 
impossible doctrine; but for reasons other than those which Mr. 
Richards holds. For against the 'revelation' theory it is 
necessary to maintain that, as we do not know 'for truth' (as 
Keats says), the ultimate nature of the universe, we must be 
content with a situation in which the poet is seen as conveying 
to us the world as it is for his imagination, which controls his 
life, and which is thus real to him. Ultimately, whether or not 
the world is really as it exists for his imagination neither he 
nor we can in all strictness be said to know. 10 
I shall have to refer to this passage again in discussing Professor Whalley's 
approach to literature for Whalley tries. to build a 'revelation' theory on 
the shaky foundation (for James) of the poetic imagination, but the important 
9. To which, of course, I.A.Richards took exception·. 
10. D.G.James. Scepticism and Poetry. (B.Di). pp. 66-67. 
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to poetic imagination to an acceptance of Christian dogma, which is the 
concern of the second book. In the first, Scepticism and Poetry, James is 
anxious to assert that belief expressed in a poem9 is in a different 
category from belief that is related to dogma. He writes: 
Now the matter of the explicit expression of belief in poetry 
is by no means so important as Mr. Richards would have us believe. 
For the poet's belief can ultimately be interpreted to be only the 
presence to his imagination of a world which is the world in which 
he lives, and which, as he responds to it in his life, is his real 
world. The poet's belief in other words is not a matter of mere 
explicit assertion; it consists in his emotional-volitional 
response to the world of his imagination, which is shown by that 
response to be his real world. Whether or not the poet makes 
formal assertion of belief is not important. Mr. Richards, in 
accordance with his view of the place of belief in poetry, is 
strongly opposed to what he calls 'revelation' theories - views 
which hold that poetry can claim to give us truth. For our part, 
we should agree that the 'revelation' theory is a useless and 
impossible doctrine; but for reasons other than those which Mr. 
Richards holds. For against the 'revelation' theory it is 
necessary to maintain that, as we do not know 'for truth' (as 
Keats says), the ultimate nature of the universe, we must be 
content with a situation in which the poet is seen as conveying 
to us the world as it is for his imagination, which controls his 
life, and which is thus real to him. Ultimately, whether or not 
the world is really as it exists for his imagination neither he 
nor we can in all strictness be said to know. 10 
I shall have to refer to this passage again in disaussing Professor Whalley's 
approach to literature for Whalley tries to build a 'revelation' theory on 
the shaky foundation (for James) of the poetic imagination, but the important 
9. To which, of course, I.A.Richards took exception. 
10. D.G.James. Scepticism and Poetry. (B.Di). pp. 66-67. 
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point here is that a corollary of James's position is that acceptance of 
dogmatic truth in a poet must be at odds with poetic activity. James 
shows that this was the case with Wordsworth, whereas Keats and Shakespeare 
retained their poetic powers by not committing themselves to a received 
dogmatic truth. In advocating the acceptance of dogmatic truth, James is 
proposing a gesture which is not unlike a Kierkegaardian leap from the 
'aesthetic' to the •ethical•. 11 Indeed, James divides Coleridge's life into 
three phases until 1801, 1801-1817, 1817-1834, in which he regards the main 
interests to have been scientific, aesthetic, and religious respectively. 
James is never interested in the first of the three periods. 
The Romantic Comedy: 
The first period, that up to 1801, is the least 
12 important for our purposes. 
He writes in 
and, later in the same book, the structure which suits his convenience forces 
him to make the following amazing comment: 
for up to about the year 1817 Coleridge's thought turned 
on the imagination and afterwards principally on the reason, 
the life of which is consummated in faith. Up to this year 
he did not write as a Christian; afterwards he did, and during 
this later period we hear very little of the imagination but a 
great deal of the practical reason and of faith. 13 
Presumably Unitarianism did not count as Christianity for James, and here we 
have a sugges tion of the basis of my dissatisfaction with his work on 
Coleridge. If James did deliberately discount Unitarianism in the above 
comment it would have been because Unitarianism was itself a rational 
mythology which stood in opposition to orthodox dogmatic Christianity. 
11. See S. Kierkegaard. (int. W. Lowrie) Fear and Trembling. 
New York. 1954. 
12. D.G.James. The Romantic Comedy. (B.Di). p. 162. 
13. I bid. 
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Coleridge became dissatisfied with Unitarianism for the same sorts of 
reasons as we have seen that he became hostile to Godwinism in 1795 and 
1796 - notably because both doctrines were substitute religions which were 
founded on personal inclinations rather than on absolute truths. My point 
is that the conflict between personal mythology and dogma was a conflict of 
the 1790's as well as of the period which James describes, but that the 
conflict at the earlier period was different in that the idea of dogma 
involved was a pre-Kantian one. 
After discussing the ideas of the late Coleridge alongside the views 
of Newman, James summarises the way in which Coleridge is forced beyond the 
personal mythologising characteristic of the 'aesthetic' period to an 
acceptance of an authoritative myth that is given, not made. 
expounds in the following manner: 
James 
The reason, therefore, or the imagination, as we can now 
indifferently call it, rises to its final task in the 
incorporation of the super-sensible in the images of sense, in 
the creation of dogma. We may call the creation of dogma a 
process of myth-making in which there is working a process of 
high dialectical subtlety; but this was not (at least, finally) 
the view of Coleridge. The only mythology in which we can find 
rest is the mythology which is also history, and which therefore 
is given to the imagination. Concerned with truth and reality 
beyond sense, the reason of man must operate imaginatively. The 
reason tries to use the concepts of the understanding, despite 
their feebleness and contradictriness, to say in what the 
transcendent consists; also it must use the images of the 
imagination in its endeavour, also vacillating and inadequate, to 
show the eternal. But here, in the face of human failure, God's 
act intervenes. For the Bible is not a human book; the New 
Testament is the record of God's act in history; Christ's life 
and the divine Sacrifice of the Cross hold the imagination as 
nothing less than God's act could do. In this, in acceptance 
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of the mythology which is divinely given as history, the long 
and difficult history of Romanticism in England comes to its end. 
After the labour of mighty imaginations in the creation of myth 
and allegory, we return to the mythology enacted in time through 
the free act of God. 14 
I have tried to show that the idea that God had revealed himself in history 
was a theological assumption for Coleridge in his early years. In the 
Theological Lectures of 1795 Coleridge does not question this belief, and I 
have also attempted to indicate how the breakdown of a sense of history led 
to the compression of historical events into mental possibilities in the 
present. 
My point, therefore, is that initially the function of the imagination 
for Coleridge was to recreate mentally those conditions which had previously 
revealed God in objective events. This was the way in which Coleridge 
attempted to make an 'objective' God subjectively meaningful. As I have 
already claimed, Coleridge's imagination in the mid-1790 1 s was a means to a 
theological end, and that end had dogmatic priority. The dogmatism which 
Coleridge made existential in the 1790 1 s was therefore dif ferent in kind from 
the dogmatism which James argues that that existentialism made necessary. 
It was also different from the dogmatism which James found amongst some of 
his contemporaries. 15 James is unhappy with contemporary dogmatism because, 
in fact, it is more nearly what it says. James seems unhappy because modern 
dogmatism is~ received belief and not one that has been achieved through the 
14. Ibid. P• 209. 
15. See James's strictures on modern dogmatism at t he end of The 
Romantic Comedy. pp. 274-275. 
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exercise and final renunciation of human imagination. 16 Achieved dogmatism, 
is different in kind from received dogmatism, and no one asks the question 
whether a second generation new dogmatism - a 'classicist' dogmatism, 
perhaps, - is the same as a pre-Romantic theistic dogmatism. This kind of 
'objective' God was the object of the belief of the rational deists of the 
early eighteenth century. 17 In the 1790's Coleridge was moving towards a 
critical attitude to everything theological except the being of God. 
Coleridge retained, at this period a reverential attitude to an absolute God 
which is different from the post-critical attitude which James describes 
16. James, therefore, found himself very much in the predicament of 
Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, a critic of whom, C. Van Til (B.Di), wrote in 1946: 
"All the doctrines of the Theology of Crisis, then must 
be seen through the spectacles of the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Nothing could be more untrue to history than to say that the 
theology of ~arth and Brunner is basically similar to that of 
Luther and Calvin. Dialecticism is a basic reconstruction 
of the whole of Reformation theology along critical lines •••• 
A reformation theology reconstructed along the lines of 
modern critical principles is not a Reformation theology in 
any form". (p. 366) 
For Barth, see H. Hartwell. (B.Di). 
17. I f, that is, such a belief in an 'objective' God is or was 
attained or attainable. I am aware of subscribing, somewhat incidentally and strictly for the sake of argument, to what may be as much a myth of 'objectivity' as of an existent man of 
undissociated sensibility. Philosophically, I would prefer to 
subscribe to the view that Kant was right absolutely rather than 
to the view that his argument is a function of what is wrong with post-Renaissance man. If James is Kantian, I would wish to be 
more, not less, so . 
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from his own post-critical position. James argues that Coleridge's sense 
of dogma developed from his view of imagination, but I wish to claim that 
The Ancient Mariner, for instance, was an attempt to describe the achievement 
of theological knowledge, and that it was only later that Coleridge could 
himself consider it as a work of 'pure imagination'. It was only later that 
Coleridge could see knowledge of God in the context of post-Kantian thinking 
about the imagination, whereas at the time of the main poems it was the 
quest for knowledge of God which suggested to him a function for the 
imagination which was to prepare him f or the reception of Kant's thinking . 
James presents a valuable picture of the relation between religious thinking 
and personal mythopoiec activity - one which I find more convincing than 
Dr. Beer's. For this reason I find James's comparison between Blake and 
Coleridge more accurate than Beer's. 18 Nevertheless, James seems to be 
right for a l l the wrong reasons. His account of the early Coleridge, such 
as it is, is inaccurate or without interest. The religious dogmatism which 
he describes is not the same dogmatism which affected Coleridge at the time 
of writing The Ancient Mariner. 
18. · See D. G.James. The Romantic Comedy. (B.Di). Part One . The 
Gospel of Hell. 
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CHAPTER IV 
G. Whalley 
In the Introduction to his Poetic Process (1953) Professor wnalley 
makes it clear that his attitude towards the status of poetry developed 
out of his parti cular study of Coleridge. He writes: 
Not until my work was well advanced did I come upon the 
fulfilment, in the work of Kierkegaard, Jaspers and I\18.rcel, 
of much that Coleridge had striven for and of much that, in 
a tenuous and indistinct form, I had been led by my subject 
1 to adopt. 
Two points of Whalley 1s account of poetic process are of most 
significance. Outlining the position which he is to develop, Whalley writes: 
From a direct inquiry into artistic experience certain facts 
emerged with compelling force to dominate the whole 
investigation. e) A work of art is not first conceived 
and then made; it is discovered and realizes itself in the 
making. f) Art bodies forth reality. 2 
The second of ·these two points is fundamental to Whalley's belief in the 
importance of art. 
way: 
Whalley finally summarises his belief in the following 
1. 
2. 
In short, this is a plea that we should notice how from time 
to time, in those persons for whom we reserve the name of 
genius, the mind asserts itself by breaking through the opaque 
screens of cultivated custom, social formality, and intolerant 
professionalism, to achieve and embody acts of vision; and how 
those acts of vision, by bringing us suddenly and humbly back to 
earth, restore for us the memories of incandescent moments-in-
time which are our only glimpses of eternity.3 
G. Whalley. Poetic Process. 
Ibid. 
Ibid. 
PP• xvii-xviii. 
P• xxvi. 
(B,Di). p. xiv, 
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It is not difficult to descern the materials from which Whalley constructs 
his view of art. In a chapter entitled 'Two Views of Imagination', Whalley 
writes: 
Coleridge maintained that imagination was not the unique 
property of the artist, but that it underlay all knowledge 
even of the most prosaic kind. He sought to establish the 
claim that poetry be considered as a serious mode of 
revelation; he wished to show that poetry and 'life' were 
not divorced, that poetry is a window opening upon reality. 
The poet's activity, exceptional though it might be, was in 
his view an extension of ordinary cognitive experience; 
poetry and any other form of knowledge were to be judged by 
the same criteria.4 
It is easy to see that this is a reading of Coleridge through the work of 
D.G.James which at the same time distorts James and Coleridge. 
footnote to the above paragraph is inadequate here: 
Whalley's 
This summary view of Coleridge's position is set forth at 
length by D.G.James in Scepticism and Poetry (1937). The 
account that follows diverges, however, in several respects 
from Professor James's discussion.5 
As the passage I have quoted shows, Whalley clearly diverges ragically from 
James's interpretation of Coleridge. 6 Whalley imposes a 'revelation' theory 
of poetry on James's Kantian view, and posits a Coleridgean position which 
was a mixture of attitudes. Whalley does not support his assertions by 
reference to Coleridge's work with the result that one has the impression that 
analysis of Coleridge's thinking is secondary to the analysis of conflicting 
interpretations of it. Whalley accepts James•s position in opposition to 
4. Ibid. P• 50. 
5. Ibid. P• 50n. 
6. See Part III. Chapter 3. (10). 
. 
---~ 
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Richards, but he does not accept James•s contention that poetry has only 
limited cognitive force. On the contrary, for Whalley, it is only through 
poetry that reality can be known. In James 1 s terms, Whalley accepts that 
•scientific imagination' is a distinct category of cognitive activity, but 
Whalley insists that 'poetic imagination' is superior and is not inferior 
to any dogmatism. 
Alongside a belief in the status of the 'poetic' as reality-revealing, 
Whalley develops his view of the 'process' by which the revelation is 
achieved. He writes: 
The process which ends in a work of art is at once an act 
of discovery and self-discovery; it is an act of self-
realization which at the same time makes the world more 
real. 7 
The reality which Whalley considers to be revealed does not exist before the 
revelation but is manifested in it. Whalley eschews the dualism between 
'experience' and •words' which, for Harding, was in truth a dualism between 
'life' and 'art•. However, unlike Beer, Whalley is not prepared to rest 
content with imaginative activity. For Whalley, imaginative activity does 
not simply extend possible meanings of 'real' but instead partly is 'real' 
as a process of creativity and partly increases the 'reality' of an 
objective world. In his attempt to fuse the idea that art 1bodies forth' 
reality with the sense that there is no dichotomy between art and reality at 
all, Whalley tries to reconcile a view of art as cognitive of external 
realities with a view which sees it as 'expression' which contributes to a 
process of psychological individuation. 
reconciliation in the following way: 
Whalley elaborates his attempted 
7. G. Whalley . Poetic Process. (B.Di ) . p. 11. 
The difference between involvement in reality and non-
involvement must now be described. To be involved at the 
interface is to experience, to engage in, (in some sense) to 
construct, an event of reality: and this event I call 
paradeigmatic. This term .has two implications: a) the form 
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or archetype of human experience is to be found in paradeigmatic 
experience and not in the experience of everyday man in a work-
aday world; and b) that this order of experience is its own 
argument, carries its own proof within itself, is at once an 
event of value and of knowing. 8 
At first sight it might seem to be open to every individual to gain contact 
with this paradeigmatic experience through personal dream or fantasy, but no 
sooner does Whal ley approach this psychological emphasis as dominant than he 
moves away towards a sense of objectivity that is particularly revealed to 
the artist or the mystic. He writes: 
The desire for what is predictable in experience can become 
so powerful as to lift a person out of the flux of unique 
experience into a static lifeless world of abstractions in 
which there is no reality and in which he ceases to be real. 
And such a state of affairs - as we see in our o~n time - can 
be misrepresented as reality, not only by individuals, but by 
families, societies, even whole nations. It is of no such 
worl d that the poets and mystics bring us news.9 
Significantly, Whalley adds this footnote to the last sentence: 
8 . 
Cf. C.G.Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul: 'Any reaction 
to stimulus may be causally explained; but the creative act, 
which is the absolute antithesis of mere reaction, will for 
ever elude the human understanding 1 • 10 
Ibid. P• 31. 
to the use of 
of our Time. 
Valuation and 
\Vhalley's use of 1paradeigmatic' is explicitly related 
the same term in the work of Karl Mannheim. Diagnosis (B.Di). Towards a New Social Philosophy. Section 6. 
Paradigmatic Experience. pp, 134~135. 
9. G.Whalley. Poetic Process. (B.Di). p. 43. 
10. Ibid. p. 43~. 
I 
I 
.I 
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The sentence from Jung does not seem especially pertinent to the point that 
Whalley is making, but it indicates that Jungian thinking lurks beneath the 
surface of Whalley's thoughts. The confusion in Whalley's position arises, 
perhaps, from the fact that his language elides the ideas of physical and 
psychic 'reality' with the result that there is also confusion between 
'revelation' and 'expression'. The important point is that vVhalley's 
confusion enables him to seem to be discussing 'experience into words' with 
relation to Coleridge and The Ancient Mariner as if an existent experiential 
reality is carried into artistic expression, whilst in fact he is discussing 
words in relation to psychic reality which is not fixed at a point in time 
prior to the expression of the words for the first time in the poem. 
Speaking abstractly of 'symbol and myth', Whalley 1s attitude in this respect 
becomes apparent in the following passage: 
The personal myth preserves its integrity in an infinity of 
variations and resonant combinations; the incandescent centre 
of emphasis falls now on this symbol, now on that; and with 
each f!esh arrangement, each gracious combination of personal 
symbols, the flow of evoked images, words, sounds · is modified 
to serve the compelling integrity of the myth ••.• The primitive 
and civilised, the communal and the private,the primordial and 
· the personal, the accidental and the permanent, join in a ritual 
dance gesturing forth the present epiphany, while the poet 
relives and revives a past in the present from which already a 
11 future is taking shape. 
Whereas G. Wilson Knight12 and Maud Bodkin13 the 'mythographers' as 
11. G. Whalley. Poetic Process. (B.Di). p. 189. 
12. For G.W.Knight's theoretical position, see (B.Dii) and for his 
remarks on The Ancient Mariner see (B.Di). 
13. See M.Bodkin. (B.Di). 
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C.S.Lewis called them14 - were interested in archetypes as links between 
poetic expression and poetic appreciation by the reader, Whalley does control 
his interest historically in as much as he is predominantly concerned with 
the experiential relationship of the poet with his own words both before and 
after their poetic expression, nevertheless I want to argue that he is not 
sufficiently historical in that his attitude towards poetry causes him not 
to want to differentiate too carefully between the experience which preceded 
and which followed the writing of the poem. I wish to insist once more, as 
I have already done in reply to Professor James, that the experience which 
went into The Ancient Mariner was different in kind from the experience which 
was then partly given meaning by it, and I wish to insist that the difference 
does not simply reside in the intervening existence of the poem. 
Whalley's article "The Mariner and the Albatross" anticipates the 
approach to poetry which he elaborated in Poetic Process. My main objection 
to his reading of The Ancient Mariner is, as I have suggested, that he fails 
to distinguish carefully between the experience which went into the poem and 
the experience by whi ch Coleridge came to interpret it. 
intention is apparent at the outset: 
Whalley 's confused 
I wish to examine the poem a) to show how and to what extent 
Coleridge's inner life is revealed in the Rime; and b) to 
show that the albatross was for Coleridge, whether consciously 
or unconsciously, a symbol with profound personal significance. 15 
In this passage Whalley does not make it clear whether he regards his first 
examination to be concerned with Coleridge's experience before the existence 
of the poem and his second examination with it afterwards, or whether he is 
prepared to accept that the two kinds of examination are essentially the same, 
14. See C.S.Lewis and E.M.W.Tillyard. (B.Di). p. 120. 
15. G.Whalley. "The Mariner and the Albatross". (B.Dii). p. 382. 
302 
that, as Jung would claim, emanations from the subconscious progressively 
reveal the whole personality and provide the individual with symbols by which 
he can understand the inner self of which he was previously unaware. 16 
Whereas I have suggested that Professor Harding rejected simple intentionalism 
in favour of an idea of subconscious intention, Whalley clings to the 
language of intentionalism even though he in fact sees the poem as part of 
a flux of experience. 
introductory comment: 
Whalley's uneasiness emerges in the following 
The aesthetic and poetic qualities of The Ancient Mariner are 
impressive. Other writers have examined in the poem the elements 
of colour and drama, the moral, the truth and accuracy of the 
detail, the supple and sensitive versification. But the haunting 
quality of the poem does not, and cannot, grow from any of these 
elements, whether taken singly or in any combination. Coleridge's 
creative imagination has fused all these elements into a completely 
unified organism to express his fundamental meaning; a meaning of 
whose full significance he was probably unconscious at the time of 
. t' 17 composi ion. 
Although I accept -that Coleridge may not have been fully conscious of the 
full implications of the language which he used in his poe~, I do not accept 
that it necessarily follows that the unconscious meaning of 1797 is the 
meaning which becomes conscious in 1815 or 1830 or at any time in Coleridge's 
life thereafter. To accept this supposition would be to see the development 
of the personality solipsistically as the development of inner life and hence 
deny the possibility that external affairs might render it unnecessary for 
the individual that past unconscious meaning should ever become conscious. 
Whalley seems to assume too easily that Coleridge's later conscious 
16. See C.G.Jung (B.Dii) and also H.Schaer (B.Di). 
17. G. Whalley. "The Mariner and the Albatross". (B.Dii). P• 382. 
I 
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experience is a key to his earlier unconsciousness, and by a process of 
deduction from Coleridge's late to his early experience Whalley is then able 
to claim prophetic force for The Ancient Mariner. He writes: 
Whether or not he recognized th~s process at the time, Coleridge 
enshrined in The Ancient Mariner the quintessence of himself, of 
his suffering and dread, his sense of sin, his remorse, his 
powerlessness. And 
Never sadder tale was heard 
By man of woman born. 
For it is not only a crystallization of his personal experience up 
to the time of the composition of the first version, but also an 
appalling prophecy fulfilled to a great extent in his life and 
successively endorsed by his own hand as time passed. 18 
Whalley's position would be more convincing if he could show how Coleridge's 
attitude to The Ancient Mariner developed after its writing alongside other 
intellectual and emotional developments, but I should still wish to insist 
that Coleridge's application of the poem to his own condition at the time, for 
instance, of his journey to Malta, 19 is revealing about Coleridge in 1805 
but not at all about Coleridge in 1797 or about the meaning of the poem for 
Coleridge at the time that he completed it. The problem of the relation 
between Coleridge's experience and the poem in 1797 still remains, but I think 
that it is not at all aided by consideration of Coleridge's relation to it at 
later dates. 
Like Whalley, I am concerned with the process involved in the creation 
of literature, but, unlike Whalley, I see the process solely as the 
achievement of synthesis and do not wish to assert that the achievement 
reveals reality. Like Dr. Beer, I see that the possible function of a work 
18. Ibid. P• 383. 
19. See D.Sultana. (B.Di). p. 129. 
I 
I 
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of literature is to extend the sense of t he 'real', but, unlike Dr. Beer, 
I see this extension as the result of comprehensive imitation rather more 
than of imaginative creation. 
CONCLUSION 
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CONCLUSION 
In my Preface I argued that we now stand in relation to works of 
literature - aesthetic products, in the same way as Coleridge stood in 
relation to Priestley's rational systematisation of Christian theology, 
Coleridge attempted to systematise his relationship as well as be sceptical 
of his systematisation. Both responses were projected in The Ancient 
Mariner, in relation to which we now find ourselves. I argued that to 
follow Coleridge would involve both a willingness to provide a systematic 
explanation of his artefact and, equally, a willingness to be sceptical of 
that explanation. Both responses are projected in this thesis. In the 
first three Parts I have tried to describe the complex forces surrounding 
the writing of The Ancient Mariner, and, in Part IV, I have indicated, in 
four cases, the way in which there is an inevitable inter-play between the 
critical stance adopted towards a work of literature and the origin of the 
stance in the work itself. By indicating how this is true in these four 
cases, I have tried to suggest that the attitude that I have adopted towards 
the study of Coleridge also derives in large measure and often unconsciously 
from that study. That this circularity must perplex the critic of 
Coleridge in particular is, I think, an indication of the amazing extent to 
which present thinking has been influenced by Coleridge's wide-ranging 
intellect. 
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